tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-48710887504730935602024-03-12T22:01:03.643-07:00Brown Moses BlogBrown Moseshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17562126209980810351noreply@blogger.comBlogger451125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4871088750473093560.post-48354716523744817842014-07-15T14:17:00.000-07:002014-07-15T14:17:08.319-07:00What is BellingcatThis week I've launched the <a href="https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/1278239551/bellingcat">Kickstarter</a> for my new website, <a href="https://bellingcat.com/">Bellingcat</a>, which I hope will solve one issue I've come across again and again. Often I've been invited to various events where people who have developed great tools and techniques for working with open source information have spoken in front of a crowd of eager journalists, activists, researchers, etc, who listen to the presentation, then go home and forget about it. With Bellingcat I'm trying to do something that will keep those people engaged with those tools and techniques, and also show others how to use them.<br />
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Bellingcat has contributors writing for the site on a variety of subjects, but all using open source information for their work. Over the last two years I've used open source information to investigate the conflict in Syria, but it's not just about conflict zones, with the <a href="https://reportingproject.net/occrp/">OCCRP</a> demonstrating the use of open source information to investigate cross-border crime and corruption. <br />
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I want to engage Bellingcat's contributors with the tools and techniques organisations like the OCCRP have developed, but also teach others how to use them. Along with news and analysis, Bellingcat has guides and case studies so anyone can learn the same techniques we've used in our investigations, creating new investigators.<br />
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We also plan to have ongoing projects which Bellingcat readers can get involved in, learning about tools and techniques while contributing to the projects in a meaningful way. In the coming weeks I hope to provide information about these projects, and how Bellingcat readers can get involved.<br />
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Bellingcat is as much about the readers as it is the contributors. We only have to look at what's happening with Ukraine and Gaza to see why it's important to understand open source information and why verification is important. If you agree, then please donate to the <a href="https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/1278239551/bellingcat">Bellingcat Kickstarter</a>.Brown Moseshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17562126209980810351noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4871088750473093560.post-11642237859380947192014-07-01T04:42:00.000-07:002014-07-14T07:39:00.327-07:00Brown Moses Announces Bellingcat - Open Source Investigations For All<div>
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Update - The <a href="https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/1278239551/bellingcat">Bellingcat Kickstarter is now live</a>, with more details on Bellingcat. Donate £5 or more to get access to the Bellingcat website, with exclusive content and podcasts.<br />
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I have big news to announce. I will be launching a website called Bellingcat.<br />
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As a champion of open source tools, I cannot imagine bringing this website to life in any other way than appealing to my community of supporters who have brought me to where I am now. So, we will be launching a crowdfunding campaign on July 14.<br />
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Bellingcat is a website that triumphs the power and potential of using open source information.<br />
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It focuses on two main objectives:<br />
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1. It will bring together a group of writers and activists who through using open source tools have transformed journalism and solidified themselves as experts in their fields, such as (might already be familiar with these great people): Peter Jukes; my anonymous phone hacking contributor; Jonathan Krohn; Phillip Smyth; Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi; and more.</div>
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2. It will be a place that will attract others to come and learn how to use these same tools, techniques, and processes. Bellingcat will include how-to guides, case studies, articles, and other media such as webinars on the latest tools and technologies, which will aid others in becoming citizen open source investigators.<br />
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For me, Bellingcat is about giving other people out there, just like me, a chance to learn what I've learnt over the last two years by trial and error in one place, making it as easy as possible to investigate the things they are passionate about. I also want to help support the people who are already doing the same kind of work on a variety of subjects, and get them involved with the opportunities I'm presented with on a regular basis— new technology projects, contacts with all sorts of organisations and individuals who could benefit from their expertise.<br />
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I welcome any of your ideas for the crowdfunding page. The success of this open source endeavor relies on participation. YOUR participation. Please join me in making this a reality.<br />
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To be part of the Bellingcat mailing list, sign up <a href="http://eepurl.com/X4K8f">here</a>. You can also follow <a href="https://twitter.com/bellingcat">Bellingcat on Twitter</a>.<br />
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Please contact <a href="mailto:brownmoses@gmail.com">brownmoses@gmail.com</a> with any media queries.</div>
Brown Moseshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17562126209980810351noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4871088750473093560.post-62451709096406080322014-06-11T06:11:00.001-07:002014-06-11T06:11:04.016-07:00Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi - Saraya al-Madina al-Munawara: A Revived Iraqi Insurgent Brand<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-qAUotn7hSvg/U5hS2ofGr_I/AAAAAAAALag/wIsyX50r86Y/s1600/1.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-qAUotn7hSvg/U5hS2ofGr_I/AAAAAAAALag/wIsyX50r86Y/s1600/1.jpg" height="321" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: small; text-align: start;"><b>Logo of Saraya al-Madina al-Munawara</b></span></td></tr>
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The name of this group translates to “The Honored City’s Brigades.” Its origins lie in the days of the Sunni insurgency of the Iraq War, though it is quite clear that it was an independent group. For example, in this posting from <a href="http://www.iraqipa.net/09_2007/6_10/News/a16_8sep07.htm">September 2007</a>, it is identified as one of the “jihadi groups not rallying under any front,” contrasting with, most notably, the “Islamic State of Iraq” umbrella that included al-Qa’ida in Bilad al-Rafidayn. Like the Jaysh al-Mujahideen, Saraya al-Madina al-Munawara has begun advertising its military activities more openly on social media with the revival of the broader Sunni insurgency since the beginning of this year.<br />
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According to a media representative for Saraya al-Madina al-Munawara whom I interviewed, the group “was established after the beginning of the occupation, and <a href="http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=2a4_1203283628">continued fighting</a> until the occupier left. After the occupier left, it undertook secret work, and when the battle in Syria began, some of the youth went to Syria to fight there, and a contingent within Iraq remained to prepare for the occasion to go to Syria, and after that the battle began in Iraq.”<br />
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To be sure, the media representative’s claims of secrecy post-American withdrawal in 2011 explain the lack of media material demonstrating a supposed presence within Syria. A contingent fighting in Syria hardly comes as a surprise if true. Tying the Iraq and Syria struggles together is not solely the preserve of the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS), but also articulated by ISIS’ rivals in Jamaat Ansar al-Islam (which has ideological affinity with ISIS and has openly deployed a contingent to Syria), the Islamic Army of Iraq, and Jaysh al-Mujahideen.<br />
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However, unlike these aforementioned groups, Saraya al-Madina al-Munawara does not see itself at odds with ISIS, as indicated to me in the interview in response to a question I posed on relations with ISIS: “Our program is the book [i.e. the Qur’an] and the Sunnah. We have no disagreement with any of the mujahideen. Our aim is the establishment of justice and a rightly-guiding Caliphate.” At the same time the representative expressed hopes to me for unity among the insurgent groups, saying that if such unity were achieved, they could reach Baghdad “within days.” The testimony thus related points to a clear Islamist outlook, though the open-source discourse does not place emphasis on establishing the Caliphate in the manner stressed by ISIS and Jamaat Ansar al-Islam.<br />
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There is no reason here not to accept the claims of good relations with ISIS. Though I have documented tensions with groups like Jamaat Ansar al-Islam and Jaysh al-Mujahideen (who, incidentally, have taken advantage of the chaos ensuing the fall of Mosul to launch a new coordinated offensive in the Hawija area of Kirkuk), it is apparent that others are willing to work with ISIS and even hail their efforts.<br />
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<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-86Cl-fEY9I0/U5hTlbaXLwI/AAAAAAAALao/Jn64TfxFmCI/s1600/2.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-86Cl-fEY9I0/U5hTlbaXLwI/AAAAAAAALao/Jn64TfxFmCI/s1600/2.jpg" height="300" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"> <b>”Jaysh al-Mujahideen unite with their al-Ansar [i.e. Jamaat Ansar al-Islam] brothers,” as part of Operation “Kirkuk is being liberated.” </b></td></tr>
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An instructive case-in-point is the local Mosul franchise for the General Military Council (GMC), which is a front group for the Ba’athist Naqshbandi Army (JRTN). With the Mosul branch having previously <a href="http://www.aymennjawad.org/14350/comprehensive-reference-guide-to-sunni-militant">hailed ISIS</a> as “lions of the desert,” the GMC recently released a statement on the <a href="https://twitter.com/ajaltamimi/status/476379767550521345/photo/1">fall of Mosul</a> in which it claimed that “the rebels of Mosul in all their factions- by God’s preference- seized complete control of the right side of Mosul [i.e. the side west of the Tigris River]…and all the political and security leadership fled.” The GMC also released some photos showing capture and destruction of Iraqi army equipment in the wider Ninawa province.<br />
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-Ac5QcrqtzaI/U5hURZ0rCpI/AAAAAAAALaw/ExTKJDrDur8/s1600/3.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-Ac5QcrqtzaI/U5hURZ0rCpI/AAAAAAAALaw/ExTKJDrDur8/s1600/3.png" height="300" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><b>GMC photo claiming captured military equipment in Ninawa province, 10th June</b></td></tr>
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-SJH-PEepWzo/U5hUZKw-EaI/AAAAAAAALa4/Uwe7CzloLRk/s1600/4.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-SJH-PEepWzo/U5hUZKw-EaI/AAAAAAAALa4/Uwe7CzloLRk/s1600/4.png" height="300" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><b>GMC photo claiming seizure of an army Hummer in Ninawa province, 10th June</b></td></tr>
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Though there is good reason to be skeptical of the GMC’s claims to have participated in the takeover of Mosul in light of past <a href="http://www.aymennjawad.org/14755/key-updates-on-iraq-sunni-insurgent-groups">stealing credit from ISIS</a> for new insurgent offensives launched in Anbar province (most notably in al-Zuba’ and al-Karma, with the record subsequently clarified in ISIS’ favor <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0j2B-L4IkjY">here</a>), two conclusions are to be drawn here: first, neither JRTN nor its front groups wish to confront ISIS, regardless of true feelings towards ISIS, and second, other groups are clearly exploiting the vacuum created by the ISIS-dominated takeovers of new areas in Ninawa, Kirkuk and Salah ad-Din provinces. </div>
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There is a possibility that the eventual arrangement in Mosul may parallel Fallujah, where there is sharing of the city between ISIS and other insurgent groups but as per a virtual agreement on ISIS’ terms, or parallel to the nebulous co-existence between the Assad regime forces and the PYD in Qamishli. </div>
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Coming back to Saraya al-Madina al-Munawara, it remains to discuss the group’s area of operations. According to the media representative I interviewed, the group does not openly proclaim or advertise many of their operations, but from what can be gathered from published material, it would appear the group primarily operates in Anbar (to be more specific, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tl_8vZKBxL0">the wider Fallujah</a> and Ramadi areas), and like other minor insurgent groups its attacks are mostly limited to mortar strikes and hit-and-run style operations. This does not exclude the possibility of their operating in the wider area.</div>
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-Z8IWFTJXm50/U5hUsyVH7kI/AAAAAAAALbA/czKH4CIlK40/s1600/5.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-Z8IWFTJXm50/U5hUsyVH7kI/AAAAAAAALbA/czKH4CIlK40/s1600/5.jpg" height="225" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><b>”Hitting army headquarters in Anbar.” Saraya al-Madina al-Munawara photo</b></td></tr>
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-m72L1udIEDk/U5hUy8pNqyI/AAAAAAAALbI/A5TW7uaashs/s1600/6.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-m72L1udIEDk/U5hUy8pNqyI/AAAAAAAALbI/A5TW7uaashs/s1600/6.jpg" height="225" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><b>As above</b></td></tr>
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-VyXrZdF4MLw/U5hU2_TpA-I/AAAAAAAALbQ/4R-jC8ymyH0/s1600/7.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-VyXrZdF4MLw/U5hU2_TpA-I/AAAAAAAALbQ/4R-jC8ymyH0/s1600/7.jpg" height="225" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><b>As above</b></td></tr>
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Though dwarfed by the size and capabilities of ISIS, the case of Saraya al-Madina al-Munawara does illustrate the complexity of intra-insurgent dynamics going beyond the well-known rivalries such as the tensions between Jamaat Ansar al-Islam and ISIS, further eroding any government hopes of making gains against ISIS and the wider insurgency. </div>
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<i><a href="https://twitter.com/ajaltamimi">Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi</a> is a Shillman-Ginsburg Fellow at the Middle East Forum.</i></div>
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Brown Moseshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17562126209980810351noreply@blogger.com6tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4871088750473093560.post-68150157122711206572014-06-01T01:45:00.003-07:002014-06-01T01:45:47.750-07:00Evidence Of A Possible Failed Chlorine Barrel Bomb Attack Two Months Before The First Reported AttacksDuring a recent review of the many Syria related photographs I've downloaded from a variety of sources, I came across the following photographs from <a href="https://www.google.com.sa/maps/place/Muzayrib/@32.7080104,36.0256075,15z/data=!3m1!4b1!4m2!3m1!1s0x151bf0e7a14332cd:0xb3c0bbfdf1bdac63">Muzeireeb</a>, Daraa, posted to Facebook on February 11th 2014<br />
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<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-xvpT44w9YmE/U4rivAylaII/AAAAAAAALBw/GZ9vQ9P5szw/s1600/1507824_411033255707072_896410277_n.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-xvpT44w9YmE/U4rivAylaII/AAAAAAAALBw/GZ9vQ9P5szw/s1600/1507824_411033255707072_896410277_n.jpg" height="223" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><b>[<a href="https://www.facebook.com/mzereeb.mobasher/photos/pb.236546736478842.-2207520000.1401609612./430355183764662/?type=3&permPage=1">Source</a>]</b></td></tr>
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-3-o464Ymu2M/U4rivYnNjAI/AAAAAAAALB0/Je-AVfwLkVQ/s1600/1782085_411042505706147_934052316_n.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-3-o464Ymu2M/U4rivYnNjAI/AAAAAAAALB0/Je-AVfwLkVQ/s1600/1782085_411042505706147_934052316_n.jpg" height="223" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><b>[<a href="https://www.facebook.com/mzereeb.mobasher/photos/pb.236546736478842.-2207520000.1401609612./430366727096841/?type=3&src=https%3A%2F%2Ffbcdn-sphotos-d-a.akamaihd.net%2Fhphotos-ak-xpf1%2Ft1.0-9%2F1779979_430366727096841_157771196_n.jpg&size=960%2C540&fbid=430366727096841">Source</a>]</b></td></tr>
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A quick search through the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCdcNH5lzz03M4z4oEPvqu6A">Muzeireeb YouTube channel</a> came up with this video showing the same bomb</div>
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<iframe allowfullscreen='allowfullscreen' webkitallowfullscreen='webkitallowfullscreen' mozallowfullscreen='mozallowfullscreen' width='320' height='266' src='https://www.youtube.com/embed/k239Nvt1ZbE?feature=player_embedded' frameborder='0'></iframe></div>
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It's unclear if the locals took a closer look at the remains of the unexploded bomb, and they may have (sensibly) decided to leave the huge unexploded bomb alone. It's described as the remains of an unexploded barrel bomb, nothing too unusual in Syria, but there's something about this example that makes it very interesting. <br />
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-3Bluow1HOH8/U4rlRd4Pk5I/AAAAAAAALCA/eeMI3ZgwW9Q/s1600/Barrel+bomb+front.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-3Bluow1HOH8/U4rlRd4Pk5I/AAAAAAAALCA/eeMI3ZgwW9Q/s1600/Barrel+bomb+front.jpg" height="193" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><b>Still from video</b></td></tr>
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The front of the bomb has two slots cut into the side, and a metal bar with two long bolts running through it. This is a very unusual feature which also appears in some of the chlorine barrel bombs used since April 11th<br />
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<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><b>Bomb dropped on Kafr Zita on April 18th</b></td></tr>
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The assumption is the bar was to hold the end of the cylinder away from the ground, so it would have enough room to release the gas contained in the cylinder on impact, with the slots on the side allowing the gas to escape. If that's the case, then it seems likely the example from Muzeireeb was also a chemical barrel bomb, used two months before the first attack in Kafr Zita on April 11th, and hundreds of miles away in Daraa. It begs the question whether other reported chemical attacks since (and even before) February were chemical barrel bombs, and how long these have been in use by the Syrian air force.</div>
Brown Moseshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17562126209980810351noreply@blogger.com3tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4871088750473093560.post-19339557866756556622014-05-23T04:18:00.004-07:002014-05-23T04:18:45.449-07:00Hersh's Ghouta: Conspiracy, Dismissal, and DenialA guest post by <a href="https://twitter.com/JettGoldsmith">Jett Goldsmith</a>.<br />
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In blogging, expectations are lowered; not only in terms of quality, but in terms of accuracy and professionalism. Plenty of bloggers maintain a standard of quality and accuracy in light of their profession, like Mr. Higgins and the dozens of other remote reporters on the Syrian conflict -- who blur the lines between amateur and professional, and who still manage to break stories <a href="http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/11/07/how-the-syrian-war-subreddit-scoops-mainstream-media.html">sometimes hours before mainstream sources</a>, despite unfavorable odds. But for every journalist who has embraced the massive soapbox of the internet with open arms and an eye for quality reporting, there remain those who choose otherwise; riding on the coattails of legitimacy touted by reliable bloggers, misusing the unquestioning arms of the internet to inject falsehoods, poor research and shoddy journalism into what tries its best to be a proper field.<br />
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Enter Seymour Hersh. A once-famed investigative journalist <a href="http://www.pierretristam.com/Bobst/library/wf-200.htm">noted for exposing</a> the Mỹ Lai Massacre by U.S. troops in Vietnam. Perhaps one of the first true “bloggers” of his time, who chose to work as a contributor rather than a professional staff writer. But unlike today’s bloggers, Higgins and the like included, Hersh never truly adapted to the standard of accuracy which most would expect from a seasoned contributor. His career was frequently tainted by allegations of <a href="http://www.newsweek.com/jfk-marilyn-hoax-174044">poor research</a> and <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2006/POLITICS/04/10/hersh.access/index.html">dubious</a> sources. Claims he made, while typically taken on faith, had <a href="http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/opinion/thus-are-reports-about-the-mideast-generated-1.223615">the remarkable tendency to be proven false</a>. And nowhere more egregious were these lapses in credibility than his commentary on the Syrian Civil War.<br />
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In early April, Hersh released <a href="http://www.lrb.co.uk/v36/n08/seymour-m-hersh/the-red-line-and-the-rat-line">a report</a> entitled “The Red Line and the Rat Line,” which called into question the role of the Syrian government in the devastating August 21st Ghouta chemical attack which killed and injured over 4,000 people, many of them civilians. The popular sentiment was obvious: Intelligence agencies and officials from <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/02/syria-crisis-french-intelligence-assad">France</a>, <a href="http://www.haaretz.com/news/middle-east/1.542975">Israel</a>, <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/08/30/government-assessment-syrian-government-s-use-chemical-weapons-august-21">the United States</a>, <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/10284773/Syria-crisis-chemical-weapons-use-a-big-mistake-Hizbollah-told-Iran.html">Germany</a>, <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkeys-state-agency-obtains-detailed-information-about-chemical-attacks-in-syria-.aspx?pageID=238&nID=53556&NewsCatID=352">Turkey</a>, <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/235094/Jp_115_JD_PM_Syria_Reported_Chemical_Weapon_Use_with_annex.pdf">the UK</a>, <a href="http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/middle-east/arab-league-says-assad-crossed-global-red-line-with-chemical-attack">the Arab League</a> and even the independent <a href="http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/09/10/syria-government-likely-culprit-chemical-attack">Human Rights Watch</a> placed blame for the attacks on Assad’s Syrian Arab Army. An <a href="http://www.un.org/disarmament/content/slideshow/Secretary_General_Report_of_CW_Investigation.pdf">independent United Nations report</a>, while failing to directly pin blame (as per its design), heavily supported the conclusion that Assad was responsible. But Hersh refused to sit on the side of credibility. Instead of following the authority and ethos of nearly every accredited world government and human rights organization in existence, he chose the path of conspiracy -- sitting in the company of such bastions of truth and knowledge as <a href="http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/09/21/reporter-denies-writing-article-that-linked-syrian-rebels-to-chemical-attack/">Mint Press News</a>, <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2013/06/13/in-case-you-werent-clear-on-russia-todays-relationship-to-moscow-putin-clears-it-up/">Russia Today</a> and <a href="http://www.infowars.com/exclusive-syrians-in-ghouta-claim-saudi-supplied-rebels-behind-chemical-attack/">Infowars</a>.<br />
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Hersh’s main argument is one of denial, interlaced with effrontery and a small touch of paranoia. His claim is straightforward: Jabhat al-Nusra, the al Qaeda-affiliated rebel group, were the true culprits of the August 21st Ghouta attack -- and they were supplied by Turkey’s Prime Minister Recep Erdoğan. Hersh’s argument is debunked and rebutted in CBRN specialist Dan Kaszeta’s “<a href="https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/commentaryanalysis/542509-hersh-and-the-red-herring">Hersh and the Red Herring</a>,” and in Higgins’ “<a href="http://brown-moses.blogspot.com/2014/04/the-knowledge-gap-seymours-hersh-of.html">The Knowledge Gap - Seymour’s Hersh of Cards</a>,” and even in <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-us-dismiss-seymour-hersh-report-.aspx?pageID=238&nID=64686&NewsCatID=359">a statement</a> by United States National Security Council spokeswoman Caitlin Hayden -- all of which are unsurprising. In reality, Hersh’s argument is no different than those made by the questionable creatures trolling the depths of the AboveTopSecret forums, or the murky waters of PressTV’s government-fueled newsrooms. They differ in allegations, sure: AboveTopSecret claims the <a href="http://www.abovetopsecret.com/forum/thread1000214/pg1">CIA did it</a>; PressTV <a href="http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2013/12/21/341125/ghouta-attacks-who-was-responsible/">points at a</a> “US-approved false-flag operation conducted by Saudi Arabia in collusion with Israel;” and the like-minded Seymour Hersh blames Jabhat al-Nusra and Turkey. But their variances in blame are all connected by one factor: the attempted vindication of the Assad regime, and the unabashed embrace of conspiracism, faulty logic and dangerous assumptions to accomplish it.<br />
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Bashar al-Assad needs no vindication. The Syrian conflict is complex: both sides have committed atrocities, and the lines of morality are becoming increasingly blurred. For many, a rebel victory may not be the best possible scenario for Syria. But to vindicate a brutal, murderous dictator -- one who gasses his own people, executes <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2014/01/20/world/syria-torture-photos-amanpour/">the systematic torture and murder of detainees</a>, and drops thousands of pounds of explosives <a href="http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/4/29/syria-barrel-bombs.html">on the homes of families</a>, men, women and children -- that is the true crime against humanity.<br />
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As for Hersh? His credibility erodes at a stunning pace. He is long gone from the days of the Mỹ Lai Massacre, and even further from his brief period of respectability as an investigative journalist. Once heralded amongst the likes of Pulitzer winners and Polk recipients, he lives on amongst those of paranoid pundits and crazed conspiracists. And although serving as a sort of glorified blogger for the tenure of his career, Hersh will never meet the standards of any credible journalist, neither in accuracy nor in quality. His unabashed defense of a regime which has killed thousands of civilians and destroyed the lives of millions more has no place in any legitimate discussion, and it certainly has no place as an accolade under the belt of a once-famed investigative journalist.<br />
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<br />Brown Moseshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17562126209980810351noreply@blogger.com9tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4871088750473093560.post-5210696469383627612014-05-22T13:10:00.002-07:002014-05-22T13:10:53.106-07:00Three Chemical Barrel Bomb Attacks Reported On The Day The UNSC's Vote On Referring Syria To The ICC Is VetoedToday, as Russia and China <a href="http://www.rte.ie/news/2014/0522/618862-syria/">vetoed a UN Security Council resolution to refer the Syrian government to the International Criminal Court</a>, there's been more reports of chemical barrel bomb attacks on towns in Syria. Following a reported attack on Kafr Zita on May 19th (videos <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ysxeLrFLJtA&list=PLPC0Udeof3T5rXG8FJkVuBuV0fF9mHYHI">here</a>), Kafr Zita was reportedly attacked this morning and this evening, along with Al Tamanah, scene of three earlier attacks. Videos of the Kafr Zita attacks can be seen <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LMa1Mk-8vJA&list=PLPC0Udeof3T5YsahDfdbs5LeS2XusbWWx">here</a> and <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=irxzBoMaDVc&list=PLPC0Udeof3T4vUv5v3SGvB6S5KQczyPRQ">here</a>, and the Al Tamanah attack <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ILbEGH8itAg&list=PLPC0Udeof3T7wYj6BkTamUBVXuJ0yQl0W">here</a>.<br />
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The videos show what have become now familiar scenes in Syria of choking victims being treated in medical centers, but one video stood out from the rest. <br />
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<iframe allowfullscreen='allowfullscreen' webkitallowfullscreen='webkitallowfullscreen' mozallowfullscreen='mozallowfullscreen' width='320' height='266' src='https://www.youtube.com/embed/jU26RJ1IXYo?feature=player_embedded' frameborder='0'></iframe></div>
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It appears in this video yellowish-green chlorine gas may be visible, the first time footage has been shot on the ground showing the gas shortly after impact. <br />
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To me, it's difficult not to see three chemical attacks on the same day an attempt to refer the Syria to the ICC is vetoed as the Syrian government thumbing its nose at the international communities' attempts to hold it to account. Given the flaccid reaction to chemical barrel bomb attacks it seems future attacks of this type are more than likely.<br />
<br />Brown Moseshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17562126209980810351noreply@blogger.com5tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4871088750473093560.post-35715245031331830822014-05-12T04:06:00.000-07:002014-05-12T04:06:53.262-07:00Photographs From Daniele Raineri Of Chemical Barrel Bombs In SyriaToday, the Daily Telegraph published a pair of articles on chemical barrel bombs in Syria, "<a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/10823180/Syrian-chemical-weapons-use-backed-up-by-second-investigation.html">Syrian chemical weapons use backed-up by second investigation</a>", and "<a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/10820440/Found-the-bombs-that-delivered-Syrias-chlorine-gas.html">Found: the bombs that delivered Syria's chlorine gas</a>" by <a href="https://twitter.com/DanieleRaineri">Daniele Raineri</a>.<br />
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Daniele took a number of photographs of the remains of the barrel bombs, some of which were published in the Daily Telegraph. He's now given me permission to publish the remaining 59 photographs online, the full collection of which can be found <a href="http://imgur.com/a/y1joC">here</a>.<br />
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The following pictures shows the remains of a cylinder that has a number of interesting features<br />
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<a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-C9eO9BoNdxs/U3Cmnl84U8I/AAAAAAAAKAI/R77CsXAi5GA/s1600/DSCN3686.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-C9eO9BoNdxs/U3Cmnl84U8I/AAAAAAAAKAI/R77CsXAi5GA/s1600/DSCN3686.JPG" height="300" width="400" /></a></div>
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This appears to be the same chemical barrel bomb featured in this video from Kafr Zita on April 18th</div>
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<iframe allowfullscreen='allowfullscreen' webkitallowfullscreen='webkitallowfullscreen' mozallowfullscreen='mozallowfullscreen' width='320' height='266' src='https://www.youtube.com/embed/bx9ebxU38YA?feature=player_embedded' frameborder='0'></iframe></div>
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As I noted in an earlier post, <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Detonating_cord">det cord</a> has been wrapped around the neck of the cylinder, shown below<br />
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<a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-Hr097eQ77xY/U3CoGdL6_3I/AAAAAAAAKAU/c4A2dOnGEKY/s1600/det1.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-Hr097eQ77xY/U3CoGdL6_3I/AAAAAAAAKAU/c4A2dOnGEKY/s1600/det1.jpg" height="261" width="400" /></a></div>
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It would appear the function of this is to blow off the end of the cylinder using the least explosive power possible, reducing the among of chlorine gas destroyed in the explosion. One photograph may show an example where this configuration has functioned as intended<br />
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<a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-TB4nttmfxho/U3CouEj8-TI/AAAAAAAAKAc/2U2zY4ebJ4Y/s1600/DSCN3705.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-TB4nttmfxho/U3CouEj8-TI/AAAAAAAAKAc/2U2zY4ebJ4Y/s1600/DSCN3705.JPG" height="300" width="400" /></a></div>
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Another interesting feature of the same barrel bomb is the metal bar with two large bolt which sits in front of the cylinder<br />
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The same metal bar and bolt assembly is visible in <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7JdVpmExt_E">a video</a> from another reported attack in Telmens on April 21st<br />
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<a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-UgfVmlXWeZw/U3CqHy5kJVI/AAAAAAAAKAw/aCEx18e-tKc/s1600/det2.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-UgfVmlXWeZw/U3CqHy5kJVI/AAAAAAAAKAw/aCEx18e-tKc/s1600/det2.jpg" height="220" width="400" /></a></div>
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I believe the function of this assembly is to hold the cylinder away from the base of the bomb, so during impact the cylinder doesn't end up buried in the ground, preventing the release of gas. There's also a slot in the casing of the barrel bomb, next to the end of the cylinder, which could be there to allow gas to be released on impact. This would strongly suggest more effort has gone into the design of these munitions than simply placing a gas cylinder inside a barrel bomb.<br />
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More videos showing the remains of chemical barrel bombs can be found <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bx9ebxU38YA&list=PLPC0Udeof3T5Uzu_lvilAKsUecsxUhhOD">here</a>, and the remaining Daniele Raineri photographs can be found <a href="http://imgur.com/a/y1joC">here</a>.Brown Moseshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17562126209980810351noreply@blogger.com10tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4871088750473093560.post-79863129287976326292014-05-11T15:14:00.000-07:002014-05-11T15:14:08.311-07:00Key Updates on Iraq’s Sunni Insurgent GroupsBy <a href="https://twitter.com/ajaltamimi">Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi</a><br />
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In January I provided a lengthy overview of the Sunni insurgent groups currently operating in Iraq. What dynamics have changed since then?<br />
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<b><u>Jamaat Ansar al-Islam’s Emergence in Anbar</u></b><br />
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In the previous piece I noted how Jamaat Ansar al-Islam (JAI)- the main rivals of the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS) despite the common ideology- lacked a meaningful presence in Anbar province and was primarily based in the Mosul and Kirkuk areas. However, that is no longer true as clear evidence has emerged showing the JAI banner and fighters in the Fallujah area in particular, as can be seen below.<br />
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<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-WEibCztHtUs/U2_vU1N1lrI/AAAAAAAAJ7M/8ebW8rBnTBU/s1600/1.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-WEibCztHtUs/U2_vU1N1lrI/AAAAAAAAJ7M/8ebW8rBnTBU/s1600/1.jpg" height="400" width="335" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><b>JAI in Fallujah area</b></td></tr>
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-K7fbpj-imHc/U2_valNWqQI/AAAAAAAAJ7U/Ad-lbAqKrNk/s1600/2.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-K7fbpj-imHc/U2_valNWqQI/AAAAAAAAJ7U/Ad-lbAqKrNk/s1600/2.jpg" height="298" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><b>JAI in Fallujah area</b></td></tr>
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-tP258wxY2qU/U2_veCVGNhI/AAAAAAAAJ7c/KWMW1XaxRE4/s1600/3.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-tP258wxY2qU/U2_veCVGNhI/AAAAAAAAJ7c/KWMW1XaxRE4/s1600/3.jpg" height="300" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><b>JAI in Fallujah area</b></td></tr>
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Though these official photos date back to early April, some earlier unofficial photos from JAI social media circles exist claiming a presence in Anbar. Concomitant with these new photos are some officially claimed operations in Anbar, such as <a href="https://twitter.com/ansar_al_islam/status/454231971661873152">a sniper attack</a> on an Iraqi soldier in the al-Sijr area of Fallujah on 6th April, as well as an <a href="https://twitter.com/ansar_al_islam/status/450251653393170432">IED attack</a> on the Iraqi army in the same place on 29th March. However, the frequency of such JAI operations in Anbar does not compare with JAI activities in Mosul or Kirkuk. Indeed, it seems most probable that in Anbar JAI has merely been taken up as a name and banner for fighters opposed to ISIS to rally around.</div>
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-pFB4ZecEh3Q/U2_vq1eDyXI/AAAAAAAAJ7k/31Gk4FoMQU4/s1600/4.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-pFB4ZecEh3Q/U2_vq1eDyXI/AAAAAAAAJ7k/31Gk4FoMQU4/s1600/4.jpg" height="300" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><b>JAI fighters pose with a flag in early March, claimed to be in Anbar province. Though the exact area is not specified, it is most likely from the Fallujah area, which is the main stronghold for all insurgents in Anbar.</b></td></tr>
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-ZLvrkhEznCA/U2_wMqq_I1I/AAAAAAAAJ7s/RNdDyh3wqMg/s1600/5.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-ZLvrkhEznCA/U2_wMqq_I1I/AAAAAAAAJ7s/RNdDyh3wqMg/s1600/5.jpg" height="300" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><b>JAI fighters allegedly training in Anbar province, early March.</b></td></tr>
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<b><u>JAI’s Continued Infighting with ISIS; Expansion in Syria</u></b></div>
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As of now, tensions between JAI and ISIS remain unresolved. To summarize from my earlier work, the roots of the dispute are thus: ISIS members and supporters claim JAI is a criminal group that does not actually support the project of a Caliphate, while JAI counters that it is in favour of this project but regards ISIS’ claims to already be a state and its attempts to subjugate JAI under its wing as problematic. This is why JAI has always insisted on calling ISIS and its predecessor jamaat ad-dawla- “group of the state,” which is now standard from al-Qa’ida circles that had previously accepted the Islamic State of Iraq as a state entity. </div>
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When I asked one JAI member- going by the name of Ibrahim al-Ansari- whether Iraqi press rumours of fighting between JAI and ISIS in Diyala province were true, specifically regarding <a href="http://bit.ly/1qqE7JW">a supposed JAI war declaration</a> on ISIS northeast of Baquba, he <a href="https://twitter.com/snroe8/status/463285097517838337">affirmed</a>: “In every place, not only Diyala.” Also in this context one should note Iraqi press reports of <a href="http://bit.ly/1ntwq3x">clashes</a> between JAI and ISIS in the al-Rashad area of southwest Kirkuk province. </div>
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Though there was an attempt by ISIS to bring about a <a href="https://twitter.com/althabaat_ansar/status/458325104490213376">ceasefire</a> with JAI in late April, JAI stipulated that there should be a neutral Shari’a court acceptable to both parties to settle the disputes, but ISIS went back on any pledge to adhere to such conditions. It should be noted that this behavior exactly mirrors ISIS’ conduct in Syria, where it has similarly rejected all attempts at independent arbitration of its rivalries with other rebel groups (e.g. Sheikh Muheisseni’s Ummah Initiative). This relates to JAI’s fundamental complaint about ISIS: namely, the fact it already considers itself a state and therefore above other groups and not having to answer to third-party authority.</div>
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In Syria, JAI has now become much more open about its presence, no longer calling itself the “Ansar ash-Sham” contingent. The group most notably played a role in the capture of Jabal Shwayhana and Kafr Hamra in Aleppo province in March in coordination with other rebels including Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic Front, with which JAI is closely aligned. There is also some limited fighting with Kurdish YPG forces.</div>
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<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-HgF1HLYj08c/U2_wnAs3KEI/AAAAAAAAJ70/5EncYy_wQ2A/s1600/6.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-HgF1HLYj08c/U2_wnAs3KEI/AAAAAAAAJ70/5EncYy_wQ2A/s1600/6.jpg" height="225" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><b>JAI in Kafr Hamra, 25th March.</b></td></tr>
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-0nMRNy0VK8w/U2_wsTPydbI/AAAAAAAAJ78/biZXbilFaE8/s1600/7.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-0nMRNy0VK8w/U2_wsTPydbI/AAAAAAAAJ78/biZXbilFaE8/s1600/7.jpg" height="225" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><b>JAI in Jabal Shwayhana, 22nd March.</b></td></tr>
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-vElOwMMqzS0/U2_wyw8bpnI/AAAAAAAAJ8E/JxfFNv0zjdw/s1600/8.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-vElOwMMqzS0/U2_wyw8bpnI/AAAAAAAAJ8E/JxfFNv0zjdw/s1600/8.jpg" height="300" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><b>A Mistubishi vehicle owned by JAI in Syria.</b></td></tr>
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-CnNHd7NrvQE/U2_w6crY_CI/AAAAAAAAJ8M/JR_LKLAI66g/s1600/9.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-CnNHd7NrvQE/U2_w6crY_CI/AAAAAAAAJ8M/JR_LKLAI66g/s1600/9.jpg" height="300" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><b>A BMW X5 owned by JAI in Syria.</b></td></tr>
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<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-TuUGcDqNzYE/U2_xAp-4kwI/AAAAAAAAJ8U/ndhb7pzfibM/s1600/10.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-TuUGcDqNzYE/U2_xAp-4kwI/AAAAAAAAJ8U/ndhb7pzfibM/s1600/10.jpg" height="300" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><b>Inside a JAI-owned BMW.</b></td></tr>
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<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-OgAtS1I7Koc/U2_xIhyu3UI/AAAAAAAAJ8c/7oWp3EzUdKk/s1600/11.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-OgAtS1I7Koc/U2_xIhyu3UI/AAAAAAAAJ8c/7oWp3EzUdKk/s1600/11.jpg" height="300" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><b>An Izuzu owned by JAI in Syria.</b></td></tr>
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<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-QfreDz_piAo/U2_xPfrhl4I/AAAAAAAAJ8k/Cq4_aQIXVek/s1600/12.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-QfreDz_piAo/U2_xPfrhl4I/AAAAAAAAJ8k/Cq4_aQIXVek/s1600/12.jpg" height="400" width="300" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><b>Da’wah material distributed by JAI in Syria.</b></td></tr>
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<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-UgaxuP0KCkM/U2_xU6_lrqI/AAAAAAAAJ8s/T4tgvc-0Teg/s1600/13.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-UgaxuP0KCkM/U2_xU6_lrqI/AAAAAAAAJ8s/T4tgvc-0Teg/s1600/13.jpg" height="300" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><b>A JAI member in Syria prepares food. JAI in Syria also calls itself the “Soldiers of Abu Hashim Al Ibrahim,” in reference to the overall leader. Photo from early February.</b></td></tr>
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<a href="http://i.imgur.com/27pg0s4.jpg">GRAPHIC - A “PKK” fighter beheaded by JAI in Syria. Photo from 30th April.</a></div>
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The Anbar and General Military Council: Naqshbandi Army Front-Groups</div>
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In my previous analysis, I noted that there was a strong case that most of the various “Military Councils for the Revolutionaries of the Tribes” that were announced across the country should be viewed as front groups for the Ba’athist Naqshbandi Army (JRTN), evidence for which included the release of most of the declaration videos via JRTN’s activist wing Intifada Ahrar al-Iraq and the use of limited cross-sectarian messaging that is unique to JRTN among the Sunni insurgent groups (e.g. purportedly Shi’a tribal military councils) on account of the Ba’athist ideology.</div>
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At the time, it was on the other hand possible to see the Anbar Military Council, which emerged before the other military councils, as its own independent grouping, as it appeared to place sole emphasis on notions of self-defense and seemed to have a social media output separate from Intifada Ahrar al-Iraq. I also argued that it was possible to view the General Military Council that emerged from the Anbar council in the same light. </div>
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However, it has since become clear that the two entities are not distinct, and that the General Military Council is another front for JRTN. Now, there are no more separate Anbar Military Council videos, but instead they are released as part of General Military Council operations, and the political wing of the latter is widely advertised in Ba’athist/JRTN circles, such as on <a href="http://www.dhiqar.net/Art.php?id=38081#.U2-E2q2Vmvg">Ba’athist websites</a> like DhiQar. Besides these points, one should further note that the General Military Council operates in areas where Naqshbandi influence has traditionally been strong, such as the Hawija area in Kirkuk province. Linked to this is the overlap with Ba’athist discourse here: whereas ISIS and JAI will refer to Kirkuk province by its current name, the General Military Council calls the area <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Py6AJw0JvN4">al-T’amim</a> (not to be confused with my tribal name that is spread throughout Iraq), as was the case under Saddam Hussein. </div>
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-l_RgGOvjnew/U2_yOVp6rEI/AAAAAAAAJ84/K9VMYqpHDe4/s1600/15.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-l_RgGOvjnew/U2_yOVp6rEI/AAAAAAAAJ84/K9VMYqpHDe4/s1600/15.jpg" height="400" width="332" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><b>Logo of the General Political Council for the Revolutionaries of the Tribes, the political wing of the General Military Council.</b></td></tr>
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-cyeMgYIalic/U2_yUnnJs_I/AAAAAAAAJ9A/jTbeZ3qWyPQ/s1600/16.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-cyeMgYIalic/U2_yUnnJs_I/AAAAAAAAJ9A/jTbeZ3qWyPQ/s1600/16.jpg" height="299" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><b>An example of a regional branch of the General Military Council” the Military Council for the Revolutionaries [of the Tribes] of Salah ad-Din. Sometimes the word “tribes” (asha’ir) is dropped from the title. In any case, the parallel logos are clear. </b></td></tr>
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It may be asked why JRTN operates numerous front-groups. The answer is that on its own, JRTN cannot appeal to a wide, potentially cross-sectarian support base, because it advocates a specific brand of Sunni Sufism (of the Naqshbandi variety) associated with Saddam’s right-hand man Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri. Appeal on the basis of Iraqi nationalist Ba’athism, which, while emphasizing discrimination against Sunnis by the “Safavid” government and supporting the Syrian rebellion, nonetheless can potentially outreach to Iraqis of all sects. In practice, of course, the number of Shi’a or Kurds supporting the JRTN or its front groups is no more than a token figure.</div>
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-CiCVJ_E5kc4/U2_ycg9XtnI/AAAAAAAAJ9I/ljoix-LSHtA/s1600/17.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-CiCVJ_E5kc4/U2_ycg9XtnI/AAAAAAAAJ9I/ljoix-LSHtA/s1600/17.jpg" height="250" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><b>General Military Council video from Taji area in Baghdad, where it frequently conducts operations. Here, a sniper operation against an army soldier.</b></td></tr>
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-MD9vkqf8LtQ/U2_yjH70scI/AAAAAAAAJ9Q/RuwYKSt11d0/s1600/18.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-MD9vkqf8LtQ/U2_yjH70scI/AAAAAAAAJ9Q/RuwYKSt11d0/s1600/18.jpg" height="250" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><b>General Military Council targeting Iraqi army with three 82 mm mortar rounds in al-Karma, Anbar province. Video released 7th May.</b></td></tr>
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-Q4qcPeF6_E0/U2_ypW1IFYI/AAAAAAAAJ9Y/JoP2vo-tPTE/s1600/19.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-Q4qcPeF6_E0/U2_ypW1IFYI/AAAAAAAAJ9Y/JoP2vo-tPTE/s1600/19.jpg" height="250" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><b>General Military Council targeting Iraqi army Hummer vehicle in al-Karma, Anbar province, with an IED. Video released 4th May.</b></td></tr>
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<b><u>JRTN Tensions with ISIS?</u></b></div>
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Though ISIS’ initial approach on entering into Fallujah in particular was conciliatory as ISIS most notably spared members of the local police and their families, there have been signs of tensions between the JRTN and its front groups. The most open instance came at the start of April with an <a href="http://justpaste.it/eydg">official statement</a> from ISIS in Anbar province, accusing the General Military Council of claiming operations in the Zuba’ and al-Karma areas of the province that were in fact conducted by ISIS, and even going so far as to affirm that the group has “no real existence on the battlefield and this is well-known to the Muslims in general.” </div>
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The statement went on to make a clear distinction between ISIS’ aims and that of the General Military Council, declaring: “The time for building the structure of the Islamic Caliphate on the program of the Prophets has begun and anyone who opposes this aim or stands in the way of this goal is an enemy to us.” This is the most explicit affirmation to date by ISIS in Iraq of ISIS’ ideological program, whereas in the past ISIS in Iraq has put far more emphasis on a public image of carrying out “revenge” attacks in protecting the country’s Sunnis from the “Safavid” government and its practices like ethnic cleansing, a grievance that resonates widely with the 2013 protest movement. </div>
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To be sure, ISIS still stresses this image of protector of the Ahl al-Sunna in Iraq with statements claiming operations, and the lack of real strongholds in comparison with Syria means that you will not see ISIS billboards in Iraq proclaiming the building of a Caliphate. However, some other ISIS social media graphics from Iraq have emerged with the theme of establishing a Caliphate, and there is now emphasis on the global nature of the struggle with the advertisement of foreign fighter martyrdoms in Iraq, most of whom have entered into the country from Syria: a process that has been occurring since late last year. </div>
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-KRam05-67Dc/U2_y21mhfaI/AAAAAAAAJ9g/voZdLYplsFo/s1600/20.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-KRam05-67Dc/U2_y21mhfaI/AAAAAAAAJ9g/voZdLYplsFo/s1600/20.jpg" height="300" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><b>”Anbar Province: The Muslims’ delight with the mujahideen of the Islamic State”- ISIS-forum graphic released in late February. Note the inscription in the top-right: “The State of the Islamic Caliphate.” </b></td></tr>
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-fU4xv4TPWi4/U2_y8VrHwCI/AAAAAAAAJ9o/fbmQkIfPG0A/s1600/21.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-fU4xv4TPWi4/U2_y8VrHwCI/AAAAAAAAJ9o/fbmQkIfPG0A/s1600/21.jpg" height="300" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><b>One of many foreign fighters advertised by ISIS to have conducted suicide operations in Iraq. This individual is Abu Hayder the Tunisian, who carried out an attack on “Jaysh al-Dajjal” (a common ISIS-term for Mahdi Army militiamen- active or demobilized) in Diyala province on 5th February this year.</b></td></tr>
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What of ISIS’ complaint about the General Military Council stealing credit for ISIS operations? It must be said that there is at least some truth to this allegation, for pro-Ba’athist and pro-nationalist insurgent social media pages have frequently taken photos and video footage of ISIS and tried to obscure any indications of ISIS symbols, portraying the operations as the work of fighters they support.</div>
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-sr2vlUEoR_E/U2_zDoJV0uI/AAAAAAAAJ9w/FsHoMwXghIw/s1600/22.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-sr2vlUEoR_E/U2_zDoJV0uI/AAAAAAAAJ9w/FsHoMwXghIw/s1600/22.jpg" height="251" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><b>Photo of ISIS operations in Jurf al-Sakhr, Babil province. Note the ISIS logo for what ISIS calls “Wilayat al-Janub” (“Southern Province”- i.e. all points south of Baghdad) has been obscured. This came from a pro-Ba’athist insurgent page- “Al-Qadisiya’s Men Army”- on Facebook in April (now deleted).</b></td></tr>
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-sojIeGrHNNg/U2_zKDL2PqI/AAAAAAAAJ94/A_5MzzbRyPs/s1600/23.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-sojIeGrHNNg/U2_zKDL2PqI/AAAAAAAAJ94/A_5MzzbRyPs/s1600/23.jpg" height="225" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><b>Screenshot from footage of an ISIS parade in Fallujah in April. However, the screenshot is such as to render it impossible to tell without knowledge of the original video that the group in question is ISIS. From a pro-Ba’athist/nationlist insurgent page- “Sons of the tribe of Zuba’”- in early April.</b></td></tr>
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Other signs of tension that have emerged more recently include a purported statement at the beginning of this month from the <a href="http://www.hanein.info/vb/showthread.php?t=364477">Fallujah Military Council</a> (which jointly shares power with ISIS in the city, and appears to consist of a myriad of the other insurgent groups operating in the wider Fallujah area), urging ISIS (referred to as Jamaat ad-Dawla) to focus on fighting the common enemy rather than consolidating power at the expense of others, with accusations of theft of weapons. </div>
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These hints of tension culminated in Iraqi press rumours of a JRTN declaration of war on ISIS, which was then promptly denied in an official JRTN statement issued on 4th May: “We absolutely deny issuing any fatwa to incite killing or fighting among the myriad of groups and components of our people and we are not responsible for such a thing, and we have called for resistance to the Zionist-America-Majusi occupation through all legitimate paths and means, and we have declared that since America and its allies first brought their armies together to attack Iraq.” </div>
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-P989nfFjYSo/U2_zcSpNwhI/AAAAAAAAJ-A/Hs2n-4ImLhU/s1600/24.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-P989nfFjYSo/U2_zcSpNwhI/AAAAAAAAJ-A/Hs2n-4ImLhU/s1600/24.jpg" height="400" width="282" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><b>JRTN statement denying Iraqi press claims of issuing a fatwa to fight ISIS.</b></td></tr>
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It will be noted that nowhere does JRTN refer to ISIS by name. I have previously noted how the views of supporters of JRTN and its front groups are varied. Even if JRTN’s top leadership dislikes ISIS at heart, it is apparent they are afraid to confront ISIS openly for the moment.</div>
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<b><u>Jaysh al-Mujahideen’s Re-Emergence</u></b></div>
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/--yYGlk1ZOv0/U2_zlWZ2XPI/AAAAAAAAJ-I/xJHav5AbAfY/s1600/25.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/--yYGlk1ZOv0/U2_zlWZ2XPI/AAAAAAAAJ-I/xJHav5AbAfY/s1600/25.jpg" height="400" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><b>Jaysh al-Mujahideen logo.</b></td></tr>
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The <a href="http://www.aymennjawad.org/14605/interview-with-the-leader-of-iraq-jaysh-al">Jaysh al-Mujahideen</a> faction in Iraq is one of the older insurgent groups and has a nationalist-Islamist outlook. Unlike the Islamic Army of Iraq (with which Jaysh al-Mujahideen is at odds), the group has always rejected integration into the political process and believes in the complete overthrow of the government, whereas the Islamic Army of Iraq has an activist wing in the “Sunni Popular Movement” and believes in the formation of a Sunni federal region. More recently Jaysh al-Mujahideen is advertising itself more openly on social media, both with photos of operating on-the-ground and martyrdom announcements. That said, the material is confined to one area: namely, al-Karma in Anbar province (near Fallujah). Announcements of operations elsewhere (e.g. in the area between Tikrit and Kirkuk) remain written claims. </div>
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-7vgc4Xbfscs/U2_zzMLbNCI/AAAAAAAAJ-Q/Aujq124YggA/s1600/26.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-7vgc4Xbfscs/U2_zzMLbNCI/AAAAAAAAJ-Q/Aujq124YggA/s1600/26.jpg" height="223" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><b>Jaysh al-Mujahideen convoy in al-Karma, Anbar province. Photo from late April.</b></td></tr>
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-kzzFPh0kOVQ/U2_z5kv564I/AAAAAAAAJ-Y/m_x67DlpOoI/s1600/27.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-kzzFPh0kOVQ/U2_z5kv564I/AAAAAAAAJ-Y/m_x67DlpOoI/s1600/27.jpg" height="250" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><b>More Jaysh al-Mujahideen in al-Karma: “The clash with the Rafidite army and the militias.”</b></td></tr>
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/--3OU4fTzBC4/U2_z-4gI1KI/AAAAAAAAJ-g/kW0g1lxoqGI/s1600/28.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/--3OU4fTzBC4/U2_z-4gI1KI/AAAAAAAAJ-g/kW0g1lxoqGI/s1600/28.jpg" height="250" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><b>Jaysh al-Mujahideen targeting an army Hummer in al-Karma.</b></td></tr>
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-XzYu8GS96rQ/U2_0FhpHs5I/AAAAAAAAJ-o/iYMdfDCsy3s/s1600/29.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-XzYu8GS96rQ/U2_0FhpHs5I/AAAAAAAAJ-o/iYMdfDCsy3s/s1600/29.jpg" height="201" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><b>Jaysh al-Mujahideen fighters in al-Karma, from mid-April.</b></td></tr>
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-67LulPrkvfw/U2_0MNK3WZI/AAAAAAAAJ-w/SZRv4zridW4/s1600/30.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-67LulPrkvfw/U2_0MNK3WZI/AAAAAAAAJ-w/SZRv4zridW4/s1600/30.jpg" height="273" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><b>Abu Marwan al-Fahdawi, a Jaysh al-Mujahideen commander killed in al-Karma. Death announced on 9th May. His name indicates he is a native. </b></td></tr>
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<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-mQvc_VLyoO8/U2_0R5VRMjI/AAAAAAAAJ-4/PwjOplCHs1U/s1600/31.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-mQvc_VLyoO8/U2_0R5VRMjI/AAAAAAAAJ-4/PwjOplCHs1U/s1600/31.jpg" height="400" width="300" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><b>Unofficial photo of Jaysh al-Mujahideen member on his walkie-talkie.</b></td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<div>
<div>
The Jaysh al-Mujahideen, whose approach emphasizes cooperation with the local tribes, has traditionally had problems with ISIS. The most recent claims of tensions focus on the <a href="http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:MKHWx3jsMn4J:www.hanein.info/vb/showthread.php%3Ft%3D365884+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=uk">al-Karma</a> area. Specifically, it is alleged that the local tribes with Jaysh al-Mujahideen in the vanguard played the main role in freeing the area from government control, while ISIS arrived later on the scene and focused on building up a presence with acquiring new bases while other factions were focused on fighting government assaults. ISIS is then alleged to have stopped the entry of petrol, gas and other basic commodities into the area, so that people would be forced to buy such things from ISIS.</div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
If this situation outlined be the case, then it has a parallel with the case of the Fallujah-area dam that was <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TGa-crF0_Ws&list=UUu_v-OW8GQD9K3CJcL9s4mw">initially seized</a> by JRTN fighters in January but was subsequently taken over by ISIS alone (H/T: Kirk Sowell). </div>
</div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
<b><u>Jaysh al-Mustafa?</u></b></div>
<div>
<b><u><br /></u></b></div>
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-MOxd_CNkr7o/U2_0igF0_UI/AAAAAAAAJ_A/KY8ezck9yk4/s1600/32.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-MOxd_CNkr7o/U2_0igF0_UI/AAAAAAAAJ_A/KY8ezck9yk4/s1600/32.jpg" height="400" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><b>Logo of the purported Jaysh al-Mustafa</b></td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<div>
<b><u><br /></u></b></div>
<div>
In mid-April on Facebook there emerged pages for a Jaysh al-Mustafa, claiming allegiance to ISIS and operations in a variety of areas including Anbar and Diyala provinces. However, it will be immediately noticed that at least one of the photos put out under this label is a rip-off from another group (namely, the Jaysh al-Mujahideen).</div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-UyuOS1L0iHY/U2_0qsrwQ0I/AAAAAAAAJ_I/fJunR81PjcQ/s1600/33.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-UyuOS1L0iHY/U2_0qsrwQ0I/AAAAAAAAJ_I/fJunR81PjcQ/s1600/33.jpg" height="202" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><b>Claimed destruction of an army Hummer on the Ramadi highway area. The photo is identical with a Jaysh al-Mujahideen photo from al-Karma given above.</b></td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-Jy-lMfKX_v0/U2_0wvvE4II/AAAAAAAAJ_Q/If1V4sJB0jM/s1600/34.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-Jy-lMfKX_v0/U2_0wvvE4II/AAAAAAAAJ_Q/If1V4sJB0jM/s1600/34.jpg" height="358" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><b>A purported Jaysh al-Mustafa fighter targeting an army watch tower on 15th April.</b></td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<div>
<div>
However, by the end of April, a pro-ISIS activist released a <a href="http://justpaste.it/f8lq">clarification statement</a>, affirming that “after a number of connections with brothers in the aforementioned regions [Ramadi, Fallujah and Zuba’] it has become clear that this is merely an imaginary army with no existence on the actual ground and all its operations are stolen from the Islamic State, so they are a group of lying media youths. I say: the Islamic State has nothing to do with this lying Ba’athist army.” </div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
<b><u>Conclusion</u></b></div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
To summarize, the main Sunni insurgent groups operating (in no particular order) are:</div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
- ISIS</div>
<div>
- JRTN and its front-groups.</div>
<div>
- Jamaat Ansar al-Islam</div>
<div>
- Islamic Army of Iraq</div>
<div>
- Jaysh al-Mujahideen</div>
<div>
- <a href="http://www.aymennjawad.org/2014/02/formation-of-new-jihadi-group-jabhat-al#continued">Jabhat al-Murabiteen</a></div>
<div>
- Kata’ib Thuwar al-Sunna</div>
<div>
- Jaysh al-Izza wa al-Karama</div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
With the exception of the Islamic Army of Iraq, all these groups are revolutionary in their aims in that they at least seek to overthrow the central government. The Jaysh al-Izza wa al-Karama may be an exception too, though the evidence points to its being a mere banner around which some insurgents can gather, rather than having a real command structure.</div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
The most important in terms of manpower, financial resources (primarily through extortion in Ninawa province, expanded recently in Salah ad-Din province), and deadliness remains ISIS. It is the only group capable of carrying out major operations south of Baghdad, can carry out coordinated bomb attacks to cause mass civilian casualties in one go, and has the most capability to launch incursions and offensives into new territory. Statistically, ISIS can now carry out well over 1000 operations a month. The other groups simply do not compare in this regard, and are primarily limited to carrying out gunfights, IED and mortar attacks. </div>
</div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-E6f7DL8kCvs/U2_1BXkvqeI/AAAAAAAAJ_Y/RaNjHnrwn_0/s1600/35.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-E6f7DL8kCvs/U2_1BXkvqeI/AAAAAAAAJ_Y/RaNjHnrwn_0/s1600/35.jpg" height="366" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><b>ISIS operations by province for the period 2nd January-1st February 2014. The total amounts to 1295 operations, with the most numerous (as expected) in Ninawa province, at 476 operations. Anbar follows second with some 300 operations.</b></td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<div>
<div>
As I expected, total casualties per month are roughly at 1000 deaths or so per month. Meanwhile, whatever tensions exist between the different insurgent groups have not been sufficient to disrupt ISIS’ operations in Iraq. Talk of al-Qa’ida’s impending revival in Iraq as a potential challenge to ISIS is so far unsubstantiated, despite Jabhat al-Nusra leader Jowlani’s boasts of being able to call up new members from Iraq to aid his cause. Some have pointed to Jabhat al-Murabiteen as a possible front-group for a new al-Qa’ida in Iraq, but there is no convincing evidence for this claim. </div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
What of the future? There is little cause for optimism. The Iraqi army has great difficulty in dealing with the overall insurgency’s guerrilla tactics, and is generally ineffective at winning local cooperation in areas where insurgents operate, engaging in tactics like mass arrests that only fuel a “serves them right attitude” from residents. Problematic also is the government’s reliance to a certain extent on Iranian-backed Shi’a militias, particularly Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, which has already made its fighting in Anbar clear with the recent announcement of a martyrdom for the group.</div>
</div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-niMjcwXvnd0/U2_1KPRcDxI/AAAAAAAAJ_g/yo8IRb0d0vU/s1600/36.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-niMjcwXvnd0/U2_1KPRcDxI/AAAAAAAAJ_g/yo8IRb0d0vU/s1600/36.jpg" height="217" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><b>Graphic dedicated to Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq fighter Muhammad al-Lami, killed in Anbar on 7th May. Video of his funeral <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qrmPWuvE_jc">here.</a></b></td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-BST7Y62oNW4/U2_1UCPm80I/AAAAAAAAJ_o/CZeFRCjJRVM/s1600/37.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-BST7Y62oNW4/U2_1UCPm80I/AAAAAAAAJ_o/CZeFRCjJRVM/s1600/37.jpg" height="300" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><b>Supporters of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq are not shy from reveling in scenes of brutality. This is supposedly the corpse of a slain member of ISIS circulated in some social media circles. </b></td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<div>
It should be emphasized that this development does not mean Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq only started fighting in Anbar this month. Credible claims of involvement in Anbar actually go back to the beginning in <a href="http://www.islamistgate.com/461">January</a>, with rumours in Iraqi press circles of members returning from Syria in small numbers to help the government to combat the growing insurgency dating back to at least December of last year. In any event, the group has already been active in the ethnically mixed Diyala province throughout much of last year, as I documented <a href="http://www.aymennjawad.org/13709/al-qaeda-self-presentation-syria-iraq">here</a>, partly helping to fuel ISIS’ support base that culminated in the brief takeover of the Buhriz area south of Baquba in late March. The government then retook the area partly relying on <a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/04/27/uk-iraq-strife-idUKBREA3Q0FO20140427">Shi’a militiamen</a>, with summary executions following.</div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-N5crBzA3-20/U2_1lv2SDyI/AAAAAAAAJ_w/nlziGON16Sc/s1600/38.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-N5crBzA3-20/U2_1lv2SDyI/AAAAAAAAJ_w/nlziGON16Sc/s1600/38.jpg" height="300" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><b>"Revenge for our people in Anbar”: the brief ISIS takeover of Buhriz that included hoisting the ISIS flag in local mosques.</b></td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<div>
<div>
In my view, Diyala and the Baghdad belt areas, where risks of ethnic cleansing are highest, are the main places to watch regarding Shi’a militias and the overall insurgency. For Anbar, the involvement seems to be comparatively minor, with Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq supporters I have spoken to estimating that only a few fighters from the group have been killed in Anbar. There are also some clear cases of pro-insurgent Sunni social media circles misrepresenting Shi’a militia fighters who were killed in Syria as fighters slain in Iraq (H/T: Phillip Smyth). </div>
<div>
<br /></div>
</div>
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-H3h3W9wND6Q/U2_18guJATI/AAAAAAAAJ_4/Q4xCxcbNX1A/s1600/39.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-H3h3W9wND6Q/U2_18guJATI/AAAAAAAAJ_4/Q4xCxcbNX1A/s1600/39.jpg" height="250" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><b>The pro-insurgent Facebook page from Zuba’ tags this photo thus: “What are you doing in Fallujah? Are you a member of Maliki’s army?” The person in question is one Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq member Salim al-Ghanami, who was actually killed in Syria (cf. this <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LHmvVq5FpOM">video</a>).</b></td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="EN-US">Even so, the overall picture is bleak and
looks set to continue for years to come. While military force is undoubtedly
part of the solution to dealing with the revived insurgency, reliance on Shi’a
militias only perpetuates the problem. A political outreach program, beginning
with reforms to de-Ba’athification as proposed last year, as well as reforms to
security practices is the way forward.<br /><i><br />
Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi is a Shillman-Ginsburg Fellow at the Middle East Forum. </i><b><u><br />
<!--[endif]--><o:p></o:p></u></b></span></div>
</div>
</div>
Brown Moseshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17562126209980810351noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4871088750473093560.post-1567164049902156852014-05-10T04:23:00.001-07:002014-05-12T12:10:26.386-07:00Is The Iraqi Air Force Using Improvised Barrel Bombs in Fallujah?Fallujah, Iraq, currently under control of anti-government forces, has been the scene of <a href="http://www.rappler.com/world/regions/middle-east/57678-iraq-forces-launch-assault-near-fallujah">recent government military operations</a>, with the long term goal of retaking control of the town. Photographs posted by the anti-government Twitter account <a href="https://twitter.com/barq_iq_sy">@Barq_iq_sy</a> show what appear to be improvised barrel bombs reportedly dropped by the Iraqi Air Force on Fallujah<br />
<div>
<br /></div>
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-1v8IJdD_VLQ/U24Kh3nNRvI/AAAAAAAAJ4M/RdLZ2Z95oPs/s1600/BnRF05CCQAAexsx.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-1v8IJdD_VLQ/U24Kh3nNRvI/AAAAAAAAJ4M/RdLZ2Z95oPs/s1600/BnRF05CCQAAexsx.jpg" height="195" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">[<a href="https://twitter.com/barq_iq_sy/status/465073443356934144">Source</a>]</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<br />
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-5MBAOdkXvxk/U24KiB2KF-I/AAAAAAAAJ4Q/j5PX0sMBtNI/s1600/BnRFYnNCMAAXKF5.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-5MBAOdkXvxk/U24KiB2KF-I/AAAAAAAAJ4Q/j5PX0sMBtNI/s1600/BnRFYnNCMAAXKF5.jpg" height="400" width="225" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">[<a href="https://twitter.com/barq_iq_sy/status/465072957543313408">Source</a>]</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<div>
This design doesn't match any known type of conventional bomb used by the Iraqi air force, nor does it match the design of the improvised barrel bombs in Syria. While improvised barrel bomb aren't unique to the Syrian conflict (<a href="http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/12/11/sudan-civilians-describe-toll-attacks">Sudan being another example</a>), considering the media and political furore over the use of improvised barrel bombs in Syria, it will be interesting to see the reaction from those same quarters if improvised barrel bombs can be proven to be have been used by the Iraqi military in Fallujah. </div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
Thanks to <a href="https://twitter.com/me2455">@me2455</a> for highlighting these images.<br />
<br />
<b>Update </b>Thanks to <a href="https://twitter.com/Azler00">@Azler00</a> for highlighting <a href="https://www.facebook.com/Iraqe.Revolution/photos_stream?fref=photo">this Iraqi opposition Facebook page</a> with more examples of improvised barrel bombs reportedly dropped by the Iraqi air force.<br />
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<b>Update </b>Since making this post I've discovered a number of other <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QM7fUVsjbII&list=PLPC0Udeof3T7lx0toDjuzRdadVPunPeZc">videos</a> and <a href="https://www.facebook.com/msciq/photos/pb.245764402264908.-2207520000.1399921159./282001315307883/?type=3&src=https%3A%2F%2Ffbcdn-sphotos-d-a.akamaihd.net%2Fhphotos-ak-prn1%2Ft1.0-9%2F10277175_282001315307883_1077686933615373356_n.jpg&size=960%2C540&fbid=282001315307883">photographs</a> of improvised barrel bombs used in Iraq, including this news report from May 6th discussing their use in the Anbar province (Arabic only)<br />
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<object class="BLOGGER-youtube-video" classid="clsid:D27CDB6E-AE6D-11cf-96B8-444553540000" codebase="http://download.macromedia.com/pub/shockwave/cabs/flash/swflash.cab#version=6,0,40,0" data-thumbnail-src="https://ytimg.googleusercontent.com/vi/yhg6BOXym_o/0.jpg" height="266" width="320"><param name="movie" value="https://youtube.googleapis.com/v/yhg6BOXym_o" /><param name="bgcolor" value="#FFFFFF" /><param name="allowFullScreen" value="true" /><embed width="320" height="266" src="https://youtube.googleapis.com/v/yhg6BOXym_o" type="application/x-shockwave-flash" allowfullscreen="true"></embed></object></div>
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I've collected all the videos I've found <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QM7fUVsjbII&list=PLPC0Udeof3T7lx0toDjuzRdadVPunPeZc">here</a>.</div>
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Brown Moseshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17562126209980810351noreply@blogger.com10tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4871088750473093560.post-43515323223307954102014-04-30T03:28:00.001-07:002014-04-30T03:28:47.750-07:00New Chemical Attack Alleged In Al-TamanahThis morning, videos from the town of Al-Tamanah have been posted online showing what's claimed to be the aftermath of a fresh chemical barrel bomb attack. Videos show two different locations receiving victims of the attack (playlist <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KQSJ9vLL-B0&list=PLPC0Udeof3T4hSW98_qudLTrOMGvBm5Vr">here</a>), as well as what's claimed to be two impact sites<br />
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The local medical centre's Facebook page claims <a href="https://www.facebook.com/hanen1.2013/posts/506109432828328?stream_ref=10">70 were injured</a>, and at least one death. As with previous chlorine/ammonia attacks, it has been claimed that the attacks involved barrel bombs dropped from helicopters, with the medical centre claiming this is <a href="https://www.facebook.com/hanen1.2013?hc_location=timeline">the third such attack on the town</a>. Videos posted on <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WICv_mqgu9I&list=PLPC0Udeof3T5AF43Zf_6k_zJdclOEJ8XQ">April 12th/13th</a> and <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0-aowarUIOg&list=PLPC0Udeof3T4MzUYMprVYrEGo0jfA4QAa">April 18th</a> support the claim that this is the third attack in the town.<br />
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Al-Tamanah is located <a href="http://wikimapia.org/#lang=en&lat=35.417454&lon=36.696224&z=13&m=b&gz=0;366112518;353777136;1338957;791809;0;0&search=%D8%AE%D8%A7%D9%86%20%D8%B4%D9%8A%D8%AE%D9%88%D9%86">15km northeast</a> of Kafr Zita, and 20km south of Talmenes. Both towns were subject to <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/10796175/Syria-chemical-weapons-the-proof-that-Assad-regime-launching-chlorine-attacks-on-children.html">a recent investigation</a> by the Daily Telegraph and <a href="https://twitter.com/securebio">SecureBio</a> which confirmed high levels of chlorine and ammonia in samples taken from the impact sites of attacks on April <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-eDHqQIZsDM&list=PLPC0Udeof3T7yySO0dNQ2aNDO4Wuzb5JB">11th</a>, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_jfTpsyTFig&list=PLPC0Udeof3T5hSY-Zc8KXwb4D1Ipd_Lru">18th</a>, and <a href="https://twitter.com/securebio">21st</a> (click on the links for videos from those attacks). As with the Al-Tamanah attack, and other reported chemical barrel bomb attacks in the area, witnesses have consistently reported the use of helicopters to drop the chemical barrel bombs used. As it stands, around a dozen chemical barrel bomb attacks have been alleged in that region in the last three weeks.</div>
Brown Moseshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17562126209980810351noreply@blogger.com18tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4871088750473093560.post-7171395481766328552014-04-29T07:36:00.000-07:002014-04-29T07:36:02.914-07:00Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi - Key Updates on Albukamal (Abu Kamal)By <a href="https://twitter.com/ajaltamimi">Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi</a><br />
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I have previously documented in-depth the various militia factions that exist in the town of Albukamal (Abu Kamal: on the border with Iraq in Deir az-Zor province) <a href="http://www.aymennjawad.org/14161/the-factions-of-abu-kamal">here</a> and<a href="http://www.aymennjawad.org/14350/comprehensive-reference-guide-to-sunni-militant"> here</a>, in addition to giving an account of the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham’s (ISIS) <a href="http://www.aymennjawad.org/14657/the-fighting-in-abu-kamal-albukamal-background">unsuccessful assault</a> on the town earlier this month. Factional dynamics are never static, of course, so below are the key updates and clarifications to understand the current situation in Albukamal.<br />
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<b>1. Liwa Allahu Akbar no longer exists</b>: Previously I have mentioned Liwa Allahu Akbar as the local Supreme Military Council (SMC)-aligned faction in the town. However, it turns out that once the group’s leader- Saddam al-Jamal- became the local leader of ISIS, members of Liwa Allahu Akbar either joined him in ISIS or became part of other factions. Thus the formation was dissolved.<br />
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<b>2. Liwa al-Fatah al-Mubin separate from Kata’ib Allahu Akbar</b>: In my overview of the factions of Albukamal I described Liwa al-Fatah al-Mubin as an apparent subsidiary unit of the local Authenticity and Development Front faction Kata’ib Allahu Akbar. However, if that were the case before, it is quite clear now that the group is separate from Kata’ib Allahu Akbar. This is illustrated in two ways. First, note in a recent joint statement by factions in the Albukamal area (town and countryside), Liwa Fatah al-Mubin emerges as a signatory distinct from Kata’ib Allahu Akbar.<br />
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-aRUzL99ctPk/U1-1GXAtLRI/AAAAAAAAJlM/zrQlBq0HE00/s1600/1.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-aRUzL99ctPk/U1-1GXAtLRI/AAAAAAAAJlM/zrQlBq0HE00/s1600/1.jpg" height="400" width="225" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><b>Joint statement issued on 27th April 2014 for the formation of a Shari’a commission in light of ISIS’ actions. The signatories are Liwa al-Qadisiya al-Islamiya, Kata’ib Allahu Akbar, Liwa al-Fatah al-Mubin, Jabhat al-Nusra, and Liwa al-Mujahid Omar al-Mukhtar</b></td></tr>
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In an interview at the end of March, the group’s spokesman clarified to me that the group is independent but uses the FSA-banner, adding that “we work to remove oppression from our people, to make the phrase- ‘There is no deity but God and Muhammad is the messenger of God’- supreme, and to build a free Syrian state devoid of the gangs and shabiha of Assad.” In other words, the group espouses a vague Sunni Islamist ideology, characterized also by rejection of the opposition-in-exile. </div>
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In the weeks since the interview, Liwa al-Fatah al-Mubin has subsequently defined itself as part of the Euphrates [Islamic] Liberation Front coalition, a conglomeration of FSA-banner groups along the Euphrates River, including members in the Manbij countryside area in Aleppo province who have been fighting ISIS. This fighting has included limited coordination with Jabhat al-Akrad (a YPG/PKK front-group) and Liwa Thuwar Raqqa, an ex-Jabhat al-Nusra affiliate (FSA-banner in origin) that was never quite properly integrated into Jabhat al-Nusra likely responsible for the unofficial statement put out in Jabhat al-Nusra’s name in Raqqa at the beginning of the infighting with ISIS in Raqqa city. The group has since January been an independent formation, invalidating ISIS claims of supposed PKK-Jabhat al-Nusra coordination against ISIS in the northern Euphrates area near Kobani (Ayn al-Arab).<br />
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-wRhcVfQiUoY/U1-1OwiWk8I/AAAAAAAAJlU/hE9wk_Yq0yg/s1600/2.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-wRhcVfQiUoY/U1-1OwiWk8I/AAAAAAAAJlU/hE9wk_Yq0yg/s1600/2.jpg" height="400" width="398" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><b>Logo of the Euphrates Islamic Liberation Front. I put ‘Islamic’ in square brackets above because it is used interchangeably with Euphrates Liberation Front. In an interview, a media activist for the coalition from Aleppo explained to me that the grouping consists of more than 20 brigades, supposedly including Christian fighters. The Euphrates Islamic Liberation Front defines itself as FSA.</b></td></tr>
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-sznK_DWUl18/U1-1WN9tlCI/AAAAAAAAJlc/5kGwyfv6Vr8/s1600/3.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-sznK_DWUl18/U1-1WN9tlCI/AAAAAAAAJlc/5kGwyfv6Vr8/s1600/3.jpg" height="225" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><b>Members of Liwa al-Fatah al-Mubin, 27th April.</b></td></tr>
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-XbmkVMua4lg/U1-1cqg97VI/AAAAAAAAJlk/1Z7lcFgtE80/s1600/4.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-XbmkVMua4lg/U1-1cqg97VI/AAAAAAAAJlk/1Z7lcFgtE80/s1600/4.jpg" height="225" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><b>Another photo of members of Liwa al-Fatah al-Mubin on the same day.</b></td></tr>
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-wxui7wXR4YM/U1-1oxW9UpI/AAAAAAAAJls/LwFRhap4uwk/s1600/5.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-wxui7wXR4YM/U1-1oxW9UpI/AAAAAAAAJls/LwFRhap4uwk/s1600/5.jpg" height="225" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><b>Members of Liwa al-Fatah al-Mubin before heading out to fight, 27th April</b>.</td></tr>
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Though a signatory to the joint statement noted above, it should be pointed out that Liwa al-Fatah al-Mubin does not appear to be part of the coalition of factions governing the town itself, but is primarily based in the surrounding countryside, and is arguably the most influential in that area.</div>
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-xHrl-bUKW2Q/U1-1v8gGX4I/AAAAAAAAJl0/vp5fKyOCrk4/s1600/6.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-xHrl-bUKW2Q/U1-1v8gGX4I/AAAAAAAAJl0/vp5fKyOCrk4/s1600/6.jpg" height="147" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><b>The five factions of the town of Albukamal: Kata’ib Allahu Akbar, Katiba Bayariq al-Sunna, Liwa al-Qadisiya al-Islamiya, Kata’ib Junud al-Haq (Jabhat al-Nusra), Liwa al-Mujahid Omar al-Mukhtar. In my first article on Albukamal I noted there was once an FSA-banner faction in the Albukamal area called Katiba Junud al-Haq that coordinated with Jabhat al-Nusra. It turns out this group was the direct predecessor of Kata’ib Junud al-Haq, which became an affiliate of Jabhat al-Nusra.</b></td></tr>
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<b>3. Katiba Bayariq al-Sunna in reformation: </b>It will be noted in the 27th April joint statement that Katiba Bayariq al-Sunna’s signature is absent. This is because the group is currently undergoing a reformation process following a change of leadership, which also led to the dismissal of some of the group’s members. Hence it is otherwise inactive.</div>
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<b>4. New convoy heading out from Albukamal to fight ISIS:</b> In light of the ongoing fighting between ISIS and other factions in the al-Markadah area of southern Hasakah province and western localities of Deir az-Zor province like Kabajeb, the factions of Albukamal are sending out new convoys to fight against ISIS. </div>
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-utS5buc57c8/U1-2S-qflxI/AAAAAAAAJmA/IDL9kMIZEKE/s1600/7.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-utS5buc57c8/U1-2S-qflxI/AAAAAAAAJmA/IDL9kMIZEKE/s1600/7.png" height="250" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><b><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=youtu.be&v=SGyGKXr8jP0&app=desktop">Saddam al-Jamal</a> in a recent ISIS al-Itisam Media video, accusing Jabhat al-Nusra of working with other factions (in particular the Hay’at al-Arkan: i.e. SMC) to form a united front against ISIS. A particular purpose in this video is to highlight Jabhat al-Nusra’s supposed inconsistency in Jowlani’s pronunciation of takfir on SMC-aligned groups while working with them in the eastern region (e.g. the Deir az-Zor locality of <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dDJRUu2WkGw&feature=youtu.be">Muhessen</a>) against ISIS. Saddam proudly speaks of being a “soldier” in ISIS and his “repentance” in joining ISIS. He also rejects allegations of indiscriminate killing by ISIS, and accuses the other factions, on whom he pronounces takfir, of fighting “for the sake of dunya [the material world], while we fight for the sake of martyrdom and the Hereafter.” He concludes by emphasizing ISIS does not want to fight but is just striving for the arbitration of God’s law.</b></td></tr>
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-YWsSrQf3fSk/U1-2kluSKLI/AAAAAAAAJmI/P6BBhkxXc-c/s1600/8.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-YWsSrQf3fSk/U1-2kluSKLI/AAAAAAAAJmI/P6BBhkxXc-c/s1600/8.png" height="250" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><b>ISIS officially justified its assault on Albukamal as an operation to free prisoners.</b></td></tr>
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-FeeiomOUo-o/U1-236sNZJI/AAAAAAAAJmQ/0X2JJVN_5SE/s1600/9.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-FeeiomOUo-o/U1-236sNZJI/AAAAAAAAJmQ/0X2JJVN_5SE/s1600/9.jpg" height="223" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><b>Part of the new rebel convoy heading out from Albukamal on 28th April to fight ISIS. In the photo are vehicles belonging to the independent group Liwa al-Mujahid Omar al-Mukhtar</b></td></tr>
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-Xau_qB8_ozE/U1-29Q0MJHI/AAAAAAAAJmY/6LcQFFMDybw/s1600/10.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-Xau_qB8_ozE/U1-29Q0MJHI/AAAAAAAAJmY/6LcQFFMDybw/s1600/10.jpg" height="292" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><b>Part of the new convoy including Jabhat al-Nusra to fight ISIS.</b></td></tr>
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<b>Summary</b></div>
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In short, the factions currently governing the town of Albukamal are:</div>
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- Jabhat al-Nusra</div>
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- Kata’ib Allahu Akbar (Authenticity and Development Front)</div>
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- Liwa al-Qadisiya al-Islamiya (independent, close to Jabhat al-Nusra)</div>
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- Katiba Bayariq al-Sunna (independent, close to Jabhat al-Nusra).</div>
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- Liwa al-Mujahid Omar al-Mukhtar (independent).</div>
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But in the surrounding countryside more factions exist.</div>
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<i>Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi is a Shillman-Ginsburg Fellow at the Middle East Forum.</i></div>
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Brown Moseshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17562126209980810351noreply@blogger.com3tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4871088750473093560.post-80839913940714877492014-04-26T13:52:00.002-07:002014-04-26T13:52:44.506-07:00Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi - The Latakia FrontBy <a href="https://twitter.com/ajaltamimi">Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi</a>.<br />
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It has now been just over a month since rebels launched a new offensive on regime-held areas in northern Latakia province in the wake of rebel losses in Qalamoun and Homs, so how stands the current situation, and who is fighting?<br />
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<b><u>Current Positions </u></b><br />
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As of now, the historically Armenian Christian town of Kasab- now almost entirely emptied of its original residents as inhabitants fled in fear of the rebel offensive- remains in the hands of rebel forces, who have named their offensive the “Battle of Anfal” (‘spoils of war’: a reference to eighth chapter of the Qur’an). The capture of Kasab allowed for rebels to reach the Mediterranean shoreline in Syria for the first time via the nearby locality of Samra.<br />
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<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><b>On the beach by Samra, Latakia: “We are all Jabhat al-Nusra.”</b></td></tr>
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Though much outcry was raised over a supposed impending ‘genocide’ of Armenians in the town at the hands of the rebels with the “#SaveKessab” hashtag on Twitter, no convincing evidence exists pointing to mass slaughter or rampant desecration of churches in the town, drawing attention away from the contrasting situation in the Damascus province town of <a href="http://english.al-akhbar.com/photoblogs/churches-yabrud-ruins">Yabroud</a>, which- recently captured by the Syrian army coordinating with foreign Shi’a militias- has shown signs of desecration of churches by rebels. </div>
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<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><b>While churches have not been desecrated en masse in the town of Kasab, many rebels in the offensive are keen to emphasize a supposed new Islamic identity for the town. In this photo, under the initiative “Islamic Kasab,” a Jabhat al-Nusra member paints some walls in white. </b></td></tr>
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-N-S3hyi6NgY/U1waFT__MxI/AAAAAAAAJiY/p1mPPHw94SQ/s1600/3.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-N-S3hyi6NgY/U1waFT__MxI/AAAAAAAAJiY/p1mPPHw94SQ/s1600/3.jpg" height="400" width="300" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><b>Abu Qatada al-Masri, an Egyptian member of Jabhat al-Nusra, says that his fellow mujahid in the photo here tore down the cross in this church in Kasab.</b></td></tr>
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For a time the rebels also held the area of Burj 45 (“Tower 45”) to the south of Kasab and leading the way to Latakia city itself, but this place has since been reclaimed by regime forces. Generally, fighting is now much more sporadic as rebels have unsuccessfully tried to regain Burj 45 and regime forces remain confined to the rural areas of the Kasab district, though in short, the rebels have certainly been put on the defensive.</div>
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<b><u>Rebel Goals</u></b></div>
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The question then arises of what the rebels’ goal here is. The offensive did not simply arise out of nowhere. It should be seen in the context of the recent rebel losses in Damascus and Homs province: that is, the hope is to score at least a psychological blow against the regime by pushing into what has been seen as the regime’s homeland and, if not capturing regime territory, then at least kill figures closely tied to Assad- something that was achieved this time around with the killing of Bashar al-Assad’s cousin Hilal early on in the offensive. Particular significance is attached to reaching or capturing <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xqGLPicCJwA">Assad’s ancestral village of al-Qardaha</a>- something that was also underlined in the offensive launched <a href="http://jihadology.net/2013/09/18/musings-of-an-iraqi-brasenostril-on-jihad-moroccan-ex-guantanamo-detainees-fighting-in-syrias-civil-war/">last summer</a>- but both then as now, that goal is unlikely to be reached, apart from the occasional mortar and rocket falling on the area.</div>
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<b><u>Participating Groups: Regime Side</u></b></div>
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On the regime side, it is not simply the Syrian army and the local branch of the National Defense Force (NDF, which in Latakia was led by Hilal), for there is also the militia group known as the “Muqawama Suriya” (“Syrian Resistance”), which prior to the outbreak of conflict in Syria was called “The People’s Front for the Liberation of the Sanjak of Alexandretta”: dedicated to bringing Turkey’s Hatay province just north of Latakia under Syrian control, as Syria has never accepted the territory’s incorporation into Turkey since it was ceded to the latter by the French in 1937. </div>
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Led by Turkish-born Alawite Mihrac Ural (also known as Ali Kayali, who, despite initial rebel claims, I can confirm via direct contact has not been killed and remains alive and well in Latakia), the Muqawama Suriya claims an inclusive national line not distinguishing among sect, the militia is primarily Alawite and Twelver Shi’a in composition and has <a href="http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/aymenn-al-tamimi-speaks-to-ali-kayali-and-profiles-the-syrian-resistance-a-pro-assad-militia-force/">largely dedicated itself</a> to defending such areas in Latakia, Idlib, Homs and Aleppo provinces.</div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
Though the Muqawama Suriya is sometimes thought of as a joke group that does no meaningful fighting, the militia has in fact lost some fighters in the current rebel offensive in Latakia, concurrent with the militia’s assuming a more active role in aiding the Syrian army’s offensive in Aleppo province. Most recently in the Latakia fighting, the Muqawama Suriya conducted a joint operation with the Syrian army to clear the Burj 45 area of rebels. </div>
</div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-0J8QUXHEkqY/U1waZqexp8I/AAAAAAAAJig/UTNyXzCzmwU/s1600/4.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-0J8QUXHEkqY/U1waZqexp8I/AAAAAAAAJig/UTNyXzCzmwU/s1600/4.jpg" height="223" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><b>NDF on Mount Chalma in the Kasab district on 19th April.</b></td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-7-XNI0JlF5w/U1wae_rNyXI/AAAAAAAAJio/1790E9yEUh8/s1600/5.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-7-XNI0JlF5w/U1wae_rNyXI/AAAAAAAAJio/1790E9yEUh8/s1600/5.jpg" height="281" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><b>Ali Kayali (centre) at the funeral on 26th March for the local Syrian army commander of Burj 45 who was killed by rebels in the initial offensive.</b></td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-cCqiyrWdxyk/U1wak6_ZwzI/AAAAAAAAJiw/NY0RH2EdhxM/s1600/6.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-cCqiyrWdxyk/U1wak6_ZwzI/AAAAAAAAJiw/NY0RH2EdhxM/s1600/6.jpg" height="400" width="372" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><b>Nawar Yusuf, a fighter for the Muqawama Suriya whose death was announced on 31st March as part of the ongoing fighting in Latakia.</b></td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-vQ7fRA6OhtI/U1was9AB4kI/AAAAAAAAJi4/SqwJSFFUAhk/s1600/7.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-vQ7fRA6OhtI/U1was9AB4kI/AAAAAAAAJi4/SqwJSFFUAhk/s1600/7.jpg" height="300" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><b>Members of the Muqawama Suriya in the Burj 45 area in mid-April.</b></td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<div>
<div>
In line with the regime’s narrative, Ali Kayali told me that the rebels are “terrorists” who have been sent over the border by the Turkish government under the “Salafi dictator” Erdogan. Just as Hezbollah supporters attached particular importance to capturing Yabroud with the song “<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZLvU-EN6R2M">Finish your victory in Yabroud</a>” by Lebanese singer Ali Barakat, so the Muqawama Suriya has attached the same significance to the objective of recapturing Kasab, releasing a song attributed to Ali Barakat under the title “<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-T9rxLMZWP0">Finish your victory in Kasab</a>,” whose lyrics include: “Oh Nusra [Jabhat al-Nusra], we are coming, oh you who resist, the spirit of God is your edge…We protect ash-Sham with heroism and honor. Syria will remain free. Coming, we will cleanse all the land and wipe out da3esh and Nusra.”</div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
The term da3esh is a derogatory Arabic acronym for the al-Qa’ida-offshoot the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham [ISIS], which, unlike last summer, is not participating on the rebel side in this offensive, having withdrawn from Latakia province to the east some time before in order to consolidate control over Raqqa, eastern Aleppo province, and most of southern Hasakah province. </div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
In addition to the Muqawama Suriya, two other irregular regime-aligned forces are playing a role in the ongoing fight by the regime to retake Kasab. The first of these is the Ba’ath Brigades, which also plays a role in the fighting in Aleppo province and whose local Latakia commander- Hussam Ibrahim Khadra- was killed recently. The second is the Suqur al-Sahara (‘Desert Falcons’: see my profile <a href="http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/desert-falcons-elite-pro-assad-force/">here</a>) elite forces that previously have tried to secure Syrian desert border areas with Iraq and Jordan.</div>
</div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-n41tn5JZVSU/U1wbCPsLSVI/AAAAAAAAJjA/7v1yAunxTqQ/s1600/8.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-n41tn5JZVSU/U1wbCPsLSVI/AAAAAAAAJjA/7v1yAunxTqQ/s1600/8.jpg" height="336" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><b>Funeral for Hussam Ibrahin Khadra, also attended by Ali Kayali. 23rd April.</b></td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-fay-7azkqrM/U1wbJi4wgGI/AAAAAAAAJjI/NPDsloYkjVI/s1600/9.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-fay-7azkqrM/U1wbJi4wgGI/AAAAAAAAJjI/NPDsloYkjVI/s1600/9.jpg" height="266" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><b>Car decorated for the funeral of Hussam Ibrahim Khadra on 23rd April</b></td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-k0cGoUg1DZA/U1wbReut3SI/AAAAAAAAJjQ/TvZfJg3o33c/s1600/10.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-k0cGoUg1DZA/U1wbReut3SI/AAAAAAAAJjQ/TvZfJg3o33c/s1600/10.jpg" height="300" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><b>Suqur al-Sahara ambush point set up in the forests around Kasab</b></td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-TaiMF_ionxI/U1wbc9irT0I/AAAAAAAAJjY/YEUzoUJLpNc/s1600/11.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-TaiMF_ionxI/U1wbc9irT0I/AAAAAAAAJjY/YEUzoUJLpNc/s1600/11.jpg" height="400" width="300" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><b>Two members of Suqur al-Sahara in the ongoing regime push for Kasab. Photo from 24th April.</b></td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-vfPhHpi5KEg/U1wblu5BbqI/AAAAAAAAJjg/79hSXe_eb-U/s1600/12.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-vfPhHpi5KEg/U1wblu5BbqI/AAAAAAAAJjg/79hSXe_eb-U/s1600/12.jpg" height="400" width="300" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><b>Suqur al-Sahara fighter in the countryside of the Kasab area.</b></td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<div>
<div>
<b><u>Rebel Side</u></b></div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
While one can easily be inclined to dismiss routine regime claims of a foreign conspiracy, there is no doubt that in common with the failed 2013 summer offensive, the ongoing battale in Latakia is being spearheaded on the rebel side by muhajireen (‘foreign fighters’). The most important groupings on the rebel side are the Islamic Front (the Salafi Islamist coalition: specifically Ahrar ash-Sham and Kata’ib Ansar ash-Sham), Harakat Sham al-Islam, the al-Qa’ida-affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra, and the Chechen-led grouping <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n8AWjNbIYOk">Junud ash-Sham</a>. Free Syrian Army-banner groups have only played a very minor supporting role.</div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
For the Islamic Front, Kata’ib Ansar ash-Sham has played a particularly important role in supply of heavy weaponry for the offensive, and operations are directed under the group’s Chechen muhajireen component, specifically one <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eFyB_FW2uGA">Abu Musa ash-Shishani</a>. One should also note that Ansar ash-Sham have a battalion named after the first president of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria that broke away from Russia: <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hQYqzeFOkaM">Dzhokar Dudayev</a>. Chechens play a leading role here is not to be unexpected: they are familiar with hilly terrain, and have long maintained a presence in Latakia. The group is currently focused on <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AttchSAlgHA">trying to reclaim Burj 45</a>.</div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
Harakat Sham al-Islam is arguably the second most important group behind the offensive. Though an independent organization, it shares the same ideology as al-Qa’ida (i.e. establishing a Caliphate over the entire world, as a Syrian member of Harakat Sham al-Islam <a href="http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/latakia-front-interview-rebel-side/">confirmed</a> to me). Taking an official anti-fitna stance in the conflict between ISIS and other rebel groups, Harakat Sham al-Islam is nonetheless closer to Jabhat al-Nusra, as my contact pointed out to me, which comes as no surprise since the group’s deceased founder- Abu Ahmad al-Muhajir (Ibrahim bin Shakaran, who was once a detainee in Guantánamo)- was a member of al-Qa’ida Central and fought in the Tora Bora mountains of Afghanistan. Like the group’s founder, Harakat Sham al-Islam largely consists of Moroccan muhajireen, with a minor native Syrian component. It has throughout the conflict been primarily based in Latakia, and participated in last summer’s offensive.</div>
</div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-Gc95DIwGKvI/U1wcFw9zwqI/AAAAAAAAJjo/WtwQMKeg-Q4/s1600/13.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-Gc95DIwGKvI/U1wcFw9zwqI/AAAAAAAAJjo/WtwQMKeg-Q4/s1600/13.jpg" height="300" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><b>Al-Mathna al-Maghrebi, a Moroccan fighter for Harakat Sham al-Islam killed in the Latakia offensive.</b></td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/--vT4tQVTp1s/U1wcMPkyzSI/AAAAAAAAJjw/BQ3knFOYHqA/s1600/14.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/--vT4tQVTp1s/U1wcMPkyzSI/AAAAAAAAJjw/BQ3knFOYHqA/s1600/14.jpg" height="400" width="266" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><b>Ibrahim bin Shakaran: the founder of Harakat Sham al-Islam, killed during the fighting in Latakia.</b></td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<div>
Under Jabhat al-Nusra’s wing, one should note in particular the muhajireen group Suqur al-Izz, which was founded by Saudi fighters. Like Harakat Sham al-Islam, it is officially independent but is ideologically aligned with al-Qa’ida. Though no official pledge of allegiance has been made to Jabhat al-Nusra, <a href="http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/muhajireen-battalions-syria-part-two/">the group’s inability to support itself financially</a> from private Gulf donors has made it ever more dependent on Jabhat al-Nusra. At the end of last year, another foreign fighters’ battalion in Latakia- Katiba al-Muhajireen- pledged formal allegiance to Jabhat al-Nusra.</div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-_AtA9DSgvgM/U1wcae6vpFI/AAAAAAAAJj4/FfOam_f9-Q8/s1600/15.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-_AtA9DSgvgM/U1wcae6vpFI/AAAAAAAAJj4/FfOam_f9-Q8/s1600/15.jpg" height="390" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><b>Abu Maryan al-Jawfi, a Suqur al-Izz fighter killed in the Latakia offensive.</b></td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<div>
<div>
<b><u>Conclusion</u></b></div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
Ultimately, the fighting in northern Latakia, regardless of whether the regime eventually retakes the town of Kasab, only serves to reinforce the stalemate across Syria. Though no churches may have been desecrated in Kasab, the importance of foreign fighters on the rebel side- harboring Islamic supremacist sentiments (e.g. describing Alawites as “<a href="http://safeshare.tv/w/ZiNcLUfczn">enemies of religion</a>,” while my Harakat Sham al-Islam contact told me Christians of Kasab should be subjugated as second-class citizens or dhimmis)- hardly reassures minorities, and will only serve to strengthen support for the regime in the long-run, just as the rebel-YPG conflict out to the north and the east has only reinforced stalemate and led to the supreme position of the PYD among Syrian Kurds.</div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
<i>Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi is a Shillman-Ginsburg Fellow at the Middle East Forum.</i></div>
</div>
<div>
<br /></div>
Brown Moseshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17562126209980810351noreply@blogger.com14tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4871088750473093560.post-62540232302929832512014-04-25T10:41:00.001-07:002014-04-25T10:41:23.827-07:00Guardian Masterclasses - How to be a citizen journalist with Brown MosesI've teamed up with the Guardian to put together a masterclass teaching my methods and techniques.<br />
<br />
Citizen journalists are outperforming the mainstream media, breaking new ground and untouchable stories in countries such as China, Kenya and Brazil. But thanks to the vast repositories of video footage, satellite images and eyewitness reports posted on social media, anyone with an internet connection can report from the world's most dangerous territories without setting foot in them. Founder of the famous Brown Moses blog, Eliot Higgins research into the Syrian conflict has inspired questions in parliament, major stories in the Guardian and New York Times, and praise from Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch.<br />
<br />
During this large-scale seminar, Eliot reveals the tools and techniques for tracking down sources of new footage and information, verifying facts, spotting fakes and accurately geolocating material. He also offers tips on how to use multiple sources to build up a comprehensive picture of on-the-ground realities.<br />
<br />
This course offers a unique opportunity to learn from a recognised pioneer in the field, whose work at the vanguard of social media forensics is prized by news outlets, NGOs and governments alike.<br />
<br />
<b>This course is for you if...</b><br />
<br />
<ul>
<li>You're interested in exploiting vast reserves of new information for your own writing or blog</li>
<li>You're a journalist looking for new sources for stories or corroborative evidence</li>
<li>You're a researcher or investigator for a charity or NGO, especially those working in conflict zones</li>
<li>You're a documentary maker who wants to find new, original and trustworthy sources for open source footage</li>
<li>You're interested in methods of gathering competitive intelligence</li>
</ul>
<br />
<b>Course description</b><br />
<br />
This is a large-scale seminar during which Eliot Higgins reveals the tools and techniques needed to find, verify and geolocate news footage through social media. Eliot will demonstrate practical application of his methods, using his own investigation of Sarin gas attacks in Damascus as a model. Topics covered on the day include:<br />
<br />
<ul>
<li>What is open source information?</li>
<li>Finding open source information on social media</li>
<li>Primary sources on social media, how to find them and why they are important</li>
<li>An introduction to verification and geolocation</li>
<li>Advanced verification and geolocation techniques</li>
<li>An example of the practical applications of these tools and techniques (The Damascus Sarin attacks)</li>
<li>Q&A with Eliot Higgins and Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi</li>
</ul>
<br />
<b>Tutors profile</b><br />
<br />
Eliot Higgins is an independent conflict analyst who attained global recognition through his Brown Moses blog on the Syrian conflict. Drawing on extensive Arabic language Facebook and YouTube pages and Twitter feeds, his research focuses on collating, filtering and analysing images and text from social media platforms that have, among other stories, provided evidence of supplies of arms to various Syrian opposition groups, as well as chemical weapon usage by the Syrian armed forces. His investigations and research have been widely covered in global media, and he has conducted social media forensics work for organisations including Human Rights Watch.<br />
<br />
<b>Guest speaker profile</b><br />
<br />
Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi is a Shillman-Ginsburg Fellow at the Middle East Forum and a research fellow for the Forum's Jihad-Intel project.<br />
<br />
Ticket information can be found <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/guardian-masterclasses/how-to-be-a-citizen-journalist-brown-moses-eliot-higgins-course">here</a>. Limited to 100 spots, so book soon.Brown Moseshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17562126209980810351noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4871088750473093560.post-27449233731359014032014-04-25T05:17:00.000-07:002014-04-25T05:17:24.971-07:00SecureBio Report - Improvised Chemical Weapons In SyriaThe following report was published by SecureBio on April 13th, authored by Hamish de Bretton-Gordon and Oliver Morton. SecureBio are updating this report to reflect current developments and this new report will be available direct from <a href="http://www.securebio.co.uk/">www.securebio.co.uk</a>. You can also follow <a href="https://twitter.com/securebio">SecureBio on Twitter</a> for updates on CBRNe issues.<br />
<br />
<b>Executive Summary: </b>Toxic Industrial Chemicals (TICs) are readily available and have been previously used to produce improvised or dirty chemical weapons. More recently, we have seen Chlorine used in Iraq in 2007, Hydrogen Cyanide developed by terrorist organisations and individuals around the world (including AQ), Ammonia in the production of homemade explosives and Organophosphates in the production of home made nerve agents (Tokyo in 1995).<br />
<br />
The chemicals used are generally covered under schedule 2 of the Chemical Warfare Convention but owing to the intended nefarious use, they become difficult to track as a small scale weapon through internal borders. Since 2003, Military planners have begun to prioritise the security of TICs across the battlefield but this is unlikely to be of use in Syria. Thankfully, despite the fact that the chemicals are readily available, easy to mix and relatively easy to deliver their usage as a terrorist weapon has not been widely taken up. There are two likely reasons for this:<br />
<ol>
<li>Notoriety. Individuals and organisations like their efforts to be noticed, a big explosion is ideal for this but counter productive to a chemical release. </li>
<li>Risk. Due to the size and scale of agent required to deliver a truly “battle winning” effect, a large footprint will be generated and therefore, easily interdicted. </li>
</ol>
<b>Recommendations:</b> SecureBio assess that the deliberate use of chemical agents, be it CWA or improvised chemical agents, inside Syria remains <b>MODERATE </b>(An attack is possible but not likely). However, SecureBio assess that the accidental release of a TIC or CWA to be a more credible threat and categorise it as <b>SUBSTANTIAL </b>(An attack is a strong possibility.). It is recommended that individuals and crews operating inside Syria, should ensure that they have CBRN PPE available to them, understand the short comings of their equipment and have a prearranged escape plan and “actions on”, under pinned by SecureBio advice.<br />
<br />
<div style="text-align: center;">
<b>SecureBio remain available for further advice, comment and training.</b></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<b>OVERVIEW</b><br />
<b><br /></b>
<b>Introduction.</b> Historically, chemical warfare agents (eg.Tabun Nerve Agent) have been developed either directly or as bi-product from a relatively innocent but never-the-less harmful chemical (eg. Organophosphate used as pesticides). These harmful chemicals, not designed to kill, are usually categorised as toxic industrial chemicals (TICs) however, by modifying the delivery means or combining with other TICs, these chemicals have given rise to improvised or dirty chemical weapons, often referred to as “Kitchen Sink WMDs”.<br />
<br />
The chemicals used in improvised chemical weapon, are typically covered under the Chemical Weapons Convention as a Schedule 2 Chemical; permitting their legitimate manufacturing in controlled quantities. However, to better understand the threats posed by TICs, the International Task Force 40 (ITF40) list was created in 2003; ITF 40 prioritises some 1756 (and growing) of the most dangerous chemicals readily available. 63 of the chemicals included on the ITF40 list are considered so dangerous that they are classed as military priority industrial hazards.<br />
<br />
Some of the chemicals included on the ITF40 list are:<br />
<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-2U41MN9uviY/U1pAhypgXfI/AAAAAAAAJg8/VNYYyNT56Nc/s1600/Hazards.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-2U41MN9uviY/U1pAhypgXfI/AAAAAAAAJg8/VNYYyNT56Nc/s1600/Hazards.jpg" height="126" width="400" /></a></div>
<br />
<b>THE AGENTS</b><br />
<b><br /></b>
Annex A covers the 8 chemicals listed above, under High Hazards, in greater detail and includes<br />
signs and symptoms and commercial uses. It is SecureBio’s assessment that the most likely<br />
agents to be used in Syria, as part of an improvised chemical weapon, are Chlorine, Hydrogen<br />
Cyanide or an Organophosphate (all marked in bold).<br />
<br />
Lethality. Whilst generally considered to be less lethal than Chemical Warfare Agents, the 8 high<br />
hazard chemicals listed above are considered lethal in relatively small doses, usually measured in<br />
parts per million (PPM). To better understand this, SecureBio have created a scale (below); using<br />
Hydrogen Cyanide as the benchmark at 250PPM. On this scale, Chlorine is considered to be<br />
x0.25 less lethal than Hydrogen Cyanide (it is still exceptionally harmful), where as Sarin Nerve<br />
gas is x4166 more lethal than Hydrogen Cyanide.<br />
<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-xTNvdP0D_Bg/U1pBhkTRN5I/AAAAAAAAJhE/11KBr5RjBCQ/s1600/Danger.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-xTNvdP0D_Bg/U1pBhkTRN5I/AAAAAAAAJhE/11KBr5RjBCQ/s1600/Danger.jpg" height="65" width="550" /></a></div>
<b>DELIVERY</b><br />
<br />
In order to effectively turn a TIC into an improvised chemical weapon, a means of delivery is<br />
required. There are a number of ways to deliver the dirty chemical agent however, SecureBio<br />
would suggest that there are 4 primary routes, each with their own pros and cons; Chemical IED,<br />
Binary Device, Sprayer and finally as Indirect Fire (IDF).<br />
<br />
<b>Chemical Improvised Explosive Device.</b> Chemical IEDs have been seen on many occasions in<br />
Iraq, either as a deliberate device or inadvertently utilising legacy chemical munitions, such as an<br />
unidentified Mustard shell. 2007 saw an increase in the use of chemical IEDs in the form of<br />
Chlorine devices (see below image).<br />
<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-NAm40vCxRnU/U1pCCNCZwQI/AAAAAAAAJhM/BNL2LXGrbWo/s1600/Chlroine+VBIED.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-NAm40vCxRnU/U1pCCNCZwQI/AAAAAAAAJhM/BNL2LXGrbWo/s1600/Chlroine+VBIED.jpg" height="302" width="400" /></a></div>
<br />
<br />
<b>Pros.</b> This is by far the simplest and historically most popular method to deliver a chemical agent; it relies on existing IED knowledge to provide the burster charge, with the chemical agent ideally stored in a pressurised container, being released on initiation of the IED. It also creates a high degree of attention, due to the explosion<br />
<b>Cons.</b> The system relies on the intended target coming to the device and more importantly the explosion typically burns most of the chemical agent off, thereby rendering it useless.<br />
<br />
<b>Binary Device</b>. These require a little more chemistry but are still relatively simple to manufacturer; again they have been seen in Iraq, Afghanistan and also on terrorist and suicide websites from around the world. The most widely covered Binary Device is the Mubtaker (see below image), which utilises two separate containers to mix Potassium Cyanide (commonly used in the jewellery industry) and an acid together; this will produce Hydrogen Cyanide.<br />
<br />
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<a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-Qx6f187B96Y/U1pCjX2qy0I/AAAAAAAAJhU/YAqEETXEBGg/s1600/Binary.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-Qx6f187B96Y/U1pCjX2qy0I/AAAAAAAAJhU/YAqEETXEBGg/s1600/Binary.jpg" height="180" width="500" /></a></div>
<br />
<b>Pros</b>. The device is widely publicised on the internet and consequently relatively easy to manufacturer. Furthermore, in its constituent parts is easy to transport and critically poses very little hazard to the operator. <b>Cons.</b> Again there is a reliance on the intended target coming to the device and will generally only impact on a small area; ideally suited to confined spaces.<br />
<br />
<b>Sprayer</b>. The most effective method for delivering a dirty chemical (or biological) agent but generally considered unpopular due to its lack of “spectacular” effect. The system requires either a garden sprayer or crop-duster and a moving platform, ideally an aircraft. In 1990 the Aum Shinrikyo cult (infamous for the use of homemade Sarin in Tokyo) utilised truck-borne sprayers to launch a biological attack against the US Navy; nobody noticed and the agent was blown out to sea.<br />
<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-IYjD2x3O25A/U1pPuU7eLyI/AAAAAAAAJhk/-db57OG6M_o/s1600/Sprayer.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-IYjD2x3O25A/U1pPuU7eLyI/AAAAAAAAJhk/-db57OG6M_o/s1600/Sprayer.jpg" height="239" width="320" /></a></div>
<br />
<b>Pros.</b> The agent is delivered in the most effective and cheapest method, allowing it to be carried downwind for some distance, especially if released at slight altitude.<br />
<b>Cons.</b> The sprayer is highly dependent on wind direction and will generally require a suitably protected individual to be in the area. Additionally a suitable delivery platform needs to be procured.<br />
<br />
<b>Indirect Fire.</b> Technically the hardest to achieve; a mortar bomb, artillery shell or rocket requires a high degree of stability inflight to maintain accuracy. Chemical agents are typically liquid which will dramatically affect the stability of flight, causing the missile to at best fly erratically or at worst break up en route to the target. Furthermore, a burster charge and fuse would be required to ensure that the agent is effectively released over a wider area and doesn’t just generate a mucky puddle at point of impact (below picture). Consequently, it is assessed as the least likely method attack, owing to the technical hurdles that must be over come.<br />
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<a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-OwEGD9K_0oM/U1pQCq_xkII/AAAAAAAAJhs/sL5h6ZRtToo/s1600/Munition.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-OwEGD9K_0oM/U1pQCq_xkII/AAAAAAAAJhs/sL5h6ZRtToo/s1600/Munition.jpg" height="243" width="320" /></a></div>
<br />
<b>Pros.</b> Allows a dirty chemical agent to be fired with a high degree of standoff and can (theoretically) burst over a given area.<br />
<b>Cons. </b>Technology required to make this an effective delivery means.<br />
<br />
<b>RECOMMENDATIONS</b><br />
<b><br /></b>
Protective Equipment. Toxic Industrial Chemicals behave very differently to Chemical Warfare Agents (CWA) and consequently traditional CBRN equipment often has significantly reduced efficacy against them, eg. In the open air, Chlorine may defeat a CWA filter in under a minute (specialist Toxic Industrial filters are available.). It is therefore, best to avoid contact with TICs, where possible however, should crews find themselves inadvertently caught out, SecureBio provide the following advice:<br />
1. Don your respiratory protection immediately, if you have it.<br />
2. Fasten your chemical protective clothing, if you are ALREADY wearing it.<br />
3. Leave the area immediately, upwind of the hazard.<br />
4. Where possible, head to high ground.<br />
5. Conduct immediate decontamination, away from any potential hazard.<br />
<br />
<b>CONCLUSION</b><br />
<b><br /></b>
In modern times security organisations have seen TICs being increasingly used by terrorists and those seeking to commit suicide. SecureBio typically report 2-3 major incidents per week involving a TIC death, usually a suicide. In addition to this terrorist websites and counter-insurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have not only seen these dirty chemical weapons being used but also highlighted the vulnerability of individuals to attack from improvised chemical warfare agents.<br />
<br />
The situation in Syria is clearly becoming more and more desperate however, both sides are fully aware of the impact of using Chemical Warfare Agents. It is therefore assessed as unlikely that the regime would use CWAs, unless left with no-alternative. However the use of red lines for CWA draws two further possibilities.<br />
<br />
Firstly, the FSA (or other fighters) acquire CWAs, use them and then attribute blame to the Assad regime, thereby triggering western intervention. Alternatively, both sides play semantics and develop improvised chemical warfare agents and launch a dirty chemical weapon attack, on the proviso that it hasn’t breached Obama’s redline.<br />
<br />
It is SecureBio’s assessment that the use of improvised chemical weapons is not in the interests of either side and therefore, assessed as unlikely. However, utilising existing CWA stockpiles and blaming the other side is entirely plausible and continues to pose the greatest threat. Consequently, SecureBio assess the deliberate use of chemicals weapons to be a MODERATE threat, inside Syria.<br />
<br />
The final and most credible scenario option is the accidental realise of TICs or CWAs, through the inadvertent destruction of a processing plant, storage facility, or accidental firing of an unidentified CWA munitions. Owing to the number of facilities and availability of CWA munitions, SecureBio assess the accidental release of a TIC/CWA as SUBSTANTIAL.<br />
<br />
A pdf of the full report, including details of improvised chemical agents, can be found <a href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/qdvdz7yh9rhgbd0/20130327-Dirty%20Chemical%20Weapons%20Threat%20Assessment-SecureBio-ODM%20%282%29.pdf">here</a>.<br />
<br />Brown Moseshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17562126209980810351noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4871088750473093560.post-41040978326545535512014-04-22T04:42:00.004-07:002014-04-22T04:42:42.147-07:00Evidence From 2 Weeks Of Chlorine Barrel Bomb AttacksOver the past 10 days I've collected videos from various alleged chemical attacks in Syria, all of which appear to be linked to the alleged use of chlorine gas inside improvised barrel bombs. US officials have <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2014/04/21/world/meast/syria-chemical-u-s-/">recently acknowledge</a> the potential use of chlorine gas in attacks, with one official reportedly stating<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
Our assessment is it is, at a minimum, concentrated chlorine dropped from helicopters, that could only be the regime. </blockquote>
The following are playlists of videos from various attacks that have been reported since April 11th<br />
<br />
<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-eDHqQIZsDM&list=PLPC0Udeof3T7yySO0dNQ2aNDO4Wuzb5JB">April 11th - Kafr Zita, Hama</a><br />
<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WICv_mqgu9I&list=PLPC0Udeof3T5AF43Zf_6k_zJdclOEJ8XQ">April 12th - Al-Taman'ah, Idlib</a><br />
<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DeZYVbFQ4_0&list=PLPC0Udeof3T7uEf4N0tKEGiaro1fmeS0F">April 14th - Atshan, Hama</a><br />
<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dsYdFO7UHk0&list=PLPC0Udeof3T7oUruLAhzyl2t_zifbaWIo">April 16th - Kafr Zita, Hama</a><br />
<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0-aowarUIOg&list=PLPC0Udeof3T4MzUYMprVYrEGo0jfA4QAa">April 18th - Al-Taman'ah, Idlib</a><br />
<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_jfTpsyTFig&list=PLPC0Udeof3T5hSY-Zc8KXwb4D1Ipd_Lru">April 18th - Kafr Zita, Hama</a><br />
<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_jfTpsyTFig&list=PLPC0Udeof3T5hSY-Zc8KXwb4D1Ipd_Lru">April 21st - Telmans, Idlib</a><br />
<br />
It should be noted these playlists represent only some of the reported chlorine attacks over the past 10 days, with at least six having been reported in Kafr Zita over that period. Chemical attacks were also reported in Harasta, Damascus on <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xdlttBzRCCA&list=PLPC0Udeof3T5Jky_Xr6cqhEBriv4D86w0">April 11th</a> and <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dhNVgwywIIQ&list=PLPC0Udeof3T46vndqIXekyjW2R6NgBEQX">April 16th</a>. It should be stressed there's been no way to independently verify these reports.<br />
<br />
Along with videos of victims, videos showing the remains of the improvised barrel bombs used in the attack have also been posted online (<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bx9ebxU38YA&list=PLPC0Udeof3T5Uzu_lvilAKsUecsxUhhOD">playlist</a>). These videos share some similarities with each other, which adds some weight behind the claim chlorine gas was used. The following video from Kafr Zita shows the remains of two barrel bombs reportedly used in the attack, with the remains of what appear to be chlorine cylinders are part of the debris<br />
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<br />
It's worth noting the yellow paint on the chlorine cylinders, the colour coding used for industrial chlorine cylinders in many parts of the world.<br />
<br />
Two days after this video was posted online, another video from Kafr Zita was uploaded showing the remains of what was claimed to be another chlorine barrel bomb<br />
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<br />
In this case it appears explosive det cord has been wrapped around the neck of the gas cylinder, no doubt in an attempt to explosively detach it from the cylinder on impact. The colours on this cylinder are interesting as well, it appears to be a yellow undercoat with red painted on top. It's not entirely visible, but it could possibly be an ammonia cylinder, which is usually painting yellow with a red top.<br />
<br />
Videos from the April 21st attack at Telmens (<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rGxojZb-UlA&list=PLPC0Udeof3T5dLb1N1LvLDIaYTMkBxz0c">playlist</a>) also show the remains of barrel bombs, as well as dead animals near the impact sites<br />
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<br />
It appears in the first video we can yet again see yellow paint on a cylinder inside the barrel bomb. Neither video is terribly clear, but there do appear to be some small clues chlorine was used again.<br />
<br />
<br />Brown Moseshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17562126209980810351noreply@blogger.com16tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4871088750473093560.post-19474509934272297742014-04-17T05:07:00.000-07:002014-04-17T05:07:47.017-07:00Two New Significant DIY Barrel Bomb Videos - Chemical And SkinnyOver the last 24 hours, two new videos have been uploaded to YouTube from different areas of Syria showing interesting variations in DIY barrel bombs.<br />
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
The first, from Kafr Zita, shows the remains of two DIY barrel bombs that have been dropped on the town</div>
<div>
<br /></div>
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<div>
<br /></div>
This video shows the remains of a DIY barrel bomb and chlorine cylinder that was reportedly used in an attack on April 12th (covered <a href="http://brown-moses.blogspot.com/2014/04/evidence-chlorine-gas-was-used-in-kafr.html">here</a>). Later in the video, we see the remains of a badly damaged cylinder that shares very similar markings, from a more recent attack, and it appears since the initial reported chlorine barrel bomb attack on April 11th, there's been <a href="http://www.vdc-sy.info/index.php/en/reports/1397487934#.U0wGXfldVDN">a number of attacks reported</a>. Only last night another chlorine barrel bomb attack was reported, with <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dsYdFO7UHk0&list=PLPC0Udeof3T7oUruLAhzyl2t_zifbaWIo">several videos</a> uploaded from Kafr Zita.<br />
<br />
Another video posted today from the town of <a href="http://wikimapia.org/#lang=en&lat=35.441110&lon=36.650155&z=14&m=b">Khan Shikhoun</a> shows the remains of a DIY barrel bomb<br />
<br />
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What's interesting about this is it's a skinny version of the types of DIY barrel bombs that have been seen over the last few months (many examples <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UQZnJV_6FoI&list=PLPC0Udeof3T4jks5VP0pITiqYBQUmq3Cp">here</a>). The first wave of DIY barrel bombs were around this smaller size, but there's certain features of this barrel bombs that suggest it's based on the design innovations of the newer, larger, barrel bombs<br />
<br />
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-kuAY0mxgnEU/U0-2YsgnH7I/AAAAAAAAJXo/4soBz2ah7SI/s1600/Tail+fins.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-kuAY0mxgnEU/U0-2YsgnH7I/AAAAAAAAJXo/4soBz2ah7SI/s1600/Tail+fins.jpg" height="291" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Three tail fins [<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BfBNgj2oQuU">Source</a>]</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-lVPG2lep_rQ/U0-2ou6xACI/AAAAAAAAJX4/1JHnCvc1rT4/s1600/Tail+fin+slot.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-lVPG2lep_rQ/U0-2ou6xACI/AAAAAAAAJX4/1JHnCvc1rT4/s1600/Tail+fin+slot.jpg" height="317" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Slot between tail fins [<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=otcb_dZgZjo">Source</a>]</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-d8HEn1jf8-M/U0-2xuZHZhI/AAAAAAAAJYA/aaLAEeJISyY/s1600/Det+cord.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-d8HEn1jf8-M/U0-2xuZHZhI/AAAAAAAAJYA/aaLAEeJISyY/s1600/Det+cord.jpg" height="258" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Det cord [<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R6DhPhNi_IM">Source</a>]</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
So it appears this new, smaller, DIY barrel bomb is based on the design lessons learnt from the new wave of DIY barrel bombs. Why they are using these smaller bombs is unknown for now.<br />
<br />
Something else I noticed during my research for this post is the front end of one of the barrel bombs as it falls, something I only noticed when watching a particular piece of footage frame by frame<br />
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<a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-qSAt9GrTilw/U0_CEgORkxI/AAAAAAAAJYQ/luehLfzJ0Vk/s1600/Impact+fuze+bomb.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-qSAt9GrTilw/U0_CEgORkxI/AAAAAAAAJYQ/luehLfzJ0Vk/s1600/Impact+fuze+bomb.jpg" /></a></div>
<br />
You'll note there appears to be a plate at the front of the bomb, and this is something visible in some videos of DIY barrel bombs<br />
<br />
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-JTBMkz0KjBI/U0_CZ_hXwfI/AAAAAAAAJYY/EGhCtizNkfk/s1600/Impact+fuze.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-JTBMkz0KjBI/U0_CZ_hXwfI/AAAAAAAAJYY/EGhCtizNkfk/s1600/Impact+fuze.jpg" height="262" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">[<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ynoj0NTH_yw">Source</a>]</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
It appears this front plate is part of a large, flat, impact fuze, another piece of information on how these bombs operate.Brown Moseshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17562126209980810351noreply@blogger.com6tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4871088750473093560.post-81092614404562169662014-04-13T02:28:00.000-07:002014-04-14T09:04:09.775-07:00Evidence Chlorine Gas Was Used In A Second, Failed, Chemical Attack On Kafr Zita<i>This is an update of an earlier post.</i><br />
<br />
On April 11th, reports supported by <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-eDHqQIZsDM&list=PLPC0Udeof3T7yySO0dNQ2aNDO4Wuzb5JB">video</a> from the town of <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kafr_Zita">Kafr Zita</a>, Hama, claimed to show the aftermath of a chemical attack on the town. <a href="https://www.facebook.com/kafrzita2011">Reports</a> claimed helicopters had dropped a "barrel bomb" containing a toxic gas on the town, with the below video claiming to show the attack as it happened<br />
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While there's been a number of small alleged chemical attacks reported in the months since the August 21st Sarin attack, this attack was unusual for a number of reasons. First, earlier attacks have mostly (if not entirely) been on front-line positions with adult males being the victims, while in the Kafr Zita attack it appears children made up a significant number of victims. Second, it's a rare occasion both the government and opposition claim an attack took place, with the government claiming Jabhat al-Nusra launched the attack. As reports claim a helicopter dropped the bomb, it seems highly unlikely Jabhat al-Nusra would have been operating a helicopter, unless they have a previously unheard of air-force the Syrian air defence system failed to detect.<br />
<br />
Syrian State TV felt confident enough to <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-27001737">specify the type of agent used</a>, "there is information that the terrorist Nusra Front released toxic chlorine... leading to the death of two people and causing more than 100 people to suffer from suffocation". <br />
<br />
Now, <a href="https://www.facebook.com/kafrzita2011/posts/590516997710408?stream_ref=10">videos</a> and <a href="https://www.facebook.com/kafrzita2011/posts/590508311044610?stream_ref=10">photographs</a> from Kafr Zita provides evidence of a second, failed chemical attack, on the night of April 12th, with the following video showing a container supposedly used in the attack<br />
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<a href="https://www.facebook.com/kafrzita2011/posts/590508311044610?stream_ref=1">Photographs</a> show the markings on the container clearly<br />
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The markings, <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chlorine_gas">CL2</a>, indicate the container has Chlorine gas inside it, with the name of the Chinese company <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Norinco">Norinco</a> also visible. "Bar" is a reference to pressure, so it seems extremely likely this was a cylinder containing Chlorine gas.<br />
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Reports from the Kafr Zita media centre claims the cylinder was inside a DIY barrel bomb which failed to explode, shown in the below video. This seems an incredibly badly designed way of deploying chlorine, but may be the only option available after the OPCW's work in Syria, and like the <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chlorine_bombings_in_Iraq">chlorine bombs used in Iraq</a> appear to be better at spreading terror than chlorine. <br />
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In the videos and photographs this is specifically described as being dropped from a helicopter. Again, there's no evidence of Jabhat al-Nusra have a helicopter, and considering Kafr Zita has been the focus of Syrian military activity for the past weeks (including<a href="http://brown-moses.blogspot.co.uk/2014/02/evidence-of-syrian-military-deploying.html"> the first deployment of BM-30 launched cluster munitions</a>) it seems unlikely the Syrian military would have missed a mystery helicopter flying overhead. One also has to ask how Syrian State TV could state Chlorine was used without access to the site, a pro-opposition area. One also has to wonder how much State TV's claims Jabhat al-Nusra was responsible is influenced by Seymour Hersh's<a href="http://www.lrb.co.uk/v36/n08/seymour-m-hersh/the-red-line-and-the-rat-line"> recent claims</a> Jabhat al-Nusra were responsible for the August 21st Sarin attack.<br />
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Thanks to <a href="https://twitter.com/markito0171">@markito0171</a> and <a href="https://twitter.com/7oriaWBas">@7oriaWBas</a> for highlighting the videos and photographs.<br />
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<b>Update </b>The Violations Documentation Center has now produced a detailed report on the attacks, which can be read <a href="http://www.vdc-sy.info/index.php/en/reports/1397487934#.U0wGXfldVDN">here</a>.Brown Moseshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17562126209980810351noreply@blogger.com26tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4871088750473093560.post-65988548415920518332014-04-12T00:30:00.000-07:002014-04-12T00:35:03.582-07:00The Fighting in Abu Kamal (Albukamal): Background and Analysis<b>By <a href="https://twitter.com/ajaltamimi">Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi</a> and <a href="https://twitter.com/CdricLabrousse">Cedric Labrousse</a>.</b><br />
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<b><u>Introduction</u></b><br />
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The eastern Deir az-Zor provincial town of Abu Kamal (more accurately in Arabic, ‘Albukamal’)- on the border with Iraq- recently came to headlines with reports of clashes between the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS) and other rebels including Jabhat al-Nusra (JN), resulting in dozens killed. What is the story behind this incident?<br />
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Maps put out in mainstream media outlets (e.g. the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-22798391">BBC</a>) have frequently color-coded Abu Kamal as an ISIS stronghold. As demonstrated previously, this characterization is highly inaccurate. One need not repeat at length what has already written, but to recap for convenience: the town itself is controlled by <a href="http://brown-moses.blogspot.co.uk/2013/12/the-factions-of-abu-kamal.html">six different factions</a>.<br />
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One of these- Kata’ib Junud al-Haq- is the local JN affiliate, and arguably the most influential in the town and wider area, having exclusive control of the Shari’a Committee. Briefly in late spring and summer last year, Kata’ib Junud al-Haq was part of ISIS, re-defecting to JN following Aymenn al-Zawahiri’s call for ISIS to be dissolved.<br />
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<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-WvbIq2iAvEE/U0joECQ4oRI/AAAAAAAAJP4/aXJyasNz8v0/s1600/1.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-WvbIq2iAvEE/U0joECQ4oRI/AAAAAAAAJP4/aXJyasNz8v0/s1600/1.jpg" height="280" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><b>JN signposts in various parts of Abu Kamal, illustrating the group’s influence: “The da’wah media office in Abu Kamal: decoration of the streets with banners of Tawhid.” </b></td></tr>
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The other five are Katiba Bayariq al-Sunna, Liwa al-Qadisiya al-Islamiya , Liwa al-Mujahid Omar al-Mukhtar, Kata’ib Allahu Akbar and Liwa Allahu Akbar. Of these groups, the first two are independent but closely aligned ideologically with JN, the third is an independent grouping that professes no real political program beyond bringing an end to the Assad regime, the fourth is an affiliate of the Authenticity and Development Front (ADF: an Islamist coalition professing influence from Saudi religious thought) and the fifth is aligned with the SMC. </div>
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However, it would appear for a time that Liwa al-Mujahid Omar al-Mukhtar professed some kind of affiliation with <a href="http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:54RB6YM3p4wJ:https://ar-ar.facebook.com/L.Omar.almoktar/posts/409635279162960+&cd=2&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=uk">Ahrar ash-Sham</a>, stating on 27th October:</div>
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“Up to now Ahrar ash-Sham remains the most organized Syrian Islamic faction and the least sinful, maintaining a good reputation among the sons of the Syrian people from the beginning of the revolution…with loyalty and purity till now in the shadow of chaos it has remained, excelling by far factions on the ground.”</div>
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Jointly, the six groupings have maintained a “security battalion” responsible for maintaining order in the town, and are represented on the local governing council. In September last year, JN clashed with Liwa Allahu Akbar, which was then led by one Saddam al-Jamal, accused by JN of being a criminal. Later, Saddam was apparently kidnapped by ISIS, which maintained an underground presence in the wider area, and broadcast a video of his apparent defection.</div>
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At the time, it seemed that Saddam’s supposed confession was made under duress and therefore not genuine and of little importance. After all, in the immediate aftermath of Saddam’s disappearance, nothing had changed on the ground, and he was not exactly missed by members of the other factions. Further, at least two of the town’s factions- namely, the local JN and Liwa al-Qadisiya al-Islamiya- had some sympathy for ISIS, with the local leaders aiding ISIS across the border in Iraq.</div>
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However, it turns out that regardless of the nature of Saddam’s initial testimony, subsequent rumors that he became ISIS’ local amir in the Abu Kamal area were correct. This development, together with the wider infighting across Syria between ISIS and other factions that broke out in January, proved important in the creation of tensions between ISIS and other groups in the area, culminating in the heavy fighting we have just seen. </div>
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<b><u>Events from January to March 2014</u></b></div>
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When the infighting first broke out, opinions in the Abu Kamal area were somewhat divided. In an interview, the local JN spokesman distanced his group from ISIS and blamed ISIS for the problems that had arisen in northern Syria, saying that the problem with ISIS is its ‘extremism’ and the existence of too many ‘ghuraba’ (‘foreigners’) in the group, in contrast to JN. On the other hand, Liwa al-Mujahid Omar al-Mukhtar officially took an ‘anti-fitna’ stance on the infighting, releasing <a href="https://twitter.com/ajaltamimi/status/428303622091206656">a statement at the end of January</a> formally distancing itself from Ahrar ash-Sham, while not mentioning the group by name:</div>
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“We announce the following:</div>
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1. Our rejection of this fitna and Liwa al-Mujahid Omar al-Mukhtar’s return to independence not affiliated with any side.</div>
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2. Our arms are directed against the evil Nusayri regime only and we will not direct our arms against any faction unless it attacks [us].</div>
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3. Our affirmation and support for the so-called ‘Ummah Initiative’ [Sheikh Muheisseni’s attempt to stop infighting] and any initiative aiming to stop the fighting and apply God’s law between those disputing among themselves.”</div>
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In the Abu Kamal countryside, where more factions exist beyond the six in the town, a certain group called “<a href="http://alplatformmedia.com/vb/showthread.php?t=35500">Jund ash-Sham</a>” (not to be confused with the group formerly based at Krek des Chevaliers that was founded by Lebanese muhajireen) declared its support for ISIS.</div>
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For the first month or so after the wider infighting broke out, Abu Kamal remained free of clashes, even as ISIS was deploying suicide car bombs against rivals like Ahrar ash-Sham in nearby localities such as al-Mayadeen. However, on 8 February, some ISIS fighters crossed over the border from Iraq and launched an assault on the town, only to be driven out quickly in light clashes with JN that ended by the late afternoon on the same day (according to JN’s local spokesman whom I interviewed). JN issued a ‘repentance’ deadline on the same day for remaining ISIS members in the area, calling on them to surrender themselves and their weapons. On the following day, JN then issued a statement saying the deadline for ‘repentance’ was to be extended by another 24 hours </div>
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<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-C11ctgCDnFc/U0jogJNU53I/AAAAAAAAJQA/DGJqmCRpuq8/s1600/2.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-C11ctgCDnFc/U0jogJNU53I/AAAAAAAAJQA/DGJqmCRpuq8/s1600/2.jpg" height="400" width="300" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><b>Local JN statement on 9 February extending repentance deadline for 24 hours to ‘da3esh’ (derogatory acronym for ISIS).</b></td></tr>
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Even so, ISIS under Saddam al-Jamal continued a clandestine campaign in the local area, culminating in the killing of four members of Kata’ib Allahu Akbar during an ambush, prompting a <a href="https://twitter.com/ajaltamimi/status/446462356990619648">statement of condemnation</a> on 18 March:</div>
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“The group was on its way to carry out a military mission as part of the missions of the ‘Battle of Bay’ah’, and on the path there was an ambush for them set by a gang from the so-called ‘Islamic State’- da3esh- under the leadership of the criminal ‘Saddam al-Rakhaytah’ [Saddam al-Jamal] so they surrounded the group of fighters and after their surrender, they were bound and then killed in cold blood with shots to the head and marks on their pure bodies.</div>
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This account came from an eyewitness with the Shari’a Committee in Abu Kamal. The criminal Saddam al-Rakhaytah spared him to send a message to the mujahideen in Deir az-Zor: that the da3esh gang will kill every mujahid who comes into their hands and so the ADF has undertaken to call out its mujahideen in Deir az-Zor and fund this criminal and those with him, for they are wanted by all brigades of the ADF in the expanses of Syrian lands so that they can face judgment and be punished with just retaliation for the crimes they have committed against the Syrian people.”</div>
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-pPDg8hfJ_vE/U0jotGKbjNI/AAAAAAAAJQI/JNb3ZaZtFlY/s1600/3.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-pPDg8hfJ_vE/U0jotGKbjNI/AAAAAAAAJQI/JNb3ZaZtFlY/s1600/3.jpg" height="182" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><b>The four Kata’ib Allahu Akbar fighters killed by ISIS in March.</b></td></tr>
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The local JN branch released a <a href="https://twitter.com/ajaltamimi/status/446460688408387584">statement</a> on the same day, condemning ISIS for the same ambush but also accusing Saddam al-Jamal and his followers of two other actions: first, “placing a car bomb to blow it up in the middle of the public square from the path of its followers (Ans al-Hadid and Yusuf al-Juburi from al-Baghuz)” and “placing IEDs among civilian families in the middle of Abu Kamal without regard for the safety of families and civilians from women and children (IED on the military checkpoint- IED on the house of Ya’ud Layith Sharaqat- IED on the house of Hamadi al-Alaiwi).” </div>
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Tensions were further raised by the ongoing fighting between ISIS on one side and JN aligned with the Islamic Front and ADF on the other for control of the strategic southern Hasakah province locality of al-Markadah, which can serve a useful access point for ISIS into Deir az-Zor province. Despite repeated assaults from JN et al. on the locality, they have been unable to gain control of it from ISIS, and have had to send up reinforcements on multiple occasions from Deir az-Zor province, including Abu Kamal. </div>
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-LJPuESqfFx0/U0jo51NhGoI/AAAAAAAAJQQ/wGcJAelHHRI/s1600/4.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-LJPuESqfFx0/U0jo51NhGoI/AAAAAAAAJQQ/wGcJAelHHRI/s1600/4.jpg" height="283" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><b>”Now, now the fight has come”: JN’s renewed offensive on ISIS in eastern Syria at the end of March.</b></td></tr>
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As it so happens, the intense fighting in al-Markadah has led to the killing of at least two JN fighters from Abu Kamal: Zayd al-Omar and Omar al-Shaman, whose corpses are shown <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TKvQfvE0jm8&list=UUP4KA40NVurHut0Dv0kvPlg">here</a>. This led to an emotional funeral eulogy from the Shari’a judge in Abu Kamal known by the name of Abu al-Layth (real name: Muhammad Majul al-Rawi, who, despite his surname suggesting ultimately Iraqi origins, was a native of Abu Kamal). </div>
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In the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=McFvnhluhbw">eulogy</a>, he denounces ISIS as the “gangs of Rafdan” (referencing Aamer al-Rafdan: ISIS’ amir in the Deir az-Zor province but to whom he ascribes control over Hasakah; also renowed for criminality like Saddam al-Jamal; <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wBfAgSZKSos">his house was blown up</a> in February by rebels) and “gang of Saddam al-Rakhaytah.” He then accuses ISIS of killing youths, entering Muslims’ homes by force, abducting women from their homes in the middle of night: “You know, oh people, what Saddam al-Rakhaytah’s gang has done.” He further denounces those who would suggest that the fight against ISIS is a case of “fitna,” which implies equal wrongdoing on both sides.</div>
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On the ISIS side, one problem for rebel factions in the Deir az-Zor area that has been developing is the fact that in addition to controlling most of Raqqa province, eastern Aleppo province, and Hasakah territory out of regime and Kurdish hands, ISIS also operates with impunity in much of the Homs province and western Deir az-Zor province desert areas, dubbed “Wilayat al-Badiya” in ISIS discourse. Here, as in the Anbar desert, ISIS has been freely running military camps, providing an apt front from which to attack rivals in Deir az-Zor province</div>
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<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-jHrWu0b1TqY/U0jpOB4H3hI/AAAAAAAAJQY/fduaBtgxfB8/s1600/5.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-jHrWu0b1TqY/U0jpOB4H3hI/AAAAAAAAJQY/fduaBtgxfB8/s1600/5.jpg" height="300" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><b>Example of a photo of ISIS fighters in the Syrian deserts.</b></td></tr>
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<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-xXCNTBWI9hg/U0jpTvwpRJI/AAAAAAAAJQg/5v6avJprhJw/s1600/6.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-xXCNTBWI9hg/U0jpTvwpRJI/AAAAAAAAJQg/5v6avJprhJw/s1600/6.jpg" height="266" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><b>ISIS fighters praying at night in Wilayat al-Badiya.</b></td></tr>
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<b><u>The Fighting this Month</u></b></div>
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In the circumstances of a growing ISIS presence in the desert expanses, a clandestine local ISIS insurgency, and a renewed offensive on al-Markadah by ISIS’ rivals, a new ISIS offensive on eastern Deir az-Zor province comes as no surprise. The starting point was overnight ISIS movement on 9-10 April primarily focused on Abu Kamal. </div>
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By how many routes ISIS moved on the town is a matter of dispute. Some accounts give an attack from two fronts: across the Iraq border (as happened last time in February) and from the southwest desert areas (i.e. ISIS’ Wilayat al-Badiya). While an attack on Abu Kamal using manpower from Iraq would be logical in trying to connect Anbar and Deir az-Zor provinces in ISIS’ hopes of building a continuum of territory over the borders (which they have already done so to an extent with Ninawa and Hasakah provinces), Jabhat al-Nusra’s local spokesman in an interview denied that ISIS came over from the Iraqi border, saying instead that they “departed from Raqqa and came from the Abu Kamal desert” (i.e. to the southwest).</div>
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<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-I9JyuV_W8Bk/U0jpZ8qNxAI/AAAAAAAAJQo/_EA84jqJqQk/s1600/7.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-I9JyuV_W8Bk/U0jpZ8qNxAI/AAAAAAAAJQo/_EA84jqJqQk/s1600/7.jpg" height="225" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><b>Document recovered by rebels purporting to show the ISIS plan of attack on Abu Kamal.</b></td></tr>
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The first ISIS contingents to arrive in Abu Kamal early on 10 April consisted of native Syrian members who moved in on the cultural center in the town, which has been used by Liwa al-Qadisiya al-Islamiya as a base. Apparently the ISIS fighters presented themselves on friendly terms to the rebels in the cultural center but then quickly turned their weapons on the rebels, overrunning the center. ISIS’ main forces then arrived in the town and overran multiple sites, including the Shari’a Committee’s building, the Baghuz bridge, the “industrial area,” and the grain silos.</div>
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-V7senA6hhJM/U0jphiYiydI/AAAAAAAAJQw/agAxOaq6qqA/s1600/8.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-V7senA6hhJM/U0jphiYiydI/AAAAAAAAJQw/agAxOaq6qqA/s1600/8.jpg" height="250" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><b>ISIS graffiti- “Islamic State”- inside the JN Shari’a Committee building in Abu Kamal. Remnant of the assault on 10 April.</b></td></tr>
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The other rebel contingents in the town quickly mobilized in response sparking intense clashes before midday. By mid to late afternoon local time, much of the areas taken by ISIS had been recaptured by JN and the other local factions, confining ISIS control to a local hospital- the A’isha hospital- the industrial area and the grain silos. The A’isha hospital soon fell into rebel hands, but Saddam al-Jamal and his associates, who were allegedly inside the hospital, escaped capture and joined the remaining ISIS contingents in the industrial area and grain silos. </div>
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By nightfall, ISIS had been driven out from the town and was then expelled from the surrounding countryside into the desert areas at the hands of local battalions (e.g. Kata’ib Ahfad A’isha- whose leader Abu Ibrahim was killed in the fighting- and Katiba la Ghalib illa Allah), who, like the town’s local factions, drew on tribal support and had sent in some fighters to assist the rebels inside the urban area. The expulsion of ISIS by nightfall was celebrated with victory parades that can be observed <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6-KytktJwTI">here</a>.</div>
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The fighting came at a heavy price. A complete list of those slain on the rebel side can be found <a href="http://justpaste.it/f227">here</a>, but one of the most notable losses was Abu al-Layth for JN.</div>
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<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-b6a2w7MB1_s/U0jpyfcl_tI/AAAAAAAAJQ4/sxMH6fXXPvE/s1600/9.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-b6a2w7MB1_s/U0jpyfcl_tI/AAAAAAAAJQ4/sxMH6fXXPvE/s1600/9.jpg" height="231" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><b>Corpse of Abu al-Layth.</b></td></tr>
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-2AnyYZpJ8Bo/U0jp29zB3KI/AAAAAAAAJRA/CI33KdDlNKg/s1600/10.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-2AnyYZpJ8Bo/U0jp29zB3KI/AAAAAAAAJRA/CI33KdDlNKg/s1600/10.jpg" height="223" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><b>Prayers in the Great Mosque in Abu Kamal for those killed in the fighting with ISIS.</b></td></tr>
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-nKt4JpY-H3I/U0jp9whs4NI/AAAAAAAAJRI/l7W4XBEB__M/s1600/11.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-nKt4JpY-H3I/U0jp9whs4NI/AAAAAAAAJRI/l7W4XBEB__M/s1600/11.jpg" height="250" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><b>The corpse of Abu Ibrahim, the leader of Kata’ib Ahfad A’isha slain in clashes with ISIS.</b></td></tr>
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-sNlclMhLVtQ/U0jqFKctJ6I/AAAAAAAAJRQ/1lgJo6Os7FA/s1600/12.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-sNlclMhLVtQ/U0jqFKctJ6I/AAAAAAAAJRQ/1lgJo6Os7FA/s1600/12.jpg" height="250" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><b>One of the corpses of the slain Liwa al-Qadisiya al-Islamiya fighters. A list of the dead for this battalion can be found <a href="http://justpaste.it/abukamalslainlqi">here.</a></b></td></tr>
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-YNroFHiTiDc/U0jqSKZin2I/AAAAAAAAJRY/dxpRcOgrLBM/s1600/13.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-YNroFHiTiDc/U0jqSKZin2I/AAAAAAAAJRY/dxpRcOgrLBM/s1600/13.jpg" height="300" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><b>Saraqa Khalid al-‘Aran (Abu Lu’ay): a Liwa al-Mujahid Omar al-Mukhtar fighter who was killed in the clashes with ISIS. A full list of the brigade’s dead- totaling 20 people- can be found <a href="http://justpaste.it/liwamujahiddead">here</a>. The battalion hails them as martyrs killed fighting “the Nusayri dogs of <i>da3esh</i>.” Note that the instances of shared surnames appear to show the brigade, like other factions in the town, is based on local families.</b></td></tr>
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Elsewhere in eastern Deir az-Zor province, the three main localities ISIS tried to enter on 10 April were Kabajeb, al-Quria and Taiana. In Taiana, ISIS were expelled during the afternoon by JN, and ISIS’ disappearance from the locality was confirmed on the following day in an interview with a contact from the area. </div>
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-ApUd1qTKMI0/U0jqjdb5_2I/AAAAAAAAJRg/9QeABWKjA-Q/s1600/14.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-ApUd1qTKMI0/U0jqjdb5_2I/AAAAAAAAJRg/9QeABWKjA-Q/s1600/14.jpg" height="250" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><b>JN flag in Taina amid celebration at the expulsion of ISIS from the town.</b></td></tr>
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In al-Quria, the situation was more complicated as an apparent local agreement was reached between JN and ISIS that neither side should hold up its banner in the town. <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lKynpsrRgUk">Here</a> is a video of a reception given to a Tunisian fighter from ISIS, expressing his intentions to establish God’s law in the land. In <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6TZgPuzsIKU">another video</a>, an ISIS fighter in al-Quria speaks of the “much ignorance” and shirk [polytheism] in the town. ISIS’ entry into the town was supposedly facilitated by a local battalion called Liwa al-Qa’qa’, which was <a href="https://twitter.com/ajaltamimi/status/454331913978011648">accused by JN</a> of being an affiliate of ISIS. However, Liwa al-Qa’qa’’s leadership <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I0PmnBJs_6Q">denied these claims</a>. The following day saw <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NuuzwvgZacs">a demonstration in al-Quria</a> against ISIS calling for the group’s expulsion from the town. Finally, in Kabajeb, ISIS’ assault was ultimately unsuccessful, with a <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VpNFOpNITPg&feature=youtu.be">number slaughtered</a> by the Islamic Front and JN.</div>
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<b><u>Conclusion</u></b></div>
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The fighting in Abu Kamal marks the first major ISIS offensive on rebel-held areas since the infighting broke out to have been repulsed. One factor undoubtedly significant here in the failure of the ISIS offensive (dubbed “the conquest of Abu Kamal” in ISIS social media) is the lack of local support for ISIS, particularly in light of ISIS’ leaders in the area being associated with criminality. The situation should perhaps be contrasted with eastern Aleppo, Raqqa and Hasakah provinces, where ISIS has been able to co-opt local tribal support. The phenomenon cannot be dismissed as mere ISIS propaganda.</div>
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-ky_8ofhTiAk/U0jq8ZBo_GI/AAAAAAAAJRo/q6ZK21tRLow/s1600/15.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-ky_8ofhTiAk/U0jq8ZBo_GI/AAAAAAAAJRo/q6ZK21tRLow/s1600/15.jpg" height="223" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><b>Tribal convoy in rural eastern Aleppo province pledging allegiance to ISIS in late January.</b></td></tr>
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-pKGx5aDTQ2g/U0jrDJ7Kq0I/AAAAAAAAJRw/4MeO7TaJKB8/s1600/16.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-pKGx5aDTQ2g/U0jrDJ7Kq0I/AAAAAAAAJRw/4MeO7TaJKB8/s1600/16.jpg" height="210" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><b>Tribesmen in Raqqa province who have pledged allegiance to ISIS. Photo from early February.</b></td></tr>
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ISIS’ lack of local support in the Abu Kamal area and nearby localities notwithstanding, the rebel side clearly sustained much heavier losses, and ISIS’ free rein in the Badiya areas in particular means that there is still a considerable chance of a renewed ISIS incursion or offensive in the near future. In short, we may well call these recent clashes a Pyrrhic victory for the rebels, and the ability to withstand another ISIS attack (backed by superior financial resources and weaponry) must be somewhat in doubt. </div>
Brown Moseshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17562126209980810351noreply@blogger.com6tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4871088750473093560.post-399104770737478372014-04-09T03:56:00.003-07:002014-04-11T02:04:37.235-07:00The Knowledge Gap - Seymour's Hersh Of CardsSince my earlier blog posts examining some of the issues with Seymour Hersh's piece, <a href="http://www.lrb.co.uk/v36/n08/seymour-m-hersh/the-red-line-and-the-rat-line">The Red Line and the Rat Line</a>, Hersh has made further media appearances defending his piece. At the same time, many more pieces have been published criticising Hersh's work.<br />
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In <a href="http://www.diken.com.tr/vitrin/seymour-hersh-dikene-konustu-mit-planladi-jandarma-halepe-kadar-kimyasal-tasidi/">his recent interview</a> in the Turkish press (<i>update, <a href="http://www.diken.com.tr/english/seymour-hersh-in-an-interview-with-diken-claims-that-turkish-intelligence-and-military-were-behind-the-sarin-gas-attack-in-syria/">now in English</a>)</i>, Hersh gives more details on the claims he's making. Hersh is asked about Volcano rockets, with my work being referenced. Previously, <a href="http://brown-moses.blogspot.co.uk/2014/04/what-does-seymour-hersh-knows-about.html">Hersh has claimed</a> the rockets used were "homemade" and not known to be used by the Syrian government. </div>
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<iframe allowfullscreen='allowfullscreen' webkitallowfullscreen='webkitallowfullscreen' mozallowfullscreen='mozallowfullscreen' width='320' height='266' src='https://www.youtube.com/embed/cGLULD3LksI?feature=player_embedded' frameborder='0'></iframe></div>
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As <a href="http://brown-moses.blogspot.co.uk/2014/04/seymour-hershs-volcano-problem.html">I've clearly demonstrated</a>, Volcano rockets have been in use by the Syrian military since late 2012, with both explosive and chemical versions being in use, and the chemical version turning up in previous alleged chemical attacks, including August 5th in Adra <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YLcqi_dE9SU&list=PLPC0Udeof3T7Pm73DTrbR64i8SFN-iWr3">where three examples were filmed</a>. Videos and photographs from pro-government sources have clearly shown the government using the explosive type of Volcano rockets, which are virtually identical to the type connected to alleged chemical attacks. It seems clear that despite their "homemade" appearance (in the view of Hersh), the rockets have been used by the Syrian government. </div>
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This is not some small point in events of August 21st, but key evidence linking the rockets to the Syrian government, so Hersh's statement that the rockets are not used by the Syrian government seems incredibly ill-informed, and considering the amount of information easily available online it seems rather alarming that any journalists would fail to uncover that fact when writing a story on August 21st, especially one that blames a government for assisting with a false flag attack. </div>
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When asked about Volcano rockets in his most recent interview, Hersh seems dismissive of their relevance. Oddly, Hersh now seems to be aware of the work I've done linking the rockets to the government, and shifts his position; rather than the rockets not being used by the government, it now doesn't matter they are being used as the government because of claims about the range of the rockets by Richard Lloyd and Ted Postol, and also statements by Ake Sellstrom. He fails to address how the Syrian opposition acquired these munitions, and as I've pointed out earlier, the Syrian government has never claimed the munitions were captured or otherwise lost from the stockpiles. The alternative is the Turkish government or Jabhat al-Nusra created perfect copies of them for their false flag attack. </div>
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It seems this dismissiveness is down to his belief that the approximately 2km range described by Lloyd and Postol and referred to by Ake Sellstrom means any discussion about who has the rockets is irrelevant. He appears to believe the front-lines were far more than 2km away, just like the White House claimed in their intelligence report criticised by Lloyd and Postol, and therefore not worth discussing. </div>
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The problem for Hersh is, as Lloyd and Postol points out, the White House report lacked certain details that reflected the situation on the ground accurately. The map provided by the White House does seems to show government position several kilometres way, and for Hersh that seems to be enough. Except, it provable using open source information that the White House report didn't accurately reflect the situation on the ground. </div>
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From June 2013 to August 20th 2013, ANNA News, embedded with the Syrian military, uploaded a series of reports to YouTube showing "Operation al-Qaboun". In total, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f68wlZ3FH3c&list=PLPC0Udeof3T4y14LAjPvcE6-i-inK990b">nearly two dozen videos were uploaded</a>, showing the Syrian government's forces slowly capturing a region between Qaboun and Jobar. Videos from opposition sources show the other side of the fighting, in particular firing mortars at checkpoints on major roads in the area. I've spent the past 8 months collecting and analysing videos related to that area, and I now have what I strongly believe to be an accurate representation of the area controlled by the Syrian government on August 21st</div>
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<a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-wSov1xnhOBI/U0UcrjbxHHI/AAAAAAAAJPI/599LNiQ9fkU/s1600/Aug+21st+map.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-wSov1xnhOBI/U0UcrjbxHHI/AAAAAAAAJPI/599LNiQ9fkU/s1600/Aug+21st+map.jpg" height="272" width="400" /></a></div>
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Videos do suggest there was some firing into these areas by opposition groups, but it appears sporadic at best, and not of significant intensity. </div>
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But how does this relate to Hersh and his dismissal of the relevance of Volcano rockets? The below map shows the impact locations I've found for 5 Volcano rockets used on August 21st using a combination of videos, photographs, and satellite imagery, with the 2km distance from each rocket marked in red</div>
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<a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-hbzp3KIsA-c/U0Ud6AecJDI/AAAAAAAAJPQ/BFmB6bT_8No/s1600/Aug+21st+rockets.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-hbzp3KIsA-c/U0Ud6AecJDI/AAAAAAAAJPQ/BFmB6bT_8No/s1600/Aug+21st+rockets.jpg" height="252" width="400" /></a></div>
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These only represent those five rockets I've been able to find precise positions for, and the below map shows the positions of rocket impact sites reported by the Zamalka Local Co-ordination Committee, some of which match the above locations</div>
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<a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-g52ziyv5EgQ/U0Ue8A8rrPI/AAAAAAAAJPY/t64666Q03JY/s1600/August+21st+LCC.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-g52ziyv5EgQ/U0Ue8A8rrPI/AAAAAAAAJPY/t64666Q03JY/s1600/August+21st+LCC.png" height="237" width="400" /></a></div>
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Despite Hersh's dismissal of the Volcano rockets importance, these images do show the impact locations were in range of government controlled areas on August 21st. This is to assume the 2km maximum range is correct, and with the greatest respect to the work of Lloyd and Postol I do not believe their calculations have been peer reviewed. However, based on video evidence showing rockets being launched and landing, which allows for basic calculations on how far the rockets travelled (one example <a href="http://brown-moses.blogspot.co.uk/2013/11/new-key-evidence-in-understanding.html">here</a>), it seems 2km is a realistic figure for the minimum range of the rockets used on August 21st. </div>
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It seems by not researching Volcano rocket, nor the situation on the ground on August 21st, Hersh has wrongly dismissed the importance of the rockets. As I've clearly demonstrated, Volcano rockets are used by the Syrian government, despite Hersh's statements to the contrary, and their 2km range is not an indication they can only have been launched from opposition territory. <br />
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It's also worth noting Hersh appears to completely ignore the M14 artillery rockets recovered in the west of Damascus that have also been linked to the August 21st attacks. He makes no mention of these in his article, and only refers to "homemade" rockets, which the M14 certainly are not. No explanation is given for their presence in the attack, nor that the attacks would have been launched from two different sites. Again, it's seem Hersh has deemed this information irrelevant to his narrative.<br />
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A number of articles have been published in response to Hersh's piece, criticising various aspects of his report. "<a href="http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2014-04-07/who-trusts-russian-spies-on-syria">Who Trusts Russian Spies on Syria?</a>", "<a href="http://warincontext.org/2014/04/06/seymour-hershs-alternate-reality/">Seymour Hersh’s alternate reality</a>", and "<a href="http://guests.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/4329/turkeys-syria-policy-why-seymour-hersh-got-it-wrong">Turkey’s Syria Policy: Why Seymour Hersh Got it Wrong</a>" all focus on different aspects of the story, and Dan Kaszeta's <a href="https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/commentaryanalysis/542509-hersh-and-the-red-herring">Hersh and the Red Herring</a> looks closely at the chemistry and practicality of the claims made in Hersh's piece. This includes Hersh's claim that Porton Down couldn't match batches of Sarin together from their reference stock and the type used on August 21st:<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
The article also either ignores or misunderstands other important technical details. Much is made of a sample of Sarin provided by Russian intelligence. Even under the best of circumstances, can we count on Russian intelligence services to have probity and objectivity, given Russia’s record of obfuscation on the issue of the Sarin attacks? After all, Russian state media has been ruthless in pursuing alternative narratives in this case. Hersh also makes much of matching samples of Sarin. By its very definition, all Sarin, binary or otherwise, is made by a batch process and not a continuous production process. Even with the best, highest grade of stockpile-quality US Sarin, there were differences between batches even though millions were spent to have a standardized product. Consistency was hard to achieve. Certainly, Iraq could not produce consistent batches. With binary Sarin, the differences can be particularly pronounced, as the product is typically made in much smaller quantities at a time. The Sarin from the first pouring from the mixing vessel can be much different than the last one. Given these differences, the ubiquitous presence of an additive, hexamine, is ever more pronounced. None of these important facts are mentioned in Mr. Hersh’s report. </blockquote>
This section of the article is of particular interest as Tom Coghlan, Foreign Correspondent for The Times, contacted the MoD about these claims</div>
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<blockquote class="twitter-tweet" lang="en">
<a href="https://twitter.com/michaeldweiss">@michaeldweiss</a> <a href="https://twitter.com/Brown_Moses">@Brown_Moses</a> Hersh's claim that Porton Down found it to be 'Kitchen Sarin' is completely untrue. We've just checked.<br />
— Tom Coghlan (@TomCoghlan) <a href="https://twitter.com/TomCoghlan/statuses/453570964023169024">April 8, 2014</a></blockquote>
<script async="" charset="utf-8" src="//platform.twitter.com/widgets.js"></script>
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<blockquote class="twitter-tweet" lang="en">
<a href="https://twitter.com/WashingtonPoint">@WashingtonPoint</a> <a href="https://twitter.com/michaeldweiss">@michaeldweiss</a> <a href="https://twitter.com/Brown_Moses">@Brown_Moses</a> MOD sources: no doubts expressed by Porton Down on quality of sarin found in the soil sample<br />
— Tom Coghlan (@TomCoghlan) <a href="https://twitter.com/TomCoghlan/statuses/453580997939167232">April 8, 2014</a></blockquote>
Again, when asked about the work of Dan Kaszeta Hersh does little more than dismisses it, rather than realising it's key to the claims he's making. Hersh also claims Jabhat al-Nusra has a Sarin production facility in Aleppo, clearly having no grasp of what that would actually entail (a large custom made facility to produce the quantity of Sarin used on August 21st), and his claims that Turkey were shipping precursor chemicals to the factory in Syria would require at least one end of the process to be manufacturing Methylphosphonyl difluoride, a key component of the Sarin used on August 21st, requiring large, custom built, facilities to manufacture the quantity needed for the August 21st Sarin attack, and huge amounts of closely controlled chemicals. Beyond the vaguest of explanations, Hersh provides no explanation to how any of this could have occurred, and it seems when it comes down to the finer details, that would cast doubt on the narrative he's constructed, he believes a hand wave is all he needs to dismiss it.<br />
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<span style="font-size: xx-small;">You can contact the author on Twitter </span><a href="http://twitter.com/Brown_Moses" style="font-size: x-small;">@brown_moses</a><span style="font-size: xx-small;"> or by email at </span><a href="mailto:brownmoses@gmail.com" style="font-size: x-small;">brownmoses@gmail.com</a><br />
<script async="" charset="utf-8" src="//platform.twitter.com/widgets.js"></script>Brown Moseshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17562126209980810351noreply@blogger.com3tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4871088750473093560.post-83416844496303545192014-04-07T10:48:00.002-07:002014-04-07T10:48:43.887-07:00What Does Seymour Hersh Knows About Volcano Rockets?This morning, I wrote about <a href="http://brown-moses.blogspot.com/2014/04/seymour-hershs-volcano-problem.html">Seymour Hersh's Volcano Problems</a><span class="">, asking why Seymour Hersh left out key details on Volcano rockets from his recent piece for the London Review of Books, <a href="http://www.lrb.co.uk/2014/04/06/seymour-m-hersh/the-red-line-and-the-rat-line">The Red Line and the Rat Line</a>, about the August 21st Sarin attack. Following my piece, Seymour Hersh appeared on Democracy Now, <a href="http://www.democracynow.org/2014/4/7/sy_hersh_reveals_potential_turkish_role">talking about the article</a>, and finally spoke about the rockets used:</span><br />
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<span class=""><b>AMY GOODMAN</b> : Sy, on Sunday, the EA WorldView website published a piece headlined "There is No Chemical Weapons Conspiracy-Dissecting Hersh's 'Exclusive' on Insurgents Once More." The author, Scott Lucas, questioned the claim that rebels could have been responsible for the chemical weapons attack last August, given the range and scale of the operation. <span class="">He wrote, quote, "Reports on the day and subsequently Not indicated that 7-12 sites were Attacked with chemical agents at the same time. In other words, whoever was responsible for the attacks Launched multiple surface-to-surface rockets with chemical payloads against opposition-held towns in East Ghouta and one town in West Ghouta, near Damascus. [The chemical] ... FOLLOWED BY ... heavy Conventional attacks were attacks. " </span>The author, Scott Lucas says, is that you fail to ask questions about wheth anyone, apart from the regime, would have the ability to carry out such an extensive operation. Sy?</span></div>
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<b>Seymour Hersh</b> : [inaudible]-we're past that first article on. We know now. Actually, The New York Times even ran a retraction, of sorts. You had a-it was like reading Pravda. But if you read the article carefully, The New York Times had run a series of articles after the event saying that the warheads in question that did the damage to the car but from a Syrian army base, something like nine kilometers, six miles, away. And at that time, there were a number of of analysts, a group from MIT [Massachusetts Institute of Technology], led by Ted Postol, who used to be a science advisor to the CNO, the chief of naval operations, Busy somebody with a great deal of background and no bias. He did a series of studies that Concluded that the warheads with his team probably did not go more than one or two, at most, kilometers-two kilometers, 1.2 miles. And we now know from the UN report-a man named Aker Sellström, who ran the UN investigation, he's Concluded the same thing: These are missiles that were fired were fired no more than a mile.</div>
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They were-one from the footage looks-just saw one, they were homemade. They did not fit any of the known nomenclature of the weapons. And do not think we do not have a very good picture of what the warheads in terms of Syrianska have. They have a series of warheads that can deliver chemical weapons, and we know the dimensions of all of them. And none of these weapons that fit. And so, you have a UN report. You have this independent report saying they were-went no more than one or two kilometers. And so, I do not know why we're talking about multiple-launch rockets. These are homemade weapons. And it seems very clear to most observers-as I say, even to the UN team that did the final report-the UN, because of whatever rules they have, was not able to say is that-who fired what. They could just say-they just could describe the weapons and never make a judgment. But I can tell you, I quote somebody from inside that investigation unit who was fired weapons were very clear that the Syrian army and were not homemade. This is asked and answered; these are the arguments that go on. This is-I assume it's a blog. I do not know-I do not know the the blog.<br />
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-----<br />
So, point by point:<br />
"These are missiles that were fired were fired no more than a mile" - Well, we don't know that, video of the Volcano rockets have shown them travelling at least 2km, (1.24 miles), and it's possible they have a longer range. It's much shorter than the previous estimates, as he correctly states, but videos from ANNA News, a Russian channel embedded with Syrian government forces show the frontline was around 2km away from the August 21st impact sites. <br />
<br />
"[T]hey were homemade. They did not fit any of the known nomenclature of the weapons...They have a series of warheads that can deliver chemical weapons, and we know the dimensions of all of them. And none of these weapons that fit." - As I've repeatedly demonstrated, despite their appearance, there's clear evidence that the Syrian government has been using this family of munitions for over a year. They don't fit any of the known nomenclature because they've been developed by the Syrian military and were virtually unknown before August 21st. <br />
<br />
These are both issues I wrote about in my Foreign Policy article, <a href="http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/12/09/sy_hershs_chemical_misfire">Sy Hersh's Chemical Misfire</a>, and questions that have been asked and answered repeatedly since.<br />
<br />
So what's the answer to "What Does Seymour Hersh Knows About Volcano Rockets?" It seems barely anything at all, which is pretty shocking when so much information is available about them online, even in articles about Seymour Hersh's work on August 21st. For someone making such huge accusations about the Turkish government's involvement in the August 21st Sarin attacks, you'd think he'd do at least a quick Google search the subject.<br />
<br /></div>
</span></div>
Brown Moseshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17562126209980810351noreply@blogger.com5tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4871088750473093560.post-40470146142554512462014-04-07T09:49:00.000-07:002014-04-07T11:57:55.499-07:00Hersh’ün Volkan ProblemiLondon Review of Books dün Seymour Hersh’ün 21 Ağustos’taki Sarin gazı saldırısıyla ilgili ikinci yazısını yayımladı. Aralık 2013’teki yazısında Hersh saldırılara iki açıdan bakmıştı: Beyaz Saray’ın Suriye’deki müdahaleye zemin hazırlamak için seçme istihbarat kullandığı ve delillerin saldırıda kullanılan silahların uyduruktan/doğaçlama olduğunu gösterdiğini ve bu yüzden saldırıdan muhtemelen muhaliflerin sorumlu olduğu. Bahsi geçen ilk iddia özellikle 21 Ağustos’tan beri elde edilen bilgiler ışığında araştırmaya değer olmakla beraber, ikinci iddia ise Suriye devletinin bu saldırıda kullanılan silahları 2012’nin sonlarından beri kullandığı yönündeki açık deliller sebebiyle son derece sıkıntılı. Bu konuyu “Sy Hersh’s Chemical Misfire” adlı yazımda detaylandırmıştım.<br />
<br />
21 Ağustos hakkındaki en son yazısında Seymour Hersh Türk istihbarat servisinin 21 Ağustos’ta bir “false flag” –sahte bayrak saldırısını gerçekleştirme konusunda Suriyeli muhaliflere yardım ettiği dilini kullanıyor. Bunu özellikle bir “eski istihbaratçı” kaynağını kullanarak yapıyor. EA Worldview zaten Hersh’ün yazısındaki büyük kusurlara -özellikle ithamlarının çoğu için tek kaynak kullanması gibi-dikkat çeken harika bir cevap yazdı. Ben ise bu saldırıların belli ki Hersh’ün bilmediği veya görmezden gelmeyi seçtiği bir yönüne odaklanmak istiyorum.<br />
<br />
Doğu Guta’da 21 Ağustos’taki saldırının ardından pratikte bilinmeyen silahların kalıntıları saldırının etkilediği birçok yerde kayda alındı.<br />
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<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="TR">Aylar süren araştırmalardan sonra bu füzeler
hakkında önemli miktarda bilgi toplama imkânı oldu. 21 Ağustos, “Volkan” olarak
bilinen bu füzelerin bir çatışmada ilk kez kullanıldığı tarih değildi. 5
Ağustos 2013’te aynı çeşit füzenin üç örneği Şam, Adra’da –iddiaya göre-
gerçekleştirilen kimyasal saldırıda kaydedilmişti.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<iframe allowfullscreen='allowfullscreen' webkitallowfullscreen='webkitallowfullscreen' mozallowfullscreen='mozallowfullscreen' width='320' height='266' src='https://www.youtube.com/embed/tev6cCHVHos?feature=player_embedded' frameborder='0'></iframe></div>
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<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="TR">“Kimyasal füze” olarak tarif edilen bir başka
örneği Haziran 2013’te Şam-Adra’da kaydedildi. Ayrıca aynı füzenin başka bir
çeşidi Ocak 2013’te Şam, Daraya’da, bu kez “kimyasal füze” şeklinde tarif
edilmeksizin kaydedildi.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-V_jaMylLSfs/U0JSIOEBEBI/AAAAAAAAJOM/fVNA_220mFM/s1600/Chemical+Volcanoes.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-V_jaMylLSfs/U0JSIOEBEBI/AAAAAAAAJOM/fVNA_220mFM/s1600/Chemical+Volcanoes.jpg" height="235" width="400" /></a></div>
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<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="TR">Bütün bu olaylarda füzeler küçük somununa ve
cıvatasına varıncaya kadar tam olarak aynı dizayna sahipti ve dört olayın
üçünde kimyasal silah olarak tarif edilmişlerdi.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="TR"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="TR">Volkan füzelerinin birden fazla çeşidinin
olduğunu ve en geç 2012 sonlarından beri yaygın bir şekilde kullanılan
patlayıcı çeşitlerinin de olduğunu saptamak da mümkün oldu. Hepsi aynı temel ilkeye
dayalıydı; savaş başlığının çıkarılıp yerine daha büyük bir savaş başlığının
takıldığı, böylelikle çok daha az menzile sahip ama tahrip gücü çok daha yüksek
konvansiyonel füze.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="TR"><br /></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="TR">Rejim yanlısı Youtube kanallarına ve Facebook
sayfalarına, özellikle de Suriye Milli Savunma Kuvvetleri’nin resmi sayfalarına
yüklenen videolar Volkan füzelerinin kullanılma anlarını gösteriyor ve rejim
güçlerinin bunları bir yılı aşkın süredir kullandığını doğruluyor. Aşağıda üç
temel tip patlayıcı Volkan füzeleri gösteriliyor.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-QSD-W5xZFVQ/U0JUAXF06MI/AAAAAAAAJOY/06DjyAuUIPw/s1600/Volcano+rockets.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-QSD-W5xZFVQ/U0JUAXF06MI/AAAAAAAAJOY/06DjyAuUIPw/s1600/Volcano+rockets.jpg" height="210" width="400" /></a></div>
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<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="TR">Özellikle dikkati çeken ve yukarıdaki resimde
gösterilen, iki namlulu fırlatıcıdan atılan 122 mm motor gövdeli Volkan. Güneybatı
Şam’da rejim kontrolündeki Mezze askeri hava üssünde çekilen birden fazla video
bu fırlatıcıların 2012 sonlarında kullanıldığını, sonraki fotoğraf ve
videolarsa aynı tip Volkan füzelerinin ve bunların fırlatıcılarının rejim
güçleri tarafından kullanıldığını gösteriyor. Suriye devletinin bu tip Volkan füzelerini
bir yılı aşkın bir süredir kullanmakta olduğu inkâr edilemez görünüyor ve Volkan
füzesinin bu çeşidini muhaliflerin ele geçirdiğine veya kullandığına dair
hiçbir kanıt yok. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="TR"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="TR">122 mm Volkan füzelerinin patlamamış
kalıntıları da ortaya çıktı. Bu videoları kimyasal tipteki 122 mm Volkan füzesiyle
karşılaştırmak mümkün. Patlayıcı ve kimyasal 122 mm Volkan füzeleri, füze
kısımları üzerindeki yazılar dışında –kimyasal çeşidinde kırmızı rakamlar,
patlayıcı çeşidinde siyah rakamlar var- görünen o ki birbirinin aynısı. Bu tip
rakamlandırma farklı tarihlerdeki kimyasal ve patlayıcı füze çeşitlerinin üzerinde
görülebiliyor ve kuvvetli bir şekilde rakamların renginin silahın işlevini –
kimyasal veya patlayıcı- belirttiği intibasını uyandırıyor.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="TR"><br /></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="TR">Savaş başlıklarıysa benzer boyutlara sahip ama
farklılık gösteren yüklerinden dolayı açıkça farklı dizaynlara sahipler. Örneğin her iki çeşit füzenin savaş başlığının
tabanında delik var ama kimyasal çeşittekinin silahı doldurmak için kullanılan
ayrı bir deliği daha var. (Alttaki resmin solunda)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-zK3ZgHnJJuM/U0JZ_hlvB5I/AAAAAAAAJOo/98WZZO8alIw/s1600/vua2OeS.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-zK3ZgHnJJuM/U0JZ_hlvB5I/AAAAAAAAJOo/98WZZO8alIw/s1600/vua2OeS.jpg" height="300" width="400" /></a></div>
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<span lang="TR">Peki bunun Seymour Hersh’ün yazısıyla ne
alakası var? Öyle görünüyor ki Hersh [Volkan füzelerinin kendi iddiasına önem
teşkil ettiğini] düşünmüyor, yazılarının hiçbirinde bunların varlığından dahi
söz etmiyor. Daha önce belirttiğim gibi, Suriye ordusu tarafından bunların
kullanılması, Hersh’ün önceki yazısında bunların şekillerinin, Suriyeli
muhalifler tarafından yapılmış, uyduruk silah oldukları intibasını uyandırdığı
argümanını tamamen çürütüyor. Eğer Türk hükümeti Hersh’ün yazısında belirttiği
üzere bir “sahte bayrak” saldırısına yardım ettiyse, o zaman bu silahların
tamamen Suriye devletinin envanterine özgü olduğu gerçeği iki şeyi akla
getirir:</span></div>
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<ol>
<li><span lang="TR" style="text-indent: -18pt;"><span style="font-size: 7pt;"> </span></span><span lang="TR" style="text-indent: -18pt;">Suriyeli muhalifler Sarin’siz bazı
kimyasal Volkan füzelerini ele geçirmişlerdir, ve Sarin daha sonra muhaliflere
Türkiye tarafından temin edilmiştir, veya,</span></li>
<li><span style="text-indent: -18pt;">Kimyasal Volkan füzelerinin
kusursuz kopyaları Suriyeli muhaliflerce veya Türk hükümetince üretilmiştir.</span></li>
</ol>
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<span lang="TR">Birinci seçeneğe bakacak olursak, OPCW
(Kimyasal Silahların Yasaklanması Örgütü) tarafından açıklamaları istendiğinde
bile Suriye devleti kimyasal silahlarının herhangi birinin Suriyeli
muhaliflerce ele geçirildiğini iddia etmedi. Hersh (veya kaynağının) bu
silahlara hiç değinmemesi nedeniyle, bu silahların Hersh ve kaynağının
anlattığı Türk “sahte bayrak” saldırısı iddiasının neresinde kendine yer
bulduğunu bilmek zor.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="TR"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="TR">Ayrıca unutulmamalı ki OPCW/BM timi bu füzelerden
binary Sarin çeşidinin kullanıldığına işaret eden örnekler topladı. Yani Sarin
savaş başlığına doldurulmadan önce karıştırılmış olmalıydı. Bu küvette
yapabileceğiniz bir işlem değildir. İki prekursörün birleşimi sadece Sarin
değil, güçlü bir asit de olmak üzere tehlikeli yan ürünler üretirdi, bu yüzden
özel ekipmana ve güvenlik prosedürlerine ihtiyaç duyulurdu (daha fazla detay <a href="http://brown-moses.blogspot.co.uk/2014/04/why-nigel-farage-has-it-all-wrong.html">için</a>).
Ayrıca miktar meselesi de var; şimdiye kadar 21 Ağustos’ta kullanılmış 8 Volkan
füzesinin fotoğraflarının topladım ve 12’nin üzerinde Volkan füzesinin
kullanıldığına dair haberler var. Savaş başlıklarının 50-60 litre civarında
kapasiteye sahip olacağı hesaplandı, bu da en az 400 ile 720 litre arasında bir
Sarin karışımı demek.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="TR"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="TR">Seymour Hersh 8 ile 12 adet arasında 2 metre
uzunluğunda Volkan füzelerinin kusursuz kopyalarının, yüzlerce litrelik Sarin prekursörlerinin ve bunların
karıştırılması ve savaş başlıklarına dökülmesi için gerekli ekipmanların nasıl üretilip
Türkiye’den Şam’a götürüldüğünü açıklayamıyor. Türk hükümetini Suriye’nin işgaline
mazeret olsun diye yapılan korkunç bir kimyasal saldırının ortaklarından biri
olmakla itham ederken, bu gibi detaylar bazı yorumcuların yapmaya yeltendiği
gibi “Aman canım, uğraşırlarsa her şeyi yaparlar” denilerek geçiştirilecek
şeyler değil. 21 Ağustos’ta kullanılan Volkan füzeleri özellikle Seymour
Hersh’ün son ithamları bakımından kilit önemdeki delillerdir. Bu yüzden de
bunların varlığına dahi değinmeyen Hersh, görünen o ki, ya inşa etmeye
çalıştığı haber için son derece önemli olan bu kilit bilgilerden habersiz, ya
da bunları göz ardı etmeyi seçiyor.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="TR"><br /></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span lang="TR">Türk hükümetine karşı yaptığı suçlamaların
ciddiyetini göz önünde bulundurursak, böylesine bir özensizlik Hersh’ün
itibarına sahip bir gazeteci için hayli sorumsuzca duruyor.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div>
<br />
----<br />
<br />
<a href="https://twitter.com/aliosaday">Ali Osman Aday</a>'a teşekkürler.</div>
Brown Moseshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17562126209980810351noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4871088750473093560.post-70478016548642051272014-04-07T01:22:00.001-07:002014-04-07T11:35:03.736-07:00Seymour Hersh's Volcano Problem<b>Update </b>Seymour Hersh has now let the world know what he knows about Volcano Rockets, which I've detailed in my latest piece, <a href="http://brown-moses.blogspot.co.uk/2014/04/what-does-seymour-hersh-knows-about.html">What Does Seymour Hersh Knows About Volcano Rockets?</a><br />
<br />
This article is now available in Turkish <a href="http://brown-moses.blogspot.co.uk/2014/04/hershun-volkan-problemi.html">here</a>.<br />
<br />
Yesterday, the London Review of Books published <a href="http://www.lrb.co.uk/2014/04/06/seymour-m-hersh/the-red-line-and-the-rat-line">a second piece</a> by Seymour Hersh on the August 21st Sarin attack. In <a href="http://www.lrb.co.uk/v35/n24/seymour-m-hersh/whose-sarin">an earlier piece</a> published in December 2013, Hersh had approached the attacks from two angles, that the White House had used dodgy intelligence in the build up to intervention in Syria, and that the evidence suggested the munition used were improvised, and therefore it was likely the opposition was responsible. While the first point is certainly worth exploring, especially in light of information gathered about the attacks since August 21st, the second point was extremely flawed, with there being clear evidence of the government using the type of munitions linked to August 21st going back to late 2012, which I detailed in my piece <a href="http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/12/09/sy_hershs_chemical_misfire">Sy Hersh's Chemical Misfire</a>.<br />
<br />
In his latest piece on August 21st, Seymour Hersh presents a narrative where the Turkish intelligence services aided the Syrian opposition in carrying out a false flag attack on August 21st, using one "former intelligence" source in particular. EA Worldview has already <a href="http://eaworldview.com/2014/04/syria-hersh-chemical-weapons-conspiracy-insurgents/">put together an excellent response</a> highlighting some of the major flaws in Hersh's piece, in particular the use of one source for most of his accusations, and I'd like to focus on one particular aspect of the attacks that Hersh appears to be ignorant of, or has chosen to ignore.<br />
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In the aftermath of the Sarin attack on Eastern Ghouta on August 21st, the remains of munitions that were practically unknown where recorded at several impact sites (shown below)<br />
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After months of research it has been possible to gather a significant amount of information about these rockets. August 21st was not the first time these types of rockets, known as "Volcano" rockets, were used in the conflict. On August 5th 2013, three examples of the same type of rocket were filmed at the scene of an alleged chemical attack in the town of Adra, Damascus<br />
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Another example, described as a "chemical rocket" <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HylX8OiczHk">was filmed in June 2013</a>, again in Adra, Damascus, with the remains of another type of the same rocket<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=68YeijuMHec"> filmed in January 2013</a>, in Daraya, Damascus, this time without it being described as a chemical rocket.<br />
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<a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-V_jaMylLSfs/U0JSIOEBEBI/AAAAAAAAJOM/fVNA_220mFM/s1600/Chemical+Volcanoes.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-V_jaMylLSfs/U0JSIOEBEBI/AAAAAAAAJOM/fVNA_220mFM/s1600/Chemical+Volcanoes.jpg" height="235" width="400" /></a></div>
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In all incidents, the rockets have exactly the same design, down to the small nut and bolt, and in three of the four incidents they are described as being chemical weapons. <br />
<br />
It's also been possible to establish there's multiple types of Volcano rockets, and that there are explosives types that have been used widely since at least late 2012. They all follow the same basic principle, a conventional artillery rocket with the warhead removed and replaced with a much larger warhead, with a much reduced range, but much greater destructive capability.<br />
<br />
Videos posted on pro-government YouTube channels and Facebook pages, in particular the official pages of the Syrian National Defence Force, shows Volcano rockets in action, and confirms government forces have been using them for over a year. The three main types of explosive Volcano rockets are shown below<br />
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<a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-QSD-W5xZFVQ/U0JUAXF06MI/AAAAAAAAJOY/06DjyAuUIPw/s1600/Volcano+rockets.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-QSD-W5xZFVQ/U0JUAXF06MI/AAAAAAAAJOY/06DjyAuUIPw/s1600/Volcano+rockets.jpg" height="210" width="400" /></a></div>
<br />
What's of particular interest is the 122mm motor based Volcano fired from the two barrelled launcher, shown in the above picture. <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=92Ed80vpah4&list=PLPC0Udeof3T7vS0pEreOlJ_ZzvJkCLBeW">Multiple videos</a> from the government controlled Mezzeh airbase, in southwest Damascus, show these launchers being used in late 2012, and later images and videos show the same type of Volcano rockets and their launchers being used by government forces. It seems undeniable that the Syrian government has been using these types of Volcano rockets for over the year, and there's been no evidence of Syrian opposition forces capturing or using this type of Volcano rocket. <br />
<br />
The <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ThtLIc0iEzc&list=PLPC0Udeof3T5ul2imLYgPVHHDIriS5VYg">unexploded remains</a> of the explosive type of 122mm Volcano rockets have also been recovered, and it's possible to compare these videos with the images of the remains of the chemical type of 122mm Volcano rocket. The rocket sections of the explosive and chemical 122mm Volcano rockets appears to be identical, apart from markings, which on the chemical type are red numbers, and on the explosive types of black numbers. This type of numbering can be seen on chemical and explosive versions from examples from different dates, and seems to strongly suggest the colour of the number denotes the type of munition, explosive or chemical.<br />
<br />
The warheads have similar dimensions, but are obviously different designs due to their differing payloads. For example, both types have a port at the base of the warhead, but the chemical type has an additional port that appears to be used to fill the munition (shown on the left of the below image)<br />
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<a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-zK3ZgHnJJuM/U0JZ_hlvB5I/AAAAAAAAJOo/98WZZO8alIw/s1600/vua2OeS.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-zK3ZgHnJJuM/U0JZ_hlvB5I/AAAAAAAAJOo/98WZZO8alIw/s1600/vua2OeS.jpg" height="300" width="400" /></a></div>
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So, what does this have to do with Seymour Hersh's piece? Well, it seems Hersh thinks nothing at all, as he fails to even acknowledge their existence in either of his pieces. As I mentioned before, their use by the Syrian military totally destroys his argument in his earlier piece that their design suggests they are improvised munitions created by the Syrian opposition. The fact the appear totally unique to the Syrian government's inventory would then suggest two things if the Turkish government had helped with a false flag attack on August 21st as per Hersh's narrative<br />
<ol>
<li>The Syrian opposition captured some chemical Volcano rockets, without Sarin, which was then provided to the opposition by Turkey, or</li>
<li>Perfect replicas of chemical Volcano rockets used by the Syrian government were recreated by the Syrian opposition or Turkish government.</li>
</ol>
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As for point one; the Syrian government has never claimed any of their chemical weapons have been captured by the Syrian opposition, even when required to do so by the OPCW. As Hersh (nor, one assumes, his source) never refers to these munitions it's difficult to know how Hersh and his source thinks these munitions fits into the Turkish false flag narrative Hersh and his source has put together. </div>
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It should also be kept in mind that the OPCW/UN team took samples from these rockets that points towards a binary type of Sarin being used, that would have been premixed before being poured into the warheads. This is not something you can do in a bathtub, the combination of the two precursors would have produced not only Sarin, but dangerous by-products, including a powerful acid, and specialised equipment and safety procedures would have been required (more details on that <a href="http://brown-moses.blogspot.co.uk/2014/04/why-nigel-farage-has-it-all-wrong.html">here</a>). There's also a question of quantity; so far I've collected images of at least 8 Volcano rockets used on August 21st, and there are reports that over 12 Volcano rockets were used. It's been calculated the warheads would have a capacity of 50-60 litres, making for at least 400 to 720 litres of the Sarin mixture.</div>
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Seymour Hersh fails to address how eight to twelve 2 meter long perfect copies of Volcano rockets were produced and transported from Turkey to Damascus, along with hundreds of litres of Sarin precursors, and the required equipment to mix it and pour it into the warheads. When accusing the Turkish government of participating in a horrific chemical attack as the pretext to invading Syria, these sort of details aren't something that can just be hand-waved with "well, they could do anything if they put their mind to it", as some commentators have attempted. The chemical Volcano rockets used on August 21st are a key piece of evidence, especially in the case of Seymour Hersh's latest accusations, so by not even acknowledging their existence, it seems Hersh is either ignorant of, or chooses to ignore, key information that is extremely significantly to the narrative he's trying to construct. </div>
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Considering the seriousness of the charges he's making against the Turkish government, such an oversight seems highly irresponsible for a journalist of Hersh's reputation.</div>
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<br />Brown Moseshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17562126209980810351noreply@blogger.com7tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4871088750473093560.post-63855194365238691102014-04-02T14:56:00.004-07:002014-04-02T14:56:32.061-07:00Why Nigel Farage Has It All Wrong: Smoking Guns, Hexamine, And Syrian SarinA guest post by chemical weapons specialist <a href="https://twitter.com/DanKaszeta">Dan Kaszeta</a>.<br />
<br />
This evening witnessed the odd spectacle of Mr. Nigel Farage, MEP and head of the rightwing UK Independence Party, giving ventilation to discredited theories. This is not the first time strange utterances have come from Mr. Farage, but this time he has parked himself squarely in the lane of my expertise. Sadly, he’s placed himself on the side of the brutal Assad dictatorship by repeating conspiracy theories that somehow Syrian rebels perpetrated the 21 August 2013 attacks on themselves. This canard has been proved to be substantially wrong. Others address it by means of analysis of the rockets used, but I rely on the technical aspects of the chemical weapon that was used. I am using this particular opportunity to summarize the work myself and many others have done over the last months to get to the bottom of the 8/21 attacks.<br />
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The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights issued a UN report that confirms what I have known to be the case for some time. There is evidence tying the Sarin chemical warfare agent used at Ghouta last year to the significant chemical warfare stockpile of the Syrian government. I originally formulated my ideas in November of last year, and provisionally called them the ‘Hexamine Hypothesis’, a theory which now appears to be vindicated. Indeed, I believe that the chemical hexamine is a unique link tying the Ghouta war crimes to the Syrian government. This article explains the what, why, and how of the ‘Hexamine Hypothesis’.<br />
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<b><u>Two general categories of Sarin</u></b></div>
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<br /></div>
<div>
To the layman, Sarin is Sarin. But that’s simply not true. I have spent a lot of time and effort studying the history of Sarin and the particularly obtuse history of industrial efforts to produce Sarin. There are at least 20 production pathways to Sarin, each of at least 5 steps. I do not exclude the theoretical possibility of additional pathways to Sarin being developed in a laboratory at some point in the future. All of these methods rely on one of two reactions to produce Sarin in the final chemical reaction. For the purposes of this discussion, we can divide Sarin into two basic categories, based on the final chemical reaction. </div>
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<br /></div>
<div>
<b>DF + Isopropanol reaction</b> - The simplest methods react DF and Isopropanol. Often, online sources, some of which are of dubious provenance, refer exclusively to these methods. Most of the 20 or so Sarin production pathways use this reaction. This reaction combines DF (methylphosphonyl difluoride) with isopropyl alcohol. 1 mol DF + 1 mol Isopropanol react to create 1 mol Sarin + 1 mol HF (hydrogen fluoride). By mass, this works out to 140 g of HF for each 1 kg of Sarin produced. As you probably can understand, this residual HF is highly dangerous and destructive. It is corrosive to most materials and seriously reduces the shelf-life of the Sarin. Indeed, this reaction is really only suitable for binary-type weapons, and even then only if you do something about the residual HF acid. (More on this later.) The Japanese Aum Shin Rikyo cult, which used Sarin in 1994-1995 in terrorist attacks in Japan used one of the methods using this step. If you are making Sarin to keep for a long period of time, production processes that use this reaction are not very useful as it is indeed hard to get rid of this HF. Saddam Hussein's Iraq discovered this, because they used these methods, and the shelf life of their Sarin could be measured in weeks. The US military used this method in the M687 binary Sarin artillery shell, and found that, without some method to counteract the HF, the binary Sarin weapon systems barely survived the six to ten seconds time of flight of an artillery shell.</div>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
“High quality Sarin” – Some critics have made points about whether or not the 8/21 Sarin was “high quality” or not. It should be noted that this DF + Isopropanol reaction cannot make “pure” or “high grade Sarin” by definition. This process produces a cocktail of Sarin and HF. It produces a mix that is, at best, 50% Sarin by mol or 87% if you go by weight.</blockquote>
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<b>The DC+DF reaction (The "di-di" process.)</b> - The US and the Soviet Union both realized that DF+Isopropyl worked, but created Sarin that was not very useful for long-term storage. Both the US and the Soviet Union wanted to have weapons that could be kept in long-term storage until they were needed, not artillery shells and rockets that had only a few months shelf-life. In this method, equal parts of DC (methylphosphonic dichloride) and DF are reacted with alcohol to produce Sarin and HCl. From an economic and industrial viewpoint, these DC+DF methods are more complicated, because they require effectively two parallel production paths, one for DF and one for DC. The important difference is the residual contaminant in the Sarin. In the di-di process, the residual is hydrogen chloride (HCl) not HF. While being corrosive and dangerous, is not as difficult to deal with the HCl as is the HF in the other methods. More importantly, it is much more possible on an industrial scale to refine this residual HCl out of the Sarin and get a high purity product. Getting rid of this excess HCl is still not easy and both the US and the Soviet Union had to do a lot of research and spend much time and money to figure out how to do it. These issues were eventually solved, but the effort to do so was measured in years and millions of dollars. It was a complex industrial process and is still considered a secret. Indeed, the US had to re-refine its earlier stockpiles of Sarin in order to ensure a long shelf-life for its Sarin. </div>
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<b><u>Environmental and biomedical samples after 8/21</u></b></div>
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<b><br /></b></div>
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The joint UN/OPCW mission collected a number of biomedical and environmental samples. If we delve into the details of both the interim and the final reports as well as various reports and statement made by the OPCW, there are interesting conclusions we can make if we carefully examine the fine details. These are as follows:</div>
<div>
<ul>
<li>Sarin was used, not some other chemical. We know this for the following reasons:</li>
<li>Sarin was actually detected in field samples</li>
<li>Both unique and generic Sarin decomposition products were detected in field samples</li>
<li>Sarin was re-generated out of protein adducts in human blood using a sophisticated method known as fluoride regeneration. </li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>The Sarin was binary, produced from a DF + alcohol method. We know this for several reasons:</li>
<li>The OPCW’s own documents refer to the Syrian government having binary methods for production of chemical warfare agents. A chemical known as MPFA (methylphosphonofluoridic acid) was found in many of the environmental samples. This is a hydrolysis product of DF. DF degrades quickly into MPFA in the environment. This is no smoking gun on its own, as MPFA is also a decomposition product of Sarin under alkaline conditions. </li>
<li>No DF was found. But I would not expect this, as DF is far more volatile than Sarin, and would have either evaporated or degraded. </li>
<li>A DC+DF method requires DC. There is no evidence of DC production, DC precursors, or DC decomposition products. </li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>The chemical hexamine, also known as hexamethylenetetramine, was present in large numbers of the field samples. It would appear that the munitions contained hexamine for some reason. The significance of this finding was unknown to me at the time. But with only one exception (a headscarf), hexamine was in every sample that had Sarin or Sarin decomposition products. There were also many samples that had hexamine, but no Sarin, but this is a logical state of affairs as hexamine does not evaporate like Sarin does. </li>
</ul>
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<b><u>The Syrian Regime’s Declared Inventory of Chemicals</u></b></div>
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<br /></div>
<div>
An interesting revelation occurred 20 November 2013. The OPCW issued a document called a “Request for Expression of Interest ” for the disposal of chemicals from Syria. This document described the OPCW’s requirements to safely get rid of various chemicals from the Syrian government’s chemical weapons program. The serious high-grade chemicals, such as chemical warfare agents themselves and immediate precursors aren’t listed. So this document represents an effort to get rid of the various feedstock, additive, and waste chemicals that represent less of a proliferation hazard. For example, the list contains 30 tons of phosphorous trichloride, which is an early feedstock chemical in many of the production methods for making Sarin. The list also included 80 tons of hexamine. This is really interesting. There’s hexamine all over the battlefield and hexamine in the storage vaults of the Syrian government. </div>
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Knowing how the Chemical Weapons Convention is written and understanding how the OPCW works, one can make several assumptions from this revelation. </div>
<div>
<ul>
<li><b><i>Assad’s government admitted to having 80 tons of hexamine.</i></b> This kind of list would only be made based on declarations by the Syrian government. The OPCW inspectors did not have the resources or wherewithal to crawl into every nook and cranny of Syria during an active war. If 80 tons of hexamine are on this list, it is likely because this list was given to the OPCW by the Syrian government</li>
<li><b><i>The hexamine is for chemical weapons purposes:</i></b> The OPCW operates within the terms of its mandate. Hexamine isn’t a substance on the various schedules of the CWC. The OPCW has no remit to deal hexamine for its numerous commercial and industrial uses, including the manufacture of RDX, an explosive. If it is on this list, it is because either the OPCW believes it has a use in chemical weapons industrial processes, the Syrians said that it was for such processes, or both. </li>
<li><b><i>80 tons ain’t cheap to get rid of:</i></b> The OPCW is not going to spend money getting rid of 80 tons of a chemical unrelated to either its remit or the problem at hand. </li>
<li><b><i>Hexamine would have been easy to deny:</i></b> If the Assad regime wanted to deny the 8/21 attacks, they would have had ample opportunity to do so by not declaring the hexamine. As it is not a scheduled chemical under the CWC it would have been quite easy for Syria to not declare it. </li>
</ul>
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<b><u>The Hexamine Hypothesis</u></b></div>
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So, what is the hexamine doing on the list? And why is it all over the battlefield. There are many commercial and industrial uses of hexamine , as a cooking and heating fuel, as the most common example. It also has uses as an anti-corrosion aide. However, it has very little history of use in the history of chemical warfare. Indeed, I researched the subject at some length and the only use I could find was its sporadic use as an anticorrosion additive in the seriously outdated Levinstein Mustard, an older form of Sulfur Mustard (commonly misnamed “Mustard Gas”). There’s no use for hexamine in Mustard production processes after the 1920s, and it does not occur as a trace content in published specifications for either older or more recent US Mustard, nor does it have any use as a precursor. </div>
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<div>
Hexamine’s anti-corrosion properties stem partly or even largely from its ability to bind with acid molecules. This is where it gets interesting. The US Army spent a lot of time trying to turn binary Sarin, made by the DF + Isopropanol method into a useful weapon system. This process, described in detail above, results not in pure Sarin but in a cocktail of Sarin and Hydrogen Fluoride (HF). When the US tried to make weapons, like the M687 155mm howitzer round, using the binary method, this surplus HF was like a wrecking ball inside the munition. Most of the information from the M687 program is still not available, but it takes little imagination or technical knowledge to realize that HF, one of the most corrosive chemicals in existence, will have a serious deleterious effect on things like the case of the shell, the fuze, and the conventional explosive bursting charge. The US military found that the chemical isopropylamine (also noted in the Syrian inventory, by the way) was an isopropanolamine as an additive to reduce the HF content in Sarin produced by the DF + Isopropanol method. The US M687 howitzer shell combined a cartridge of DF with a cartridge containing a mix of 72% isopropyl alcohol and 28% isopropylamine, a ratio published in the US Army’s Field Manual 3-9. </div>
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<div>
While isopropylamine is the amine compound of record for use in Sarin, other amines are of use for acid scavenging, including hexamine. I found a dissertation on the usefulness of hexamine specifically as an HF scavenger , noting the ability of one molecule of hexamine to bind up to four molecules of HF. I consulted 5 chemists and an engineer, all of whom affirmed to me that hexamine’s utility of an acid scavenger. Hexamine can be used in binary Sarin as an acid scavenger, either on its own or in conjunction with isopropylamine. Because this is an “off-label” use of hexamine, and one never done before, if hexamine was in the Syrian government recipe (as implied by the inventory) AND in the field samples, it is strong evidence that the 8/21 Sarin came from government inventories and was made using a unique Syrian government process. </div>
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<div>
Of particular interest is environmental sample 25, which was taken from the screwthread of a bolt on one of the rockets. No amount of hexamine in the ambient environment for cooking purposes could explain the presence of hexamine on this component of the actual weapon system. There's no physical or mechanical mechanism to explain why hexamine elsewhere in the environment would get onto a screw-thread. Hexamine on the screw thread is consistent with hexamine dissolved in the expected cocktail of substances that result from a binary reaction.</div>
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<b><u>The Hypothesis Confirmed </u></b></div>
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<div>
After working hard to confirm my suspicions about hexamine as the acid reducer in Sarin, I originally broached this idea in an article in NOW Lebanon in early December 2013. Somini Sengupta at the New York Times interviewed me at length, and an appropriate question was put to the OPCW in congressional hearings on 13 December 2013 . Ms. Sengupta put forward the hexamine hypothesis in the New York Times on 18 December 2013. I knew I was onto something serious because of the furious onslaught of trolling, threats, and general cyberbullying I received as a result of voicing the hexamine hypothesis. Ake Sellstrom, Swedish CBRNE expert and head of the UN/OPCW inspection mission, acknowledged the role of hexamine in the following extract from Sellstrom interview from his interview with CBRNe World magazine:</div>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
CBRNe World - Why was hexamine on the list of chemical scheduled to be destroyed - it has many other battlefield uses as well as Sarin? Did you request to put it on the list or had the Syrian’s claimed that they were using it?<br />Sellstrom - It is in their formula, it is their acid scavenger.</blockquote>
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I confirmed the veracity of this statement in an email exchange with Prof. Sellstrom, although he did not provide further elaboration. This is as close as I can ever hope to a confirmation of my hexamine hypothesis, and I believe that this was one of the reasons, if not the strongest reason, that the UN firmly concluded that the 8/21 Sarin came from Syrian government stockpiles. </div>
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The lack of compelling alternative narratives helps to reinforce the conclusion. Other attempts to come up with a logical explanation for hexamine are based on some combination of wishful thinking, stretches in credibility, and/or faulty chemistry. </div>
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<b><u>Conclusion:</u></b></div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
I believe the regime committed the 8/21 Sarin attack. The following formula is a useful summation of the evidence:</div>
</div>
<div>
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<div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<b>Nobody’s used hexamine previously as a Sarin additive</b></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<b><br /></b></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<b>+</b></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<b><br /></b></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<b>There’s hexamine in the field samples</b></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<b><br /></b></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<b>+</b></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<b><br /></b></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<b>There’s 80 tons of hexamine in the declared inventory of the Assad Regime</b></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<b><br /></b></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<b>+</b></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<b><br /></b></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<b>The Syrian government’s admission to Sellstrom’s team</b></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<b><br /></b></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<b>EQUALS</b></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<b><br /></b></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<b><u>The Assad Regime Did the Wicked Deed</u></b></div>
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<br /></div>
</div>
<div>
<u>About the author:</u> Dan Kaszeta is the author of “CBRN and Hazmat Incidents at Major Public Events: Planning and Response” (Wiley, 2012) as well as a number of magazine articles and conference papers. He has 23 years of experience in CBRN, having served as an officer in the US Army Chemical Corps, as CBRN advisor for the White House Military Office, and as a specialist in the US Secret Service. He now runs Strongpoint Security, a London-based CBRN and antiterrorism consultancy. Mr. Kaszeta also holds a part-time post as Senior Research Fellow with the International Institute of Nonproliferation Studies and is a contributor to Wikistrat.</div>
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Brown Moseshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17562126209980810351noreply@blogger.com14tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4871088750473093560.post-44952332129568101842014-04-02T13:03:00.000-07:002014-04-02T13:03:24.654-07:00Evidence Of New Models Of Volcano RocketsSeveral weeks ago, I posted an image taken by Syrian forces near the opposition controlled town of Zara showing a twin barrel Volcano rocket launcher<br />
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<a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-ah0UM6KBttw/UzxfGcGOQNI/AAAAAAAAJLo/2YlQN46g-2Y/s1600/BgQbDwcCYAEJZjR.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-ah0UM6KBttw/UzxfGcGOQNI/AAAAAAAAJLo/2YlQN46g-2Y/s1600/BgQbDwcCYAEJZjR.jpg" height="362" width="400" /></a></div>
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What was interesting about this image is it appeared the Volcano rocket loaded into the launcher had a slightly different design from Volcano rockets seen in the past year. The tail fins appear to be swept back, and absent the usual tail ring, but due to the quality of the image it was not possible to be 100% certain.<br />
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Now, a new video from the town of Maliha shows the remains of what appears to be the same type of rocket<br />
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<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<object class="BLOGGER-youtube-video" classid="clsid:D27CDB6E-AE6D-11cf-96B8-444553540000" codebase="http://download.macromedia.com/pub/shockwave/cabs/flash/swflash.cab#version=6,0,40,0" data-thumbnail-src="https://ytimg.googleusercontent.com/vi/S_LEuMIs978/0.jpg" height="266" width="320"><param name="movie" value="https://youtube.googleapis.com/v/S_LEuMIs978" /><param name="bgcolor" value="#FFFFFF" /><param name="allowFullScreen" value="true" /><embed width="320" height="266" src="https://youtube.googleapis.com/v/S_LEuMIs978" type="application/x-shockwave-flash" allowfullscreen="true"></embed></object></div>
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There appears to be three similarities between the tails fins show in the above video, and the tail fins from Volcano rockets used in other attacks<br />
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<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-J_geMDzXR0w/UzxrYQxiZCI/AAAAAAAAJMY/NzK6tZXbWrQ/s1600/kz2epvO.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-J_geMDzXR0w/UzxrYQxiZCI/AAAAAAAAJMY/NzK6tZXbWrQ/s1600/kz2epvO.jpg" height="300" width="400" /></a></div>
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<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-JSy26oAH21o/Uzxrg4KBUfI/AAAAAAAAJMg/FbRJDimC7HM/s1600/Volcano+new.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-JSy26oAH21o/Uzxrg4KBUfI/AAAAAAAAJMg/FbRJDimC7HM/s1600/Volcano+new.jpg" height="326" width="400" /></a></div>
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1 - The tail fins are welded into slots.<br />
2 - The tail fins extend beyond the end of the rocket.<br />
3 - A small screw hole is visible near the base of the rocket at the same position on both rockets.<br />
<br />
Having studied a large number of images of rocket and missile tail fins in my months of research of Volcano rockets, in my opinion it seems fairly certain that this new video shows the first close up of the new type of Volcano rocket, confirming that the earlier picture did show the new design being deployed.<br />
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<span style="font-size: xx-small;">You can contact the author on Twitter </span><a href="http://twitter.com/Brown_Moses" style="font-size: x-small;">@brown_moses</a><span style="font-size: xx-small;"> or by email at </span><a href="mailto:brownmoses@gmail.com" style="font-size: x-small;">brownmoses@gmail.com</a>Brown Moseshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17562126209980810351noreply@blogger.com5tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4871088750473093560.post-75315397991651754212014-03-16T11:58:00.000-07:002014-03-16T14:12:27.342-07:00Elijah J Magnier On The Latest Developments In The Yabrud Offensive<i>Is Qalamoun battle over? Hezbollah will be standing on over 18000 sqm2.</i><br />
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Special report from Elijah J. Magnier – <a href="https://twitter.com/EjmAlrai">@EjmAlrai</a><br />
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The battle of Yabrud is over but not the battle of Qalamoun. As written in previous reports (see <a href="http://brown-moses.blogspot.com.tr/search/label/Elijah%20J.%20Magnier">here</a>), it took the attacking forces over a month to end the battle of Yabrud. Moreover, the nuns‘ exchange marked a turn in the battle when Jabhat al-Nusra (JAN) asked a free passage to 1500 fighters. The request was refused but corroborated intelligence information to attacking forces regarding the number of rebels left in the city. Today, JAN accuses other rebel groups for the fall of Yabrud, claiming these did not fight. Similar claim by rebels was also formulated when the fate of Qusseyr battle was marked. JAN was the leading force – but not the only one – in Yabrud. Obviously, the rebels do not fight under one command, neither as one man like the attacking forces.<br />
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The city of Yabrud was under heavy shelling by air, artillery and ground troops who used all sorts of weapons (see <a href="http://brown-moses.blogspot.com.tr/2014/02/special-report-on-hezbollahs-role-in.html">previous report</a>).<br />
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According to a reliable source within the attacking forces, “the Syrian Army offered logistic and fire support to Hezbollah fighters who launched a frontal simulated attack from Rima Farms and the west of Yabrud as a diversion. The real penetration of ground troops took place from the East, breaking the rebels defensive lines. By night fall, another penetration of forces advanced from West into the national hospital to meet the forces from the East in the city Centre were heavy fighting took place. Once the defensive line was broken, the rebels lost their will to continue fighting”.<br />
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“The attacking forces decided to launch repetitive attacks at night to limit the damage and casualties but also due to rebels’ lack of night vision equipment and rebels anti-tank missile (Kornet and others). Rebels relied on caves, hills and on the difficult topography of the area to slow down the attacking forces. The rebels were prepared for the battle since 4 months bringing in men and military supplies. Re-taking the hills first took most of the month and was not an easy task but a necessary move and an essential military tactic to ensure the protection of the attacking ground troops on the city. Hezbollah has lost most of his casualties in the mountains battle”, said the source.<br />
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The source explained “most of what was left from the remaining of the rebels fled Yabrud by night, leaving behind military hardware, as well as hundreds of bodies from different nationalities. These are Saudi, Kuwaiti, Tunisian, Egyptian, Moroccan, Iraqi, Lebanese and others. A small number of rebels have surrender”.<br />
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But this is not the end of the Qalamoun battle. Falita (West of Yabrud), Ras al-Ain (South of Yabrud) and Ras al-Maarra (South-West of Yabrud) all are on the main list of the next attack from the Qalamoun area. Rankus, around 80 km from Yabrud, maybe better attacked from Lebanon rather than Al-Qalamoun for its vicinity to the Lebanese-Syrian borders.<br />
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Many unconfirmed claims from cities in Qalamoun claiming a will to negotiate with the regime forces to spear the numerous cities south of Yabrud, including Maalula. It is clear that Hezbollah will not stop to celebrate its victory over Yabrud and will not take a break. The military operation will continue, taking advantage of the low moral of the rebels and their scattered men.<br />
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Moreover, the Qalamoun Mountains represent undoubtedly a future “military zone” for Hezbollah for its war against Israel. It is clear that Hezbollah, today, is no longer standing on 10452 sqm2 (the surface of Lebanon) but will be on additional 8000 sqm2, starting from Tal Kalakh, north of Quseyr to Zabadani, once the battle of Qalamoun is over.Brown Moseshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17562126209980810351noreply@blogger.com3