A Year Of Conflict In Syria In Ten Videos - 6 to 4

Part one of this series can be found here.

6 - Abu Sakkar

Probably the most notorious video of the conflict so far, the video posted online in May showed a member of the Syrian opposition, Abu Sakkar, stating that "we will eat your hearts and your livers, you soldiers of Bashar the dog!", then cutting out an organ from the corpse on the ground, and biting down on it.  There's many edited versions of the video online, here's an example of one of them

One thing that's interesting to note is the video that appeared online was actually edited before it was even posted.  Supposedly, the edited video was sent to pro-government groups as a threat, but earlier versions seen by various organisations also included direct threats to Alawites that were apparently removed before the video was sent out.

The media storm that followed this video was quite unique for any video coming from Syria, and Abu Sakkar rapidly became the poster boy for anti-opposition sentiments, with one individual's act being used to paint the opposition as "cannibal rebels", even by Russian President Vladimir Putin, who stated "one does not really need to support the people who not only kill their enemies, but open up their bodies, eat their intestines in front of the public and cameras".  In the media storm that followed, Abu Sakkar even felt the need to justify his actions, claiming images on the dead man's phone of rape and child killing had been his motivation, and telling the BBC "I didn't want to do this. I had to.  We have to terrify the enemy, humiliate them, just as they do to us. Now, they won't dare be wherever Abu Sakkar is.".

Whatever motivation or justification Abu Sakkar claimed, in the public imagination he came to represent the darkest elements of the Syrian opposition, and the increasingly extreme nature of the conflict.

5 - Chasing White Grenades In Saraqeb

While many people who know my blog are no doubt very familiar with my work on the August 21st Sarin attack in Damascus, what many people are unaware of is my equally obsessive investigation into another alleged chemical attack in the town of Saraqeb, Idlib, on April 29th. One particularly unusual element of the attack was the delivery method, which was reportedly white grenades, as shown below

France had received samples from the scene of the attack which they claimed contained evidence of Sarin. Despite that, so many different details of the attack didn't make sense to me.  From piecing together various pieces of evidence (which I detailed here) I discovered the method of attack was claimed to be two white grenades, placed inside a breeze/cinder-block (the remains of which can be see here), which was then dropped from a helicopter, with the grenades apparently producing smoke as they fell.  This didn't seem to make sense if it was a Sarin attack; the grenades would have produced heat while producing smoke, and as Sarin is heat-sensitive it would have degrading the Sarin; the scale of the attack was tiny on areas with no obvious military value; and all-in-all it seemed like the most inefficient, awkward, and potentially self-endangering way of using Sarin.

In fact, I would have almost have dismissed the attack if it wasn't for another alleged Sarin attack two weeks earlier in Sheikh Maqsoud, Aleppo.  Again, there were reports of grenades dropped from helicopters, a small number of causalities, and photographs showing the same type of white grenade surrounded by the remains of what appears to be a disintegrated breeze/cinder-block.

To add to the confusion, a Jabhat al-Nusra member was photographed with the same type of grenade, and that led to the journalist Alfred Hackensberger hunting for the grenades in Syria, where he discovered most people knew them as just plain smoke grenades.

After that the trail went cold, with no more attacks using this unusual method reported, and I was inclined to think that the attacks were possibly not Sarin at all, but something else.  It wasn't until the final UN report on the use of chemical weapons was published that the agent used in the attack was possibly identified.  One victim of the Saraqeb was taken to Turkey, and her corpse was made available for testing to the investigation team.  They discovered her organs had traces of Sarin in them, and this seemed to strongly point towards Sarin being used in Saraqeb. While the report had little to say on Sheikh Maqsoud attack, it seems not unreasonable to assume the same chemical agent was used.

The question is then, why?  As I said before, the attacks were executed in a very unusual fashion, seemed capable of resulting in small numbers of causalities, and were on targets with no obvious military value.  So the question remains, why did the Syrian military go to the risk of delivering Sarin in such a self-endangering and seemingly pointless manner?

4 - Qatar, Sudan, China, And Missiles

Croatian weapons weren't the only arms smuggled to the Syrian opposition in 2013.  In February, a couple of months after the first sighting of Croatian weapons, Chinese FN-6 MANPADS (MAN Portable Air Defence Systems) started to appear in the east of the country

At the time it was unclear exactly where they had come from.  It was considered highly unlikely that the Western powers involved in the conflict would sign off on MANPADS being supplied to a fractured opposition, so one theory was they came from an as yet unknown stock of weapons supplied to the Syrian government by China.  However, several months later, the New York Times revealed Sudan had been selling the FN-6 MANPADS to Qatar, who had been supplying them to the opposition.  In fact, it also appears other Chinese weapons havd been provided by Sudan to Qatar, including Chinese HJ-8E ATGMs (Anti-Tank Guided Missiles), M99 anti-materiel rifles, QLZ-87 automatic grenade launchers, and other weapons.

Much like the Croatian weapons smuggling, this goes to show that YouTube can be the starting point of investigations that can uncover all sorts of newsworthy information.

Responses To The Final UN Report Into The Use Of Chemical Weapons In Syria - Part 2

In this second part of my ongoing series on the final UN report into the use of chemical weapons in Syria, Hamish de Bretton-Gordon, Former Commander UK CBRN Forces and COO SecureBio, looks at what the UN/OPCW did and didn't achieve, and details his thoughts on the use of chemical weapons in Syria.

The UN/OPCW Final Report - Mandate and What they Did and Did Not achieve

The UN/OPCW mandate was very clear….’to identify if chemical weapons were used in Syria’.  This mandate referred to 5 sites of alleged use of CW in Aleppo, Damascus and Saraqeb.  It also included Khan al-Assal which the Russians offered information on, in a determined fashion, that the Opposition were to blame.  What the mandate did not critically do was direct the UN/OPCW to apportion blame.  This could have been possible, and has been possible since by various experts around the world, many of them cajoled, interpreted and assimilated by Brown Moses.  However, the team assembled under the very able Ake Sellstrom did not appear to posses the expertise able to make judgements of use, his team made up predominantly of scientists and inspectors, right for the task in hand, but taking those with military expertise, who could analyse what they saw on the ground and judge, with a high degree of certainty who was responsible, was lacking – a missed opportunity, which is now evident – to most.  This lack of capability in the military expertise area could also be manifesting itself in the planning for the movement of the CW stockpile to Latakia, which appears to be unravelling late in the day.

Those of us with experience of movement in war-zones such as Iraq and Afghanistan, can see the challenges of moving a very large convoy through very complex and dangerous terrain.  The fact that some of the issues, such as security and availability of appropriate vehicles, are only just becoming apparent, suggests that those involved in the planning process lack the experience and capability to be able to identify these shortcoming at the beginning of the planning process, when it would have been clear.  A similar sized convoy moved a few years ago in Afghanistan from Kandahar to Kajacki Dam in Afghanistan.  This was a strategically important move, like this one, to take a hydroelectric turbine to the Kajacki dam to provide electricity to Helmand and Kandahar provinces.  The planning took around 6 months involved 10,000’s of troops and lots of military hardware to ensure success.  There appeared to be basically one route along Highway One and then up route 66 through Sangin and on to Kajacki, and passing through, or close to, a number of Taliban strongholds – hauntingly similar to the issue of moving CW to Latakia – the physical challenges of the move is where the similarities end.  In the end, the convoy surprisingly cut across the formidable desert, similar to Hannibal going over the Alps, caught the Taliban by surprise and the turbine was successfully delivered, on time, intact – which now looks unlikely for the CW move, especially on time – and the reality being that this delay, could/probably will affect Geneva 2 22 Jan 13, the first genuine hope for peace in this 3 year conflict.

Back to the UN/OPCW inspectors and report; remember they arrived in Damascus on 20 Aug 13, and the Ghouta attack was on 21 Aug 13.  Nobody could believe the Regime would use CW as the inspectors arrived in Town and hence began the conspiracy theories, and creating confusion and uncertainty on this most complex of battlefields.  The inspectors then had the opportunity to go to Ghouta a few days later to collect evidence.  Both the Regime and Opposition allowed this to happen, and led each to claim they had nothing to hide.  The inspectors collected a whole array of evidence, under very challenging conditions, which allowed them [UN/OPCW] to unequivocally state that Sarin, in quantities probably more than a couple of hundred litres was used at Ghouta.  They [UN/OPCW] also collected evidence of delivery methods and azimuth and trajectory of rocketry.  All this has since been analysed and analysed, by many including myself, and with my military expertise, I am unequivocal in my assertion that  responsibility for Ghouta attack is firmly in the hands of the Regime.  Three factors lead me to this, firstly, the detail and level of planning required for this type of attack is well beyond the Opposition, the amount of Sarin used is well beyond the Opposition to manufacture, and the loading and delivery methods are only held by the Regime.  Hence if I were on the ground with the UN/OPCW I would have been confident to attribute the attack to the Regime, even more so than I am from my armchair in my office at Porton Down, UK.

The UN/OPCW also looked at Khan al-Assal and Saraqeb and concluded that Sarin was used in both events.  I covered the Sarin attack with the BBC’s Ian Pannell and concluded without doubt, that the Regime was responsible, and we didn’t have any detailed chemical analysis kit with us.  But the CW was tipped out of a helicopter, without doubt, and the Opposition certainly did not posses helos and the Regime did.  It was apparent to me from the symptoms I saw and talking to those around that this was a Sarin attack.  The UN/OPCW had the same and better evidence, and could, mandate aside, also have attributed blame.  The Khan al-Assal attack is different to the others, as it could be concluded that the Opposition is responsible.  UN/OPCW conclude that Sarin was used mainly from evidence provided by the Russians and that the victims were Syrian soldiers.  It could be the Opposition - AQ certain claim to be in the CW market – they [Opposition] could have acquired small amounts of Sarin,  the Regime recently stated that they had lost some [Sarin] from Aleppo Airport and the Syrian Army soldiers were victims.  It could also have been the Regime, who are probably not beyond killing their own people to gain a tactical advantage.  It could have been fratricide, which is always possible, and likely; experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan bear this up, and the highly complex battlefield of the Syrian conflict make this also a possible explanation.

So what have the UN/OPCW done and not done? – they have unequivocally stated that CW was used after 3 months of detailed study, well done!  – I appeared on the BBC Today programme at 0830 on 21 Aug 13 – I was rung at 0815 and asked to comment on the attack and had just returned from my morning run around London, I had a quick look at the evidence (YouTube videos) and said to TODAY……….’ it looks like Sarin and it looks like the Regime handiwork, because of the amount of agent probably used and the level of planning required’…… and I have only reinforced my view since.  So, they [UN/OPCW] haven’t attributed blame which if directed they should and could do, may be supplemented with some military expertise.  It’s import because we know the Regime is responsible for Ghouta, and those responsible must face justice in time, and if the Opposition is responsible for Khan al-Assal then we all need to be on our guard; because if the Opposition have Sarin, so does AQ and ISIS and this would now be a global threat which we all need to be resilient against.

The Syrian Regime and its CW stockpile is currently hold the International Community to ransom and they [CW] must be moved out of Syria or neutralised as soon as possible to allow any chance of some sort of peace – the job of the UN/OPCW is far from over, but I expect they need some additional support, and I for one, hope, that HM Government steps up to the plate and offers to do some of the heavy lifting.

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More responses to the UN report can be found in part 1 and part 3 of this series.

Responses To The Final UN Report Into The Use Of Chemical Weapons In Syria - Part 1

Yesterday, the final UN report into the use of chemical weapons in Syria was published online (here), detailing the investigation into several alleged uses of chemical weapons in Syria.  I've invited a number of chemical weapon specialists to give their thoughts on different aspects of the report, and today I'll be focusing on the Khan al-Assal attack, Saraqeb and Sheik Maqsood attacks.

Khan al-Assal

In July, Russia provided the UN with a 100-page report on their own investigation into the chemical attack in Khan al-Assal on March 19th 2013.  While the report was not published, key findings were detailed by the Russian Foreign Ministry when the report was submitted, and also reiterated in a statement by H.E. Ambassador Vitaly Churkin, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations

It was established that on March 19 the rebels launched an unguided "Basha'ir-3" projectile towards Khan al-Assal controlled by the Government forces. As you know, 26 people were killed (16 of them were military personnel), 86 injured and intoxicated to different levels.
The results of the analysis clearly indicate that the ordnance used in Khan al-Assal was not industrially manufactured and was filled with sarin. The sarin technical specifications prove that it was not industrially manufactured either. The absence of chemical stabilizers in the samples of the detected toxic agents indicates their relatively recent production. The projectile involved is not a standard one for chemical use. Hexogen utilised as an opening charge is not used in standard ammunitions.
Therefore, there is every reason to believe that it was the armed opposition fighters who used chemical weapons in Khan al-Assal.
According to the information at our disposal, the production of "Basha'ir-3" unguided projectiles was started in February 2013 by the so-called "Basha'ir al-Nasr" brigade affiliated with the Free Syrian Army.

Not only did the Russian's claim it was a DIY rocket fired by the Syrian opposition, but even the specific type, "Basha'ir-3", and the group involved, the "Basha'ir al-Nasr" brigade.  One would assume that as this claim is being made in relation to the 100-page report presented to the UN, the teams investigating the Khan al-Assal attack would be fully aware of the details on those rockets, which are incredibly specific.  However, in the final report the picture is somewhat less clear

The United Nations Mission received contradicting information as to how chemical weapon agents were delivered in the Khan Al Asal incident. Witness statements collected by the UNHRC Commission of Inquiry, provided to the United Nations Mission, supported the position by the Syrian Arab Republic that a rocket was fired from the neighborhood. However, according to other witness statements to the UNHRC Commission of Inquiry, an overflying aircraft had dropped an aerial bomb filled with Sarin.
The United Nations Mission was not able to collect any primary information or any “untouched” artifacts relevant to the incident and necessary for an independent verification of the information gathered. 

It goes on to say

The United Nations Mission received from the Government of the Russian Federation its report of the results of the analysis of samples obtained from Khan Al Asal from 23 to 25 March 2013, which identified Sarin and Sarin degradation products on metal fragments and in soil samples taken at the site of the incident.

For me, the question I have now is why the big difference between the UN report and the Russian report about which munition was used?  It seems the type remains of the munition would be the best possible evidence of who was responsible, especially if the Russian's were able to figure out the exact type of munition, and which group uses them.  If Russia had that level of detail, why is the UN report unclear on whether or not it was even a rocket that was responsible?  It's also very interesting that the UN report also states

The team was open, however, to receiving any biomedical samples previously collected by the Syrian Government, which the United Nations Mission would authenticate through DNA tests.
No biomedical samples were handed over to the United Nations Mission by the Syrian Government.

So why did the Syrian Government fail to keep what would have been key evidence in the investigation?  Either way, it seems that the Russian's must have the best possible evidence of opposition responsibility, and with the UN report failing to concur with their results, it's time that the Russian government publishes at least that part of their findings to clear up the discrepancies between the reports.

Saraqeb and Sheikh Maqsoud

Saraqeb and Sheikh Maqsoud are two attacks I spent a number of months investigating.  What first caught my interest in the two attacks was the method of attack used.  Reports and images from both attacks suggested a similar method of attack, my initial thoughts on which I detailed in this April 2013 post.  The March 29th Saraqeb attack, which took place two weeks after the Sheikh Maqsoud, is described in the UN report

The source close to the opposition claimed that, on 29 March 2013, a helicopter was seen passing above the western part of Saraqueb flying from north to south and that the helicopter allegedly dropped items at three locations. The first point of impact was reportedly in the northern area of the town, the second in the middle of the courtyard of a family house, and the third was close to an opposition checkpoint on the roads to Idlib and Aleppo.
A trail of white smoke reportedly came down from the helicopter as improvised munitions were allegedly observed being dropped. 

This mostly agrees with the detailed report I put together on the Saraqeb attack on May 17th, but at that time I believed only two items were dropped from the helicopters.  It was also reported that the Sheikh Maqsoud attack involved the same method of attack, but there was a lot more that linked the two attacks.

The UN describes the munition used in the Saraqeb attack as follows

Based on the information gathered by the United Nations Mission from the source close to the opposition, the Saraqueb incident was atypical for an event involving alleged use of chemical weapons. The munitions allegedly used could hold only as little as 200 ml of a toxic chemical. Allegedly tear gas and chemical weapon munitions were used in parallel. The core of the device allegedly used was a cinder block (building material of cement) with round holes. These holes could, allegedly, serve to “secure” small hand grenades from exploding. As the cinder block hit the ground, the handles of the grenades would become activated and discharged. Some of the hand grenade–type munitions allegedly contained tear gas, whereas other grenades were filled with Sarin.

I've spoken to a number of chemical weapon specialists about this method deliver in the past (earlier interviews here, here, and here), and the general viewpoint has been this would be a really odd way of delivering Sarin.  There's video and photographic evidence from Saraqeb, with the BBC report on Saraqeb showing video footage of the munition falling through the sky, as described in the UN report

The shattered remains of one of the cinder blocks used

And photographs and videos of the grenades used

Compared to the Saraqeb report, there was very little information on the Sheikh Maqsoud attack, but what there was appears to link it to the Saraqeb attack.  Aside from reports of a helicopter dropping the munitions, we also had a series of photographs

In these photographs we see the remains of the same type of white grenade, surrounded by the same type of debris that appears to have come from a disintegrating cinder block.  It would seem that this evidence would link the two attacks, and point towards the use of Sarin in the Sheikh Masqoud attack.

The story of the white grenades didn't stop there.  In May, I was sent the following photograph from Jeffry Ruigendijk of a Jabhat al-Nusra fighter (hi-res here)

This begged the question of whether or not Jabhat al-Nusra has the same grenades, and what they actually were.  Journalist Alfred Hackensberger took up the challenge of finding out, and detailed his finding in my blog post The Hunt For Chemical Weapon Attack Linked Gas Grenades In Syria

At beginning, nobody recognized them and we thought we are at a dead end. But later, we found two rebels at front line position in Assafireh who immediately recognized them. They were sure of seeing them on rebels, but didn't remember if the were from Liwa Tawhid or al-Nusra. But anyway, they said this were smoke grenades, not chemical grenades. Later in Aleppo we found two more men who said same thing.

He went on to add

He said, that he saw these grenades (the original one from Saraqeb and Maqsoud) during his military service over one year ago in Daraa (before he defected). An elite force, supposedly from the 4th Division, was training with these grenades. His officer told him that the grenades were delivered by Iran and would contain, beside smoke, a certain nerve relaxant, to calm protesters down. The former soldier also said that these grenades were not used at that time.

So it seems that if these grenades were carrying Sarin in the Saraqeb attack, they don't appear to have been designed to do so.  For me, the Saraqeb and Sheikh Maqsoud attacks have always been a bit of a mystery. The delivery method has seemed, awkward, and almost self-endangering.  Why use a helicopter to deliver just 3 of the munitions, for such a tiny number of causalities, in areas where the attack has no obvious military value?  Could what we've seen in these attacks have been a test? There were certainly no other reports of these munitions being recovered in relation to chemical attacks, so it remains somewhat of a mystery.

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More responses to the UN report can be found in part 2 and part 3 of this series.

A Chemical Weapon Specialist's Thoughts On The UN Visit To Syria

With the arrival of a UN team in Syria searching for evidence of chemical weapon use in Syria I asked Dan Kaszeta, a chemical weapons specialist, some questions about the investigation.

In general terms, what do you think the UN investigation will involve?

I have no direct experience of UN investigations.  Indeed, this sort of investigative expedition is a rare event with relatively few precedents  What I can do, is speculate as to what I would do  if I were in charge of the investigation.

The UN is scheduled to visit Khan al-Assal, the scene of an alleged chemical weapon attack some months ago, with Russia claiming sarin was the agent used. What is the likelihood of the UN team being able to detect sarin at the scene of the attack?

If sarin had been used at Khan al-Assal, the likelihood of sarin actually being found in some form some 5 months after the alleged event is extremely small.  Sarin evaporates quickly.  It is classified as a non-persistent agent for this reason.  The vapour pressure of sarin is similar to water.  It evaporates at about the same rate as water on a very dry day.   Syria is a warm, dry climate.  Even if Sarin had been used, which, based on various information I have seen is unlikely, it would be long gone.  This is the scientific equivalent of pouring a bottle of vodka in your garden and going back over a month later trying to find the vodka still there.  It isn't a rational expectation and it isn't supported by basic science.

There is also the concept of “scene integrity” to be considered.  The Khan al-Assal site is an alleged crime scene that has been unsecured for five months.  People and objects have come and gone.  There is ample opportunity for things that were at the crime scene to be removed and there is ample opportunity for things that weren't at the crime scene.

There are some relatively rare circumstances wherein a sample of sarin might still be available after this time:

• An unexploded, sealed munition that did not function as intended. 
• A shell or rocket fragment collected within a few hours of the incident and sealed in a jar or sealed plastic bag.
• A shell or rocket fragment containing sarin liquid embedded in some other matter in a way that would prevent evaporation or hydrolysis (reaction with ambient moisture).   

However, given the extreme concerns about the scene integrity, chain of custody, and the time elapsed, the validity of such evidence would be suspect.

There were some reports at the time of a strong smell of chlorine at the scene of the attack, would that be detectable at the scene of the attack?

There are far too many chemical compounds that could potentially cause a “chlorine smell” to make any definitive conclusions.  It should be noted that a chlorine smell is not at all associated with any category of nerve agents.   Also, odours are base on gases, vapours, and aerosols.  There’s no rational expectation that a gas, vapour, or aerosol could be present after the passage of this much time.  In addition, the “scene integrity” concerns above still apply. 

Would it be possible to detect the use of sarin in the blood, hair, urine, or tissue of victims, both the dead and the survivors?

There’s lots of scientific work that has been in this area, as I noted in a previous paper on this subject.  The issue is elapsed time.  There’s little scientific/academic work that addresses the issue of forensic analysis after such a lengthy period of time.  Again, one must view “survivors” and dead bodies as evidence.  Where have they been for this period of time?  There’s no chain of custody or scene integrity. 

Several months after the attack, would victims of the attack still present any symptoms?

It seems highly unlikely.  There is some evidence of miosis (pinpoint pupils) being visible for weeks after exposure, but we are talking about many months in this situation.  

The Russians have claimed a very specific type of rocket was used.  Assuming the remains of the rocket were available to be examined, would the UN team have any chance of being able to confirm it was used to deliver a chemical agent, and would they be able to detect sarin on it?

I think that it is much more likely to be able to evaluate the shape and construction of the rocket to see if it is consistent with a chemical weapon, or if it is more consistent with a conventional explosive rocket. 

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More details posts on chemical weapons in Syria can be found here, including more from Dan Kaszeta on sarin.

You can contact the author on Twitter @brown_moses or by email at brownmoses@gmail.com

Chemical Weapon Specialists Talk Sarin, Saraqeb, and Khan Al-Assal - Part 2

Here's the second set of answers from two more chemical weapons specialists on the use of chemical weapons in Syria.  Part one can be found here.

Dan Kaszeta, a US Army Chemical Corps veteran, provides some very detailed answers on sarin.

What form does sarin take?  

Sarin (also know as GB) is a liquid at normal temperatures.  It has the appearance and general consistency of water. The term “sarin gas” is misleading.  It is not a gas at normal temperatures. (For example, chlorine is a gas at room temperature.)  It is liquid between the temperatures of -56º C and approximately +150º C, although it evaporates in proportion to the temperature.

Sarin has a viscosity (how thick the liquid is) slightly higher than water, although my own experience is that you can’t tell with the naked eye.  

Vapour pressure. Sarin has a vapour pressure.  In other words, it has a tendency to evaporate into a vapour state from liquid state, just like many liquids.  Water, alcohol, petrol, acetone, etc. all have vapour pressure.   Sarin has a slightly lower vapour pressure than water.  This means (all other factors being equal) that a drop of Sarin at 25º C should evaporate slightly slower than a drop of water.  In practice, it often evaporates quicker than water.  I’ve seen a drop of water next to a drop of Sarin on the side of a rifle in a test chamber. This is because there is already water vapour in the air (i.e. humidity).  So, the rule of thumb that I learned is that Sarin evaporates like water in the desert.  

It should be noted that at high temperatures, Sarin evaporates very quickly.  This makes it a “non-persistent” nerve agent.   At room temperature or higher, terrain, clothing, equipment, etc. will not remain contaminated for long periods of time as any liquid droplets will evaporate.  This is in contrast to so-called “persistent agents” (e.g. GD, VX) which have lower vapour pressures and evaporate much slower. 

Sarin vapour is heavier than air.  

Can it be liquid, gas, powder, etc? 

The best way to describe Sarin is that it is a liquid that gives off vapours.  It should be noted that many ways of dispensing Sarin (see weaponisation below) cause the formation of an aerosol – a finely divided cloud of droplets.  Aerosols behave much like gases and vapours.   

“Dusty agents”/ Powder: There’s no way that I know of to dispense Sarin as a solid or powder, although I can’t completely rule out the possibility that someone has developed a “dusty agent” form of Sarin.  There is some literature out there on the possibility of “dusty” chemical warfare agents.  As far as I know, this was only ever a possibility with really low vapour pressure agents, not fast evaporating agents like Sarin. The only benefit I can think of for making a “dusty sarin” (in reality, not Sarin as a powder, but small particles impregnated with sarin) would be to slow down the evaporation time of the Sarin… i.e. increase its persistency.   But doing so would decrease the rate at which the agent is dispensed in vapour form, thus reducing its immediate lethality somewhat.  And immediate lethality is the point and purpose of Sarin.   It would seem to have little utility and an awfully difficult way of engineering some persistency into Sarin.  It would be far easier to use a more persistent nerve agent instead.  Or it may be possible to thicken Sarin with an additive. The US government applied for a patent to do so in 1969.

Does it have a particular smell or colour?

It is colourless.  Pure sarin has no odour.  Even if it did have an odour, it would be difficult to tell as a concentration detectable by a human nose is probably a lethal exposure.  

How is sarin typically weaponised?

By “weaponised” we generally mean “how is this chemical put into a device or munition in order to function effectively on the battlefield. In order to answer this question we must apply the characteristics of the liquid Sarin to the battlefield environment.  Because of its physical and toxicological characteristics, the most useful methods of employment for Sarin or any other non-persistent nerve agent are means and devices that rapidly disperse droplets or aerosols in a concentration high enough to cause immediate casualties. Dispersing a payload of Sarin in one load of liquid all in one place (like dumping a bucket) causes a great hazard in one spot, but not wide effects.  A device that did this would be less useful than a conventional explosive device of similar size.  Likewise, dividing it too finely over a large area will cause it to disperse quickly and not have a concentration adequate to cause incapacitation or death.  Again, such a device would have little or no value in comparison to a conventional device of similar size, weight, or shape.   

The overall guiding principle for weapon design with Sarin was that is was meant to rapidly cause casualties, and as such, weapons/munitions were designed to detonate/disperse at ground level.  (As opposed to persistent agents, which are designed to contaminate terrain and equipment, which generally burst/dispense/detonate some meters above ground level in order to spread a radius of droplets.) During the Cold War, the various superpowers devoted a lot of time, expertise, and money to studying and testing various weapon designs to see how effective different munitions and configurations might be.  Rather a lot of this information is now out in the public domain, either directly in form of declassified documents or indirectly, e.g. we can see the types of weapons that were the result of testing and optimisation and draw our own conclusions as to what types of weapons work and which ones don’t.  Drawing on US and Soviet experience, the following are the classic weapons for dispensing Sarin on the battlefield, all fuzed to detonate at surface:

• Artillery shells 
• Mortar shells 
• Air dropped bombs 
• Cluster bombs
• Missile warhead
• Rocket warhead
• Land mine

It should be noted that some types of weapons that aren’t so good for Sarin:

• Hand grenade – Very small payload possible.  Possibiity of leakage killing soldier handling it.  Soldier likely to have to be in protective gear the whole time.  Soldiers throwing grenades in protective gear are probably going to be less accurate and achieve less distance.
• Grenade launcher round – same liabilities as hand grenade.  And very low payload.
• Aerial spray devices – Unless the helicopter or aircraft is almost at ground level (highly unlikely), the Sarin would be too dispersed to have much effect.  Aerial spray devices are better for more viscous persistent agents (like Mustard or VX)
• Anything fuzed for aerial burst.  Likely to spread the droplets 
• Any explosive dissemination device with too little or  much explosive.  I won’t specify what it is (for obvious reasons) but there is an optimum ratio of charge to agent.  Too little leaves a puddle, too much spreads it too thin.

Some notes about types of “agent fills”.  An “agent fill” is a term that describes exactly how the chemical warfare agent is configured inside.  There’s three basic kinds of agent fills:

• Unitary: This means the agent is in the weapon in one big pool.  
• Binary:  Binary fills mean that two separate components are mixed to created the chemical agent.  Generally, this is done for the purposes of safely handling the munitions and to avoid having to store chemical weapons or filled munitions.  Sarin could be mixed on-site and poured into empty shells/rounds or munitions could be designed to mix two different components in flight.  To my knowledge, this was done with GB and VX.  A well-made binary weapon would have little or no difference from a unitary fill.  A poorly made one would have a high dud rate and would be generally less effective.
• Submuntions: A highly effective way of dissemination would be a munition that scattered bomblets or submunitions at some height, with the submunitions designed for ground impact detonation.  Other factors being equal (…but they often aren’t), submunitions are generally considered a more efficient method of dispensing Sarin.  

A note about “dud rates.”  Any class of munition has a dud rate, i.e. the percentage of shells/rockets/etc. that fail to function as intended.  Anecdotal evidence is that some older chemical weapons may have quite high dud rates. Even many modern conventional artillery rounds have non-trivial dud ratesv there’s no physical mechanism to explain why chemical rounds would have a radically lower dud rate.  This means that if any significant use of chemical warfare happens, there’s going to be an unexploded shell out there somewhere, which will be of great intelligence value if it can be safely retrieved.  (A task not for amateurs!)

Have you ever heard of sarin being used in a diluted form, or mixed with other chemical substances to make it less lethal?

There seems to be little point in trying to dilute Sarin to have some kind of non-lethal effect and I have no knowledge of this ever happening.  The sub-acute, low-level signs and symptoms of nerve agent poisoning are annoying but not terribly debilitating.  Giving a bunch of people a runny noses and pin-point pupils has far less tactical usefulness than using conventional riot control agents or the generally non-lethal vomiting agent adamsite. Such agents can easily cause debilitating effects, whereas with nerve agents, there’s a fine razor’s edge, not easily (or at all) controllable between incapacitating dosage and lethal dosage.  Why risk the opprobrium of the international community and the possibility of triggering international intervention by using just a wee bit of Sarin?  There seems no point. 

Sarin is designed to injure and kill.  There’s not much leeway between the incapacitating doses and lethal doses with Sarin (1000 mg and 1700 mg respectively as the ED50 and LD50) and the concentration that would lead to a person absorbing 1000mg Sarin would quickly lead to absorption of a lethal dose of 1700mg. 

A number of reports have claimed to have proven the use of sarin through tests on hair, clothing, blood, tissue, and urine samples.

I will address each of these types of samples in turn:

Blood: 

Sarin can be directly and indirectly detected in blood samples.  Several methods have been studied for detection of sarin in blood. Several studies have been described in the academic literature. There are also indirect methods that detect decomposition products of sarin or the physiological effects of sarin. 

Experience from the Tokyo subway incident in 1995, documented by the OPCW shows that one of the decomposition products of Sarin is a chemical known as IMPA is detectable in blood.   

Sarin’s method of action is to inhibit a substance called acetylcholinesterase, which is used by the human nervous system.  At least one study shows that the presence of a nerve agent could be deduced by examining post-mortem blood samples for presence or lack of acetylcholinesterase, up to a week after death.  A person who has died from Sarin exposure would have little or no acetylcholinesterase present.  It should be noted that this would only indicate the presence of a nerve agent and would not specifically indicate Sarin versus any other nerve agent (or even organophosphate pesticide intoxication) nor would it conclusively indicate nerve agent as a cause of death, as other factors may have killed the victim, such as conventional trauma. 

Urine

One of the decomposition products of Sarin in the human body is methylphosphonic acid.  A study shows that this substance is detectable in urine by use of mass spectrometry.   This particular substance is not specific to Sarin.  (The journal article says it is a decomposition product of cyclosarin, Soman and one type of VX as well.)  It should be noted that it can take some time for chemicals absorbed in the human body to end up in urine.  An immediate post-exposure sample may not have any evidence of exposure.

Tissue

A study from 2004 using guinea pigs indicates that plasma, heart, liver, kidney, and lung samples can indicate the presence of either Sarin or Soman using gas chromatography and mass spectrometry.  

Clothing, Skin, or Hair

Clothing, skin, or hair could get contaminated by droplets of Sarin.  I cannot find any literature on the absorption of Sarin into human hair, but common sense would dictate that any water-like liquid could be trapped in hair.  Because of the rapid speed at which Sarin evaporates, a sample would need to be collected quickly and kept in a sealed container.  A lowered temperature would help.  In such a case, the Sarin might actually be most easily identified in vapour form in the headspace of the container, having desorbed from the sample itself. 

How would these samples be tested for the presence of sarin?

First of all, my expertise is not very strong in the laboratory techniques used for such analysis.  My expertise is strongest in field detection techniques.  To the best of my knowledge, the generally accepted gold-standard analytical technique is the combination of gas chromatography and mass spectrometry (GC/MS) which is widely used by chemists to identify molecules.  GC/MS is a sophisticated technique requiring training and expensive equipment mostly found in labs.  There are some portable GC/MS devices, but they are generally used in vehicles or mobile labs and aren’t handheld devices.  

The following are field technologies which also have relevance in laboratory settings, given the appropriate equipment. All have pros and cons.

• FTIR:  Fourier transform infrared – Used to analyze a gas, vapour, liquid, or solid sample.  Not real time. An identifier, not a surveillance or detection tool.
• Raman: Laser-based identification technique that can identify liquids or solids. Not real time. An identifier, not a surveillance or detection tool.
• Ion Mobility Spectrometry (IMS):  Fast acting analysis of gas and vapour. IMS is the backbone of military field electronic nerve agent detectors. Works very quickly and is very sensitive.  Some problems with false positives, varying from model to model.  Some units will only detect, others will identify as well (i.e. discriminate VX from Sarin), while others provide a qualitative (“Hi, Med, Low”) or quantitative (“25 mg/m3”) measurement.
• Flame ionization: Used by a family of French chemical warfare detectors.  Broadly similar to IMS in application
• Photoionization: Commonly used in civilian HAZMAT detectors.  Generically detects toxic gases, but cannot identify chemicals.  Would not be able to tell difference between, say, ammonia, acetone, and Sarin.  I only mention this because it is so prevalent in civilian fire departments. 
• Wet chemistry: A variety of manual chemistry techniques ranging from very sophisticated to very simple.  Too many different kits and tools to generalize, other than to state that the cheap tools are easy to use but not very specific, whereas the expensive tools can be good but hard to use.  There are some specific nerve agent detection techniques in this category, but they generally have difficulty discriminating between types of nerve agent.  

If sarin was detected in hair and urine wouldn't that suggest small, non-lethal quantities, being ingested over a period of time?  

Sarin detected in hair might theoretically be a small droplet that was in the hair as a direct result of a Sarin attack.  However, the sample would have to have been collected quickly and sealed up.  (See above)  I don’t know of a biological mechanism that would result in Sarin or byproducts ending up inside human hair through hair growth.  I checked the literature and found nothing in this regard.  

As far as urine is concerned, I can’t find direct literature in my cursory search about how quickly Sarin or decomposition products end up in urine.  However, Sarin acts on the bladder and kidneys rather quickly, so this cannot be ruled out.  One Japanese Sarin victim of the lesser-publicized Matsumoto incident (previous to the infamous Tokyo incident) had measurable Sarin decomposition products in his urine. 

If sarin was on clothing how hazardous would it be to handle that clothing without correct protection?

Very hazardous.  Depending on the amount of contamination, possibly lethal. Full head-to-toe protection would be needed.  The fastest acting hazard would be vapour from the clothing.  

Is it possible other substances could produce false positives for sarin?

Yes.  Generally, the more sophisticated and expensive the detection technique, the less scope for false positives.   The false positives depend entirely on the detection method.  IMS is often fooled by chemicals of the same molecular weight as sarin.  Organophosphate-based pesticides are very similar chemicals to nerve agent chemical weapons, so they may pose a false positive. 

After a suspected sarin attack how should the victims be processed, and what precautions should be taken?

An effort should be made to triage the victims and deal with the most severely affected ones first.  Triage guidelines are available in various resources. The general acronym ABCDD can be used to describe the field medical interventions required for nerve agent exposure.  This stands for Airway, Breathing, Circulation, Drugs, and Decontamination.  A general broad guideline for dealing with a serious sarin casualty is as follows:

• Move casualty out of danger.  If possible remove contaminated clothing
• Establish and maintain airway, through intubation if necessary
• Control secretions through suction
• Ventilate with oxygen if available, using bag-valve mask if necessary.  Regular air is better than nothing if oxygen is not available. 
• Monitor pulse, commence compressions if pulse stops
• Administer atropine, pralidoxmine (or other oxime, in accordance with local protocols), and diazepam via intramuscular injection.  
• Decontaminate any possible skin exposure.  Soap and water are fine, if specialty decontaminants are not available. Even plain water will work in a pinch. Flush eyes with water. 
• Establish IV access to allow further antidote administration
• Administer additional antidotes as required
• Move to definitive care
• Constantly reassess airway, breathing, and circulation en route. 

If these precautions are not taken what is likely to happen to the people coming in contact with the victims?

If the victim was only exposed to Sarin in vapour form, which is quite possible, then there’s no particular hazard.  If a victim has been exposed to droplets or liquid, then persons coming into contact with the victim are likely to be affected if they are unprotected.  Due to the rapid rate at which Sarin evaporates, the principle hazard will be respiratory hazard, although contact hazard risk cannot be eliminated.  Droplets on skin, hair, and clothing are likely to evaporate and pose a respiratory hazard both to the victim and bystanders/helpers.  

How long would it take sarin to become harmless, or dissipate?  In general terms are we talking minutes, hours, weeks? 

Minutes to hours, depending on wind and air temperature and the volume of liquid sarin.  Sarin liquid evaporates quickly.  Vapour will disperse quickly in the open, but could last a very long time in a combined space. 

Steve Johnson is Lead for Explosive and Hazardous Forensics at Cranfield university

Sarin

How is sarin typically weaponised?

Militaries have used a wide range of techniques. Artillery shells, missiles and rockets are probably the most commone, although drop/spray tanks and even jet engines (Russia) have been tried. In Tokyo it had been intended initially to aerosolise but ended up being stabbed bags left to evaporate (which is pretty good due to the speed at which it evaporates).

What form does sarin take?  Can it be liquid, gas, powder, etc? Does it have a particular smell or colour?

Its normal state is liquid, although it steadily evaporates at a similar rate to water. Its Boiling point is 158 degrees C, Freezing point is -56.

It’s unlikely to be a gas although it may be produced as an aerosol from a mechanism. It would not be a powder unless it was absorbed on to a powder or solid in order to produce one.

Have you ever heard of sarin being used in a diluted form, or mixed with other chemical substances to make it less lethal?

Not to make it less lethal – Binary production of sarin from separate less lethal and often more stable chemicals is practical and has been done in the past. The Tokyo attacks often refer to dilute sarin but that was unlikely to have been to make it less lethal.

A number of reports have claimed to have proven the use of sarin through tests on hair, clothing, blood, tissue, and urine samples.  How would these be tested for the presence of sarin?

The metabolic uptake of Sarin and its behaviour within the body is relatively well studied. For tissue samples there are a number of markers that investigators can look for and there efficacy is dependent on the time after exposure and the route of introduction (inhalation will get it in to blood fast, presence in urine is often many hours after exposure). Markers that can be looked for are:

• Sarin – unreacted pure sarin.
• Acetylcholinesterase(AChE and Acetylcholine – This only gives an indication that the nervouse system has been disrupted , potentially, but not exclusively by a nerve agent or substance behaving like one.
• isopropyl methtylphosphonic acid (IMPA) – a breaking down of Sarin, sometimes called the hydrolysis product. Pretty good and a number of studies have looked at its detection in blood and urine of Tokyo victims. Fairly hard to think of reasons for it to be in blood other than exposure to sarin.
• methyl phosphonic acid. A further breakdown product but with more potential causes.
• Macro molecules from other Sarin/protein interactions (Phosphylated tyrosine). Not impossible and potentially good for investigation longer after the exposure point.
• Butyrylcholinesterase.  While AChE is found more in the red blood cells BuChE is found more in the serum of blood. It is less affected by Sarin, but in the event of a high exposure you would expect to see it affected as well and this can be a good ratio to examine when trying to assess exposure history with samples that have a poor patient history (much like we currently have).

Different markers fall away at different times after exposure. IMPA tend tobreakdown to MPA. Ache levels return to normal after about 30 days.  BuChE around 50 days.

If sarin was detected in hair and urine wouldn't that suggest small, non-lethal quantities, being ingested over a period of time?  

Potentially. Or a small single dose. Again working up a full spectrum of the biomarkers should be able to help understand that.

If sarin was on clothing how hazardous would it be to handle that clothing without correct protection?

It’d be pretty stupid but if it were pure(ish) sarin then it evaporates at about the same speed as water. So in many cases the levels left could be very low.  Some countries are fairly casual about contamination of items that have been in the vicinity of sarin because they don’t believe the vapour condenses on surfaces easily – i.e. being near some sarin won’t contaminate you or clothing  unless you touch it. That’s not necessarily a universally accepted fact though.

Is it possible other substances could produce false positives for sarin?

In the medical tests – yes as discussed a little above. IMPA and Phosphorylated tyrosine are pretty good though. In any event though they would still be indicating a significant chemical injury to the person from a pesticide perhaps. That’s why it is so important to have a context and medical history of the person from whom the samples are taken in order to make a diagnosis. It is a fact of modern medicine that a large amount of diagnosis is based on symptoms and context/case history – which is one of the reasons people are so twisted about these samples. They need context no matter how good the test.

After a suspected sarin attack how should the victims be processed, and what precautions should be taken?

I actually think PHR have a very good fact sheet on this.

If these precautions are not taken what is likely to happen to the people coming in contact with the victims?

It really depends on the amounts of agent and how the people were exposed. You could treat sarin victims with no protection and be ok, perversely those exposed to CS will (and there is a lot of evidence of this in civil cases) present a very high hazard to medical staff due the the difficulty in decontaminating riot control agents.

How long would it take sarin to become harmless, or dissipate?  In general terms are we talking minutes, hours, weeks?

Minutes in Syria during the day.

Saraqeb

The Saraqeb attack is probably one of the mostly well documented alleged chemical weapon attacks of the conflict.  Canisters inside containers filled with white-grey powder were reportedly dropped from a helicopter, landing in two locations, one near a road, where no victims were reported, and the other in the courtyard of a family home.  It was reported that immediately after impact, one of the residents entered the courtyard, and collapsed shortly afterwards, later dying.
Shortly after the first victim entered the courtyard more members of the family entered, and also fell ill, as did people responding to the attack.  Between 11 to 13 people were reportedly effected, with only one death reported.  Video from the road-side location filmed some time after the attack would show children playing near to the remaining white-grey powder with no ill effects reported. (A more detailed breakdown can be found here)

Would the above scenario match what you'd expect to see if Sarin has been used in the attack?

Not really. The powder is unusual and the death rate is very low. It’s certainly not what one would normally expect.

In common with many alleged chemical attacks in Syria the medical staff appears to have no protective gear.  If this was a sarin attack, how likely would it be that the medical staff would be effected, and how long would it take for the medical staff to become effected?

This depends on if the patients are externally contaminated. They may just have inhaled it. Speed of action on medical staff if they were contaminated would depend on the level. If very low there may be no real noticeable effects given the general alarum in a casualty receiving post. If significant then within minutes. In fairness though the fact there is a patient and not a corpse would suggest that the level of contamination is low or the agent is non-lethal. As death from Sarin is pretty rapid.

One video shows a car pulling up with at least one victim inside.  If this was a sarin attack, how likely would it be that the inside of the vehicle would be contaminated by sarin?  If the victim inside the vehicle had been exposed to sarin is it likely other passengers in the vehicle would fall ill?

Syrian vehicles are far from airtight. If the victim had inhaled then there is no real reason for the car to become very contaminated. Potentially the victim migh exhale some contamination (this certainly happens with cyanide suicide).

Some people have proposed a scenario where a diluted mixture of sarin and other substances was used in the attack.  If that was the case, would your answers to the above questions change significantly?

Not really other than it might be possible to create a powder with another substance.

The canisters recovered from the scene of the attacks matched canisters also recovered from an attack reported in Sheikh Maqsoud in Aleppo, where there were again claims of them being dropped from a helicopter, with photographs showing the canister remains covered in white-grey powder.  

The same design of canister has also been filmed in a cache of weapons reportedly captured by the Syrian opposition from the Syrian military, and a journalist in Syria has shown the image of the canister to various armed group, many of which have claimed to have seen them in the possession of opposition fighters, claiming to have captured them from the Syrian army.

Another type of grenade, using an identical fuze, was also photographed in Syria, with the photographer being told it was a normal smoke grenade.

There's video footage from the Saraqeb attack showing what's claimed to be the canisters falling through the sky, appearing to produce smoke or a white gas, as well as producing light. The canisters appeared to show signs of heat damage around holes along the body of the canister.  

Considering the various information gathered about these grenades is it likely they would have contained Sarin?

Not really – sounds like WP or CS

Is it possible the could have contained another substance that could have caused symptoms seen in the victims of the attack?

In the grenades? Seems far fetched and the mixing of liquid sarin and a riot control agent dissolved in to solution would be a beast to get stable as it could affect agent stability.

Could one of those possibly substances produced a false positive for sarin?

Not as far as causing death and not on the basis of the medical test results.

Is it reasonable that the contents of this grenade could have been emptied and replaced by sarin?

Possibly.

Khan al-Assal

The Russian government has claimed the Syrian opposition was responsible for the Khan al-Assal attack, with a DIY rocket delivering a payload of Sarin.  

What do you think would be involved in putting together a DIY chemical warhead for a DIY rocket?

Crude devices are not that hard. Removal of explosives or whatever payload had been carried, followed by introducing the agent. You would need protective gear and it wouldn’t be very safe doing the filling.

Accuracy would be lost (if a missile) and performance of rockets could be affected by different weight distribution. I don’t really want to go in to too much detail about the how, lest I give ideas or advice, but early CW munitions were very simple.

If you don’t really care where it goes then its achievable.

Considering the Russian government's claim that a DIY rocket was used  in the attack, what would be the most effective dispersal method once the rocket reached it's target?  

Air burst or base ejection were used by military munitions but require more complex fuses. If aimed at hard targets then you’d get a level of dispersal by simple impact, but if it hit the earth then the payload could just get driven in to the earth.

As with the other alleged chemical attacks in Syria the staff treating the wounded appear not to be using any protective clothing.  Would this have resulted in medical staff and responders being contaminated if this was a sarin attack?

Not necessarily, see above.

Chemical Weapon Specialists Talk Sarin, Saraqeb, and Khan Al-Assal - Part 1

Over the past few weeks, it seems all sides in the Syrian conflict have come to agree that sarin has been used in Syria, they just disagree over who used it.  Russia's UN ambassador recently gave the UN secretary general results of tests which he claims proves the attack on Khan al-Assal involved the use of sarin by the opposition Basha'ir al-Nasr brigade, using their DIY "Basha'ir-3" rockets.  Western nations have made various claims, including France who used samples collected from Damascus and Saraqeb, Idlib, by journalists from Le Monde to confirm the use of sarin in both these areas.

With the use of sarin in Syria being a frequent topic of debate I've approached a number of chemical weapon specialists with a set of questions on sarin, and the alleged attacks in Saraqeb and Khan al-Assal to help shed some light on the topic, and hopefully clear up some confusion.  

Paul from Allen Vanguard.  Allen Vanguard have a long established reputation for reporting on Threat Intelligence.  They recently rolled-out a new web portal that offers on-line access to their products and services.  The portal can be found here.  (Qualifying businesses and organizations can obtain guest accounts upon request, using the “Subscribe” button on the top right hand side of the page.)

Sarin

How is Sarin typically weaponised?

Sarin is a lethal war agent.  It is designed and produced to cause death in humans.  It is usually loaded into a carrier projectile which is designed to contain liquid agents.  Sarin can also be dispersed by other means such as aerosols.

If projectile delivered, an explosive burster charge is used to open the projectile and disperse the Sarin without destroying all of it.

What form does Sarin take?  Can it be liquid, gas, powder, etc? Does it have a particular smell or colour?

In its weaponised state Sarin is a colourless and odourless liquid and is dispersed either in that form or as a vapour.  That is not to say that a Sarin producer could not add ingredients to make it detectable either by sight or smell although this would require careful research to ensure that the precursors and additives did not interfere with each other.  It would be an unusual thing to do.

It would not be viable from an effectiveness standpoint to use powdered Sarin, just as it is not possible to have powdered water.  Sarin is volatile and able to disperse efficiently by being mixed with Isopropyl alcohol so that it can turn into a vapour and move with air currents and then either be inhaled by living organisms or through absorption.  If it was turned into a solid (powder) then it would be too heavy to be dispersed in an efficient manner.

Have you ever heard of Sarin being used in a diluted form, or mixed with other chemical substances to make it less lethal?

No.  The advantage of CW is that they are cheap, easy to disperse and able to kill/injure a large amount of people.  The ratio between dead and injured will depend on the agent concentration and exposure, in what environment (indoors/outdoors) and in what atmospheric conditions (wind/ /temperature).

There would be little advantage of making Sarin less lethal because it would still be lethal in the right conditions.  If the objective of an attacker was to temporarily incapacitate an enemy then other CW would be considered such as mustard agents, then the attacker would be expected to physically enter that area to control it otherwise the attack would serve no purpose militarily.  In this scenario, the attacker’s soldiers/vehicles would be equipped with protective equipment/clothing otherwise they would be liable to be contaminated too.

Other agents, such as CS would be far more effective at causing non-lethal effects with the intention of temporarily incapacitating people and encouraging them to leave an area of their own accord.  ‘Mild’ nerve agent poisoning will mean that people will be more likely to stay in the area.

A number of reports have claimed to have proven the use of Sarin through tests on hair, clothing, blood, tissue, and urine samples.  How would these be tested for the presence of Sarin?

I would expect that each item would be analysed with the correct equipment which has been properly maintained and calibrated after each item has been analysed, otherwise one item could contaminate the rest of the tests, resulting in a higher cumulative result.  I explained in my Q&As with Alfred Hackensberg that there would be a requirement for tests to be taken of the environment and from local people who had not been killed or injured in the attack to compare blood samples.  To be digested and turned into urine, the victim would have had to have consumed such a small amount in another liquid that it would not have killed them.  If they had been killed by drinking Sarin, it would not have entered the digestive system.

But anyway, to answer the question, all the items would be tested for traces of the lethal precursors of Sarin and in the case of the blood, the evidence of asphyxia, the method by which Sarin will ultimately kill its victim.

If Sarin was detected in hair and urine wouldn't that suggest small, non-lethal quantities, being ingested over a period of time?  

Yes.  If someone was killed from Sarin CW attack then the Sarin would not be digested or grown out into someone’s hair.  If they had been attacked and survived in the past, they would have told someone about it, there would have been more witnesses and it is possible that the attack would have left permanent indicators of its presence, such as in the hair of the survivor.

If Sarin was on clothing how hazardous would it be to handle that clothing without correct protection?

If recently contaminated and not subjected to any decontamination procedures, then there would be a contamination risk, especially in confined spaces.  Individual protective clothing (IPE), respirator with correct filter would be required to be worn by everyone coming into contact with it.

Is it possible other substances could produce false positives for Sarin?

Yes it is.  Most chemical agents are detected in the field using generic technologies.  Precise field detection is possible through reagent kits but this requires training to use accurately.  As an example of detecting a false positive, insect repellents work in much the same was as nerve agent by attacking the nervous system of the insects and even in small quantities, they will cause electronic portable detector systems to alarm.  The quantities of active agent in insect spray are diluted so that they won’t harm humans for normal use, although it is likely that it will be ingested by people who use such substances on a regular basis.

After a suspected Sarin attack how should the victims be processed, and what precautions should be taken?

This very much depends on who is suspected of being a CW victim (military or civilian) and what infrastructure (qualified medical staff, suitable vehicles, and suitable accommodation) is in place to deal with CW attacks.  The more resources applied, the more costly but effective the process.

Nations have their own procedures, but some basic principles need to be adhered to; minimising further contamination, transferring CW victims into vehicles and then to a hospital will ensure that the vehicles can no longer be used until decontaminated and the people in the hospital who were not CW victims would become at risk of contamination.  It is possible to have sealed wards but it would be difficult to obtain video footage from inside the contaminated area as there would need to be a comprehensive system of decontamination for anyone leaving.  All the staff would need to wear IPE and be cognisant of symptoms, decontamination drills and procedures.

The most efficient method of delivering aid to CW victims would be to bring the suitably trained medical staff to the victims so that they can be treated and processed, decontaminated and then transferred to an aid post or hospital.

Setting up a hot line and cold line upwind of the incident is the normal process for chemical incidents controlling access and egress to/from the hazardous area with detection, decontamination and casualty handling incorporated into the mitigation process.

The corpses of CW victims would likely be burned to avoid further contamination of the ground, other people or buildings.

If these precautions are not taken what is likely to happen to the people coming in contact with the victims?

A person with contaminated clothing is further dispersing the agent.  Anyone coming into contact with a contaminated person will be at risk of becoming contaminated themselves, especially in confined areas such as in buildings or vehicles.

How long would it take Sarin to become harmless, or dissipate?  In general terms are we talking minutes, hours, weeks? 

This is difficult to answer because of the variables that could exist but Sarin is a non-persistent and highly volatile liquid which disperses and vaporises rapidly dependent on conditions of temperature and air flow.  A single projectile of Sarin fired in a hot, sunny featureless environment during a windy day could feasibly take minutes to dissipate.  At the other end of the spectrum, a sustained bombardment/barrage in an urban area during a period of no wind and no sustained periods of sun would be more likely to create a scenario where pockets of exposed Sarin would last for days, unexposed Sarin could last for weeks and CW UXO could remain in the area for years.

Sarin is a non-persistent agent which means that the entity who used it is intending to enter the contaminated area soon after the attack when safe to do so.  IPE and detection equipment would be used by first-in elements and until the all-clear was given.  

Saraqeb

The Saraqeb attack is probably one of the mostly well documented alleged chemical weapon attacks of the conflict.  Canisters inside containers filled with white-grey powder were reportedly dropped from a helicopter, landing in two locations, one near a road, where no victims were reported, and the other in the courtyard of a family home.  It was reported that immediately after impact, one of the residents entered the courtyard, and collapsed shortly afterwards, later dying.  Shortly after the first victim entered the courtyard more members of the family entered, and also fell ill, as did people responding to the attack.  Between 11 to 13 people were reportedly effected, with only one death reported.  Video from the road-side location filmed some time after the attack would show children playing near to the remaining white-grey powder with no ill effects reported. (A more detailed breakdown can be found here)

Would the above scenario match what you'd expect to see if Sarin has been used in the attack?

Not really.  I would be very surprised if a lethal war agent would be dispersed in this way; the risk of contamination to the helicopter and crew would be high.  Sarin is not known to be dispersed in a powdered form.

In common with many alleged chemical attacks in Syria the medical staff appears to have no protective gear.  If this was a Sarin attack, how likely would it be that the medical staff would be effected, and how long would it take for the medical staff to become effected?

Depending on concentration and method of contact, the medical staff could feel the effects of the agent as soon as they came into contact with the victim or other contaminated articles.

One video shows a car pulling up with at least one victim inside.  If this was a Sarin attack, how likely would it be that the inside of the vehicle would be contaminated by Sarin?  If the victim inside the vehicle had been exposed to Sarin is it likely other passengers in the vehicle would fall ill?

The inside of the vehicle would likely be contaminated by Sarin if the victim has been in contact with the agent droplets or vapour.  The victim would have contaminated skin and clothing which would continue to produce Sarin vapour.  The inside of a vehicle is confined and this would mean that everyone in the vehicle would breathe in the Sarin.  Contaminated surfaces inside the vehicle could affect future users of the car.

Some people have proposed a scenario where a diluted mixture of Sarin and other substances was used in the attack.  If that was the case, would your answers to the above questions change significantly?

I don’t understand why a diluted Sarin agent would be produced or used.  If a less lethal agent was required then there are more efficient solutions.

The canisters recovered from the scene of the attacks matched canisters also recovered from an attack reported in Sheikh Maqsoud in Aleppo, where there were again claims of them being dropped from a helicopter, with photographs showing the canister remains covered in white-grey powder.  

The same design of canister has also been filmed in a cache of weapons reportedly captured by the Syrian opposition from the Syrian military, and a journalist in Syria has shown the image of the canister to various armed group, many of which have claimed to have seen them in the possession of opposition fighters, claiming to have captured them from the Syrian army.

Another type of grenade, using an identical fuze, was also photographed in Syria, with the photographer being told it was a normal smoke grenade.

There's video footage from the Saraqeb attack showing what's claimed to be the canisters falling through the sky, appearing to produce smoke or a white gas, as well as producing light. The canisters appeared to show signs of heat damage around holes along the body of the canister.  

Considering the various information gathered about these grenades is it likely they would have contained Sarin? 

Not really. Hand grenades have been manufactured for military use containing lethal war agents in the past.  Sarin filled grenades would not include a pyrotechnic burning reaction to generate the toxic smoke as this is not deemed viable or known for dispersal of a Sarin payload.  

Is it possible they could have contained another substance that could have caused symptoms seen in the victims of the attack?

It is unlikely that the grenades would have contained a blood, nerve or blister agent.  Having seen the footage of the victims, I question whether their symptoms were caused by a CW attack.  Without seeing more footage before and after the filming, I’d say that they could have been exposed a number of chemical incidents including toxic smoke inhalation, exposure to industrial chemicals or unintended releases through acts of war.

Could one of those possibly substances produced a false positive for Sarin?

It depends on the chemicals involved.  If they were precursors for insect-spray then possibly but it is unlikely that the agent would have been dispersed by means of a grenade from a helicopter.

Is it reasonable that the contents of this grenade could have been emptied and replaced by Sarin?

No.  The safe conditions and process required would be the limiting factor as the procedure would be highly dangerous with a high risk of contamination.  The gains in filling a small container with a highly volatile lethal agent, which can only be projected over short distances, would seem a risky and unviable proposition.

Khan al-Assal

The Russian government has claimed the Syrian opposition was responsible for the Khan al-Assal attack, with a DIY rocket delivering a payload of Sarin.  

What do you think would be involved in putting together a DIY chemical warhead for a DIY rocket?

The rocket would need a viable motor to be able to reach its intended destination.  There would need to be a method of breaking or bursting the warhead casing in order for the Sarin to disperse.  It is possible to separate the Sarin precursors inside different containers inside the warhead (binary agent) but this further complicates the functioning of the projectile and makes successful use less likely if an improvised system.

The Syrian opposition have the technical know-how to manufacture rockets.

Considering the Russian government's claim that a DIY rocket was used  in the attack, what would be the most effective dispersal method once the rocket reached it's target?  

Most efficient would be use of a projectile with an air-burst fuze to allow the Sarin to be dispersed above the ground as to contaminate as much of the area as possible.  I would also expect that some of these rockets would miss the target wildly, contaminate the wrong targets and in some cases not initiate properly.  Simple impact of a thin cased projectile with the ground could be used to disperse the liquid which would then vaporise depending on environmental conditions.

As with the other alleged chemical attacks in Syria the staff treating the wounded appear not to be using any protective clothing.  Would this have resulted in medical staff and responders being contaminated if this was a Sarin attack?

Yes.  Everyone within a contaminated area would feel the effects of chemical attack, resulting in injury and death.  I would be surprised if Sarin victims would be able to be transported to a hospital immediately after an attack without secondary contamination occurring.

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Hamish de Bretton-Gordon is the Former Commander of UK CBRN Forces and COO of SecureBio.

Sarin

How is sarin typically weaponised?

Sarin is generally stored in its component form (separate chemicals) and is weaponised by the mixing of the components into either a liquid or vapour/gas form.  Once 'mixed' Sarin has a relatively short shelf life and would therefore need to be used within a time frame.  If not used then purity will degrade and the effectiveness/lethality will be effected.   Sarin was developed by the Nazi’s in the 1930’s originally as a pesticide and has its origins as an organophosphate.  When they realised how effective it could be as a nerve agent against humans they weaponised it. Sarin is about 3-4000 times more toxic than organophosphates, hence the poisoning of Indian School children last week with pesticide where 23 people were killed would have been significantly worse if it were Sarin or another Nerve agent. 

What form does sarin take?  Can it be liquid, gas, powder, etc? Does it have a particular smell or colour?

Sarin will generally come in the form of either a liquid of vapour.

Sarin, when in a pure form is both colourless and odourless.  However persons who were affected during the Tokyo Sarin attack,(the Sarin used was of only 50% purity)  reported a smell similar to paint thinner.  

A number of reports have claimed to have proven the use of sarin through tests on hair, clothing, blood, tissue, and urine samples.  How would these be tested for the presence of sarin?

The testing of cholinesterase levels in the samples during laboratory tests would indicate the presence of nerve agents.

If sarin was detected in hair and urine wouldn't that suggest small, non-lethal quantities, being ingested over a period of time?  

Not necessarily, it could indicate that the person was only exposed to a small amount regardless of the time involved. 

If sarin was on clothing how hazardous would it be to handle that clothing without correct protection?

This would depend largely on the quantity on the clothing and the quality/age of the Sarin.  However, a note of caution, is that exposure to Sarin can be accumulative and death or injury could occur over a time when exposed to low levels of contamination.  The best advice is to protect yourself at all times.

Is it possible other substances could produce false positives for Sarin?

Highly unlikely with today’s modern equipment which can measure to PPM PPT levels.  Some of these tests have been done at Porton Down and US and French equivalent, who conspiracy theories aside, would not get this wrong.

After a suspected sarin attack how should the victims be processed, and what precautions should be taken?

Victims will need to be triaged and treated according to medical need.  Staff treating victims should protect themselves at all times to prevent them in turn becoming victims.  Many first responders and medical staff in the Tokyo subway attacks became casualties themselves in this way.

If these precautions are not taken what is likely to happen to the people coming in contact with the victims?

Likely to become affected by the Sarin to a greater or lesser degree.

How long would it take sarin to become harmless, or dissipate?  In general terms are we talking minutes, hours, weeks? 

This will depend on a number of factors, but it will become harmless in a relatively short period, hours rather than days.  Sarin by its very nature is a non persistent agent and is lighter than air, therefore it will disperse quickly.  The speed at which it disperses will depend on temperature, humidity etc.  Generally speaking the lethal effects of Sarin are short lived, residues can remain in the soil or in clothing for weeks.  Traces of Mustard gas, a persistent blister agent are still being found in Halabja 25 years after the attack.

Saraqeb

The Saraqeb attack is probably one of the mostly well documented alleged chemical weapon attacks of the conflict.  Canisters inside containers filled with white-grey powder were reportedly dropped from a helicopter landing in two locations, one near a road, where no victims were reported, and the other in the courtyard of a family home.  It was reported that immediately after impact one of the residents entered the courtyard, and collapsed shortly afterwards, later dying.  Shortly after the first victim entered the courtyard more members of the family entered, and also fell ill, as did people responding to the attack.  Between 11 to 13 people were reportedly effected, with only one death reported.  Video from the road-side location filmed some time after the attack would show children playing near to the remaining white-grey powder with no ill effects reported.

Would the above scenario match what you'd expect to see if sarin has been used in the attack?

Not normally.  Sarin would normally be delivered by air dropped munitions or artillery shells, causing mass casualties i.e. Halabja.  However, it is pretty clear that samples from Saraqeb have tested positive for Sarin, so there would appear to be very small amounts of Sarin contained in the canisters, probably of a low quality.  This would account for the relatively few casualties.  It is certainly not textbook delivery but has presumably achieved the effect which the perpetrator wanted – confusion and derision amongst the International Community.

In common with many alleged chemical attacks in Syria the medical staff appears to have no protective gear.  If this was a sarin attack, how likely would it be that the medical staff would be effected, and how long would it take for the medical staff to become effected?

Without PPE medical staff would be vulnerable to cross contamination issues. The levels of exposure are likely to be low but as mentioned above the accumulated effects could cause injury or death.  The lack of PPE and training is also a concern for NGOs and charities operating in a medical capacity in Syria.

One video shows a car pulling up with at least one victim inside.  If this was a sarin attack, how likely would it be that the inside of the vehicle would be contaminated by sarin?  If the victim inside the vehicle had been exposed to sarin is it likely other passengers in the vehicle would fall ill?

There would in all likelihood be contamination inside the vehicle, however on the evidence given this would low level.  Other occupants of the vehicle would be contaminated to one degree or another.  Very difficult to tell from videos and pictures.

Some people have proposed a scenario where a diluted mixture of sarin and other substances was used in the attack.  If that was the case, would your answers to the above questions change significantly?

The subject of deliberately diluting a mixture of Sarin, and or mixing it with other substances would defeat the object of use it as it was designed, and the effectiveness would be difficult to predict. The less pure the Sarin is the less lethality it possesses.  Therefore the answer above would remain.  It is probably the case that less lethal Sarin was used, but it is impossible to say if this was by accident or design.

The canisters recovered from the scene of the attacks matched canisters also recovered from an attack reported in Sheikh Maqsoud in Aleppo, where there were again claims of them being dropped from a helicopter, with photographs showing the canister remains covered in white-grey powder.  

The same design of canister has also been filmed in a cache of weapons reportedly captured by the Syrian opposition from the Syrian military, and a journalist in Syria has shown the image of the canister to various armed group, many of which have claimed to have seen them in the possession of opposition fighters, claiming to have captured them from the Syrian army.

Another type of grenade, using an identical fuze, was also photographed in Syria, with the photographer being told it was a normal smoke grenade.

There's video footage from the Saraqeb attack showing what's claimed to be the canisters falling through the sky, appearing to produce smoke or a white gas, as well as producing light. The canisters appeared to show signs of heat damage around holes along the body of the canister.   

Considering the various information gathered about these grenades is it likely they would have contained sarin?  

Given the evidence above the canisters would more likely contain phosphorous, or indeed be smoke grenades.  But it is not impossible that they contained Sarin.  

Is it possible the could have contained another substance that could have caused symptoms seen in the victims of the attack?

It is possible that they could have contained organophosphates(pesticides) which have the sample chemical structure as nerve agents but are a lot less toxic and would fit with the scenario painted.  However, UK, US and French Govts have stipulated that they have detected Sarin in samples from the two attacks mentioned and that is the best information currently available.

Could one of those possibly substances produced a false positive for sarin?

It is highly unlikely that a false positive would be given for Sarin.  Lab tests on biological samples are very sophisticated, and again modern day detection, identification and monitoring equipment systems are pretty reliable. 

Is it reasonable that the contents of this grenade could have been emptied and replaced by sarin?

It is possible, but I’m not sure it is reasonable. It would be a very strange thing to do and potentially very dangerous to those doing this.  However, there appear to be no bounds to the ‘awfulness’ associated currently with the War in Syria, so one is surprised by very little at the moment.

Khan al-Assal

The Russian government has claimed the Syrian opposition was responsible for the Khan al-Assal attack, with a DIY rocket delivering a payload of sarin.  

What do you think would be involved in putting together a DIY chemical warhead for a DIY rocket?

This scenario is highly improbable.  Sarin when delivered by munitions is 'mixed' in flight and the warhead is programmed to either release its payload at a given height or on contact with the ground.  It is unlikely that the rebels would have access to this level of sophistication – this is beyond a ‘DIY’ rocket ‘thing’..

Considering the Russian government's claim that a DIY rocket was used  in the attack, what would be the most effective dispersal method once the rocket reached its target?  

If this claim was found to be justified the either an air burst or ground burst weapon would be equally effective.  There would be a number of factors to take into account before deciding which would be the best, these could include climatic conditions, target etc.

As with the other alleged chemical attacks in Syria the staff treating the wounded appear not to be using any protective clothing.  Would this have resulted in medical staff and responders being contaminated if this was a sarin attack?

It is highly likely that some form of cross contamination would occur from treating the victims, the level of contamination would be determined by the level of contamination the victim was exposed to.

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Later next week I'll be posting more interviews, and looking at what we know about the Russian claims of sarin use at Khan al-Assal, and the group they claimed used it, the Basha'ir al-Nasr brigade.