Investigating Claims Of Syrian Opposition Members Executing Prisoners

The following video, titled "FSA Terrorists Massacre Imprisoned Syrian Army Soldiers in Quneitra, Golan Heights (18+)", was posted on the YouTube channel Eretz Zen War Vids, claiming to show evidence that Syrian opposition groups executed prisoners.  The video description states

This two-part video shows strong evidence that militants from the "Free Syrian Army" (FSA) massacred Syrian Army soldiers from the Fourth Platoon of Brigade 61 in Harak town of Quneitra province, in Syria's southern Golan Heights area. The FSA terrorists also attacked a UN outpost in that area before getting to the Syrian Army location.
The participating FSA brigades include Grandsons of the Prophet Brigades, Blessing of the Compassionate Brigade, Martyr Salah al-Jolani Brigade, Freedom Martyrs Brigade, and Sibteen Brigade.
Warning: Graphic content (not for shock, 18+, not for faint-hearted, viewer discretion advised, aimed only at documenting crimes by FSA terrorists in Syria)

In this post I hope to take a closer look at this video, but also highlight some of the ways in which the person producing this video could have helped anyone trying to investigate the claims made in the video, for example news organisations who might have wanted to cover it.

When I see a video like this that's been edited, the first thing I want to find it the original source videos, to confirm the uploaded date, original description, and other details.  Whenever I upload copies of videos onto my YouTube channel, I include details from the original video, including a link to the original video (for example here), so even if the video is deleted the original information that was attached to the video is preserved.  In the case of the above video, that information hasn't been included, so that means I have to go find it myself.  That's okay for someone like me who spends all day looking at videos from Syria, but you can't expect a journalist to do that, or even know how to do it effectively, so it's best to make life easy for them.

Fortunately, the person creating the above video took screenshots of the channels they took the videos from, so after asking for help to get the names typed out in Arabic, I put them into YouTube search.  Again, this is a step that could have been skipped if those names and links were just put into the YouTube description.

That came up with two YouTube channels where I found the two videos.  It's always best to find the original channels these videos were posted on, as that's where you'll find all the original information, and if the video has been posted elsewhere by the groups involved (Facebook for example) then you can just paste the video URL into Google, and see where it appears.

The first video, showing the men still alive, was posted on a channel that translates to News Center Free Syria.  Frequently, the channels used to post original videos are named after local areas or opposition groups, so that's the first clue it might not be the original channel the video was uploaded to.  If you then take a look at the list of videos on the channel, you'll also note there's whole variety of different logos on the videos, for example:

This is a pretty strong indication this isn't a channel that posts original videos, so now we need to find the original channel.  Some channels that repost videos use the exact same title as the original video, so that's one place to start, and in the case of this video it's also worth searching for just the name of the town the video was filmed in.  For those of us who don't speak Arabic that means copying the title of the video into Google Translate, then figuring out which word is the name of the town (which in this case translates to "mobility"), then hovering over the English word with the mouse cursor, which highlights the word in the original Arabic text.  Copy and paste that into YouTube search, and away you go.

This will bring up a number of videos, so then it's a case of browsing through the video, looking for ones with matching previews, and seeing which was posted first.  In the case of this video, the first appearance appears to be on the YouTube channel Mhmad Samoor.  Judging from the video descriptions, this channel is posting videos for the local media centre, and generally all media centres have a Facebook page.  So, more copying of Arabic text into Google Translate, and this time we want the name of the media centre.  Paste that into Google, and we get results for Facebook pages with that name.  The results in this case includes this page and this page, both long established pages posting news from the area the video was reportedly filmed in, and both pages features posts made on November 11th featuring the video, (here and here).  So for the first video, we've established the video has been posted on a YouTube channel used by local media centres, the videos have been shared on the Facebook pages of those groups, and what that does is help build the evidence that these videos are authentic.  It seems like a lot of work, but when I'm writing about videos that show significant events, such as war crimes, I'm thinking about getting as much evidence as possible they are authentic.

The second video, showing the corpses of the men in the first video, was taken from the YouTube channel of Liwa Tabaruk ar-Rahman.  They rather handily link their Facebook page in some of the descriptions of their YouTube videos.  Although they don't link the video of the dead men on their Facebook page, they do link other videos from that channel on the Facebook page, dated before and after the video of the dead men.  This gives a great deal of weight to this video being genuine.

At this point we've established the videos are almost certainly genuine, so the question is now, do they match?

The most obvious thing to check is the clothes the men are wearing

Right-to-left
1 - Green shirt, black trousers, bare feet.
2 - Black jacket, camouflage trousers, black shoes/socks.
3 - Greenish stripped shirt, blue jeans, blue socks/shoes with white stripes.

4 - Camouflage jacket, blue jeans, bare feet.
5 - Black jacket with a blue trim, camouflage trousers, black shoes/socks.
6 - Camouflage jacket, blue jeans, bare feet.

Of course, clothes can be moved and changed, especially shoes or socks being removed, or jackets being removed or opened, so that should be kept in mind.  Unfortunately in the video of the bodies isn't very good quality, but there's some matches that seem pretty clear

This is clearly a strong match for man number three, same shirt, same blue jeans, and wearing some sort of footwear.  Two of the dead men match the description of two men in the video that wore black jackets, camouflage trousers, and black shoes/socks

However, in the video showing the men alive, one man clearly has no facial hair like the man in the bottom picture

It's also worth noting that one man appears to be absent from this, number 1 in the first video, wearing a green shirt, black trousers, and no footwear.

The video quality isn't great, but among the men there's at least some matches of clothing, but there's also something else that matches in the two videos, pointing towards this being the same incident

In the background of both videos we can clearly see the same debris, in particular two distinct yellow containers, as well as other debris.

It should always be kept in mind during these types of investigations that videos of the same incident may have been posted elsewhere, so it's worth searching for video uploaded using other keywords, such as other names used to describe the location, or names of other opposition groups that were operating in that area at the same time.  In the case of this incident, there was in fact another group operating in the area who filmed the same group of bodies, but much more clearly

The video's narrator doesn't provide too much additional information

Allah Akbar, dead bodies from Assad's dogs inside 4th platoon, aka Khaldoun platoon, after it was liberated by Gurabaa’a Horan Liwa, that belongs to Ahfad al Rassoul (Grandsons of the prophet) group.

But it does give a much clearer view of the dead men, and we can see, as with the video showing the living men, there's two men with camouflage jackets, blue jeans, bare feet.

So it seems certain at least one of the men in the video showing them alive was killed, and also very likely four more of the men were also killed, with the sixth man absent from the videos showing the dead men.

It seems from these videos that these men were killed after they were captured, despite the claims in the Liwa Tabaruk ar-Rahman video they were killed in an ambush.  As there were a number of groups involved in this operation it's unclear which specific group was responsible, but it seems highly unlikely it would have been anyone but one of those opposition groups.

Many thanks to all the people who contributed to this post, including everyone at Storyful's Open Newsroom.  On going discussion of these videos can be found here.

You can also find France 24 Arabic's report on these videos here.

You can contact the author on Twitter @brown_moses or by email at brownmoses@gmail.com

Is The Syrian Military Using Another Type Of Chemical Weapon?

Earlier this week I took a detailed look at the use of Improvised Rocket Assisted Munitions (IRAMs) by government forces in Syria.  The IRAMs used in Syria are basically 107mm rockets with the warheads removed, and replaced with much larger warheads, with range and accuracy being sacrificed for explosive power.  This makes it a very effective weapon in urban combat, with video evidence from pro-government channels showing them used to directly attack opposition positions at short range.

As part of that post I linked to a playlist of videos that showed IRAMs filmed by the opposition in towns and cities across the country over the past year.  Richard Lloyd of Tesla Laboratory Inc, who has studied various munitions used in the conflict, contacted me, and noted something very interesting about one of the videos.

Below are several examples of the IRAMs featured in the video.  As you can see, distortion from the original source video aside, they are all pretty much identical

The warhead is totally sealed, with no ports of any kind on the warhead, and the base of the warhead also has no ports, as shown below

Also note the configuration of the nozzles in this video showing an Iranian 107mm rocket used as part of the IRAM.  The number of nozzles vary on the type of rocket, different 107mm rockets have different numbers of nozzles, and the 140mm M14 rocket used in the August 21st Sarin attacks has 10 nozzles 

Richard Lloyd highlighted one video that wasn't like the other.  It shows what appears to be an IRAM with a significantly different design

The video, dated June 30th 2013, describe this as a strange munition dropped from an aircraft (which I believe is possibly an incorrect description of it's deployment), and there's certainly a number of strange things about it.  Photographs taken of the munition gives a clearer view

We can estimate the size of the munition from examining the rocket.  As you can see from the above picture of the Iranian 107mm rocket it's an identical nozzle configuration, so it seems almost certain the rocket is 107mm wide.  Richard Lloyd estimated the size as around 300mm wide,and 650mm long, with a volume of about 40-45 litres.

You'll note the rocket motor has embedded itself deeply into the warhead.  No other example of an unexploded IRAM shows this, and if the warhead was filled with solid explosives then it seems very unlikely to happen.   Richard Lloyd agrees with me that this strongly suggests that the warhead is hollow.

You'll also remember the other IRAMs didn't have a hole or a metal ring on the base of the warhead, so it's already notably different from other IRAMs.  Now let's examine the front of the warhead, which shows something that's extremely interesting

On the left of the warhead is a very unusual square object that appears to be very similar to the plug on the fill port of the munition used in the August 21st Sarin attacks, which I've previously referred to as the UMLACA.  The following photograph shows the base of the UMLACA warhead recovered from the August 21st attack

External

Internal

Aside from the fill port shown above, the UMLACA also had a second port on the base of the warhead, shown on the right in this image

I asked Richard Lloyd what he believe this port to be, and he said based off his knowledge, this is possibly used to arm and/or power the fuze.  There's more discussion of that in this post.

So what we appear to have here is a IRAM with a warhead designed to hold a liquid of some sort.  With only one example of this type of IRAM recorded in Syria so far, and little additional information, it's hard to know exactly what was inside this munition, but it's certainly a very unusual munition that's worth keeping an eye out for in the future.

You can contact the author on Twitter @brown_moses or by email at brownmoses@gmail.com

The Syrian National Defence Force's Most Devastating Urban Combat Weapon

In late 2012, those of us tracking the munitions used in the Syrian conflict began to see the remains of an unusual munition that opposition activists claimed had been launched from Syrian government positions

The munition appeared to be a 107mm artillery rocket (as used by the widely deployed Type-63 multiple rocket launcher), with the warhead removed and replaced with a much larger DIY warhead with a simple impact fuze.  These munitions, known as Improvised Rocket Assisted Munitions (IRAMs), sacrifice range and accuracy for a massively increased payload.  As John Ismay, a former United States Navy explosives ordnance disposal officer, told the New York Times' At War blog, these IRAMs appeared to be "conceptually identical to the IRAMs used by a particular group of insurgents fighting American forces in Iraq — Kataib Hezbollah".  He goes onto the describe the use of the Iraqi IRAMs

The Iraqi IRAM was purpose-built for one thing: popping over T-walls and Hesco barriers at short ranges that prevented interception by C-RAM and creating mass casualties on-target.

Obviously, in Syria, there was no need for either side to use the munition for this purpose, and there were some who doubted the Syrian government would used improvised weapons, especially inaccurate and powerful weapons in urban areas.

In the following months I continued to collect videos of IRAMs (see here), with the unexploded remains of the munitions showing up in Damascus, Aleppo, Homs, and elsewhere.  While it was claimed by opposition members that these munitions were fired by government forces, it wasn't until recently that an increasing body of evidence began to appear showing definite proof that the IRAMs were being used by Syrian government forces.

In late August 2013 a number of images appeared online that confirmed the munitions were being used by Syrian government forces.  First, the capture of a ammo depot in Khanasser featured this pile of IRAMs stored alongside other weapons, including IRAMs in storage crates

Around the same time Jabhat al-Nusra published images of a four-barrel IRAM launcher they claim to have captured from government forces, along with crates full of IRAMs

The final piece of proof was provided by the pro-Government Abkhazian Network News Agency (ANNA), who has rare access to the Syrian military, and regularly posts footage of the Syrian military in action on their YouTube channel.  This video showing "A brief summary of the situation in Syria for 30 August 2013" provided the final proof that the Syrian military were using IRAMs, at 1m11s

The video shows an IRAM being loaded and fired from a single barrel launcher, and was the first video showing the Syrian military using IRAMs.

One thing I was very keen to find out was how these munitions were actually being used in combat.  One report that piqued my interest was from the fighting in Qusayr in June 2013.  Colonel Abdul-Jabbar Mohammed Aqidi, at that time a senior member of the Free Syrian Army's Supreme Military Council, had travelled to Qusayr with reinforcements, and gave a very lengthy interview about his experiences.  One part of the interview caught my eye

The enemy was applying a scorched earth policy by firing Iranian vacuum bombs, which caused whole building to fall down. This was forcing the fighters to retreat to another building.

In my experience, "vacuum" is a prefix frequently used by members of the Syrian opposition to describe all kinds of powerful explosive weapons, and that description reminded me of something else that had emerged in Qusayr.  Josh Wood, a journalist who met opposition fighters who had fought in Qusayr, sent me a gallery of photographs provided to him by the fighters he spoke to, showing a munition they claimed was being used by Hezbollah

He told me that according to the opposition fighters

This weapon was used by Hezbollah forces in Qusayr.  He described them as 107mm rockets fitted to something with a higher payload, with the 107mm propelling everything. He said the max range on these was about 1 km, but most of the time they were simply fired across the street horizontally at extremely close range.  By his description, one of these could do significant damage to a small house.  He said that these rockets really helped Hezbollah shift the tide in parts of that front-line.

At the time there was no more evidence of these munitions being used in Qusayr, and no way to confirm the story of the opposition fighters about how they were used.

This week, a video by the Syrian National Defence Force was posted online, showing fighting in Barzeh, north Damascus, with footage of a single barrel IRAM launcher being used at 1m17s

What's interesting about this is the launch tube is horizontal to the ground, suggesting it's being used for direct fire, not indirect fire, as in Iraq

The launch footage is then followed by footage showing the IRAMs hitting multiple targets.  It appears, as described by the opposition fighters in Qusayr, that these munitions are being used for devastating effect against occupied buildings only hundreds of feet away from the launch site.  It's not hard to imagine how devastating these munitions are, and difficult how (if not impossible) these munitions would be to defend against in an urban combat situation.

Reviewing the National Defence Force's Facebook page, it appears they don't only have access to the single barrel launchers, but also the type of truck mounted launchers Jabhat al-Nusra claimed to have captured

Source

Source

Source

These aren't the only powerful explosive weapons the NDF has been provided with, with videos showing them using the launchers linked to the August 21st attack being posted online recently (albeit using the explosive type of munition), and the use of IRAMs in urban combat would seem to give them a significant advantage over opposition forces.  This goes some way to explain some of the more unusual reports from the opposition of the weapons used against them, and it seems these weapons will continue to be a popular choice for government forces.

You can contact the author on Twitter @brown_moses or by email at brownmoses@gmail.com.

The Syrian National Defence Force Provides More Evidence Linking The Government To The August 21st Sarin Attacks

Last week, I wrote about a video the Syrian National Defence Force had posted on their YouTube channel, showing them using the family of munitions that the munitions linked to the August 21st Sarin attack comes from.  These munitions, which I dubbed the UMLACA (Unidentified Munitions Linked to Alleged Chemical Attacks), were heavily documented by myself and others in the wake of the August 21st attack, and we were able to draw a number of conclusions about the munition.  These include there being at least two types of munition, explosive and chemical, there being two sizes of these munitions (the smaller linked to the August 21st attack, and two different types of launching platforms (a twin-barrel type, and single-barrel type).

Now, two more videos have been posted online showing Syrian military forces using the same kind of munitions.  The first video was posted on the YouTube channel of Tarek Ali, a reporter for Al Mayadeen TV, a Lebanese news channel that's been supportive of the Syrian government.  Tarek Ali has been spending time with the Syrian military, and this report is from the SAA and NDF advance on the villages of Maheen and Hawaree, after taking the town of Sadad, Homs.

At the start of the video we see a vehicle drive by, with a twin-barrel launching on the rear

This is clearly the same type of truck mounted launcher that has been filmed and photographed in Damascus and Aleppo, and shown to launch the UMLACA

Aleppo

Mezzeh air base, Damascus

It's worth noting for anyone investigating these launchers that the type of truck used appears to be different in each example.

The next example, helpfully posted on the Facebook page of the National Defence Force in Damascus, gives us our best view yet of the larger type of munition and single-barrel launcher

For those of us who have been trying to figure out every detail possible about these munitions, it provides some more clues about how these munitions and their launchers work.

The above image shows the single hole on the rear of the warhead, and a cover that has been manufactured for the nozzle of the rocket.  Not something that points towards a hastily put together DIY weapon.

Here we have the UMLACA in the launch tube, and you can just make out the black numbering that's common to the explosive type of these munitions, along with the single hole on the rear of the warhead.  Here we can see a black rod shaped device that has been attached to the hole.  It was noted that in the footage posted online shortly after the August 21st attack, showing the same kind of launcher and munition, that one of the men in the video appeared to screw something into the rear of the warhead, and this appears to be what that was.  What it actually is though, is another question.

During the launch we also get our first clear video of the fuze at the end of the warhead, which seems to point it being some sort of impact fuze.  It also appears that the black rod attached to the rear of the warhead is still in place, although it's hard to be 100% sure because of the motion of the rocket during launch.

This image was taken just after the cap on the nozzle was removed, and it appears a white cable was being held in by the cap.

A cable is also seen running of the side of the truck, but it's unclear if this could be a command cable.

The man who removes the nozzle cap then appears to possibly pull the cable onto the truck, maybe to connect to the possible command cable?

It also appears that just before each launch, no cable can be seen hanging from the rear of the rocket, suggesting that perhaps the cable has been looped back onto the truck to connect to the potential command cable.

If nothing else, this gives you an idea of the extra little details this video provides, and for those of us still trying to gather every single tiny piece of information on these munitions this sort of footage is invaluable.

More posts on the subject of the August 21st attacks can be found here, and other posts on chemical weapons and Syria, including extremely informative interviews with chemical weapon specialists, can be found here.

You can contact the author on Twitter @brown_moses or by email at brownmoses@gmail.com. 

Industrial And Economic Aspects Of Sarin : Why Poor Quality Is Not An Indicator Of Non-state Manufacture

A guest post by Dan Kaszeta.

Introduction: 

To use Sarin in any reasonable quantity, an industrial operation is needed.  The Syrian incident in August of this year is of a size and scale that a large production effort was needed to accomplish it.  But even a large-scale effort can produce an inferior quality product.  The alleged poor quality of the Sarin used in Ghouta should not be taken as evidence that the Syrian government did not make it. 

A number of blogs and articles have been advancing, either explicitly or implicitly, a thesis that I would term the “Sarin Quality argument.”  Roughly stated, the argument goes as follows: “The Sarin used in Damascus was obviously low quality.  Therefore it must not have been made by a national level production program.”  The implication, therefore, is that the Sarin in use on 21 August 2013 must not have been made by the Assad regime.   The purpose of this paper is to refute that argument. First, I will make a few general observations.   Second, I will address in detail several points made by various bloggers and activists that are advanced in support of the “Quality” argument.  Third, I will advance my own argument, which I would describe as a “Sarin Quantity and Economics Argument”.

General Observations on Sarin Production and Quality Control

Production of Sarin is actually very difficult, particularly if you want to get more than a few spoonfuls.   Various commentators have commented on the chemistry of Sarin production, but merely listing the chemical reactions required does not fully address the chemical engineering requirements.   None of the observers other than myself seems to seriously address the Sarin production issue from an industrial perspective.  A reasonable publicly available document produced by the now defunct US Office of Technology Assessment describes many of the engineering hurdles required for production of Sarin.  Sarin is not a substance that easily lends itself to home-brew or clandestine “drug-lab” type manufacture, principally due to the requirements to handle highly dangerous corrosive gases at high temperature.  I address some of these issues in summary form in my Bloomberg View op-ed column, but there is a deep well of information available if you are willing to research the history of the German nerve agent production facilities and the history and US production efforts at Rocky Mountain Arsenal, the facility in Colorado where the USA’s “unitary” Sarin was produced between 1953 an 1957.

One principle problem faced by anyone producing Sarin is that the last step of the Sarin process actually leaves you with a cocktail of Sarin and acids.  You get one mol of HF (hydrogen fluoride) or HCl (hydrogen chloride) for each mol of Sarin you produce.  Most of the production pathways will end with HF in the Sarin.  The US worked out a so-called di-di process (very hard to pull off, I may add) that ends up with HCl. Worked out in weight equivalents, if you make 1 kg of Sarin, it is going to be mixed with 140 g of HF.  This residual HF is nasty stuff, to say the least.   The residual acid, regardless of whether it is HF or HCl, is going to cause a number of problems.  First, the product will be corrosive to whatever container or munition that it is in, degrading the shelf life of the container or munition and eventually posing safety and handling problems from leakage.   Second, acidity causes degradation of the Sarin.   Third, HF vapor can defeat many types of protective clothing and equipment.  The acidic nature of the mix reduces the effective shelf life of the Sarin from decades to months.

The US, the Soviet Union, and to the best of my knowledge, the UK and Tito-era Yugoslavia had developed the ability to refine the residual acid out of Sarin as a final refining step.  I am not sure if anyone else was.  My initial research has not been able to indicate whether the original German Nazi-era production facility surmounted this problem.  Even the very large US production facility at Rocky Mountain Arsenal devoted many PhDs and millions of dollars to this effort and did not perfect the distillation process until well after production started.  Earlier batches were re-distilled once the distillation method was perfected.  The distillation of the residual acid was, and continues to be, a deeply protected dark art.  Some of the general information about the process, but not the details, is described in the engineering history of Rocky Mountain Arsenal.   It is my belief that the UK mastered this process at their facility in Nancekuke, Cornwall and that the USSR did so similarly in its production facilities.  The existence of long shelf-life Sarin in the Soviet-era stockpile is de facto evidence of this. I have spoken to several people involved in Tito-era Yugoslavian chemical weapons and they have indicated to me that Yugoslavia was able to remove the acid.  Saddam Hussein’s Iraq did not perfect the acid removal step of the process.  Chinese, Swedish, North Korean, and French Sarin efforts remain an enigma to me.

If you are planning to store your Sarin for a long time, you need to remove the residual acid.  However, this is not a terrible barrier if one is planning to use the Sarin quickly.  The Iraqi military used a “just in time” approach to Sarin production and made every effort during the Iran-Iraq war to use the Sarin that they produced quickly.  The Iraq Sarin production efforts are indicative that a nation state can produce the industrial infrastructure for Sarin but not have the acid removal step, either because they couldn’t do it or because it was too expensive to do.

The best way I can summarize the production issues in brief form is as follows:

• A bench-top or home-style setup is very dangerous.  Some lab scale production facilities using modern technology and techniques can create teaspoon-type quantities.  
• To get any reasonable quantity of Sarin you need a factory-type setup. Even a very expensive factory gets you only a moderate grade of Sarin.  The US OTA study estimated that you needed at least $10 million in 1993 USD to get a basic setup going, not accounting for effectively dealing with waste or safety issues or the refining process. 
• To get a high quality, acid-free, long-shelf life product, you need a lot more money and effort than just a base-level production facility.  Iraq wasn’t able to pull it off.  But if you don’t need shelf life, you needn’t bother with acid removal.  
• The Iraq experience shows that a large, multimillion dollar chemical weapons production effort can still produce a mediocre product.  

Salient points of the “Quality Argument”

In the various blogs and documents I have seen, the crux of the “Quality Argument” can be distilled down to four points. 

Point 1:  The UN report found multiple chemical impurities, indicating a deficient Sarin production.  This obviously means that it wasn’t produced by a state-level manufacturing program.

The Iraqi example shows us that a large and sophisticated chemical weapons production infrastructure can produce Sarin with significant impurities in it.  The presence of impurities is testament to how hard it is to remove them, not any kind of evidence of non-state manufacture.  

Point 2: Numerous odors were reported.  High quality Sarin is odorless

Indeed.  But this argument serves no great point one way or the other to tell who made it.  Pure Sarin is odorless.  But lower quality Sarin, which can be produced by a large state-run operation, will have impurities and decomposition products.  The residual acids will react to whatever the impure Sarin has been stored in.  If a binary device was used (see below), much of what may be smelled is precursors or byproducts rather than the Sarin itself.  Yes, there are many reasons why lower quality Sarin can smell funny.  But none of those reasons can be any kind of evidence to state that the Assad regime didn’t manufacture it. 

Point 3: No “stabilizers” were found in the Sarin residue.  Serious military grade Sarin has stabilizers

The purpose of so-called “stabilizers” in Sarin is to prevent corrosion during long-term storage.   In the US Sarin program in the 1950s, the additives were tributylamine and a chemical called N,N’-Diisopropylcarbodimide.  These chemicals were added to prevent corrosion of steel and aluminum.   If you don’t care about long term storage, you don’t need to add speciality additives.  If your Sarin is produced from binary components (see below), there is not any absolute requirement to add additives, particularly as shelf life is patently not a concern after mixing the two components. 

Point 4: Syria has admitted to a serious CW production program.  Such a program can’t make deficient Sarin.

This is simply not true.  The US and USSR made Sarin in poor to mediocre condition for years before perfecting the process.  Iraq devoted a large effort to manufacturing nerve agents and did so in large quantities during the Iran-Iraq war.  The size, expense, and scope of the Iraqi industrial program is well documented by UNSCOM and UNMOVIC, and appears to be larger than the Syrian program.  Yet it made an inferior grade of Sarin, largely due to the lack of an acid distillation step in the process.  I think that taking Syria’s admission of a nerve agent production facility as some sort of evidence that someone else made the Sarin in question is a truly epic feat of Orwellian doublethink. 

A quick tutorial on Binary Sarin

Many of the issues surrounding the continuing mysteries of the Ghouta attacks can possibly resolved if the Sarin used in the attacks was binary in nature.  I am increasingly of the belief that 8/21 involved a binary chemical warfare agent.  Chemical agents can be made in binary form – by combining two or more non-warfare agent precursor chemicals to create the warfare agent.  This is done for many reasons, to include safety and security.  To date, it appears that at least four different nerve agents (GB, GD, GF, and VX) can be made in a binary fashion.i  Iraq experimented with binary Mustard but could not make it into a tactically and economically viable weapon due to the low concentration of Mustard in the mix that was produced.

In the case of Sarin, a chemical known as DF (methylphosphonic difluoride) is mixed with isopropyl alcohol.  This chemical reaction results in Sarin and hydrogen fluoride (HF).  It is my understanding that this reaction is a bit violent, and the resulting HF in vapor form is in itself a highly toxic and corrosive substance.  For this reason, US binary Sarin weapons included a quantity of isopropylamine to react with the surplus acid.  

It would appear, both from the OPCW and various media activity that the Syrian CW program’s nerve agents are actually binary in nature, wherein Syria stores the binary components of Sarin and VX.  The OPCW states that Syria declared approximately 1230 unfilled munitions.  This fact implies that the mode of employment is to fill munitions prior to use, rather than manufacture and store filled munitions.  

In my experience, there are three theoretical ways to effectively field binary Sarin:

1. In-flight mixing.  One could put the separate components into the weapon system and have the mixing occur in flight on the way to the enemy.  This is much harder to do in practice than in theory.  The US spent a lot of time and money into getting the mixing in flight correct.  Even so, the project was plagued with errors and I am not convinced that the US ever fully resolved the in-flight mixing issues before the programs were cancelled. Iraq used binary Sarin.  
2. Mixing at the launch point.  Theoretically, the products can be mixed immediately prior to pouring into the munition.   This is an abysmally bad idea with Sarin.  This is very dangerous for the handler who has to do it and the reaction produced by combining the components is a very dangerous one. While it can be safely handled in a reactor vessel or inside a steel artillery shell,  doing this in a bucket on the side of the road may kill the handler and damage vital equipment due to the corrosive nature of the HF.  This may be a more viable approach with VX, though, as that reaction creates fewer acute problems.  
3. Mixing in the factory prior to shipping.  One viable concept of operations is to do the mixing in a factory setting with proper engineering controls to contain the reaction and the concomitant HF.  The munitions could be filled in the factory and sent straight to the field for use.  The OPCW’s reference to mixing and filling equipment could be taken as evidence that this is the approach in use in Syria. 

The proper employment of binary Sarin requires effective mixing and cannot be done without creating excess HF vapor.  A poorly executed binary mix will result in a cocktail of chemicals: some Sarin, some unmixed precursors, some byproducts – including HF. This could go a long way towards explaining the mix of casualties and odors during the 8/21 attack.  The precursors and byproducts are more in the category of general irritants than specific neurological poisons (as Sarin is) and are more likely to have strong odors. 

The Sarin Quantity Argument

The amount of Sarin that appears to have been used is a strong indicator of a national-level production program.

People often make assumptions about the efficiency of Sarin as a battlefield weapon.  There is a wide gulf between theoretical toxicity of Sarin in the laboratory environment and actual practical toxicity on the battlefield.   To make a very long story short, a lot more Sarin is needed to create death and injury than the layman usually thinks.   Even though Sarin is very toxic, a large number of casualties over a wide area will require a lot of chemical agent.  

In my recent article in CBRNe World magazinei, I use old military chemical target analysis methods to attempt to figure out how much Sarin may have been used.   These methods are too lengthy and obtuse to recite here.  Indeed, I had to summarize for the CBRNe World article due to a 2000 word article limit.   Basically, as a thought exercise, I pretended that I was Assad’s chemical officer and using old US charts and tables.  I had to make many assumptions and guesses, as some raw data was simply unavailable to me.   I came up with an order of magnitude estimate that the amount of Sarin for an attack of this nature would have been somewhere in the range of 370 kg to 4400 kg.  As is often the case, I believe that there are strong reasons why neither the bottom end or the top end of the range of estimates is likely to be the case.  My own instinct tells me we are looking at something roughly around a metric ton of Sarin.

A metric ton (-ish) of Sarin is not something that anyone is going to cook up without a factory.  Who is more likely to have done this?  An unnamed non-state actor or the state who has admitted to having the factory?  As previously stated, a significant amount of engineering is required to produce Sarin, even in small quantities.   It should be noted that the Aum Shinrikyo production facility, the only significant example of non-state Sarin manufacture, is an interesting comparison point. It cost a lot of money, was a large and custom-built three story building, was staffed by engineers and chemists, and used a front company to buy chemicals legally.   Despite this level of effort, the Aum Shinrikyo facility was only able to manage a modest production level of single batches of 2 gallons of Sarin. 

To make ton-level quantities of Sarin an industrial-scale factory is needed.  The level of difficult and the scale of the operation simply don’t permit it to be done in less than a factory setting.  Based on the German experience at their factory in Dyhernfurth, a ton of Sarin required about 8 tons of precursor raw materials.  Due to principles of conservation of mass, about 7 tons of waste material, much of it very dangerous, would be produced.  

The scale of the operation required to produce tons of Sarin, or indeed tons of DF (the critical precursor binary component) raises an interesting issue of economics.   Given the industrial difficulties, Sarin is extremely expensive in comparison to conventional alternatives, unless you run your Sarin plant for years and amortize the cost over the course of thousands of tons of product.  The expense, in terms of equipment and skilled labor, of such an effort means that one has to seriously question whether this is time, labor, and money well spent in pursuance of tactical military objectives.  One has to seriously question whether a cash-strapped insurgency is going to squander their resources on such an endeavor when that amount of money, tens of millions of dollars at a minimum, could be used for a lot of other purposes to greater effect.  Thirty million dollars buys a lot of conventional equipment that is much more immediately useful than a few tons of Sarin.  So, from an industrial and economic standpoint, the culprit looks to be the regime more than anyone else. 

Notes and Disclaimers:

1. This paper represents my personal opinion and does not represent any position or opinion of any previous employer.
2. I’ve used US spelling conventions and a US paper size instead of UK conventions.  I had to pick one or the other.  Criticisms on this point will be ignored. 
3. Information current as of 6 November 2013 was used for this paper. I have done rather a lot of research on chemical warfare agents over the years.   Some of the documents I have consulted are not generally available online.  They are in these quaint things called libraries.  Others are government documents that you might have to go to a special reading room to find or to request by Freedom of Information means.   If you can’t find a document I cite online, please don’t blame me.  The internet has a lot, but it doesn’t have everything. 
4. I firmly believe that Sarin, as a product trade name, should be capitalized.  I often lose this argument, but I continue to insist on this point. 

About the author: Dan Kaszeta is the author of “CBRN and Hazmat Incidents at Major Public Events: Planning and Response” (Wiley, 2012) as well as a number of magazine articles and conference papers.  He has 22 years of experience in CBRN, having served as an officer in the US Army Chemical Corps, as CBRN advisor for the White House Military Office, and as a specialist in the US Secret Service. He now runs Strongpoint Security, a London-based CBRN and antiterrorism consultancy and is also a Senior Research Fellow with the International Institute of Nonproliferation Studies.

The Fall of Yaroubiya to the YPG In Context

A guest post by Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi and Fadel al-Kifa’ee.

Introduction: Solidifying Stalemate

The small town of Yaroubiya in north-east Syria (Hasakah governorate) on the border with Iraq recently came to media attention in light of the takeover of the locality by the YPG- a Kurdish militia affiliated with the Democratic Union Party (PYD). This resulted in the expulsion of the al-Qa’ida affiliate Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS), among other fighters

To be sure, in the grand scheme of things in the conflict between the YPG and rival rebel factions, the takeover of Yaroubiya does not represent a decisive turning point but a further step towards the most likely overall outcome: namely, consolidation of existing positions.

Generally, since the outbreak of wider conflict following the YPG’s expulsion of ISIS from Ras al-Ayn in July, the YPG has retained its strongholds in Hasakah governorate- where Kurds form a continuum of populated territory in much of the area- and expanded its control to an increasing degree.

In the case of Ras al-Ayn, Jabhat al-Nusra (JN), ISIS and Ahrar ash-Sham have repeatedly failed to advance beyond the outskirts since July, and have at best only launched mortar strikes on the town center.

In contrast, in Aleppo and Raqqa governorates, where Kurds form pockets of population, the YPG has suffered serious losses, such as expulsion in August from the town of Tel Abyaḍ in northern Raqqa on the border with Turkey.

The Situation in Yaroubiya

The case of Yaroubiya stands out for its wider analytical implications. Just before the YPG takeover, the town was under the control of ISIS/JN and two other groups: Ansar al-Khilafa and Liwa al-Tawhid wa al-Jihad.

Some comment is needed here on the JN-ISIS relationship in these eastern borderlands: it would appear that the boundaries between the two remain unclear.

Thus, consider the photographic evidence below. The town of Yaroubiya features JN graffiti that has not been erased, but from the same period of the YPG offensive on the town photos of captured vehicles with the ISIS banner were released. Certainly for the YPG the two names and banners are interchangeable. This is similarly the case with reports from jihadi sources on the Yaroubiya area.

Perhaps the lack of clear boundaries between ISIS and JN in these border areas is not so surprising, where mujahideen both Syrian and foreign will naturally tie the struggles of eastern Syria and the Sunni protestors and insurgents in Anbar and Ninawa governorates in Iraq to one unified cause.

Figure 1: Entry to the market in Yaroubiya, featuring JN graffiti on the wall to the right (cf. this video at around 1:30 minutes in).

Figure 2: Vehicle captured by the YPG featuring the ISIS banner. Photo released on 24 October.

Figure 3: A graphic put out by a YPG fighter equating JN and ISIS- seen as one entity- with the gates of Hell.

According to a pro-ISIS source in Hasakah interviewed for this piece, Ansar al-Khilafa and Liwa al-Tawhid wa al-Jihad are aligned with ISIS/JN, but Liwa al-Tawhid wa al-Jihad was a very small battalion in Yaroubiya. The town was also home to a rebel group drawn from local Arab Shammar tribesmen: Liwa Ahrar al-Jazira (LAJ). The battalion was expelled from Yaroubiya in mid-October on ISIS/JN allegations of corruption. The price of flour for distribution to local inhabitants was then lowered to consolidate control over the town.

Figure 4: Photo of an Ansar al-Khilafa fighter at the Yaroubiya border gate on October 26. The town fell into YPG hands towards the end of the day. It should be pointed out that multiple groups in Syria use the name Ansar al-Khilafa. This group in Yaroubiya- extending into the Qamishli area- is distinct from Ansar al-Khilafa in Aleppo governorate affiliated with Hizb-ut-Tahrir.

Figure 5: Liwa al-Tawhid wa al-Jihad fighters in Yaroubiya on October 26, showing that they had not been driven out just yet.

Key to the narrative put out by jihadi supporters over the fall of Yaroubiya is the notion of ‘betrayal’ in the sense of collaboration between the local tribesmen, the Iraqi army under the Maliki government, and the Assad regime.

Though LAJ stayed out of the fighting and put up an announcement on Facebook immediately after the fall of Yaroubiya denouncing an alleged Iraqi army presence in the town, a report from the Iraqi Kurdish outlet Rudaw-corroborated by our local Hasakah source- has shown that LAJ has tried to reach out to the YPG for a power-sharing deal.

Figure 6: Photo distributed by LAJ, among others, allegedly showing Iraqi army vehicles in Yaroubiya. However, they do not actually belong to the Iraqi army, but the YPG.

In contrast, ISIS/JN, Ansar al-Khilafa and Liwa al-Tawhid wa al-Jihad are on the outskirts trying to regain control, aided by the Salafist battalion Ahrar ash-Sham’s firing mortar rounds at the YPG, accused by Ahrar ash-Sham of being “agents” of Iran, Assad and Israel.

This reflects the general tendency whereby organized rebel battalions- whether under the FSA-banner or Islamist coalitions-will not side with the YPG against ISIS. The rule of thumb here is partly rooted in the widespread perception of the PYD as a regime agent, though a more accurate characterization is that the PYD is determined to hold on to Kurdish areas at least and to this end is willing to cooperate or fight with regime forces and rebels depending on the circumstances at a local level.

In any case, tribal locals and other civilians- even of Arab ethnicity- differ from the organized rebel battalions in that they may prefer the YPG as the lesser of two evils, such that the YPG has now organized an “Arab Citizens’ Battalions” military unit.

Perhaps more important is the question of the Iraqi government role. It is certainly true that the Iraqi army reinforced their own side of the border, but there is no evidence of active Iraqi military aid to the YPG. Nor is there evidence for Assad forces’ assistance to the YPG in this case, despite the clear pleasure shown by pro-Assad channel Sama TV at the YPG takeover.

Figure 7: Screenshot from a video currently being circulated in jihadi social media purporting to show an Iraqi army Humvee on the Iraqi side of the border across from Yaroubiya.

Rather, the Iraqi aim was to stop the ISIS fighters in particular from slipping into Ninawa province, where, as a report from Baghdad’s newspaper al-Aalem has shown, ISIS fighters have frequently retreated in the face of rout at the hands of the YPG and/or regime forces as a launching pad to head back into Syria. Mosul in particular- where ISIS has an extensive financial network- serves as an apt base for recuperation. Of course, the YPG will also have an interest in preventing ISIS fighters from having border crossings whereby they can retreat into Iraq to launch new incursions into their territory in Syria.

Yaroubiya and Kurdish Rivalries

Unsurprisingly, this coinciding of interests on the part of the YPG and Iraqi government has won praise for Baghdad from some Syrian Kurdish figures. For example, Shelal Kedo- a member of the Syrian Kurdish Council- told Iraqi outlet al-Sumaria News that the takeover of Yaroubiya marked a turning point for the better in relations between Syrian Kurds and Iraq.

At the same time, a member of the West Kurdistan Council (NB West Kurdistan- Syrian Kurdistan) denied active Iraqi assistance in the takeover of Yaroubiya. In any event, the positive outlook on the alignment of interests between Baghdad and the YPG contrasts notably with the tensions between the PYD and the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government under Massoud Barzani, whose ties with Turkey are viewed with strong dislike by the PYD. The PYD sees Ankara as supporting jihadis against Syrian Kurds. Some YPG commanders have also voiced disaffection at a perceived lack of support from Arbil for the fight against the jihadis.

Far from bringing about Kurdish political unity in the face of a perceived common threat, therefore, the Yaroubiya affair may actually help solidify divisions among Kurds and hinder the long-term prospects of an oft-touted merger of Syrian and Iraqi Kurdistan.

Indeed, it is apparent that in its conflict with other rebel groups, the YPG has been able to bolster the PYD’s image as protector of Syrian Kurds, to the detriment of rival Kurdish factions.

Recently the YPG released a statement accusing several factions of committing aggression on YPG territory. Besides usual suspects such as ISIS, Ahrar ash-Sham and Liwa al-Tawhid (all of whom were part of a joint statement in August calling for the purging of the ‘PKK’- interchangeable with YPG here- from the Manbij-Hasakah highway), the YPG also singled out the Kurdish Islamic Front and the Salah ad-Din Kurdish brigade.

The Kurdish Islamic Front is a Salafist group that supports ISIS in its fight with the PYD and runs a number of schools according to Shari’a for Kurdish children in Aleppo, among other areas. It should also be noted in this context that the Kurdistan Islamic Union Party in Iraq has confirmed that some 30 Iraqi Kurds from Sulaymaniya have gone to join the ranks of JN/ISIS. The Salah ad-Din brigade was accused by the PYD last year of coordinating an attack with Jabhat al-Nusra on a Kurdish area of Aleppo.

Figure 8: Logo of the Kurdish Islamic Front.

On the political level, affiliates of the Kurdish National Council (KNC), which rivals the PYD, are hurt by association with the opposition-in-exile coalition, which after the takeover of Yaroubiya released a statement condemning the YPG for expelling the ‘FSA’ from the town (even as there were no FSA groups in the town by the time of the YPG takeover) with supposed Iraqi military assistance. Such detachment from reality can do the KNC no good to win Syrian Kurdish support.

In short, the Yaroubiya affair reflects a hardening of divisions, not only in territory between the YPG and other rebels, but also among the Kurdish political factions of Syria and Iraq. The events should further illustrate that the role of political ideology in the Syrian conflict cannot be down-played as analysis cannot be reduced to single paradigms of ethnicity or who simply has more money and arms.

Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi is a student at Brasenose College, Oxford University, and a Shillman-Ginsburg Fellow at the Middle East Forum. Fadel al-Kifa’ee is an Iraqi political analyst. Follow on Twitter @ajaltamimi and @fadelalkifaee