Showing posts with label Khan al-Assal. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Khan al-Assal. Show all posts

Saturday, 14 December 2013

Responses To The Final UN Report Into The Use Of Chemical Weapons In Syria - Part 2

In this second part of my ongoing series on the final UN report into the use of chemical weapons in Syria, Hamish de Bretton-Gordon, Former Commander UK CBRN Forces and COO SecureBio, looks at what the UN/OPCW did and didn't achieve, and details his thoughts on the use of chemical weapons in Syria.

The UN/OPCW Final Report - Mandate and What they Did and Did Not achieve

The UN/OPCW mandate was very clear….’to identify if chemical weapons were used in Syria’.  This mandate referred to 5 sites of alleged use of CW in Aleppo, Damascus and Saraqeb.  It also included Khan al-Assal which the Russians offered information on, in a determined fashion, that the Opposition were to blame.  What the mandate did not critically do was direct the UN/OPCW to apportion blame.  This could have been possible, and has been possible since by various experts around the world, many of them cajoled, interpreted and assimilated by Brown Moses.  However, the team assembled under the very able Ake Sellstrom did not appear to posses the expertise able to make judgements of use, his team made up predominantly of scientists and inspectors, right for the task in hand, but taking those with military expertise, who could analyse what they saw on the ground and judge, with a high degree of certainty who was responsible, was lacking – a missed opportunity, which is now evident – to most.  This lack of capability in the military expertise area could also be manifesting itself in the planning for the movement of the CW stockpile to Latakia, which appears to be unravelling late in the day.

Those of us with experience of movement in war-zones such as Iraq and Afghanistan, can see the challenges of moving a very large convoy through very complex and dangerous terrain.  The fact that some of the issues, such as security and availability of appropriate vehicles, are only just becoming apparent, suggests that those involved in the planning process lack the experience and capability to be able to identify these shortcoming at the beginning of the planning process, when it would have been clear.  A similar sized convoy moved a few years ago in Afghanistan from Kandahar to Kajacki Dam in Afghanistan.  This was a strategically important move, like this one, to take a hydroelectric turbine to the Kajacki dam to provide electricity to Helmand and Kandahar provinces.  The planning took around 6 months involved 10,000’s of troops and lots of military hardware to ensure success.  There appeared to be basically one route along Highway One and then up route 66 through Sangin and on to Kajacki, and passing through, or close to, a number of Taliban strongholds – hauntingly similar to the issue of moving CW to Latakia – the physical challenges of the move is where the similarities end.  In the end, the convoy surprisingly cut across the formidable desert, similar to Hannibal going over the Alps, caught the Taliban by surprise and the turbine was successfully delivered, on time, intact – which now looks unlikely for the CW move, especially on time – and the reality being that this delay, could/probably will affect Geneva 2 22 Jan 13, the first genuine hope for peace in this 3 year conflict.

Back to the UN/OPCW inspectors and report; remember they arrived in Damascus on 20 Aug 13, and the Ghouta attack was on 21 Aug 13.  Nobody could believe the Regime would use CW as the inspectors arrived in Town and hence began the conspiracy theories, and creating confusion and uncertainty on this most complex of battlefields.  The inspectors then had the opportunity to go to Ghouta a few days later to collect evidence.  Both the Regime and Opposition allowed this to happen, and led each to claim they had nothing to hide.  The inspectors collected a whole array of evidence, under very challenging conditions, which allowed them [UN/OPCW] to unequivocally state that Sarin, in quantities probably more than a couple of hundred litres was used at Ghouta.  They [UN/OPCW] also collected evidence of delivery methods and azimuth and trajectory of rocketry.  All this has since been analysed and analysed, by many including myself, and with my military expertise, I am unequivocal in my assertion that  responsibility for Ghouta attack is firmly in the hands of the Regime.  Three factors lead me to this, firstly, the detail and level of planning required for this type of attack is well beyond the Opposition, the amount of Sarin used is well beyond the Opposition to manufacture, and the loading and delivery methods are only held by the Regime.  Hence if I were on the ground with the UN/OPCW I would have been confident to attribute the attack to the Regime, even more so than I am from my armchair in my office at Porton Down, UK.

The UN/OPCW also looked at Khan al-Assal and Saraqeb and concluded that Sarin was used in both events.  I covered the Sarin attack with the BBC’s Ian Pannell and concluded without doubt, that the Regime was responsible, and we didn’t have any detailed chemical analysis kit with us.  But the CW was tipped out of a helicopter, without doubt, and the Opposition certainly did not posses helos and the Regime did.  It was apparent to me from the symptoms I saw and talking to those around that this was a Sarin attack.  The UN/OPCW had the same and better evidence, and could, mandate aside, also have attributed blame.  The Khan al-Assal attack is different to the others, as it could be concluded that the Opposition is responsible.  UN/OPCW conclude that Sarin was used mainly from evidence provided by the Russians and that the victims were Syrian soldiers.  It could be the Opposition - AQ certain claim to be in the CW market – they [Opposition] could have acquired small amounts of Sarin,  the Regime recently stated that they had lost some [Sarin] from Aleppo Airport and the Syrian Army soldiers were victims.  It could also have been the Regime, who are probably not beyond killing their own people to gain a tactical advantage.  It could have been fratricide, which is always possible, and likely; experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan bear this up, and the highly complex battlefield of the Syrian conflict make this also a possible explanation.

So what have the UN/OPCW done and not done? – they have unequivocally stated that CW was used after 3 months of detailed study, well done!  – I appeared on the BBC Today programme at 0830 on 21 Aug 13 – I was rung at 0815 and asked to comment on the attack and had just returned from my morning run around London, I had a quick look at the evidence (YouTube videos) and said to TODAY……….’ it looks like Sarin and it looks like the Regime handiwork, because of the amount of agent probably used and the level of planning required’…… and I have only reinforced my view since.  So, they [UN/OPCW] haven’t attributed blame which if directed they should and could do, may be supplemented with some military expertise.  It’s import because we know the Regime is responsible for Ghouta, and those responsible must face justice in time, and if the Opposition is responsible for Khan al-Assal then we all need to be on our guard; because if the Opposition have Sarin, so does AQ and ISIS and this would now be a global threat which we all need to be resilient against.

The Syrian Regime and its CW stockpile is currently hold the International Community to ransom and they [CW] must be moved out of Syria or neutralised as soon as possible to allow any chance of some sort of peace – the job of the UN/OPCW is far from over, but I expect they need some additional support, and I for one, hope, that HM Government steps up to the plate and offers to do some of the heavy lifting.

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More responses to the UN report can be found in part 1 and part 3 of this series.

Monday, 19 August 2013

A Chemical Weapon Specialist's Thoughts On The UN Visit To Syria

With the arrival of a UN team in Syria searching for evidence of chemical weapon use in Syria I asked Dan Kaszeta, a chemical weapons specialist, some questions about the investigation.

In general terms, what do you think the UN investigation will involve?

I have no direct experience of UN investigations.  Indeed, this sort of investigative expedition is a rare event with relatively few precedents  What I can do, is speculate as to what I would do  if I were in charge of the investigation.

The UN is scheduled to visit Khan al-Assal, the scene of an alleged chemical weapon attack some months ago, with Russia claiming sarin was the agent used. What is the likelihood of the UN team being able to detect sarin at the scene of the attack?

If sarin had been used at Khan al-Assal, the likelihood of sarin actually being found in some form some 5 months after the alleged event is extremely small.  Sarin evaporates quickly.  It is classified as a non-persistent agent for this reason.  The vapour pressure of sarin is similar to water.  It evaporates at about the same rate as water on a very dry day.   Syria is a warm, dry climate.  Even if Sarin had been used, which, based on various information I have seen is unlikely, it would be long gone.  This is the scientific equivalent of pouring a bottle of vodka in your garden and going back over a month later trying to find the vodka still there.  It isn't a rational expectation and it isn't supported by basic science.

There is also the concept of “scene integrity” to be considered.  The Khan al-Assal site is an alleged crime scene that has been unsecured for five months.  People and objects have come and gone.  There is ample opportunity for things that were at the crime scene to be removed and there is ample opportunity for things that weren't at the crime scene.

There are some relatively rare circumstances wherein a sample of sarin might still be available after this time:

  • An unexploded, sealed munition that did not function as intended. 
  • A shell or rocket fragment collected within a few hours of the incident and sealed in a jar or sealed plastic bag.
  • A shell or rocket fragment containing sarin liquid embedded in some other matter in a way that would prevent evaporation or hydrolysis (reaction with ambient moisture).   
However, given the extreme concerns about the scene integrity, chain of custody, and the time elapsed, the validity of such evidence would be suspect.

There were some reports at the time of a strong smell of chlorine at the scene of the attack, would that be detectable at the scene of the attack?

There are far too many chemical compounds that could potentially cause a “chlorine smell” to make any definitive conclusions.  It should be noted that a chlorine smell is not at all associated with any category of nerve agents.   Also, odours are base on gases, vapours, and aerosols.  There’s no rational expectation that a gas, vapour, or aerosol could be present after the passage of this much time.  In addition, the “scene integrity” concerns above still apply. 

Would it be possible to detect the use of sarin in the blood, hair, urine, or tissue of victims, both the dead and the survivors?

There’s lots of scientific work that has been in this area, as I noted in a previous paper on this subject.  The issue is elapsed time.  There’s little scientific/academic work that addresses the issue of forensic analysis after such a lengthy period of time.  Again, one must view “survivors” and dead bodies as evidence.  Where have they been for this period of time?  There’s no chain of custody or scene integrity. 

Several months after the attack, would victims of the attack still present any symptoms?

It seems highly unlikely.  There is some evidence of miosis (pinpoint pupils) being visible for weeks after exposure, but we are talking about many months in this situation.  

The Russians have claimed a very specific type of rocket was used.  Assuming the remains of the rocket were available to be examined, would the UN team have any chance of being able to confirm it was used to deliver a chemical agent, and would they be able to detect sarin on it?

I think that it is much more likely to be able to evaluate the shape and construction of the rocket to see if it is consistent with a chemical weapon, or if it is more consistent with a conventional explosive rocket. 

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More details posts on chemical weapons in Syria can be found here, including more from Dan Kaszeta on sarin.


You can contact the author on Twitter @brown_moses or by email at brownmoses@gmail.com

Tuesday, 6 August 2013

Chemical Weapon Specialists Talk Sarin, Saraqeb, and Khan Al-Assal - Part 2

Here's the second set of answers from two more chemical weapons specialists on the use of chemical weapons in Syria.  Part one can be found here.

Dan Kaszeta, a US Army Chemical Corps veteran, provides some very detailed answers on sarin.

What form does sarin take?  

Sarin (also know as GB) is a liquid at normal temperatures.  It has the appearance and general consistency of water. The term “sarin gas” is misleading.  It is not a gas at normal temperatures. (For example, chlorine is a gas at room temperature.)  It is liquid between the temperatures of -56º C and approximately +150º C, although it evaporates in proportion to the temperature.

Sarin has a viscosity (how thick the liquid is) slightly higher than water, although my own experience is that you can’t tell with the naked eye.  

Vapour pressure. Sarin has a vapour pressure.  In other words, it has a tendency to evaporate into a vapour state from liquid state, just like many liquids.  Water, alcohol, petrol, acetone, etc. all have vapour pressure.   Sarin has a slightly lower vapour pressure than water.  This means (all other factors being equal) that a drop of Sarin at 25º C should evaporate slightly slower than a drop of water.  In practice, it often evaporates quicker than water.  I’ve seen a drop of water next to a drop of Sarin on the side of a rifle in a test chamber. This is because there is already water vapour in the air (i.e. humidity).  So, the rule of thumb that I learned is that Sarin evaporates like water in the desert.  

It should be noted that at high temperatures, Sarin evaporates very quickly.  This makes it a “non-persistent” nerve agent.   At room temperature or higher, terrain, clothing, equipment, etc. will not remain contaminated for long periods of time as any liquid droplets will evaporate.  This is in contrast to so-called “persistent agents” (e.g. GD, VX) which have lower vapour pressures and evaporate much slower. 

Sarin vapour is heavier than air.  

Can it be liquid, gas, powder, etc? 

The best way to describe Sarin is that it is a liquid that gives off vapours.  It should be noted that many ways of dispensing Sarin (see weaponisation below) cause the formation of an aerosol – a finely divided cloud of droplets.  Aerosols behave much like gases and vapours.   

“Dusty agents”/ Powder: There’s no way that I know of to dispense Sarin as a solid or powder, although I can’t completely rule out the possibility that someone has developed a “dusty agent” form of Sarin.  There is some literature out there on the possibility of “dusty” chemical warfare agents.  As far as I know, this was only ever a possibility with really low vapour pressure agents, not fast evaporating agents like Sarin. The only benefit I can think of for making a “dusty sarin” (in reality, not Sarin as a powder, but small particles impregnated with sarin) would be to slow down the evaporation time of the Sarin… i.e. increase its persistency.   But doing so would decrease the rate at which the agent is dispensed in vapour form, thus reducing its immediate lethality somewhat.  And immediate lethality is the point and purpose of Sarin.   It would seem to have little utility and an awfully difficult way of engineering some persistency into Sarin.  It would be far easier to use a more persistent nerve agent instead.  Or it may be possible to thicken Sarin with an additive. The US government applied for a patent to do so in 1969.

Does it have a particular smell or colour?

It is colourless.  Pure sarin has no odour.  Even if it did have an odour, it would be difficult to tell as a concentration detectable by a human nose is probably a lethal exposure.  

How is sarin typically weaponised?

By “weaponised” we generally mean “how is this chemical put into a device or munition in order to function effectively on the battlefield. In order to answer this question we must apply the characteristics of the liquid Sarin to the battlefield environment.  Because of its physical and toxicological characteristics, the most useful methods of employment for Sarin or any other non-persistent nerve agent are means and devices that rapidly disperse droplets or aerosols in a concentration high enough to cause immediate casualties. Dispersing a payload of Sarin in one load of liquid all in one place (like dumping a bucket) causes a great hazard in one spot, but not wide effects.  A device that did this would be less useful than a conventional explosive device of similar size.  Likewise, dividing it too finely over a large area will cause it to disperse quickly and not have a concentration adequate to cause incapacitation or death.  Again, such a device would have little or no value in comparison to a conventional device of similar size, weight, or shape.   

The overall guiding principle for weapon design with Sarin was that is was meant to rapidly cause casualties, and as such, weapons/munitions were designed to detonate/disperse at ground level.  (As opposed to persistent agents, which are designed to contaminate terrain and equipment, which generally burst/dispense/detonate some meters above ground level in order to spread a radius of droplets.) During the Cold War, the various superpowers devoted a lot of time, expertise, and money to studying and testing various weapon designs to see how effective different munitions and configurations might be.  Rather a lot of this information is now out in the public domain, either directly in form of declassified documents or indirectly, e.g. we can see the types of weapons that were the result of testing and optimisation and draw our own conclusions as to what types of weapons work and which ones don’t.  Drawing on US and Soviet experience, the following are the classic weapons for dispensing Sarin on the battlefield, all fuzed to detonate at surface:
  • Artillery shells 
  • Mortar shells 
  • Air dropped bombs 
  • Cluster bombs
  • Missile warhead
  • Rocket warhead
  • Land mine
It should be noted that some types of weapons that aren’t so good for Sarin:
  • Hand grenade – Very small payload possible.  Possibiity of leakage killing soldier handling it.  Soldier likely to have to be in protective gear the whole time.  Soldiers throwing grenades in protective gear are probably going to be less accurate and achieve less distance.
  • Grenade launcher round – same liabilities as hand grenade.  And very low payload.
  • Aerial spray devices – Unless the helicopter or aircraft is almost at ground level (highly unlikely), the Sarin would be too dispersed to have much effect.  Aerial spray devices are better for more viscous persistent agents (like Mustard or VX)
  • Anything fuzed for aerial burst.  Likely to spread the droplets 
  • Any explosive dissemination device with too little or  much explosive.  I won’t specify what it is (for obvious reasons) but there is an optimum ratio of charge to agent.  Too little leaves a puddle, too much spreads it too thin.
Some notes about types of “agent fills”.  An “agent fill” is a term that describes exactly how the chemical warfare agent is configured inside.  There’s three basic kinds of agent fills:
  • Unitary: This means the agent is in the weapon in one big pool.  
  • Binary:  Binary fills mean that two separate components are mixed to created the chemical agent.  Generally, this is done for the purposes of safely handling the munitions and to avoid having to store chemical weapons or filled munitions.  Sarin could be mixed on-site and poured into empty shells/rounds or munitions could be designed to mix two different components in flight.  To my knowledge, this was done with GB and VX.  A well-made binary weapon would have little or no difference from a unitary fill.  A poorly made one would have a high dud rate and would be generally less effective.
  • Submuntions: A highly effective way of dissemination would be a munition that scattered bomblets or submunitions at some height, with the submunitions designed for ground impact detonation.  Other factors being equal (…but they often aren’t), submunitions are generally considered a more efficient method of dispensing Sarin.  
A note about “dud rates.”  Any class of munition has a dud rate, i.e. the percentage of shells/rockets/etc. that fail to function as intended.  Anecdotal evidence is that some older chemical weapons may have quite high dud rates. Even many modern conventional artillery rounds have non-trivial dud ratesv there’s no physical mechanism to explain why chemical rounds would have a radically lower dud rate.  This means that if any significant use of chemical warfare happens, there’s going to be an unexploded shell out there somewhere, which will be of great intelligence value if it can be safely retrieved.  (A task not for amateurs!)

Have you ever heard of sarin being used in a diluted form, or mixed with other chemical substances to make it less lethal?

There seems to be little point in trying to dilute Sarin to have some kind of non-lethal effect and I have no knowledge of this ever happening.  The sub-acute, low-level signs and symptoms of nerve agent poisoning are annoying but not terribly debilitating.  Giving a bunch of people a runny noses and pin-point pupils has far less tactical usefulness than using conventional riot control agents or the generally non-lethal vomiting agent adamsite. Such agents can easily cause debilitating effects, whereas with nerve agents, there’s a fine razor’s edge, not easily (or at all) controllable between incapacitating dosage and lethal dosage.  Why risk the opprobrium of the international community and the possibility of triggering international intervention by using just a wee bit of Sarin?  There seems no point. 

Sarin is designed to injure and kill.  There’s not much leeway between the incapacitating doses and lethal doses with Sarin (1000 mg and 1700 mg respectively as the ED50 and LD50) and the concentration that would lead to a person absorbing 1000mg Sarin would quickly lead to absorption of a lethal dose of 1700mg. 

A number of reports have claimed to have proven the use of sarin through tests on hair, clothing, blood, tissue, and urine samples.

I will address each of these types of samples in turn:

Blood: 

Sarin can be directly and indirectly detected in blood samples.  Several methods have been studied for detection of sarin in blood. Several studies have been described in the academic literature. There are also indirect methods that detect decomposition products of sarin or the physiological effects of sarin. 
Experience from the Tokyo subway incident in 1995, documented by the OPCW shows that one of the decomposition products of Sarin is a chemical known as IMPA is detectable in blood.   

Sarin’s method of action is to inhibit a substance called acetylcholinesterase, which is used by the human nervous system.  At least one study shows that the presence of a nerve agent could be deduced by examining post-mortem blood samples for presence or lack of acetylcholinesterase, up to a week after death.  A person who has died from Sarin exposure would have little or no acetylcholinesterase present.  It should be noted that this would only indicate the presence of a nerve agent and would not specifically indicate Sarin versus any other nerve agent (or even organophosphate pesticide intoxication) nor would it conclusively indicate nerve agent as a cause of death, as other factors may have killed the victim, such as conventional trauma. 

Urine

One of the decomposition products of Sarin in the human body is methylphosphonic acid.  A study shows that this substance is detectable in urine by use of mass spectrometry.   This particular substance is not specific to Sarin.  (The journal article says it is a decomposition product of cyclosarin, Soman and one type of VX as well.)  It should be noted that it can take some time for chemicals absorbed in the human body to end up in urine.  An immediate post-exposure sample may not have any evidence of exposure.

Tissue

A study from 2004 using guinea pigs indicates that plasma, heart, liver, kidney, and lung samples can indicate the presence of either Sarin or Soman using gas chromatography and mass spectrometry.  

Clothing, Skin, or Hair

Clothing, skin, or hair could get contaminated by droplets of Sarin.  I cannot find any literature on the absorption of Sarin into human hair, but common sense would dictate that any water-like liquid could be trapped in hair.  Because of the rapid speed at which Sarin evaporates, a sample would need to be collected quickly and kept in a sealed container.  A lowered temperature would help.  In such a case, the Sarin might actually be most easily identified in vapour form in the headspace of the container, having desorbed from the sample itself. 

How would these samples be tested for the presence of sarin?

First of all, my expertise is not very strong in the laboratory techniques used for such analysis.  My expertise is strongest in field detection techniques.  To the best of my knowledge, the generally accepted gold-standard analytical technique is the combination of gas chromatography and mass spectrometry (GC/MS) which is widely used by chemists to identify molecules.  GC/MS is a sophisticated technique requiring training and expensive equipment mostly found in labs.  There are some portable GC/MS devices, but they are generally used in vehicles or mobile labs and aren’t handheld devices.  

The following are field technologies which also have relevance in laboratory settings, given the appropriate equipment. All have pros and cons.

  • FTIR:  Fourier transform infrared – Used to analyze a gas, vapour, liquid, or solid sample.  Not real time. An identifier, not a surveillance or detection tool.
  • Raman: Laser-based identification technique that can identify liquids or solids. Not real time. An identifier, not a surveillance or detection tool.
  • Ion Mobility Spectrometry (IMS):  Fast acting analysis of gas and vapour. IMS is the backbone of military field electronic nerve agent detectors. Works very quickly and is very sensitive.  Some problems with false positives, varying from model to model.  Some units will only detect, others will identify as well (i.e. discriminate VX from Sarin), while others provide a qualitative (“Hi, Med, Low”) or quantitative (“25 mg/m3”) measurement.
  • Flame ionization: Used by a family of French chemical warfare detectors.  Broadly similar to IMS in application
  • Photoionization: Commonly used in civilian HAZMAT detectors.  Generically detects toxic gases, but cannot identify chemicals.  Would not be able to tell difference between, say, ammonia, acetone, and Sarin.  I only mention this because it is so prevalent in civilian fire departments. 
  • Wet chemistry: A variety of manual chemistry techniques ranging from very sophisticated to very simple.  Too many different kits and tools to generalize, other than to state that the cheap tools are easy to use but not very specific, whereas the expensive tools can be good but hard to use.  There are some specific nerve agent detection techniques in this category, but they generally have difficulty discriminating between types of nerve agent.  
If sarin was detected in hair and urine wouldn't that suggest small, non-lethal quantities, being ingested over a period of time?  

Sarin detected in hair might theoretically be a small droplet that was in the hair as a direct result of a Sarin attack.  However, the sample would have to have been collected quickly and sealed up.  (See above)  I don’t know of a biological mechanism that would result in Sarin or byproducts ending up inside human hair through hair growth.  I checked the literature and found nothing in this regard.  

As far as urine is concerned, I can’t find direct literature in my cursory search about how quickly Sarin or decomposition products end up in urine.  However, Sarin acts on the bladder and kidneys rather quickly, so this cannot be ruled out.  One Japanese Sarin victim of the lesser-publicized Matsumoto incident (previous to the infamous Tokyo incident) had measurable Sarin decomposition products in his urine. 

If sarin was on clothing how hazardous would it be to handle that clothing without correct protection?

Very hazardous.  Depending on the amount of contamination, possibly lethal. Full head-to-toe protection would be needed.  The fastest acting hazard would be vapour from the clothing.  

Is it possible other substances could produce false positives for sarin?

Yes.  Generally, the more sophisticated and expensive the detection technique, the less scope for false positives.   The false positives depend entirely on the detection method.  IMS is often fooled by chemicals of the same molecular weight as sarin.  Organophosphate-based pesticides are very similar chemicals to nerve agent chemical weapons, so they may pose a false positive. 

After a suspected sarin attack how should the victims be processed, and what precautions should be taken?

An effort should be made to triage the victims and deal with the most severely affected ones first.  Triage guidelines are available in various resources. The general acronym ABCDD can be used to describe the field medical interventions required for nerve agent exposure.  This stands for Airway, Breathing, Circulation, Drugs, and Decontamination.  A general broad guideline for dealing with a serious sarin casualty is as follows:
  • Move casualty out of danger.  If possible remove contaminated clothing
  • Establish and maintain airway, through intubation if necessary
  • Control secretions through suction
  • Ventilate with oxygen if available, using bag-valve mask if necessary.  Regular air is better than nothing if oxygen is not available. 
  • Monitor pulse, commence compressions if pulse stops
  • Administer atropine, pralidoxmine (or other oxime, in accordance with local protocols), and diazepam via intramuscular injection.  
  • Decontaminate any possible skin exposure.  Soap and water are fine, if specialty decontaminants are not available. Even plain water will work in a pinch. Flush eyes with water. 
  • Establish IV access to allow further antidote administration
  • Administer additional antidotes as required
  • Move to definitive care
  • Constantly reassess airway, breathing, and circulation en route. 

If these precautions are not taken what is likely to happen to the people coming in contact with the victims?

If the victim was only exposed to Sarin in vapour form, which is quite possible, then there’s no particular hazard.  If a victim has been exposed to droplets or liquid, then persons coming into contact with the victim are likely to be affected if they are unprotected.  Due to the rapid rate at which Sarin evaporates, the principle hazard will be respiratory hazard, although contact hazard risk cannot be eliminated.  Droplets on skin, hair, and clothing are likely to evaporate and pose a respiratory hazard both to the victim and bystanders/helpers.  

How long would it take sarin to become harmless, or dissipate?  In general terms are we talking minutes, hours, weeks? 

Minutes to hours, depending on wind and air temperature and the volume of liquid sarin.  Sarin liquid evaporates quickly.  Vapour will disperse quickly in the open, but could last a very long time in a combined space. 

Steve Johnson is Lead for Explosive and Hazardous Forensics at Cranfield university

Sarin

How is sarin typically weaponised?

Militaries have used a wide range of techniques. Artillery shells, missiles and rockets are probably the most commone, although drop/spray tanks and even jet engines (Russia) have been tried. In Tokyo it had been intended initially to aerosolise but ended up being stabbed bags left to evaporate (which is pretty good due to the speed at which it evaporates).

What form does sarin take?  Can it be liquid, gas, powder, etc? Does it have a particular smell or colour?

Its normal state is liquid, although it steadily evaporates at a similar rate to water. Its Boiling point is 158 degrees C, Freezing point is -56.

It’s unlikely to be a gas although it may be produced as an aerosol from a mechanism. It would not be a powder unless it was absorbed on to a powder or solid in order to produce one.

Have you ever heard of sarin being used in a diluted form, or mixed with other chemical substances to make it less lethal?

Not to make it less lethal – Binary production of sarin from separate less lethal and often more stable chemicals is practical and has been done in the past. The Tokyo attacks often refer to dilute sarin but that was unlikely to have been to make it less lethal.

A number of reports have claimed to have proven the use of sarin through tests on hair, clothing, blood, tissue, and urine samples.  How would these be tested for the presence of sarin?

The metabolic uptake of Sarin and its behaviour within the body is relatively well studied. For tissue samples there are a number of markers that investigators can look for and there efficacy is dependent on the time after exposure and the route of introduction (inhalation will get it in to blood fast, presence in urine is often many hours after exposure). Markers that can be looked for are:
  • Sarin – unreacted pure sarin.
  • Acetylcholinesterase(AChE and Acetylcholine – This only gives an indication that the nervouse system has been disrupted , potentially, but not exclusively by a nerve agent or substance behaving like one.
  • isopropyl methtylphosphonic acid (IMPA) – a breaking down of Sarin, sometimes called the hydrolysis product. Pretty good and a number of studies have looked at its detection in blood and urine of Tokyo victims. Fairly hard to think of reasons for it to be in blood other than exposure to sarin.
  • methyl phosphonic acid. A further breakdown product but with more potential causes.
  • Macro molecules from other Sarin/protein interactions (Phosphylated tyrosine). Not impossible and potentially good for investigation longer after the exposure point.
  • Butyrylcholinesterase.  While AChE is found more in the red blood cells BuChE is found more in the serum of blood. It is less affected by Sarin, but in the event of a high exposure you would expect to see it affected as well and this can be a good ratio to examine when trying to assess exposure history with samples that have a poor patient history (much like we currently have).
Different markers fall away at different times after exposure. IMPA tend tobreakdown to MPA. Ache levels return to normal after about 30 days.  BuChE around 50 days.

If sarin was detected in hair and urine wouldn't that suggest small, non-lethal quantities, being ingested over a period of time?  

Potentially. Or a small single dose. Again working up a full spectrum of the biomarkers should be able to help understand that.

If sarin was on clothing how hazardous would it be to handle that clothing without correct protection?

It’d be pretty stupid but if it were pure(ish) sarin then it evaporates at about the same speed as water. So in many cases the levels left could be very low.  Some countries are fairly casual about contamination of items that have been in the vicinity of sarin because they don’t believe the vapour condenses on surfaces easily – i.e. being near some sarin won’t contaminate you or clothing  unless you touch it. That’s not necessarily a universally accepted fact though.

Is it possible other substances could produce false positives for sarin?

In the medical tests – yes as discussed a little above. IMPA and Phosphorylated tyrosine are pretty good though. In any event though they would still be indicating a significant chemical injury to the person from a pesticide perhaps. That’s why it is so important to have a context and medical history of the person from whom the samples are taken in order to make a diagnosis. It is a fact of modern medicine that a large amount of diagnosis is based on symptoms and context/case history – which is one of the reasons people are so twisted about these samples. They need context no matter how good the test.

After a suspected sarin attack how should the victims be processed, and what precautions should be taken?

I actually think PHR have a very good fact sheet on this.

If these precautions are not taken what is likely to happen to the people coming in contact with the victims?

It really depends on the amounts of agent and how the people were exposed. You could treat sarin victims with no protection and be ok, perversely those exposed to CS will (and there is a lot of evidence of this in civil cases) present a very high hazard to medical staff due the the difficulty in decontaminating riot control agents.

How long would it take sarin to become harmless, or dissipate?  In general terms are we talking minutes, hours, weeks?

Minutes in Syria during the day.

Saraqeb

The Saraqeb attack is probably one of the mostly well documented alleged chemical weapon attacks of the conflict.  Canisters inside containers filled with white-grey powder were reportedly dropped from a helicopter, landing in two locations, one near a road, where no victims were reported, and the other in the courtyard of a family home.  It was reported that immediately after impact, one of the residents entered the courtyard, and collapsed shortly afterwards, later dying.
Shortly after the first victim entered the courtyard more members of the family entered, and also fell ill, as did people responding to the attack.  Between 11 to 13 people were reportedly effected, with only one death reported.  Video from the road-side location filmed some time after the attack would show children playing near to the remaining white-grey powder with no ill effects reported. (A more detailed breakdown can be found here)

Would the above scenario match what you'd expect to see if Sarin has been used in the attack?

Not really. The powder is unusual and the death rate is very low. It’s certainly not what one would normally expect.

In common with many alleged chemical attacks in Syria the medical staff appears to have no protective gear.  If this was a sarin attack, how likely would it be that the medical staff would be effected, and how long would it take for the medical staff to become effected?

This depends on if the patients are externally contaminated. They may just have inhaled it. Speed of action on medical staff if they were contaminated would depend on the level. If very low there may be no real noticeable effects given the general alarum in a casualty receiving post. If significant then within minutes. In fairness though the fact there is a patient and not a corpse would suggest that the level of contamination is low or the agent is non-lethal. As death from Sarin is pretty rapid.

One video shows a car pulling up with at least one victim inside.  If this was a sarin attack, how likely would it be that the inside of the vehicle would be contaminated by sarin?  If the victim inside the vehicle had been exposed to sarin is it likely other passengers in the vehicle would fall ill?

Syrian vehicles are far from airtight. If the victim had inhaled then there is no real reason for the car to become very contaminated. Potentially the victim migh exhale some contamination (this certainly happens with cyanide suicide).

Some people have proposed a scenario where a diluted mixture of sarin and other substances was used in the attack.  If that was the case, would your answers to the above questions change significantly?

Not really other than it might be possible to create a powder with another substance.

The canisters recovered from the scene of the attacks matched canisters also recovered from an attack reported in Sheikh Maqsoud in Aleppo, where there were again claims of them being dropped from a helicopter, with photographs showing the canister remains covered in white-grey powder.  
The same design of canister has also been filmed in a cache of weapons reportedly captured by the Syrian opposition from the Syrian military, and a journalist in Syria has shown the image of the canister to various armed group, many of which have claimed to have seen them in the possession of opposition fighters, claiming to have captured them from the Syrian army.
Another type of grenade, using an identical fuze, was also photographed in Syria, with the photographer being told it was a normal smoke grenade.
There's video footage from the Saraqeb attack showing what's claimed to be the canisters falling through the sky, appearing to produce smoke or a white gas, as well as producing light. The canisters appeared to show signs of heat damage around holes along the body of the canister.  

Considering the various information gathered about these grenades is it likely they would have contained Sarin?

Not really – sounds like WP or CS

Is it possible the could have contained another substance that could have caused symptoms seen in the victims of the attack?

In the grenades? Seems far fetched and the mixing of liquid sarin and a riot control agent dissolved in to solution would be a beast to get stable as it could affect agent stability.

Could one of those possibly substances produced a false positive for sarin?
Not as far as causing death and not on the basis of the medical test results.

Is it reasonable that the contents of this grenade could have been emptied and replaced by sarin?
Possibly.

Khan al-Assal

The Russian government has claimed the Syrian opposition was responsible for the Khan al-Assal attack, with a DIY rocket delivering a payload of Sarin.  

What do you think would be involved in putting together a DIY chemical warhead for a DIY rocket?

Crude devices are not that hard. Removal of explosives or whatever payload had been carried, followed by introducing the agent. You would need protective gear and it wouldn’t be very safe doing the filling.
Accuracy would be lost (if a missile) and performance of rockets could be affected by different weight distribution. I don’t really want to go in to too much detail about the how, lest I give ideas or advice, but early CW munitions were very simple.

If you don’t really care where it goes then its achievable.

Considering the Russian government's claim that a DIY rocket was used  in the attack, what would be the most effective dispersal method once the rocket reached it's target?  

Air burst or base ejection were used by military munitions but require more complex fuses. If aimed at hard targets then you’d get a level of dispersal by simple impact, but if it hit the earth then the payload could just get driven in to the earth.

As with the other alleged chemical attacks in Syria the staff treating the wounded appear not to be using any protective clothing.  Would this have resulted in medical staff and responders being contaminated if this was a sarin attack?

Not necessarily, see above.


Saturday, 27 July 2013

Chemical Weapon Specialists Talk Sarin, Saraqeb, and Khan Al-Assal - Part 1

Over the past few weeks, it seems all sides in the Syrian conflict have come to agree that sarin has been used in Syria, they just disagree over who used it.  Russia's UN ambassador recently gave the UN secretary general results of tests which he claims proves the attack on Khan al-Assal involved the use of sarin by the opposition Basha'ir al-Nasr brigade, using their DIY "Basha'ir-3" rockets.  Western nations have made various claims, including France who used samples collected from Damascus and Saraqeb, Idlib, by journalists from Le Monde to confirm the use of sarin in both these areas.

With the use of sarin in Syria being a frequent topic of debate I've approached a number of chemical weapon specialists with a set of questions on sarin, and the alleged attacks in Saraqeb and Khan al-Assal to help shed some light on the topic, and hopefully clear up some confusion.  

Paul from Allen Vanguard.  Allen Vanguard have a long established reputation for reporting on Threat Intelligence.  They recently rolled-out a new web portal that offers on-line access to their products and services.  The portal can be found here.  (Qualifying businesses and organizations can obtain guest accounts upon request, using the “Subscribe” button on the top right hand side of the page.)

Sarin

How is Sarin typically weaponised?

Sarin is a lethal war agent.  It is designed and produced to cause death in humans.  It is usually loaded into a carrier projectile which is designed to contain liquid agents.  Sarin can also be dispersed by other means such as aerosols.

If projectile delivered, an explosive burster charge is used to open the projectile and disperse the Sarin without destroying all of it.

What form does Sarin take?  Can it be liquid, gas, powder, etc? Does it have a particular smell or colour?

In its weaponised state Sarin is a colourless and odourless liquid and is dispersed either in that form or as a vapour.  That is not to say that a Sarin producer could not add ingredients to make it detectable either by sight or smell although this would require careful research to ensure that the precursors and additives did not interfere with each other.  It would be an unusual thing to do.

It would not be viable from an effectiveness standpoint to use powdered Sarin, just as it is not possible to have powdered water.  Sarin is volatile and able to disperse efficiently by being mixed with Isopropyl alcohol so that it can turn into a vapour and move with air currents and then either be inhaled by living organisms or through absorption.  If it was turned into a solid (powder) then it would be too heavy to be dispersed in an efficient manner.

Have you ever heard of Sarin being used in a diluted form, or mixed with other chemical substances to make it less lethal?

No.  The advantage of CW is that they are cheap, easy to disperse and able to kill/injure a large amount of people.  The ratio between dead and injured will depend on the agent concentration and exposure, in what environment (indoors/outdoors) and in what atmospheric conditions (wind/ /temperature).

There would be little advantage of making Sarin less lethal because it would still be lethal in the right conditions.  If the objective of an attacker was to temporarily incapacitate an enemy then other CW would be considered such as mustard agents, then the attacker would be expected to physically enter that area to control it otherwise the attack would serve no purpose militarily.  In this scenario, the attacker’s soldiers/vehicles would be equipped with protective equipment/clothing otherwise they would be liable to be contaminated too.

Other agents, such as CS would be far more effective at causing non-lethal effects with the intention of temporarily incapacitating people and encouraging them to leave an area of their own accord.  ‘Mild’ nerve agent poisoning will mean that people will be more likely to stay in the area.

A number of reports have claimed to have proven the use of Sarin through tests on hair, clothing, blood, tissue, and urine samples.  How would these be tested for the presence of Sarin?

I would expect that each item would be analysed with the correct equipment which has been properly maintained and calibrated after each item has been analysed, otherwise one item could contaminate the rest of the tests, resulting in a higher cumulative result.  I explained in my Q&As with Alfred Hackensberg that there would be a requirement for tests to be taken of the environment and from local people who had not been killed or injured in the attack to compare blood samples.  To be digested and turned into urine, the victim would have had to have consumed such a small amount in another liquid that it would not have killed them.  If they had been killed by drinking Sarin, it would not have entered the digestive system.

But anyway, to answer the question, all the items would be tested for traces of the lethal precursors of Sarin and in the case of the blood, the evidence of asphyxia, the method by which Sarin will ultimately kill its victim.
If Sarin was detected in hair and urine wouldn't that suggest small, non-lethal quantities, being ingested over a period of time?  

Yes.  If someone was killed from Sarin CW attack then the Sarin would not be digested or grown out into someone’s hair.  If they had been attacked and survived in the past, they would have told someone about it, there would have been more witnesses and it is possible that the attack would have left permanent indicators of its presence, such as in the hair of the survivor.

If Sarin was on clothing how hazardous would it be to handle that clothing without correct protection?

If recently contaminated and not subjected to any decontamination procedures, then there would be a contamination risk, especially in confined spaces.  Individual protective clothing (IPE), respirator with correct filter would be required to be worn by everyone coming into contact with it.

Is it possible other substances could produce false positives for Sarin?

Yes it is.  Most chemical agents are detected in the field using generic technologies.  Precise field detection is possible through reagent kits but this requires training to use accurately.  As an example of detecting a false positive, insect repellents work in much the same was as nerve agent by attacking the nervous system of the insects and even in small quantities, they will cause electronic portable detector systems to alarm.  The quantities of active agent in insect spray are diluted so that they won’t harm humans for normal use, although it is likely that it will be ingested by people who use such substances on a regular basis.

After a suspected Sarin attack how should the victims be processed, and what precautions should be taken?

This very much depends on who is suspected of being a CW victim (military or civilian) and what infrastructure (qualified medical staff, suitable vehicles, and suitable accommodation) is in place to deal with CW attacks.  The more resources applied, the more costly but effective the process.

Nations have their own procedures, but some basic principles need to be adhered to; minimising further contamination, transferring CW victims into vehicles and then to a hospital will ensure that the vehicles can no longer be used until decontaminated and the people in the hospital who were not CW victims would become at risk of contamination.  It is possible to have sealed wards but it would be difficult to obtain video footage from inside the contaminated area as there would need to be a comprehensive system of decontamination for anyone leaving.  All the staff would need to wear IPE and be cognisant of symptoms, decontamination drills and procedures.

The most efficient method of delivering aid to CW victims would be to bring the suitably trained medical staff to the victims so that they can be treated and processed, decontaminated and then transferred to an aid post or hospital.

Setting up a hot line and cold line upwind of the incident is the normal process for chemical incidents controlling access and egress to/from the hazardous area with detection, decontamination and casualty handling incorporated into the mitigation process.

The corpses of CW victims would likely be burned to avoid further contamination of the ground, other people or buildings.

If these precautions are not taken what is likely to happen to the people coming in contact with the victims?

A person with contaminated clothing is further dispersing the agent.  Anyone coming into contact with a contaminated person will be at risk of becoming contaminated themselves, especially in confined areas such as in buildings or vehicles.

How long would it take Sarin to become harmless, or dissipate?  In general terms are we talking minutes, hours, weeks? 

This is difficult to answer because of the variables that could exist but Sarin is a non-persistent and highly volatile liquid which disperses and vaporises rapidly dependent on conditions of temperature and air flow.  A single projectile of Sarin fired in a hot, sunny featureless environment during a windy day could feasibly take minutes to dissipate.  At the other end of the spectrum, a sustained bombardment/barrage in an urban area during a period of no wind and no sustained periods of sun would be more likely to create a scenario where pockets of exposed Sarin would last for days, unexposed Sarin could last for weeks and CW UXO could remain in the area for years.

Sarin is a non-persistent agent which means that the entity who used it is intending to enter the contaminated area soon after the attack when safe to do so.  IPE and detection equipment would be used by first-in elements and until the all-clear was given.  

Saraqeb

The Saraqeb attack is probably one of the mostly well documented alleged chemical weapon attacks of the conflict.  Canisters inside containers filled with white-grey powder were reportedly dropped from a helicopter, landing in two locations, one near a road, where no victims were reported, and the other in the courtyard of a family home.  It was reported that immediately after impact, one of the residents entered the courtyard, and collapsed shortly afterwards, later dying.  Shortly after the first victim entered the courtyard more members of the family entered, and also fell ill, as did people responding to the attack.  Between 11 to 13 people were reportedly effected, with only one death reported.  Video from the road-side location filmed some time after the attack would show children playing near to the remaining white-grey powder with no ill effects reported. (A more detailed breakdown can be found here)

Would the above scenario match what you'd expect to see if Sarin has been used in the attack?

Not really.  I would be very surprised if a lethal war agent would be dispersed in this way; the risk of contamination to the helicopter and crew would be high.  Sarin is not known to be dispersed in a powdered form.

In common with many alleged chemical attacks in Syria the medical staff appears to have no protective gear.  If this was a Sarin attack, how likely would it be that the medical staff would be effected, and how long would it take for the medical staff to become effected?

Depending on concentration and method of contact, the medical staff could feel the effects of the agent as soon as they came into contact with the victim or other contaminated articles.

One video shows a car pulling up with at least one victim inside.  If this was a Sarin attack, how likely would it be that the inside of the vehicle would be contaminated by Sarin?  If the victim inside the vehicle had been exposed to Sarin is it likely other passengers in the vehicle would fall ill?

The inside of the vehicle would likely be contaminated by Sarin if the victim has been in contact with the agent droplets or vapour.  The victim would have contaminated skin and clothing which would continue to produce Sarin vapour.  The inside of a vehicle is confined and this would mean that everyone in the vehicle would breathe in the Sarin.  Contaminated surfaces inside the vehicle could affect future users of the car.

Some people have proposed a scenario where a diluted mixture of Sarin and other substances was used in the attack.  If that was the case, would your answers to the above questions change significantly?

I don’t understand why a diluted Sarin agent would be produced or used.  If a less lethal agent was required then there are more efficient solutions.

The canisters recovered from the scene of the attacks matched canisters also recovered from an attack reported in Sheikh Maqsoud in Aleppo, where there were again claims of them being dropped from a helicopter, with photographs showing the canister remains covered in white-grey powder.  
The same design of canister has also been filmed in a cache of weapons reportedly captured by the Syrian opposition from the Syrian military, and a journalist in Syria has shown the image of the canister to various armed group, many of which have claimed to have seen them in the possession of opposition fighters, claiming to have captured them from the Syrian army.
Another type of grenade, using an identical fuze, was also photographed in Syria, with the photographer being told it was a normal smoke grenade.
There's video footage from the Saraqeb attack showing what's claimed to be the canisters falling through the sky, appearing to produce smoke or a white gas, as well as producing light. The canisters appeared to show signs of heat damage around holes along the body of the canister.  

Considering the various information gathered about these grenades is it likely they would have contained Sarin? 

Not really. Hand grenades have been manufactured for military use containing lethal war agents in the past.  Sarin filled grenades would not include a pyrotechnic burning reaction to generate the toxic smoke as this is not deemed viable or known for dispersal of a Sarin payload.  

Is it possible they could have contained another substance that could have caused symptoms seen in the victims of the attack?

It is unlikely that the grenades would have contained a blood, nerve or blister agent.  Having seen the footage of the victims, I question whether their symptoms were caused by a CW attack.  Without seeing more footage before and after the filming, I’d say that they could have been exposed a number of chemical incidents including toxic smoke inhalation, exposure to industrial chemicals or unintended releases through acts of war.

Could one of those possibly substances produced a false positive for Sarin?

It depends on the chemicals involved.  If they were precursors for insect-spray then possibly but it is unlikely that the agent would have been dispersed by means of a grenade from a helicopter.

Is it reasonable that the contents of this grenade could have been emptied and replaced by Sarin?

No.  The safe conditions and process required would be the limiting factor as the procedure would be highly dangerous with a high risk of contamination.  The gains in filling a small container with a highly volatile lethal agent, which can only be projected over short distances, would seem a risky and unviable proposition.

Khan al-Assal

The Russian government has claimed the Syrian opposition was responsible for the Khan al-Assal attack, with a DIY rocket delivering a payload of Sarin.  

What do you think would be involved in putting together a DIY chemical warhead for a DIY rocket?

The rocket would need a viable motor to be able to reach its intended destination.  There would need to be a method of breaking or bursting the warhead casing in order for the Sarin to disperse.  It is possible to separate the Sarin precursors inside different containers inside the warhead (binary agent) but this further complicates the functioning of the projectile and makes successful use less likely if an improvised system.

The Syrian opposition have the technical know-how to manufacture rockets.

Considering the Russian government's claim that a DIY rocket was used  in the attack, what would be the most effective dispersal method once the rocket reached it's target?  

Most efficient would be use of a projectile with an air-burst fuze to allow the Sarin to be dispersed above the ground as to contaminate as much of the area as possible.  I would also expect that some of these rockets would miss the target wildly, contaminate the wrong targets and in some cases not initiate properly.  Simple impact of a thin cased projectile with the ground could be used to disperse the liquid which would then vaporise depending on environmental conditions.

As with the other alleged chemical attacks in Syria the staff treating the wounded appear not to be using any protective clothing.  Would this have resulted in medical staff and responders being contaminated if this was a Sarin attack?

Yes.  Everyone within a contaminated area would feel the effects of chemical attack, resulting in injury and death.  I would be surprised if Sarin victims would be able to be transported to a hospital immediately after an attack without secondary contamination occurring.

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Hamish de Bretton-Gordon is the Former Commander of UK CBRN Forces and COO of SecureBio.

Sarin
How is sarin typically weaponised?
Sarin is generally stored in its component form (separate chemicals) and is weaponised by the mixing of the components into either a liquid or vapour/gas form.  Once 'mixed' Sarin has a relatively short shelf life and would therefore need to be used within a time frame.  If not used then purity will degrade and the effectiveness/lethality will be effected.   Sarin was developed by the Nazi’s in the 1930’s originally as a pesticide and has its origins as an organophosphate.  When they realised how effective it could be as a nerve agent against humans they weaponised it. Sarin is about 3-4000 times more toxic than organophosphates, hence the poisoning of Indian School children last week with pesticide where 23 people were killed would have been significantly worse if it were Sarin or another Nerve agent. 
What form does sarin take?  Can it be liquid, gas, powder, etc? Does it have a particular smell or colour?
Sarin will generally come in the form of either a liquid of vapour.
Sarin, when in a pure form is both colourless and odourless.  However persons who were affected during the Tokyo Sarin attack,(the Sarin used was of only 50% purity)  reported a smell similar to paint thinner.  
A number of reports have claimed to have proven the use of sarin through tests on hair, clothing, blood, tissue, and urine samples.  How would these be tested for the presence of sarin?
The testing of cholinesterase levels in the samples during laboratory tests would indicate the presence of nerve agents.
If sarin was detected in hair and urine wouldn't that suggest small, non-lethal quantities, being ingested over a period of time?  
Not necessarily, it could indicate that the person was only exposed to a small amount regardless of the time involved. 
If sarin was on clothing how hazardous would it be to handle that clothing without correct protection?
This would depend largely on the quantity on the clothing and the quality/age of the Sarin.  However, a note of caution, is that exposure to Sarin can be accumulative and death or injury could occur over a time when exposed to low levels of contamination.  The best advice is to protect yourself at all times.
Is it possible other substances could produce false positives for Sarin?
Highly unlikely with today’s modern equipment which can measure to PPM PPT levels.  Some of these tests have been done at Porton Down and US and French equivalent, who conspiracy theories aside, would not get this wrong.
After a suspected sarin attack how should the victims be processed, and what precautions should be taken?
Victims will need to be triaged and treated according to medical need.  Staff treating victims should protect themselves at all times to prevent them in turn becoming victims.  Many first responders and medical staff in the Tokyo subway attacks became casualties themselves in this way.
If these precautions are not taken what is likely to happen to the people coming in contact with the victims?
Likely to become affected by the Sarin to a greater or lesser degree.
How long would it take sarin to become harmless, or dissipate?  In general terms are we talking minutes, hours, weeks? 
This will depend on a number of factors, but it will become harmless in a relatively short period, hours rather than days.  Sarin by its very nature is a non persistent agent and is lighter than air, therefore it will disperse quickly.  The speed at which it disperses will depend on temperature, humidity etc.  Generally speaking the lethal effects of Sarin are short lived, residues can remain in the soil or in clothing for weeks.  Traces of Mustard gas, a persistent blister agent are still being found in Halabja 25 years after the attack.
Saraqeb
The Saraqeb attack is probably one of the mostly well documented alleged chemical weapon attacks of the conflict.  Canisters inside containers filled with white-grey powder were reportedly dropped from a helicopter landing in two locations, one near a road, where no victims were reported, and the other in the courtyard of a family home.  It was reported that immediately after impact one of the residents entered the courtyard, and collapsed shortly afterwards, later dying.  Shortly after the first victim entered the courtyard more members of the family entered, and also fell ill, as did people responding to the attack.  Between 11 to 13 people were reportedly effected, with only one death reported.  Video from the road-side location filmed some time after the attack would show children playing near to the remaining white-grey powder with no ill effects reported.
Would the above scenario match what you'd expect to see if sarin has been used in the attack?
Not normally.  Sarin would normally be delivered by air dropped munitions or artillery shells, causing mass casualties i.e. Halabja.  However, it is pretty clear that samples from Saraqeb have tested positive for Sarin, so there would appear to be very small amounts of Sarin contained in the canisters, probably of a low quality.  This would account for the relatively few casualties.  It is certainly not textbook delivery but has presumably achieved the effect which the perpetrator wanted – confusion and derision amongst the International Community.
In common with many alleged chemical attacks in Syria the medical staff appears to have no protective gear.  If this was a sarin attack, how likely would it be that the medical staff would be effected, and how long would it take for the medical staff to become effected?
Without PPE medical staff would be vulnerable to cross contamination issues. The levels of exposure are likely to be low but as mentioned above the accumulated effects could cause injury or death.  The lack of PPE and training is also a concern for NGOs and charities operating in a medical capacity in Syria.
One video shows a car pulling up with at least one victim inside.  If this was a sarin attack, how likely would it be that the inside of the vehicle would be contaminated by sarin?  If the victim inside the vehicle had been exposed to sarin is it likely other passengers in the vehicle would fall ill?
There would in all likelihood be contamination inside the vehicle, however on the evidence given this would low level.  Other occupants of the vehicle would be contaminated to one degree or another.  Very difficult to tell from videos and pictures.
Some people have proposed a scenario where a diluted mixture of sarin and other substances was used in the attack.  If that was the case, would your answers to the above questions change significantly?
The subject of deliberately diluting a mixture of Sarin, and or mixing it with other substances would defeat the object of use it as it was designed, and the effectiveness would be difficult to predict. The less pure the Sarin is the less lethality it possesses.  Therefore the answer above would remain.  It is probably the case that less lethal Sarin was used, but it is impossible to say if this was by accident or design.
The canisters recovered from the scene of the attacks matched canisters also recovered from an attack reported in Sheikh Maqsoud in Aleppo, where there were again claims of them being dropped from a helicopter, with photographs showing the canister remains covered in white-grey powder.  
The same design of canister has also been filmed in a cache of weapons reportedly captured by the Syrian opposition from the Syrian military, and a journalist in Syria has shown the image of the canister to various armed group, many of which have claimed to have seen them in the possession of opposition fighters, claiming to have captured them from the Syrian army.
Another type of grenade, using an identical fuze, was also photographed in Syria, with the photographer being told it was a normal smoke grenade.
There's video footage from the Saraqeb attack showing what's claimed to be the canisters falling through the sky, appearing to produce smoke or a white gas, as well as producing light. The canisters appeared to show signs of heat damage around holes along the body of the canister.   
Considering the various information gathered about these grenades is it likely they would have contained sarin?  
Given the evidence above the canisters would more likely contain phosphorous, or indeed be smoke grenades.  But it is not impossible that they contained Sarin.  
Is it possible the could have contained another substance that could have caused symptoms seen in the victims of the attack?
It is possible that they could have contained organophosphates(pesticides) which have the sample chemical structure as nerve agents but are a lot less toxic and would fit with the scenario painted.  However, UK, US and French Govts have stipulated that they have detected Sarin in samples from the two attacks mentioned and that is the best information currently available.
Could one of those possibly substances produced a false positive for sarin?
It is highly unlikely that a false positive would be given for Sarin.  Lab tests on biological samples are very sophisticated, and again modern day detection, identification and monitoring equipment systems are pretty reliable. 
Is it reasonable that the contents of this grenade could have been emptied and replaced by sarin?
It is possible, but I’m not sure it is reasonable. It would be a very strange thing to do and potentially very dangerous to those doing this.  However, there appear to be no bounds to the ‘awfulness’ associated currently with the War in Syria, so one is surprised by very little at the moment.
Khan al-Assal
The Russian government has claimed the Syrian opposition was responsible for the Khan al-Assal attack, with a DIY rocket delivering a payload of sarin.  
What do you think would be involved in putting together a DIY chemical warhead for a DIY rocket?
This scenario is highly improbable.  Sarin when delivered by munitions is 'mixed' in flight and the warhead is programmed to either release its payload at a given height or on contact with the ground.  It is unlikely that the rebels would have access to this level of sophistication – this is beyond a ‘DIY’ rocket ‘thing’..
Considering the Russian government's claim that a DIY rocket was used  in the attack, what would be the most effective dispersal method once the rocket reached its target?  
If this claim was found to be justified the either an air burst or ground burst weapon would be equally effective.  There would be a number of factors to take into account before deciding which would be the best, these could include climatic conditions, target etc.
As with the other alleged chemical attacks in Syria the staff treating the wounded appear not to be using any protective clothing.  Would this have resulted in medical staff and responders being contaminated if this was a sarin attack?
It is highly likely that some form of cross contamination would occur from treating the victims, the level of contamination would be determined by the level of contamination the victim was exposed to.
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Later next week I'll be posting more interviews, and looking at what we know about the Russian claims of sarin use at Khan al-Assal, and the group they claimed used it, the Basha'ir al-Nasr brigade.

Tuesday, 21 May 2013

Three Chemical Weapon Specialist Answer Questions About Chemical Weapons In Syria

With the focus on chemical weapons in Syria in recent weeks I decided it was time to talk to some experts on the subject, in an attempt to make sense of some of the reports of chemical weapon use in Syria.

Paul from Allen Vanguard.  Allen Vanguard have a long established reputation for reporting on Threat Intelligence.  They recently rolled-out a new web portal that offers on-line access to their products and services.  The portal can be found here.  (Qualifying businesses and organizations can obtain guest accounts upon request, using the “Subscribe” button on the top right hand side of the page.)

Recently images from alleged chemical attacks in Saraqeb, Idlib, and Sheikh Maghsoud, Aleppo have shown a device that local activists claimed were used in both attacks, with the same device appearing in a photograph being worn on the tactical vest of an opposition fighter.  In your opinion what do you believe these devices could be?


The devices are white handheld canisters with a ‘lid’ and fly off lever.  There is a circular hole on one side of the cylinder, with discolouring around the hole.  It would appear that this device is designed to be thrown and discharge a smoke which would explain the discolouring around the hole.  The single hole suggests that the cylinder is designed to emit smoke for a longer period of time rather than quickly and in multiple directions which would be the likely effect if there were more holes.

If these canisters were dropped by helicopters, the purpose could have been to indicate/mark the area.  The design of the canister would also support this as the smoke would visible for longer and emerge for a longer duration.

The fact that these canisters have only been seen on opposition fighters and in areas held by the opposition, it is likely that they have been sourced or produced by people/organisations sympathetic to the opposition.

The design, the areas in which they have been found and the condition of the ‘spent’ containers suggests that these cylinders are smoke canisters designed to emit a screening agent for use in tactical situations or as ‘markers’.  The colour of the canister and the way it has been manufactured suggests that it is improvised or locally made.  It is possible that it has been commercially made for public disorder scenarios. 

Are you aware of any specific models of these devices that matches what's been seen in Syria?

No.

Do you believe chemical agents such as sarin, VX, etc, would be delivered in such a device?

In short, no.  Vx is a ‘persistent’ nerve agent and would render the area in which it had been used contaminated for a significantly longer period of time than other nerve agents.  It is designed to deny entire areas from both the enemy and friendly forces and for this reason would not be deployed in hand thrown weapons and would not be handled by individuals not wearing individual protection equipment (IPE).  Vx is also a liquid and would not be suited to be deployed from hand thrown canisters and nor would it leave a trace next to the cylinder’s hole, like shown in the image.

Sarin is a ‘non-persistent’ nerve agent.  One of its characteristics is that it is an odourless liquid and the spent canisters would not be handled in the way that they are shown in the images.  Like Vx, Sarin is not suited to being deployed in hand thrown canisters and would not leave marks next to the hole in the canister as shown in the image. 

This video shows victims from the Sheikh Maghsoud attack.  In your opinion would you be able to draw any solid conclusions about the chemical agent used from the information in that video alone?

None of the people in the hospital are wearing IPE (individual protective equipment); they are not being affected by the same condition as the patient on the stretcher.  The first ‘victim’ is not in pain and does not have any visible symptoms beyond a non-moving fresh thin, white trail of foam leading down his face from each nostril.  This is not a recognised symptom of nerve agent attack and the early signs (pinpointing of pupils, running nose, tight chest & difficulty of breathing) are absent.

The second ‘victim’ is a woman.  She has no visible symptoms of nerve agent attack.

The third ‘victim’ is a man.  He has thin bright white foam at the left hand side of his mouth.  The foam is not moving and no more is emerging.  There are no symptoms of a nerve agent having been ingested by this man.

The third ‘victim’ is a woman.  She appears to have red blotches on her face and has breathing apparatus in her mouth.  She is not moving.  I don’t think that this is a nerve agent.  However, red blotches and shortness of breath (patient requiring artificial respiration) is a symptom of a blood agent, such as hydrogen cyanide.

The presence of a camera person, lack of IPE worn by the staff, lack of general panic and lack of recognised symptoms amongst the ‘victims’ makes me think that the event has been staged.  The symptoms that have been presented have probably been elaborated with single applications of foam; the foam has stopped emerging by the time the camera is shown at them.  Only the third ‘victim’ has recognisable symptoms of a chemical attack but even so, it is unlikely that a blood agent would be dispersed using a hand thrown canister because of the unreliability of the container and risk to the thrower of being contaminated by the blood agent.

There's been reports in the Turkish press that ricin was used in the April 29th attack in Saraqeb, Idlib.  Knowing what you know of the attack, how likely do you think it is that ricin would have been used?

Ricin is unlikely to react well to heat which would be required to vent smoke from the hole in the canister seen in the image.  As stated before, the canister is totally unsuitable to disperse a chemical or biological attack.   An attacker would be more inclined to use cheaper, more conventional weapons (such as a grenade or rifle) if they were in such close proximity to their enemy.

After the chemical attack in Khan al-Assal Alex Thomson of Channel 4 News reported various claims made by the Syrian government about the attack.  This includes the claim that "a relatively small amount of chlorine gas, namely CL17 which was dissolved into saline solution in a home-made rocket."  Considering the number of casualties do you believe it is a realistic scenario that chlorine delivered in such a fashion could cause that number of causalities?

‘Chlorine gas’ is dispersed by the wind; it is unsuited to missile warheads, as described in the article because of its likely destruction by any explosion but also the lack of knowledge of wind direction in the target area.  The wrong wind conditions would result in the attackers bearing the brunt of their own attack.  The survivors of a chlorine gas attack would still display chlorine gas attack symptoms, such as chronic breathing problems.  I’ve only heard about dead victims from this attack; it is unlikely that chlorine gas delivered in this manner would kill everyone in its vicinity and not leave any injured.  Chlorine was used in a few attacks in Iraq but it was reported that most of the casualties and deaths were caused by the effect of the blast rather than the effects of the chlorine.  I’ve not heard of long-term injuries caused by the chlorine attacks in Iraq and this may indicate the difficulty in dispersing a chemical weapon in an open environment with explosives. 

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Steve Johnson is Deputy Editor of CBRNe World, a magazine published bi-monthly serving the information needs of professionals around the world charged with planning for or responding to a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear or explosives (CBRNe) threat or incident.

Could you tell me your thoughts on the recent BBC reports from Saraqeb?

The dropping of material from helicopters has been a regular theme in Syria – it being one of the earliest allegations. This footage is a lot clearer than that early footage.  It still seems very strange to drop a small box with a brick from such a height.  The military purpose of this seems confusing to take such risks for dropping a single, short acting agent at a time.

The artillery and helicopter attack appear unconnected. The round on video explodes on impact and was part of a salvo.  Again small use of helicopter dropped munitions in the midst of an artillery scenario seem strange – the logic of trying to get people out in to the open using gas, or suppressing air defence with artillery while the helicopters go in makes sense. But a single package from a single helicopter?

Helicopter dropped munitions are not unprecedented – the Iran-Iraq war saw them used from altitudes of 3-4000 feet ranging from 220 litre containers that detonated on contact with the ground and 55 gallon drums. Some mixed, and generally unsubstantiated reports, suggest limited use by Iranians of predominantly captured Iraqi resources, including throwing barrels out of helicopters over troops. 

Recently images from alleged chemical attacks in Saraqeb, Idlib, and Sheikh Maghsoud, Aleppo have shown a device that local activists claimed were used in both attacks, with the same device appearing in a photograph being worn on the tactical vest of an opposition fighter.  In your opinion what do you believe these devices could be?

The device does not have a fragmentation jacket and so is most likely a carrier grenade or some type. These include CS, CN, Smoke, WP. Its an unusual design with the fixing screw and small port in the side. It bears resemblance to devices used earlier in the conflict by security forces, which emitted CS.  Notably the man with it on his vest had no apparent protective equipment.  Which suggests it's more likely to be smoke or a riot control agent (would you trust your ability to throw a nerve agent to keep you safe?)

Are you aware of any specific models of these devices that matches what's been seen in Syria?

I have looked through my resources and have be unable to find a match.  The high resolution picture suggests that one of the holes may be a filler port (if so for something liquid most likely given the gauge).  They seem very small for emission ports – though they could be.

The lack of markings though potentially suggest something homemade, particularly what looks like a cross head screw holding the carrier portion to the fusing mechanism.

Do you believe chemical agents such as sarin, VX, etc, would be delivered in such a device?

While it is not impossible that someone may have put a fill such as sarin or vx in to such a grenade it would be much less likely than CS/CN or smoke. The main reason for this is that CS, for example, is easily distributed by a pyrotechnic emission. Sarin would be quite rapidly evaporated by the intense heat of the grenades detonator – and a great deal would be decomposed or destroyed by the explosion. Field techniques usually consider a ratio of 5:1 explosives to CW sufficient to destroy all agent. VX would be more stable – but would still be sensitive to the ratio of explosives to fill.

This video shows victims from the Sheikh Maghsoud attack.  In your opinion would you be able to draw any solid conclusions about the chemical agent used from the information in that video alone?

I can see ER room chaos and an extremely unusual foaming at the mouth. Doubly unusual as the person, despite being able to move makes no attempt to remove it.  No solid conclusions one way or the other could be made from this video. Although it does raise a suspicion of faking symptoms with the highly uniform, highly white foam.

There's been reports in the Turkish press that ricin was used in the April 29th attack in Saraqeb, Idlib.  Knowing what you know of the attack, how likely do you think it is that ricin would have been used?

Syria is a relatively large producer of castor oil – and as such its not impossible that soil and human samples may give positives for Ricin.  It is inappropriate for explosive dissemination because it gets ‘inactivated’ by temps over 80 degrees C.

Ricin needs to be ingested or inhaled to have effect (or to pierce the skin).  The effects are slow (8 hours plus). It wouldn’t be very effective in the way in which the devices were constructed – which doesn’t mean that someone wouldn’t try that, but it would be unusual for a country with a mature CW program to do something so ineffective.  Ricin has traditionally been more favoured by terrorists who see it as an accessible material.
After the chemical attack in Khan al-Assal Alex Thomson of Channel 4 News reported various claims made by the Syrian government about the attack.  This includes the claim that "a relatively small amount of chlorine gas, namely CL17 which was dissolved into saline solution in a home-made rocket."  Considering the number of casualties do you believe it is a realistic scenario that chlorine delivered in such a fashion could cause that number of causalities?

Chlorine rockets seems a bit bizarre, especially a solution of chlorine that would be pretty weak once vaporised on impact. It suggests that an improvised filling, perhaps of a hypochlorite in water, was used, or some bleaching materials.  

It's not impossible, and as I pointed out lots of groups have tried putting all sorts of weird things in rockets.  Frankly these mainly just cause problems with their balance and performance and have little to no impact

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Hamish de Bretton-Gordon is the Former Commander of UK CBRN Forces and COO SecureBio.  He recently appeared on the BBC talking about the alleged chemical attack in Saraqeb.

Recently images from alleged chemical attacks in Saraqeb, Idlib, and Sheikh Maghsoud, Aleppo have shown a device that local activists claimed were used in both attacks, with the same device appearing in a photograph being worn on the tactical vest of an opposition fighter.  In your opinion what do you believe these devices could be?

The plastic device shown in your blog and as carried by the JAN fighter appears to be a riot control grenade, usually filled with a tear gas (eg. CS).  A very similar grenade, Indian DRDE version, can be found here.

These grenades will usually flash and then smoke shortly after being initiated but are unlikely to burn for prolonged periods; unless filled with phosphorus however, the body of the grenade would not be made from plastic if it had a WP fill.

CS Grenades are usually filled with a powder/solid version of CS, which is then heated in the grenade to off-gas.  Interestingly enough the Irish Medical Times conducted a study about the lethality of CS in high concentrations/purity.

There is some evidence in some of the photographs that the canisters have been tampered with – look at the screw seating.  This suggests they could have been opened and refilled with something other than CS gas.

Do you believe chemical agents such as sarin, VX, etc, would be delivered in such a device?

It is possible that the grenade may have been refilled with something other than CS.  Unlikely to be liquid so not Sarin or VX, but could be OP or CL17 in powder form.

This video shows victims from the Sheikh Maghsoud attack.  In your opinion would you be able to draw any solid conclusions about the chemical agent used from the information in that video alone?

Not really, there are some inconsistent symptoms with nerve Agent poisoning in this attack.  There is however some evidence to suggest that this attack is where the samples that the UK and US  Govts and others, analysis comes from, which reported microscope traces of Sarin.

There's been reports in the Turkish press that ricin was used in the April 29th attack in Saraqeb, Idlib.  Knowing what you know of the attack, how likely do you think it is that ricin would have been used?

It is entirely possible that Assad has Ricin however, there is little tactical benefit from using it as described.  It is therefore assessed to be unlikely that Ricin has been used in Syria at this stage.

But that is not to say it will not be in future.  Assad is believed to have a BW programme and potentially significant stocks of Anthrax.  However, delivery of BW is a challenge, but even hint at its use is likely to incite fear and panic.  The potential for BW to all into terrorists’ hands is a major concern as they are easy to conceal and hence move.

After the chemical attack in Khan al-Assal Alex Thomson of Channel 4 News reported various claims made by the Syrian government about the attack.  This includes the claim that "a relatively small amount of chlorine gas, namely CL17 which was dissolved into saline solution in a home-made rocket."  Considering the number of casualties do you believe it is a realistic scenario that chlorine delivered in such a fashion could cause that number of causalities?

It is entirely possible that the rebels have been able to develop an improvised rocket, as seen frequently in Iraq.  However, a liquid fill of this type would be inherently unstable, resulting in the rocket flying erratically if at all.

It is therefore, assessed as unlikely that the rocket claim is true.  Furthermore, the casualties are inconsistent with chlorine poisoning.

It is entirely possible that either side could produce Improvised CW, and using CL17 to produce an effective, in propaganda terms, chemical weapon.