In this second part of my ongoing series on the final UN report into the use of chemical weapons in Syria, Hamish de Bretton-Gordon, Former Commander UK CBRN Forces and COO SecureBio, looks at what the UN/OPCW did and didn't achieve, and details his thoughts on the use of chemical weapons in Syria.
The UN/OPCW Final Report - Mandate and What they Did and Did Not achieve
The UN/OPCW mandate was very clear….’to identify if chemical weapons were used in Syria’. This mandate referred to 5 sites of alleged use of CW in Aleppo, Damascus and Saraqeb. It also included Khan al-Assal which the Russians offered information on, in a determined fashion, that the Opposition were to blame. What the mandate did not critically do was direct the UN/OPCW to apportion blame. This could have been possible, and has been possible since by various experts around the world, many of them cajoled, interpreted and assimilated by Brown Moses. However, the team assembled under the very able Ake Sellstrom did not appear to posses the expertise able to make judgements of use, his team made up predominantly of scientists and inspectors, right for the task in hand, but taking those with military expertise, who could analyse what they saw on the ground and judge, with a high degree of certainty who was responsible, was lacking – a missed opportunity, which is now evident – to most. This lack of capability in the military expertise area could also be manifesting itself in the planning for the movement of the CW stockpile to Latakia, which appears to be unravelling late in the day.
Those of us with experience of movement in war-zones such as Iraq and Afghanistan, can see the challenges of moving a very large convoy through very complex and dangerous terrain. The fact that some of the issues, such as security and availability of appropriate vehicles, are only just becoming apparent, suggests that those involved in the planning process lack the experience and capability to be able to identify these shortcoming at the beginning of the planning process, when it would have been clear. A similar sized convoy moved a few years ago in Afghanistan from Kandahar to Kajacki Dam in Afghanistan. This was a strategically important move, like this one, to take a hydroelectric turbine to the Kajacki dam to provide electricity to Helmand and Kandahar provinces. The planning took around 6 months involved 10,000’s of troops and lots of military hardware to ensure success. There appeared to be basically one route along Highway One and then up route 66 through Sangin and on to Kajacki, and passing through, or close to, a number of Taliban strongholds – hauntingly similar to the issue of moving CW to Latakia – the physical challenges of the move is where the similarities end. In the end, the convoy surprisingly cut across the formidable desert, similar to Hannibal going over the Alps, caught the Taliban by surprise and the turbine was successfully delivered, on time, intact – which now looks unlikely for the CW move, especially on time – and the reality being that this delay, could/probably will affect Geneva 2 22 Jan 13, the first genuine hope for peace in this 3 year conflict.
Back to the UN/OPCW inspectors and report; remember they arrived in Damascus on 20 Aug 13, and the Ghouta attack was on 21 Aug 13. Nobody could believe the Regime would use CW as the inspectors arrived in Town and hence began the conspiracy theories, and creating confusion and uncertainty on this most complex of battlefields. The inspectors then had the opportunity to go to Ghouta a few days later to collect evidence. Both the Regime and Opposition allowed this to happen, and led each to claim they had nothing to hide. The inspectors collected a whole array of evidence, under very challenging conditions, which allowed them [UN/OPCW] to unequivocally state that Sarin, in quantities probably more than a couple of hundred litres was used at Ghouta. They [UN/OPCW] also collected evidence of delivery methods and azimuth and trajectory of rocketry. All this has since been analysed and analysed, by many including myself, and with my military expertise, I am unequivocal in my assertion that responsibility for Ghouta attack is firmly in the hands of the Regime. Three factors lead me to this, firstly, the detail and level of planning required for this type of attack is well beyond the Opposition, the amount of Sarin used is well beyond the Opposition to manufacture, and the loading and delivery methods are only held by the Regime. Hence if I were on the ground with the UN/OPCW I would have been confident to attribute the attack to the Regime, even more so than I am from my armchair in my office at Porton Down, UK.
The UN/OPCW also looked at Khan al-Assal and Saraqeb and concluded that Sarin was used in both events. I covered the Sarin attack with the BBC’s Ian Pannell and concluded without doubt, that the Regime was responsible, and we didn’t have any detailed chemical analysis kit with us. But the CW was tipped out of a helicopter, without doubt, and the Opposition certainly did not posses helos and the Regime did. It was apparent to me from the symptoms I saw and talking to those around that this was a Sarin attack. The UN/OPCW had the same and better evidence, and could, mandate aside, also have attributed blame. The Khan al-Assal attack is different to the others, as it could be concluded that the Opposition is responsible. UN/OPCW conclude that Sarin was used mainly from evidence provided by the Russians and that the victims were Syrian soldiers. It could be the Opposition - AQ certain claim to be in the CW market – they [Opposition] could have acquired small amounts of Sarin, the Regime recently stated that they had lost some [Sarin] from Aleppo Airport and the Syrian Army soldiers were victims. It could also have been the Regime, who are probably not beyond killing their own people to gain a tactical advantage. It could have been fratricide, which is always possible, and likely; experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan bear this up, and the highly complex battlefield of the Syrian conflict make this also a possible explanation.
So what have the UN/OPCW done and not done? – they have unequivocally stated that CW was used after 3 months of detailed study, well done! – I appeared on the BBC Today programme at 0830 on 21 Aug 13 – I was rung at 0815 and asked to comment on the attack and had just returned from my morning run around London, I had a quick look at the evidence (YouTube videos) and said to TODAY……….’ it looks like Sarin and it looks like the Regime handiwork, because of the amount of agent probably used and the level of planning required’…… and I have only reinforced my view since. So, they [UN/OPCW] haven’t attributed blame which if directed they should and could do, may be supplemented with some military expertise. It’s import because we know the Regime is responsible for Ghouta, and those responsible must face justice in time, and if the Opposition is responsible for Khan al-Assal then we all need to be on our guard; because if the Opposition have Sarin, so does AQ and ISIS and this would now be a global threat which we all need to be resilient against.
The Syrian Regime and its CW stockpile is currently hold the International Community to ransom and they [CW] must be moved out of Syria or neutralised as soon as possible to allow any chance of some sort of peace – the job of the UN/OPCW is far from over, but I expect they need some additional support, and I for one, hope, that HM Government steps up to the plate and offers to do some of the heavy lifting.
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More responses to the UN report can be found in part 1 and part 3 of this series.
Yesterday, the final UN report into the use of chemical weapons in Syria was published online (here), detailing the investigation into several alleged uses of chemical weapons in Syria. I've invited a number of chemical weapon specialists to give their thoughts on different aspects of the report, and today I'll be focusing on the Khan al-Assal attack, Saraqeb and Sheik Maqsood attacks.
Khan al-Assal
In July, Russia provided the UN with a 100-page report on their own investigation into the chemical attack in Khan al-Assal on March 19th 2013. While the report was not published, key findings were detailed by the Russian Foreign Ministry when the report was submitted, and also reiterated in a statement by H.E. Ambassador Vitaly Churkin, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations
It was established that on March 19 the rebels launched an unguided "Basha'ir-3" projectile towards Khan al-Assal controlled by the Government forces. As you know, 26 people were killed (16 of them were military personnel), 86 injured and intoxicated to different levels.
The results of the analysis clearly indicate that the ordnance used in Khan al-Assal was not industrially manufactured and was filled with sarin. The sarin technical specifications prove that it was not industrially manufactured either. The absence of chemical stabilizers in the samples of the detected toxic agents indicates their relatively recent production. The projectile involved is not a standard one for chemical use. Hexogen utilised as an opening charge is not used in standard ammunitions.
Therefore, there is every reason to believe that it was the armed opposition fighters who used chemical weapons in Khan al-Assal.
According to the information at our disposal, the production of "Basha'ir-3" unguided projectiles was started in February 2013 by the so-called "Basha'ir al-Nasr" brigade affiliated with the Free Syrian Army.
Not only did the Russian's claim it was a DIY rocket fired by the Syrian opposition, but even the specific type, "Basha'ir-3", and the group involved, the "Basha'ir al-Nasr" brigade. One would assume that as this claim is being made in relation to the 100-page report presented to the UN, the teams investigating the Khan al-Assal attack would be fully aware of the details on those rockets, which are incredibly specific. However, in the final report the picture is somewhat less clear
The United Nations Mission received contradicting information as to how chemical weapon agents were delivered in the Khan Al Asal incident. Witness statements collected by the UNHRC Commission of Inquiry, provided to the United Nations Mission, supported the position by the Syrian Arab Republic that a rocket was fired from the neighborhood. However, according to other witness statements to the UNHRC Commission of Inquiry, an overflying aircraft had dropped an aerial bomb filled with Sarin.
The United Nations Mission was not able to collect any primary information or any “untouched” artifacts relevant to the incident and necessary for an independent verification of the information gathered.
It goes on to say
The United Nations Mission received from the Government of the Russian Federation its report of the results of the analysis of samples obtained from Khan Al Asal from 23 to 25 March 2013, which identified Sarin and Sarin degradation products on metal fragments and in soil samples taken at the site of the incident.
For me, the question I have now is why the big difference between the UN report and the Russian report about which munition was used? It seems the type remains of the munition would be the best possible evidence of who was responsible, especially if the Russian's were able to figure out the exact type of munition, and which group uses them. If Russia had that level of detail, why is the UN report unclear on whether or not it was even a rocket that was responsible? It's also very interesting that the UN report also states
The team was open, however, to receiving any biomedical samples previously collected by the Syrian Government, which the United Nations Mission would authenticate through DNA tests.
No biomedical samples were handed over to the United Nations Mission by the Syrian Government.
So why did the Syrian Government fail to keep what would have been key evidence in the investigation? Either way, it seems that the Russian's must have the best possible evidence of opposition responsibility, and with the UN report failing to concur with their results, it's time that the Russian government publishes at least that part of their findings to clear up the discrepancies between the reports.
Saraqeb and Sheikh Maqsoud
Saraqeb and Sheikh Maqsoud are two attacks I spent a number of months investigating. What first caught my interest in the two attacks was the method of attack used. Reports and images from both attacks suggested a similar method of attack, my initial thoughts on which I detailed in this April 2013 post. The March 29th Saraqeb attack, which took place two weeks after the Sheikh Maqsoud, is described in the UN report
The source close to the opposition claimed that, on 29 March 2013, a helicopter was seen passing above the western part of Saraqueb flying from north to south and that the helicopter allegedly dropped items at three locations. The first point of impact was reportedly in the northern area of the town, the second in the middle of the courtyard of a family house, and the third was close to an opposition checkpoint on the roads to Idlib and Aleppo.
A trail of white smoke reportedly came down from the helicopter as improvised munitions were allegedly observed being dropped.
This mostly agrees with the detailed report I put together on the Saraqeb attack on May 17th, but at that time I believed only two items were dropped from the helicopters. It was also reported that the Sheikh Maqsoud attack involved the same method of attack, but there was a lot more that linked the two attacks.
The UN describes the munition used in the Saraqeb attack as follows
Based on the information gathered by the United Nations Mission from the source close to the opposition, the Saraqueb incident was atypical for an event involving alleged use of chemical weapons. The munitions allegedly used could hold only as little as 200 ml of a toxic chemical. Allegedly tear gas and chemical weapon munitions were used in parallel. The core of the device allegedly used was a cinder block (building material of cement) with round holes. These holes could, allegedly, serve to “secure” small hand grenades from exploding. As the cinder block hit the ground, the handles of the grenades would become activated and discharged. Some of the hand grenade–type munitions allegedly contained tear gas, whereas other grenades were filled with Sarin.
I've spoken to a number of chemical weapon specialists about this method deliver in the past (earlier interviews here, here, and here), and the general viewpoint has been this would be a really odd way of delivering Sarin. There's video and photographic evidence from Saraqeb, with the BBC report on Saraqeb showing video footage of the munition falling through the sky, as described in the UN report
The shattered remains of one of the cinder blocks used
And photographs and videos of the grenades used
Compared to the Saraqeb report, there was very little information on the Sheikh Maqsoud attack, but what there was appears to link it to the Saraqeb attack. Aside from reports of a helicopter dropping the munitions, we also had a series of photographs
In these photographs we see the remains of the same type of white grenade, surrounded by the same type of debris that appears to have come from a disintegrating cinder block. It would seem that this evidence would link the two attacks, and point towards the use of Sarin in the Sheikh Masqoud attack.
The story of the white grenades didn't stop there. In May, I was sent the following photograph from Jeffry Ruigendijk of a Jabhat al-Nusra fighter (hi-res here)
This begged the question of whether or not Jabhat al-Nusra has the same grenades, and what they actually were. Journalist Alfred Hackensberger took up the challenge of finding out, and detailed his finding in my blog post The Hunt For Chemical Weapon Attack Linked Gas Grenades In Syria
At beginning, nobody recognized them and we thought we are at a dead end. But later, we found two rebels at front line position in Assafireh who immediately recognized them. They were sure of seeing them on rebels, but didn't remember if the were from Liwa Tawhid or al-Nusra. But anyway, they said this were smoke grenades, not chemical grenades. Later in Aleppo we found two more men who said same thing.
He went on to add
He said, that he saw these grenades (the original one from Saraqeb and Maqsoud) during his military service over one year ago in Daraa (before he defected). An elite force, supposedly from the 4th Division, was training with these grenades. His officer told him that the grenades were delivered by Iran and would contain, beside smoke, a certain nerve relaxant, to calm protesters down. The former soldier also said that these grenades were not used at that time.
So it seems that if these grenades were carrying Sarin in the Saraqeb attack, they don't appear to have been designed to do so. For me, the Saraqeb and Sheikh Maqsoud attacks have always been a bit of a mystery. The delivery method has seemed, awkward, and almost self-endangering. Why use a helicopter to deliver just 3 of the munitions, for such a tiny number of causalities, in areas where the attack has no obvious military value? Could what we've seen in these attacks have been a test? There were certainly no other reports of these munitions being recovered in relation to chemical attacks, so it remains somewhat of a mystery.
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More responses to the UN report can be found in part 2 and part 3 of this series.
The
northeastern corner of Syria- with the city of Qamishli and its
surrounding area- has attracted some media attention as a scene of
what is known as the wider “Kurdish-Jihadi” conflict that erupted
since the expulsion of jihadis from the Hasakah northern border town
of Ras al-Ayn by the YPG in July. So which factions are fighting on
the Qamishli front on both sides?
Rebel Offensive
On the
offensive, most egregious is the ongoing wave of suicide bombings
that have struck the positions of the YPG and of the Assad regime’s
National Defense Force militia (NDF) in the city of Qamishli itself,
perpetrated more recently by the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham
[ISIS]. Fighting between ISIS and factions defending Qamishli has
been intermittent for a number of months now, including the claimed
capture by ISIS in early August of two villages near Qamishli:
namely, al-Baza and al-Hamara. Similarly, in
late October, ISIS sources reported ongoing clashes between ISIS
and the YPG on a number of fronts.
Figure 1: Photo circulated in ISIS
circles of aftermath of a suicide car bombing in late November in
Qamishli, targeting the YPG.
Figure 2: Aftermath of suicide car
bombing perpetrated by one Abu Saleh al-Qasimi of ISIS, targeting the
NDF. Photo released on 6 December.
Keen to downplay accusations of
anti-Kurdish racism, ISIS has been eager to show Kurdish
participation in its operations on the Qamishli front in particular
and Hasakah governorate in general (now renamed ‘al-Baraka’
province in ISIS circles).
Figure 3: Aftermath of a suicide car
bombing perpetrated against the YPG in Qamishli by ISIS’ Abu Omar
al-Kurdi al-Muhajir in late November.
Figure 4: Kurdish fighters for ISIS.
Figure 5: “Message from Kurdish
Mujahideen from the Islamic State.” ISIS video of Kurdish fighters
in Syria, speaking in Kurdish, not Arabic.
It would be mistaken to characterize
ISIS as the sole or leading participant in the offensive on the
Qamishli front. For example, in July, in the immediate aftermath of
the expulsion of ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra from Qamishli, an umbrella
“liberation front” for the Qamishli area was announced, with
chanting featured at the end of a jihadist orientation, most notably
the slogan: “The Caliphate is the promise of God.”
Figure 6: “Statement of the
Liberation Front of Qamishli if God wills.”
In this context,
it is worth mentioning another major set of groups on the Qamishli
front of a jihadi/Caliphate orientation: namely, those going by the
name of Ansar al-Khilafa. At least one of these ruled with Jabhat
al-Nusra/ISIS as part of a joint coalition over the eastern border
town of Yaroubiya until these forces were expelled by the YPG in late
October. This Ansar al-Khilafa of the ruling coalition of Yaroubiya-
described as ‘ansar’ (i.e. affiliates) of ISIS by a local
pro-ISIS Hasakah contact- is independent from the Ansar
al-Khilafa brigade affiliated with Hizb-ut-Tahrir in the western
Aleppo countryside.
However, an announcement posted on 15
October announcing a new offensive on the Qamishli front entitled
“And say: Truth has come and Falsehood has perished” indicates
that Hizb-ut-Tahrir’s Ansar al-Khilafa has sent deployments to the
Qamishli area as well, cooperating with these other Ansar al-Khilafa
groups. Indeed, the announcement listed the following participating
battalions: “Jabhat al-Nusra, Liwa Amjad al-Islam, Collection of
Ansar al-Khilafa Brigades, including”[NB: emphasis
my own]the Ansar al-Khilafa brigades of western Aleppo
countryside and the town of Aleppo itself, and finally Liwa
al-Qadisiyah.
The last
brigade in this list has claimed some dead fighters as of October
in Hasakah province through fighting regime forces and the “militias
of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party” (PKK, used interchangeably in
rebel discourse with the PYD and YPG): namely, Abdullah Said al-Namar
al-Dagheem, Ahmad Ali Ibrahim al-Dagheem, Hafez Saleem al-Omori and
Mahmoud Khattab.
Figure 7: Ansar al-Khilafa tank
operating in the Qamishli area as part of the new offensive announced
in October.
Figure 8: Ansar al-Khilafa fighters
celebrate victory over the dead corpse of a regime fighter killed
amid the claimed capture of the Abu Qusayeb checkpoint in Qamishli
area. From late June
Figure 9: One of the logos used by
Liwa Amjad al-Islam, a battalion primarily based in Aleppo
governorate that has also deployed fighters for the Qamishli front as
part of the October offensive.
At the same time as this “And say:
Truth has come and Falsehood has perished” offensive was announced,
a “Battle of Furqan” offensive in the Qamishli area was declared
against the PKK/PYD, including ISIS, Jabhat al-Nusra, Ahrar ash-Sham
and the “Free Army.” Ahrar ash-Sham has previously coordinated
with Anṣar
al-Khilafa and fellow Salafist rebel groups such as Jaysh
al-Tawheed (part of the former Syrian Islamic Front coalition) in the
Qamishli area.
More generally in Hasakah province, Ahrar
ash-Sham coordinates and maintains good relations with ISIS,
contrasting with localized tensions in both Aleppo and Idlib
governorates out towards the west (e.g. see this local Ahrar ash-Sham
statement on conflict with
ISIS in Maskana, Aleppo province, over a court dispute). Thus a
joint
ISIS-Ahrar ash-Sham operation was conducted against the YPG in Tel
Ma’aruf in late November. An Ahrar ash-Sham supporter from
Qamishli similarly confirmed to me an overall good working
relationship between ISIS and Ahrar ash-Sham in Hasakah province.
Figure 10: ISIS and Ahrar ash-Sham
flags side-by-side in al-Hawal, Hasakah province, on the border with
Iraq.
Considering how often rebel groups
announce new umbrella fronts and united battle initiatives, one
should not imagine an organized sustained offensive on the Qamishli
front. There are instances of cooperation but fighting remains
haphazard and confused, though the overall effort to push on Qamishli
and surrounding towns is undoubtedly being led by groups of jihadist
and Salafist orientation.
Factions on the DefensiveThe
city of Qamishli itself is controlled by two main factions: the YPG
militias, and the Assad regime’s NDF. Since the summer, the YPG has
significantly expanded its power base in the city at the expense of
regime forces, but the exact nature of the relationship between the
two factions remains nebulous. Any cooperation that does exist-
perhaps in trying to prevent suicide bomb attacks on the town, for
example- ought to be attributed more to PYD pragmatism rather than
ideological sympathy and affinity. A more recent incident pointing to
tension between the two factions involved the case
of an American journalist whom regime forces in Qamishli tried to
detain as opposed to YPG policy of securing the person’s
release.
Perhaps of most interest in the context of relations
between factions on the defensive in the Qamishli area is the
existence of Syriac Christian defense militias going by the name of
Sootoro. They exist in Qamishli, al-Malikiya and al-Qahtaniya.
Figure 11: A Sootoro emblem,
associated with the “Syriac Protection Office” of the city of
Qamishli.
According to Echoue Gouriye, head of
the Syriac Union Party that seeks to advance Syriac Christian
interests in Syria and has a base in Qamishli, Sootoro had its
beginnings among Syriac youth in the town of al-Qahtaniya after the
withdrawal of regime forces, then in al-Malikiyah (again, outside of
regime control), and finally in Qamishli, rooted in the belief that
Syriac Christians must take it upon themselves to defend their areas
and cannot simply rely on others to provide protection. At the same
time, Gouriye made clear to me that the approach does not exclude
cooperation with Kurds or Arabs when problems arise.
It
has been suggested that the Sootoro movement has split since its
inception, with the Qamishli branch overrun by pro-regime elements
while those in al-Qahtaniya and al-Malikiya remaining linked to the
Syriac Union Party. The Qamishli branch officially claims neutrality,
with the Syriac Protection Office having stated the following to me
in an interview: “We do not fight against any side of the conflict
in Syria, but our work encompasses protecting our regions from theft
or kidnapping operations…and we have forged an excellent
relationship with all groups of Syrian society in general and with
the people of Qamishli in particular.”
However, an overview
of the Qamishli Sootoro’s photos quickly shows a regime affinity at
least on the part of the leadership, most notably through the
presence of the regime flag in its images. Of course, it does not
necessarily follow that these Sootoro members are somehow diehard
Ba’athists. They should rather be seen as analogous to the Druze
militias of southern Syria: that is, they likely see the regime as
the best guarantor of the protection of the Syriac community’s
lands and interests, any reservations about the traditional Ba’athist
denial of non-Arab-Christian identity notwithstanding. This tendency
is reinforced by the Islamic supremacist tendencies of fighters
leading the offensive on the Qamishli front, culminating in the
desecration of some Syriac churches.
Figure 12: Sootoro militiamen in a
Qamishli street. Note the regime flag on the building.
Figure 13: Sootoro militiamen in
Qamishli.
Figure 14: Syrian regime flag in the
Qamishli Sootoro’s Protection Office.
Figure 15: The Mar Malki Church in
the Qamishli countryside, burnt down in September.
Pointing to a split between the
Qamishli Sootoro and groups using the name Sootoro in other towns is
a statement released in late October by the Qamishli office,
addressed to the people of al-Hasakah, al-Malikiya and al-Qahtaniya,
reading as follows:
“Stories have proliferated recently
about the existence of members affiliated with the protection office
(Sootoro) in your great towns, so we inform you that we in the
protection office have not formed until now any branch outside the
city of Qamishli and that we were in the process of forming branches
to cover al-Malikiya, al-Qahtaniya and al-Hasakah as well with these
branches composed of your great sons….and [with cooperation etc.]
there will be an announcement about it in official form.”
The
statement therefore quite clearly separates the Qamishli Sootoro from
any groups using this name in other towns.
Figure 16: Qamishli Sootoro
statement in late October denying formation of new branches in
al-Malikiya, al-Qahtaniya and al-Hasakah.
In any event, Sootoro groups maintain
generally cordial relations with local Kurdish militias in
particular, as the Qamishli group in particular has attended
funerals for YPG fighters killed in July in clashes with Jabhat
al-Nusra, offering words of praise for their efforts. In a similar
vein, the Qamishli protection office claims to have given refuge to a
Kurdish militiaman from al-Malikiya who had personal problems,
allowing him to spend the night in the Qamishli office and be
restored to his family the following day.
This fits in well
with the Qamishli Sootoro’s claim to me that the group makes no
sectarian distinctions in their areas. Indeed, such an approach makes
sense in a context where, like the Druze of southern Syria, there is
little capacity for or interest in establishing any kind of
separatist trend. There is also a contrast here with the 1980s
when many Assyrian Christians joined Kurdish Peshmerga militias
(rather than form separate militias) in the face of Saddam Hussein’s
al-Anfal campaign that saw the destruction of numerous Christian
villages in the north of the country.
ConclusionNeither
those attempting to take Qamishli and the surrounding area nor those
factions defending the region form united fronts, with relations
between the YPG, regime forces and Sootoro groups particularly
complex. However, in the long-term, territorial control is likely to
remain out of rebel hands, since the rebel factions lack local
demographic appeal in the face of a strengthened YPG in Hasakah
province in particular.
Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi is a
student at Brasenose College, Oxford University, and a
Shillman-Ginsburg Fellow at the Middle East Forum. Thanks to David
Vergili for establishing contact with Echoue Gouriye.
A guest post by Olly Morton and Hamish de Bretton-Gordon of SecureBio.
Introduction
The Syria Chemical Weapons (CW) saga in 2013 has bought weapons of mass destruction to the forefront of the world’s media however, the threat is no longer constrained to just Syria and its neighbours. As the OPCW and UN begin to oversee the movement of Syria’s CW stockpile out of Syria and destruction on the high seas, proliferation is the major threat to this process and perhaps the Geneva 2 peace talks 22 Jan 14. Russia has come in at the last minute and though this option may be viable will certainly delay things beyond Geneva 2. The international Community is currently being held hostage by Syria’s CW. With the growing threat of extremist organisations drawn to the conflict and the porous land borders has dramatically increased the risk of chemical, biological and radiological proliferation by non-state actors. At the same moment 6400 barrels of radioactive Yellow Cake is discovered unguarded in the deserts of Libya which could be used as part of a Radiological Dispersion Device (RDD), Cobalt 60 is stolen in Mexico, but it looks like Iran will be hindered in its bid to weaponise its enriched Uranium and Plutonium. Proliferation poses a significant threat to regional stability and increases the threat of a “spectacular” terrorist attack against the western world and never before has the terrorist use of WMD been more likely.
Figure 1 - Prominent Syrian CBR production facilities
Ambitious Beginnings
Unlike Iraq, Syria sought to develop an offensive chemical weapons (CW) capability from the outset; the programme began in 1971, fuelled by growing concerns about regional stability and the immediate threat posed by Israel. Initial development and implementation was supported by Egypt however, with the signing of an agreement with the Soviet Union and the development of the Tartus naval base, expertise from the USSR was provided and Syria began a programme of CW self-sufficiency.
In addition to its chemical weapons programme, Syria also developed an extensive biological and pharmaceutical programme however, unlike the CW programme, there is little evidence to support its use as a stand-alone offensive capability but the possibility of dual-use is extremely high. Prior to the civil war, Syria had one of the largest pharmaceutical industries in the region, with a number of the research and production facilities capable of rapidly converting from pharmaceutical research and manufacturing, in particular vaccine work, to producing biological warfare agents; these facilities are known as dual-use.
Prior to the development of its chemical weapons programme, Syria had signed the nuclear non-proliferation treaty in 1968 and went on to ratify it in 1969, enabling them to pursue peaceful civil nuclear power. By the mid-1980’s Syria had engaged with Argentina, China and Russia in the search for nuclear technologies and expertise, construction began in 1991 on the Chinese Der Al-Hadjar reactor, which became operational in 1996 however, despite the peaceful persona, in 2007 Israel bombed another reactor at Al-Kibar. Al-Kibar was assessed, by the CIA, to be a plutonium production reactor; the facility was developed in secrecy and had been strictly off limits to international nuclear inspectors, consequently very little was known about it. Following the 2007 air strike and a series of worrying discoveries by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), relationships began to breakdown and in June 2011 the IAEA passed a resolution that found Syria to be non-compliant with the nuclear Safeguards Agreement – this has all gone quite at the moment but no doubt with IAEA focus on Iran, the next stage of Syria WMD verification will no doubt look at this programme.
Civil War
In the past 12 months, UK Government has estimated that there have been approximately 14 chemical attacks, supported by positive sample analysis from at least 3 of these attack locations. Of concern, is that these repeated attacks do not follow a standard modus-operandi but utilise a variety of delivery means, agents and target locations, with the most horrific attack occurring on 21 Aug 2013 in the Damascus suburb of Al Ghouta. Due to the variety and nature of the attacks, attributing blame and conducting accurate threat assessments is challenging until Al Ghouta.
Figure 2 - Chemical attacks since Dec 2012
This number of attacks and the scale of the atrocity on 21 August has led to increased media coverage, which coupled with the break down of security, policing and border controls has fuelled international speculation and concern about the threat of CBRN proliferation from Syria.
The base at Safira has changed hands on numerous occasions, but what remains unclear is where the stockpiled chemical weapons and their precursors are?
Proliferation
For historical security and internal stability reasons the regime dispersed its CBRN programmes across the country, ensuring that research, production, storage and delivery means remained separated. The on-going civil war has caused a breakdown of physical security at a number of CBRN production, storage and research facilities and Syria’s growing extremist threat (both regime and opposition aligned), has enabled non-state actors to have access to Syrian WMD, their associated toxic pre-cursor chemicals and other toxic industrial materials. Recently even the more moderate opposition activists, view the possession of CBRN weapons as critical to the long-term survival of Syria and the perceived threat posed by Israel.
Open source reporting has suggested that many chemical weapons, precursors and CBRN hazards have already left the country, utilising the worrying combination of porous borders and lack of security; additional reporting has indicated a growing confidence to attack manned government controlled border posts.
Of significance has been two high prolife arrests made in May and June of this year, the first was the capture of Al Nusrah members in Turkey, on 31 May 13, who were found to be in possession of 2kgs of Sarin. The second set of arrests were made in Iraq, resulting in the capture of an Al Qaeda (AQ) cell in Baghdad, who were found to be in possession of Sarin pre-cursor chemicals and a complex plan of attack using remote controlled aircraft.
More recently, a Lebanese paper (Al-Mustaqbal) reported that 20 trucks, carrying CW manufacturing equipment and materials, crossed into Iraq. Where did they go? There are many who believe that the Regime has not declared all their CW to the OPCW and that not all of Assad’s CW are currently being centralised and moved to Latakia for disposal.
Syria CW Movement & Destruction – Proliferation
However, the greatest ‘opportunity for proliferation is going to come over the next 3 weeks when Syria’s CW stockpile is moved to the Port of Latakia. This is about a 300Km journey through at least 2 Opposition held areas. Military planning yardsticks would suggest this journey if planned and executed by, say by a NATO force or Russian (if available immediately), would expect to take around 3 weeks. Therefore, to arrive at Latakia in time to be loaded onto a Danish ship and be out of Syria by 31 Dec 13, this operation must start TODAY. SecureBio have already written on the dynamics of this operation here. Probably the biggest threat to the convoy will be powerful roadside bombs, which can be big enough to blow 60 tonnes tanks several metres in the air. A powerful explosion like this would undoubtedly destroy all the mustard gas in the targeted vehicle but the confusion, mayhem and slaughter would undoubtedly provide the opportunity to take some of the other trucks carrying CW material. This element is covered in more detail on Syria Deeply. The regime’s request last week for military capability to protect this convoy is either a delaying tactic or they know it is going to fail and are looking for reasons to justify this failure.
Once the CW is on the ‘High Seas’ the Danish vessel which has collected them will have to steam around the Mediterranean until at least the end of Jan 14 when the MV Cape Ray turns up to destroy the 30 tonnes of Mustard Gas and 600 tonnes of Priority One toxic precursor chemicals. There is a suggestion that this transfer of CW make take place at sea which could be a highly risk operation and the thought of 30 tonnes of mustard gas being lost in the Eastern Mediterranean is probably something which can ‘not’ be allowed to happen.
Mitigation
The size of the Syrian border, its porous nature, lack of security and willingness for activists to challenge border security (where it exists) presents a significant risk to regional stability and potentially even global travel through the proliferation of CBRN agents from Syrian facilities.
Many of the CBRN agents appear benign and are readily transportable in sealed containers; Sarin is a clear liquid marginally thicker than water. The benign appearance, combined with current security screening at international borders, which have been developed to counter the trafficking of narcotics, explosives and radioactive isotopes, facilitates the transportation of small amounts of chemical and biological with relative ease. Due to this security black hole, once chemical biological warfare (CBW) agents have been proliferated out of Syria, their onward movement is all but impossible to track and interdict.
The associated difficulties of identifying, tracking and interdicting these CBW agents, once proliferated from Syria, makes mitigation within current security regimes extremely challenging.
The OPCW receives the Nobel Peace Prize on Tues 10 Dec 13, let’s hope this is not tarnished by what happens in the next 3 weeks and 6 months, and the previous 16 years of outstanding service keep the Chemical Warfare Convention ‘Flame Alive’.
The Russians have come in at the last minute to potentially offer protection to the convoy, this is a big call given their experiences in Afghanistan and the Chechnya. But probably the only viable option at the moment.
Hamish de Bretton-Gordon, Former Commander UK CBRN Forces and COO SecureBio, examines the many issues the international community now faces in their attempts to destroy Syria's chemical weapons.
Syria's Deputy Foreign Minister Faisal Mekdad has told the BBC his government needs the international community to provide military equipment, to help transport their chemical weapons out of the country. Mr Mekdad was attending an Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons meeting in The Hague.
The Assad Regime is required under the auspices of the UN Security Council to remove all chemical agent and the most toxic precursors about 630 tonnes in total from Syria by 31 Dec 13 and the less toxic precursors, around 700 tonnes by Feb 14. There appear to be 3 phases to the plan, firstly, to move the 1330 tonnes to the Port of Latakia, secondly to transport these chemicals to the MV Cape Ray presumably in the Mediterranean somewhere, and to commercial toxic waste destruction facilities and finally to destroy the most toxic by hydrolysis on the MV Cape Ray and the rest by normal convention toxic waste destruction at civilian facilities, by mid 2014 – all possible, well apparently, until yesterday’s 11th hour request by Minister Mekdad.
It is understood that most of the CW is North of Damascus and will have to move through a number of contested areas before it reaches Latakia. Sigrid Kaag head of the UN/OPCW in Damascus admitted on Sat 30 Nov 13 on BBC World Service that the route to the Port is currently blocked. It is the Regimes responsibility to deliver the CW, as per the CWC, to the Port whence it will be loaded onto ships to become the responsibility of the International Community under supervision of, and verification by the OPCW.
Phase 1 planning for the movement to the Port is an extremely complex military operation with many factors which must be worked through in finite detail, from force protection, to logistics, communications, capabilities required and many alternative options if things go wrong. Ideally, it would take a sophisticated military like the US or UK many days and weeks with great expertise to plan such an operation. One of the initial stages of military planning is working out whether you have enough ‘Troops to Task’ or forces available, to achieve the mission. It would appear at the 11th hour, rather than the First or Second, that the Regime planners have decided they do not have the ‘Troops for the Task’ and now require the International Community to supply, presumably Tanks, armoured personnel carriers etc in order to be able to achieve the mission. Even if the International community was minded to supply this hardware there is no way it could be handed over the Regime and trained on in order to deliver the CW to the Port by 31 Dec 13. But surely the UN and OPCW have been intermittently involved in this planning and this would be apparent at the outset, or are the Regime only involving them [UN/OPCW] when it is convenient?
It is also, I suggest, too late to get UN or Coalition troops on the ground in Syria to support such a Mission, even if the International Community was ‘minded too,’ which it does not appear to be. US or UK units who prepare to do to places like Afghanistan usually conduct about 6 months pre-deployment training before going, and we are now in the under 3 weeks bracket. Of course US and UK have very high readiness forces but they still have to meet theatre entry standards of training and equipment and an absolute minimum would be around a 4 week flash to bang. Special Forces like the SAS or Navy Seals/Delta could be used but they are not really equipped for what is conventional force activity in this case.
SO WHAT? Is this an attempt by the Regime to buy time or are they setting up the Mission for failure, and planning to blame the International Community for not providing the appropriate support? Some see Assad’s use of Sarin in Ghouta on 21 Aug 13 as a brilliant ‘ruse of war’. Initially it was believed, [and by the Opposition, most of them] that the US was going to ‘blast’ Assad off the planet with Cruise Missiles around the 27 Aug 13; but we are now in a position where the International Community is being held to ransom by the Assad’s Chemical Weapons. And this is a position which I expect the Regime would like to proliferate, and this request for ‘undeliverable’ military hardware appears to be just that - A stalling tactic.
If this is the case and the Regime really do not believe that they can achieve their mission without the military hardware, the Opposition in all its guises must guarantee safe passage of the CW to the Port. Because it is only once the CW is out of Syria that it [CW] stops becoming the Regimes bargaining piece with the International Community and all can focus on Peace at Geneva 2 on 22 Jan 14. If the CW is still in Syria on 22 Jan 14 what hope for Geneva 2?
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You can follow SecureBio on Twitter, and listen to Hamish de Bretton-Gordon on BBC Radio 4's The World Tonight talking about chemical weapon issues in Syria.
Earlier today I came across the following video, posted on the Eretz Zen YouTube channel, featuring Saddam al-Jamal, the former leader of the Supreme Military Council of the Free Syrian Army's Eastern Front, who recently joined the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham. In this clip he details foreign involvement with the Syrian opposition
The above video is just part of a a much longer 30 minute long video recorded by the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, which can be found here. I've had the complete video translated, with some duplicate lines and statements removed for brevity's sake.
Revealing the biggest conspiracy to target our brethren in ISIS Confessions of leaders and officers of Liwa Ahfad Al Rasoul Grandsons of the prophet brigade 0:24 What about the support given by some western and Arab countries to the Staff Board, the military council and the Syrian Coalition? 0:32 Is this support free? Only to help Syrians get rid of tyrant Assad? What about the closed meetings in Ankara between highest leaders of the FSA and the Arabic and Western Intel? 0:51 What are their goals and plans? 0: 56 What’s the reason behind this fervent media campaign by the agent TV channels against the ISIS? 1:05 All these questions and others will be answered by Saddam al Jamal, the former revolutionary leader of the Eastern Front in the Staff Board, and leader of Liwa Allah Akbar of the Ahfad al Rasoul, which is one of the biggest brigades in eastern Syria. 1:28 After he discovered this plot against Islam and Muslims and the ISIS. 1:39 He surrendered to the ISIS and disclosed info of plans made by the infidel West and some treacherous Arab countries against theproject of Al Ummah, the Nation.
2:04 Part Two 2:06 In the name of God, most gracious, most merciful. My name is Sddam al Jamal, the former revolutionary leader of the Eastern Front in the Staff Board, and leader of Liwa Allah Akbar of the Ahfad al Rasoul. I declare my dissociation from the Staff Board and the Military Council and the Syrian Coalition, and my dissociation from the general leader of Grandsons of the Prophet Brigades, Major Maher Noaimi, and from Ragheb al-Tohma, leader of Ahfad al Rasoul in Deir Ezzor. And I declare my repentance, and I do not fear from Allah any blame. I address a call to my brethren in the FSA to dissociate themselves from the military councils, the Staff Board and the [Syrian] Coalition, which call them to fight our brethren the Islamists and to prevent the Sharia of Allah from being established in the land. 2:55 How were you offered to join the conglomerate of Ahfad al Rassoul? 3:07 When the Staff Board was formed, we met Maher [Noami] there, in Turkey. It was suggested to form the conglomerate of al Ahfad, and that it will receive support. You know, support given to the FSA was little, so we were looking for someone to supply us with arms and ammo. Based on this we, and Liwa al Umma- The Nation Brigade-and Qua’qua’ joined [the Ahfad]. 3:30 What’s the goal behind forming this conglomerate? 3::34 Originally, the Ahfad was meant to be part of the FSA, without any agenda or [political] ambitions, and that it would be supported without any return, only to fight the Assad regime. However, we discovered later that this project has an agenda and long-term objectives. Obviously it is supported by Qatar. 4:06 Who are the intel that sponsored this project? 4: 10 It's Qatari. In general, all the intelligence services of the world were participating in the project of the FSA. 4:20 Can you name those intel services? 4: 20 Jordanian intel, Saudi intel, Emirati intel, and Qatari intel. And, obviously, Western intel services are also present. 4:33 Can you name the Western intel? 4: 35 Obviously, the US, Britain, France, those are the main intel services present in the meetings of the Staff [Board] and the Military Councils. 4:50 Is al Ahfad exclusively funded by Qatar? 4:51 At the beginning of the Syrian revolution, the file was handled by Qatar. After a while, they switched to Saudi Arabia, under the claim that Qatar no longer wants to support the Muslim Brotherhood since they are a failed project in Syria.So, the Saudi intelligence services took over the file during the last period of the Syrian revolution. Obviously, the main goal of this project is to fight the Islamists in the Sham and preventing establishing of Sharia, though they wouldn’t openly declare this. The project was prepared for a later period, till it materialize through supporting it with money and ammunition. 6:00 Did they offer you huge sums of money? 6:01 Sure, they fund the Staff Board, who then distribute money to the battalions and brigades. 6:07 Can you give an estimate of this money? 6:10 Recently, the Staff Board was offered a sum of 450,000 USD in the form of relief aid, as far as I know, it was paid by the USA. The money was later distributed to the battle fronts, to the leader of the military council and the leader of the revolutionary council. The money was split between these two councils. 6:47 Who has given you the shipment of arms and ammo lately? 6:50 A first lieutenant of the Staff Board, I remember his name was Haitham. 7:13 After receiving the last arms shipment, did you meet with them? 7:14 Yes, we held many meetings, especially after the latest disputes between Ahfad al Rassoul and ISIS. We were ignorant of the [project] as we didn’t know that we were infidels and apostates after we used to meet with the apostates of Qatar and Saudi Arabia and with the infidels of Western nations such as America and France in order to receive arms and ammo or cash. 7:47 What was the main discussion point in those meetings with the intelligence services? 7:46 The meetings were dominated by showing blind confidence in the FSA. The most frequent question by the intelligence services was: why are you growing this beard. I replied that this a sunnah of our prophet Muhammad. They wanted to know other reasons. Qatari and American intel were present in those meetings. 8:16 Did they ask those kind of questions during the meeting or after it? 8:20 They asked those questions in front of everyone in the meeting. They also ask why we shave the mustache. 8:35 Did they ask other questions? 8:38 They asked why we are fighting Bashar, what objectives we have. We answered that after the fall of Bashar, we will give up arms and return to normal life. 9:00 What were the main questions? 9:01 All of the above, besides asking whether there was any presence of the Islamists and the extremists or the terrorists. They wanted to know if there were foreign fighters in Deir Ezzor. We denied this presence, but it looks like they knew of it and they would tell us that they knew about foreign fighters, maybe they got this info through their spies. 9:42 What intelligence that used to focus on these questions? 9:45 American and Saudi, all of them ask the same questions, even the Jordanian. 9:53 Did they ask you separately? 10: 00 Somewhat, but they were not secret meetings. 10:10 Did they ask you openly to fight the Islamists? 10:13 Those countries, especially Saudi Arabia, give weapons and ammo to to a faction that controls a certain area, only to make sure that the Islamists don’t take it over. Their arch enemy is Islam and Sharia. 10:54 Does this mean that they declared their rejection of establishing Sharia? 10:58 Yes, then how do you explain supplying and funding the FSA while denying it to Al Nusra Front and ISIS? They do know that ISIS would establish Sharia. 11:17 Tell us about the last meeting. 11:18 The last meeting included all the FSA leaders in the east areas, Hasaka, Raqqa and Deir Ezzor, as well as the leaders of Aleppo front, They held meetings with each front separately, eastern and northern, on the first and second days. On the third they met with both fronts in a single meeting, which was sponsored by Prince Salman. 12:03 Whos is Prince Salman? 12:05 Prince Salman occupies the position of Saudi Deputy Defense Minister, and he is currently responsible for the Syrian file, I told you before that Qatar was responsible, but he took over the file from them. Of course, Prince Salman is known as the brother of Prince Bandar [bin Sultan] of the house of Saud. Those present include the Jordanian, Qatari, and Emirati intelligence services as well as Salim Idriss. There were no international intel services that were not present. Maher Noami, Muhannad Tallaa’ and Muhammad Abboud, Jabhat al Asala wa al Tanmiya was also present. 12:54 What did Prince Salman ask you? 12:57 He asked all the attendees in general to ………… 13:03 Did he ask you openly to fight the Islamists? 13:05 On the first day he asked those who have plans to attack Assad positions to present their needs of arms, ammo and money. There was a plan to take full control of the eastern area, just to deny those areas to the Islamists. The suppliers did not openly say this, but they insisted that we capture almost all eastern Syria, including oil fields. They asked us to organize ourselves, select a leadership, set up training camps, and pay regular salaries. They asked that all FSA factions unify under the umbrella of the Revolutionary Council or the Military Council. 14:58 What did Salim Idriss say during this meeting? 15:00 He said that the Prince [Salman] had come to support us and supply us with ammo and money, and that he wants the various factions to unite under the umbrella of the Staff Board, and without any other names or labels, in which case all countries will support us. 15:37 What did Ragheb Tohme said during this meeting? 15:40 He was commander in the city [of Deir Ezzor] He also has close ties with Ahmed Jarba, chief of the Coalition prior to the forming of the Coalition, and he received support from Jarba. For me, I had never any contacts with the Coalition or its head Jarba. Prior to the dispute between ISIS and Al Ahfad, Yaser al Qate, Firas Kharaba, Iyad Kharaba, and Walid Shadad got a phone call from Ragheb Tohme to go and meet him in Turkey. They went and he paid 3-5 m SYP. Jarba had already gave 150,000 USD to Tohme, but I don’t know about what happened else during their meeting in Turkey. After they came back from Turkey, problems started to appear in Deir Ezzor. 17:05 Can you say that Jarba was behind the problems in Deir Ezzor? 17:07 I told you Jarba and Tohme have close ties, and Jarba is the favourite man in Syria by Saudi Arabia, Prince Salman and the international intel, he even lacks any [university] degrees and he was imposed on everyone without getting anyone’s approval. 17:32 What do you know about the Raqqa plan? 17:30 It was planned to deploy 500 fighters to liberate it from Salmiya to Raqqa. 17:45 Do this mean they planned to target ISIS in Deir Ezzor? 17:50 Sure, their original objective was to liberate AL Raqq [of ISIS] and continue along the line. Ragheb Tohme knew of this plan, and this is why he recalled them to Turkey and gave them money. When the problem started, Maher phoned and asked us to help [al Ahfad]. The relationship with them worsened after this, and later Maher asked why we did not help al Al Ahfad, I replied that I didn’t know the Ahfad in Raqqa. I said to him also that I was in Raqqa 5 days prior to the problem, and knew well the basis of the problem, namely, ISIS found alcohol in one of the al Ahfad’s vehicles.
The second reason of the problem was that Al Ahfad fighters stopped one of the ISIS’s members at a checkpoint, he was accompanied by a woman who was wearing niqab. Ahfad fighters asked that the woman remove the niqab. After we refused to help al Ahfad, I started receiving angry calls from ….. and he threatened that we will be dismissed by Al Ahfad’s leadership, I then replied that this does not matter to me, let them dismiss us, let them say I am with Qaeda.
The following day he phoned me and said that we didn’t support him and let him down, and he vowed to fight ISIS even alone. I replied that this is not of my business. He added that he will set up a training camp in Turkey and offered to give us support if we join him, and that he will train the fighters and form Special Forces. For me, if in the future some faction will fight ISIS, it will be the Special Forces. 21:25 Will there be a new shipment of arms in this period? 21:27 The countries said that the last shipment was only to boost the morale, but in the coming days a bigger shipment will arrive. 21:35 What kind of weapons they said they would send? 21:42 They always promised to send anti-aircraft missiles, but they sent none, all they sent was 14,5 mm anti-aircraft guns, shoulder fired OSA anti-armor and anti-personnel grenades. 22:09 Who will receive the next arms shipment? 22:15 As far as I know, the shipment would be sent by America and France and Western countries in general, but nobody will receive it. Those countries want to give the weapons to fighters that they call the right hands, ie, fighters who will be trained abroad. They will not give it to any faction inside Syria. They want to receive 25-50 fighters and train them abroad, without disclosing the location of the training camp, whether it was Turkey or Jordan. And when they ask for fighters for training, they at first ask for full information on them, starting from his birth date and so on. They have been asking for this info for the last 9 months. 23:06 Did they ask you this? 23:07 Yes, they did. 23:09 What did they ask exactly? 23:11 When we asked for anti-aircraft missles, and night-vision goggles, they refused to send them, saying that we give these weapons to select elite troops only, after we train them outside Syria. We will then hand them those weapons as well as night-vision snipers and modern anti-armor missiles. 23:50 Are there any FSA fighters who are being trained outside Syria? 23:52 Yes, the FSA, of course, especially from southern Syria. I know since I was in the Staff Board. In Ghouta, Damascus and Dara’a, many groups got trained in Jordan at the hands of the Jordanian intelligence services and Western ones. Everyone knows that when we say Jordan this means Israeli intelligence services. Israel is present in Jordan. All people know that. The media activist Abdu Abu Yazan was ordered by Maher Noami to appear on Al Arabiya TV channel and speak against ISIS, and say that ISIS attacked the FSA and Al Ahfad, which is contrary to the truth. Now he is on the ISIS’s wanted list. Everyone knows that ISIS found alcohol with the Ahfad in Raqq.
The Staff Board held a meeting, Feras Kharaba and Bashir Tohmeh were present, and they discussed the subject of the fight between ISIS and the FSA, especially in Deir Ezzor, Ragheb al Bashir stood up in the meeting. Jarba, head of the Coalition was present in the meeting. They wanted to know if there was a reliable faction that can fight ISIS in the eastern area, and it was suggested that this faction will receive all kinds of support. At this point, Ragheb stood up and said that he, along with Feras Kharaba, are ready to fight ISIS. Feras told them during the meeting that he had 300 fighters. He also told them that they would be able to face ISIS if they convinced Saddam to join them. 26:21 Do you mean that Ahfad started the dispute and problems in Raqqa and Deir Ezzor? 26:23 Yes, they did, In Deir Ezzor the same persons, namely, Feras Kharaba got orders from Ragheb al Tohme, aka Abu Bashir, to start the problem with ISIS. In the last meeting, which was attended by FSA leaders, and headed by Abu Furqan, who is a retired General in the Turkish Intelligence, he said that we have credible information that ISIS is related to Bashar Assad. At first, many people got convinced by this claim. 28:04 This is the devilish plan to target ISIS, through convincing the FSA that it is part of Assad regime and must be fought. 29:30 It’s an honor to come to ISIS and show repentance. 30: 55 Saddam, how did you think of ISIS before repenting and surrendering yourself? 31: The world and Military Council always told us that ISIS are terrorists and takfiris. 31:12 After surrendering yourself, what do you say about these claims? 31:14 After Allah granted me the honor of repentance, I found that all these claims are false and baseless. The treatment I received here is unbelievable, and they considered me more than a brother, and treated my according to the Sharia.
Released on November 23, 2013
Update December 5th Dan Layman of the Syrian Support Group contacted me with the following details
The supposed defection of the Saddam al-Jamal, commander of the Allahu Akbar brigade, to ISIS was not a wholly voluntary act. ISIS has been in constant combat with over 15 FSA units in northern Syria throughout the past few months in an effort to expand their zones of total control. The Ahfad Al-Rasoul brigade, of which the Allahu Akbar Brigade was an affiliate, is one of these units. Because of the existing tensions with Allahu Akbar's parent unit, ISIS stormed an Allahu Akbar command post post in Deir Ezzour, taking the brigade's weapons cache and killing several fighters, including the brother of Saddam Al-Jamal. Having lost his brigade, his weapons, and his brother, Mr. Al-Jamal pledged allegiance to ISIS to protect himself. Ideological factors were not at play.
