Things have been rather quite on the blog recently while I work on a number of projects, including the launch of a new website. One project I'm working on involves the August 21st Sarin attack, and while working on that project I've managed to geolocate one more potential impact sites from the August 21st Sarin attack in Damascus.
This task was made somewhat easier because I was able to contact the person who filmed the footage for this ITN report
He provided me with the GPS co-ordinates of what he filmed, and I was particularly interested in one site, which I've called Volcano 5 (playlist here). This video shows what appears to be the impact site, and it appears the munition was removed from the site, leaving part of the warhead's outer shell, and the remains of a black rod device that has been sighted in a number of Volcano videos, but whose purpose is unclear
Because the munition is not present, we cannot be 100% sure this is an impact location, but I believe this area is worth geolocating on the chance it could be, and because it features in a number of videos and photographs, in particular focusing on one feature, a mound of dead animals
According to the GPS information I received, the location of the dead animals was in this area
The first image from this video shows the building to the south of the open area.
This building is partly built, and we can see from Google Earth historical satellite imagery this building construction appears to have begun between 2010 and 2011
Here we can see the ground floor juts out from the building, as it does in the video
At the bottom of this image we also see the building behind the newly constructed building that's visible in the video
The forth picture in this article shows the pile of dead animals, and is facing east. On the map we can see the following 3 points of interest
At point 1 we can see a building at the corner of a walled area filled with trees. The photograph shows a small building on the south corner, with another smaller building attached to it. This matches what we have in the satellite image.
At point 2 there's a building visible in the photograph, and behind that at point 3 another building that juts out to the north, also visible in the photograph.
In this next video we have a view to the west
In this frame from the video it's possible to see a number of points of interest
At points 1 and 2 we can see the alleys to the west and south. At point 3 we can see the building at the end of the west alley. Behind that building is a taller building with balconies, visible in the historical map images of the area, marked with a 1 in the below image
Based off the above information, it seems very likely that this is the correct location, bringing the total number of Volcano rockets geolocated to three.
A big thank you to Chris Kabusk for help finding the impact locations of this rocket.
By Hamish de Bretton Gordon, director at the London based CBRN consultancy SecureBio and former commander of the UK’s specialist CBRN Regiment.
On 29 Jan 14 James Clapper, Director National Intelligence, released a statement saying “We judge that some elements of Syria’s biological warfare program might have advanced beyond the research and development stage and might be capable of limited agent production, based on the duration of its longstanding program,”. This news appeared to have shocked a number of western agencies and shed new light on to, what was viewed as, a hitherto un-disclosed Syrian capability. However, this announcement should come as no surprise, after all biological weapons are the oldest form of WMD and often referred to as the “poor mans nuke”. More worryingly why was this such a revelation, the information has been in the public domain since at least 2007 and SecureBio have included it in our specialist chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear training and awareness package since 2012.
The UN agreement, drawn up in October, to remove Assad’s weapons of mass destruction and the subsequent Syrian declaration was notably light on any mention of biological weapons, despite a report in 2007 indicating that Syria possessed a number of Category A pathogens, including Anthrax, Plague, Tularemia, Botulinium, Smallpox, Aflotoxin, Cholera, Ricin and Camelpox. Category A pathogens are considered the most toxic biological compounds, as an example 1 gram of crystalline Botulinium is assessed to be sufficient to kill about a million people, if dispersed under optimal conditions.
Syria’s Biological Weapons (BW) programme, centered at the technically advanced Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC) near Damascus, like many other nations, has its origins in the pharmaceutical and agricultural sectors, of which (pre-war) Syria provided 90% of the pharmaceuticals in the region. In order to effectively inoculate and protect individuals and livestock from the various endemic diseases, such as Anthrax (which is rife in the region), live pathogens are cultured and grown within a controlled laboratory.
These laboratories vary significantly in technology, with the SSRC being considered relatively modern, through to improvised laboratories in tin shacks on the outskirts of Kabul, which were used to produce veterinary strain vaccines in 2001. The growing of biological cultures enables scientists to produce effective vaccines, which can be used to provide inoculation from disease and deliver defensive medical counter measures to first responders, at risk individuals and of course the military.
Despite good intentions, the more advanced scientific research and development facilities (such as SSRC) are easily and readily adapted to deliver a dual-use, defensive medical and offensive military capability, whilst remaining hidden from foreign intelligence assets. Dual-use facilities have the ability to grow live pathogens and then at a very late stage, separate them into vaccine strains and the more potent strains suitable for BW agents.
Consequently, it is entirely probable that the Syrian facilities will have acquired and developed their pharmaceutical industry quite legitimately however, at a later stage blurred the lines and opted to develop dual-use technologies; obtaining proof of this illegal development requires physical inspections by technically competent bodies and regime cooperation, something which has been absent from Syria for many years.
Based on Syria’s previous (and current) alliances and the assessed list of biological agents, it is likely that in addition to obtaining samples and cultures from endemic bacteria and viruses, much of the dual-use biological pathogens and technology will have originated in Russia, Iran and the DPRK. Despite the sharing of bio-scientific information, the development of dual-use facilities and the growing of category A pathogens, it is should be noted that this is still only half the battle.
Once biological agents have been cultivated and grown, at dual-use sites, there is a significant step up in technology and scientific know-how required to transform the pathogens into a credible biological agent and then deliver them as a weapon. The programmes, to weaponise chemical, biological or radiological agents, are usually at the heart of a nation state’s most sensitive (or special) weapons sections, making it very difficult but not impossible to estimate how advanced they are.
The process of weaponising a biological agent is complex and multi-staged, involving enrichment, refining, toughening, milling and preparation of the pathogen. These processes are designed to ensure that the biological agent survives the relatively traumatic experience of being fired from a rocket, dropped from an aircraft or post delivery exposed to harsh climatic conditions eg. extremes of temperature, UV, wind, rain etc. From James Clapper’s statement, it would appear that the US view the Syrian Biological Weapons programme as having successfully achieved this process and developed a viable delivery means, most probably as an aerosol, for its biological agents. However, development of a biological weapons programme is one element, the development and refinement of biological agents is only of strategic value if the programme has the ability to scale up, ensuring sufficient stockpiles are maintained and that the agents can survive in long-term storage, through the use of climate controlled storage conditions, otherwise one rocket does represent a significant threat.
It would appear that there is little doubt about the accuracy of the US report or the inferred capabilities of the SSRC facility however, is the BW programme scalable and more importantly was it hardened against attack? Let us not forget that last year the Israeli’s launched an air strike against the SSRC, which may have destroyed or at least reduced the capability of the Syrian BW programme.
Therefore, the question whether Syria possesses a legitimate BW programme is almost certainly yes, but the real question should be what capability remains after airstrikes and two years of civil war?
The final piece to the puzzle is how secure have these sites been over the past two years? Biological agents are relatively easily identified, once deployed and symptoms begin to develop however, when in transit they are much more difficult to detect than chemical or radiological material. This difficulty in detection, coupled with the lack of internal security in Syria, presents a credible risk of biological proliferation from extremist groups. These groups, through existing networks and knowledge, are more than capable of collecting and moving biological agents across international borders and delivering them, through improvised means, as a terror weapon; this a long aspired goal of Al Qaeda.
Syria's war, waging for almost three years now, seems to have reached a new level. Since the early summer of 2013 "al-Qaeda" ruled the media. A strong presence on social media showed us that Jabhat al-Nusra (the official al-Qaeda branch in Syria) and ad-Dawla al-Islāmiyya fī al-Irāq wa's-Shām (known as ISIS, the Islamic State in Iraq and as-Shām) were not only waging full scale war against the Syrian regime, but also were clashing with objective allies. Fighting FSA and Kurdish forces in Rojava was obviously expected but after a while ISIS was getting accused of attacking member groups of the Islamic Front. And vice versa, Harakat Ahrār as-Shām, for example, lost several of its foreign fighters. A Belgian and aTunisian member of ISIS got killed near a checkpoint; news came out early December.
But the incident that seems to have triggered the current events (which can be described as the first signs of Syrian Sahwa or uprising) must have been the torture and murder of a Harakat Ahrār as-Shām member, Doctor Husayn as-Sulaymān Abū Rayyān. His body was released in a prisoner exchange. Pictures of his mutilated body circulated widely on social media. A statement about Abū Rayyān in Arabic can be read here. This and other recent violent clashes between ISIS and other rebel groups, unleashed unseen infighting in Syria.
In a few days time close to 700 casualties were reported by Jihādī sources. In about a week there were 16 suicide attacks targeting rebel forces. There are, obviously, no independent sources on these numbers. Rumors are spreading, and have been confirmed in some cases, that foreign fighters have been targeted more than ever. The last few days the most striking would be the abduction of two Belgian teenage girls. Another report claimed that three Dutch girls were abducted and raped. ISIS seems to be disintegrating in some areas. A contact in Idlib province ( Sunday January 5): "The place is swarming with lost ISIS-fighters ... There's utter chaos ... Some were arrested, some want to secure their families, others prefer to keep on fighting. In some regions Jabhat an-Nusra just took over ISIS strongholds without firing a single shot." Later that day he contacted me again: "There are no more Dawla fighters where I am, Jabhat an-Nusra, Harakat Ahrār as-Shām and FSA took it all. A lot of these boys are now in hiding, because Jaysh al-Mujāhidīn are now arresting all ISIS-fighters and Muhājirīn [foreign fighters]."
In the first few days there was some confusion whether or not Harakat Ahrār as-Shām was involved in the clashes with ISIS, but my contact was clear about that, from day one they were. And hereby the devils were unleashed. The days that followed my Twitter timeline got flooded with accusations, quite quickly there were two camps calling each other names. Some people went berserk and started a true war of words. The name calling and slander were unprecedented; even compared to what happened before between the Kurds and ISIS the tone of voice hardened. And literally all got dragged in, Jabhat an-Nusra for example; some British ISIS fighter stated: "Jabhat an-Nusra in Raqqa attacked us but Jabhat in Badiya gave us a car for free packed with a heavy machine gun. Confusing ?Most certainly." When I informed my contact about what was going on, he reacted firmly "Are they officially at war ? No ! So what's the point saying such things on Twitter ? Some Nusra guys I know left for Aleppo to protect the families of the Dawla-fighters. They should post that on Twitter."
In the meanwhile it became clear that the leadership of Jabhat an-Nusra and ISIS were bound to react to clear the fog of war. And as expected the first official reaction came from Jabhat an-Nusra's leader Abū Muhammad al-Jūlānī. In an audio recording that was released by Jabhat an-Nusra's official account he made an offer to negotiate between the clashing factions. Al-Jūlānī blamed ISIS though for the fighting between Muslims, an example he referred to was the captivity of Jabhat an-Nusra's local leader in ar-Raqqa. To solve the infighting Jabhat an-Nusra formed a committee all groups should join , an independent Sharī'a court should settle the issues. For, if the infighting continues, "we will loose a great battlefield of Jihād."
It only took a few hours before ISIS answered with it's own lengthy statement. Although it took their spokesman, Abū Muhammad al-'Adnānī, 37 minutes to bring his message, it can be summarized as Charles Lister put it in one of his recent articles: "We have armies in Iraq and an army in Syria full of hungry lions who drink blood and eat bones, finding nothing tastier than the blood of Sahwa." This message can clearly be seen as an open declaration of war towards the SNC and SMC. He refers to them as the allies of Jewish and Crusader forces, a quite often used rhetoric. He further calls upon his men to protect the foreign fighters, as they are the main victims of the Sahwa.
And indeed, as one British fighter put it; "It breaks my heart to know that the people, who in the first place left the comfort of this Dunya, now have to flee out of Syria away from Jihād. My heart is broken. Even though I disagree with ISIS in many things,the hate they are met with today is unbearable. They are my brothers." In the meantime, the infighting and battle of words linger on, it is unneeded to state that Syria's war has reached a new phase. Where this will leave ISIS, for now, is open for speculation but it's likely to result in a weakening of the whole rebellion. Meanwhile al-Assad stands by, gloating to see his enemies fighting amongst themselves.
More of Pieter Van Ostaeyen's work can be found on his blog.
Earlier parts of this series can be found here and here.
3 - The "Hezbollah" Execution Video
At this stage in the conflict, execution videos are a fairly regular occurrence, but there was one video that reflected a significant change in the conflict, as well as demonstrating the value of open source research (graphic)
The above video was posted online, with many claiming it showed Hezbollah fighters in Syria executing captured and wounded opposition fighters. In a pair of blog posts (here and here) Phillip Smyth of Jihadology.net, who has specialised in studying Shia militias involvement in the conflict, investigated the video, and discovered a variety of different online sources that confirmed that these were Shia militia in Syria, although not specifically Hezbollah as some claimed.
For me this represents two things; the increasing involvement of Shia groups with fighting inside Syria as the conflict becomes increasingly sectarian; and the way in which open source information can be used to confirm the authenticity of images, and provide related information that's incredibly useful in understand the nature of conflict.
2 - The IRAM Mystery Solved
One thing I always like to stress when talking about using open source information like YouTube videos is there's a big difference between evidence and proof. It's possible to collect plenty of evidence that supports a theory, but finding proof that theory is correct can be a different matter.
There's one munition that was something of a mystery, first spotted in October 2012. These munitions, which at the time were called IRAMs (Improved Rocket Assisted Munitions), were 107mm artillery rockets, as used by the common Type-63 multiple rocket launcher, with the warhead replaced with a much larger warhead. Whenever they appeared, it was claimed they were being fired at opposition forces by government forces, but some questioned that claim due to their apparent improvised nature. I had collected a couple of dozen videos showing unexploded examples, but after nearly year I hadn't seen anything that could prove they were used by the government.
Thanks to the unique access of ANNA News to government forces, proof finally appeared on August 30th, when the below video showed IRAMs being loaded and fired by government forces (1:15)
In fact, all of a sudden there seemed to be plenty of the proof I had been looking for appearing online. Aside from the above video, opposition forces captured the munitions at Khanasser near Aleppo, and the Syrian National Defence Force posted a video on their YouTube channel showing one in action. Eventually I was even able to find out the name for the munitions, "Volcanoes", which as the next video demonstrates started another mystery.
1 - Everyone's Favourite Volcano
As anyone who is even vaguely familiar with this blog will know, I've spent a lot of time looking at the August 21st Sarin attack, in particular the munitions used, which shares the name "Volcano" with the IRAM type munition described above. This was another example of having evidence, but not proof, that the government was using them, until one video was posted online by the Syrian National Defence Force
This video shows the same family of munitions linked to the August 21st Sarin attack being loaded into a single barrel launcher. Continued investigation after the August 21st attack has uncovered evidence that's there's two different types of launchers, and two different sizes, this single barrel launcher firing the larger size. The smaller twin-barrel launcher is seen at the start of this video of government forces filmed by Al Mayadeen TV, matching the type filmed repeatedly at Mezzeh airbase back in December 2012.
What's interesting about the above video posted by the NDF is how that particular video spread among different groups. This video from the Damascus based SAMA TV shows the munition in action, a Facebook post (now deleted) about the munitions on a pro-Hezbollah page described them as "The pride of Lebanese industry", a Iraqi Shia Facebook group posted a fact sheet about them, and a recent video from Hezbollah sources features the NDF video heavily. It's also interesting to note that it appears these videos from government sources only started to appear online after the threat of military action has subsided, even though there's evidence of them being used since late 2012.
There's still a lot to learn about these munitions, only recently have we had the best estimate for their range provided by Richard Lloyd and Ted Postol in the New York Times, and there's plenty more to be discovered, and it's likely that as with much of the information gathered on the munition so far, that'll be through open source information.
It is generally held that the ideology of Arab nationalism is virtually dead. At the governmental level, this assertion mostly holds true, with the Fatah-led regime of the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank being the last real representative of old ideals of pan-Arab unity. However, on the ground, traditional Arab nationalists may be found in all the countries of the Middle East and North Africa. As it turns out, they have formed their own volunteer militia force to fight in Syria on behalf of the Assad regime: the Arab Nationalist Guard.
Figure 1: Emblem of the Arab Nationalist Guard.
A manifesto put out by an Arab Nationalist Guard activist of Egyptian origin explains the basics of the group’s existence as follows: “The Arab Nationalist Guard is a military resistance movement currently operating in the Syrian Arab Republic, established in April 2013 by a group of Arab Nationalist Youth from many Arab countries, currently including four battalions bearing the names of martyred leaders: Wadih Haddad, Haydar al-Amali, Mohamed Brahmi, and Jules Jammal. In total there are 50 resisting Arab battalions.”
Here, an explanation ought to be given of the significance of the names. Mohamed Brahmi was a secular Tunisian politician who founded the Arab nationalist and socialist People’s Movement after the overthrow of dictator Ben Ali in the Tunisian Revolution. He was subsequently assassinated by Islamists in July of this year.
Wadih Haddad was a Palestinian Christian and Arab nationalist militant in the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, responsible for organizing plane hijackings in the late 1960s and 1970s. Jules Jammal was a legendary Syrian Arab Christian naval officer who supposedly sank a French ship during the Suez War in defense of Egypt for the cause of Arab nationalism, subject to much eulogy thereafter. Hayder al-Amali was a prominent modern Arab nationalist thinker and politician of Lebanese origin who died in 2007.
Ideology
The group’s ideology, as can be inferred from the name, falls in line with traditional pan-Arab sentiments, with notions of Arab unity and anti-imperialism: “The Arab Nationalist Guard espouses Arab nationalist ideals, believing in the existence of a single Arab ummah, and the necessity of liberating and uniting it in a single political entity gathering all Arabs away from any sectarian, ethnic, or religious extremism; and thus is the necessity of confronting Zionism and colonialist trends that threaten the Arab nation with even more division than the current partition, exploitation of its resources and colonization.”
Concomitant with these ideals is an adoption of the Assad regime’s rhetoric. Thus the Arab Nationalist Guard emphasizes the need also “to confront all Takfiri movements that aim to strike our unity and aim to sow division.” Indeed, “As a result of the ideas of the Arab Nationalist Guard, there is participation in the defense of the Syrian Arab Republic, preserving its unity and supporting it in confronting the colonialist project that threatens it with internal collaborator Arab tools with Zionist-American support declaring an attempt to break Syrian bravery.” The group also unsurprisingly stresses the necessity of liberating Palestine.
The Arab Nationalist Guard reflects its ideology in imagery circulated on social media. Particular reverence is accorded to the 20th century’s foremost representative of the ideology of Arab nationalism: namely, Gamal Abdel Nasser, who in the Syrian context of pan-Arabism is particularly relevant on account of his project of the United Arab Republic (UAR): a union between Syria and Egypt in the period 1958-61 that used the same flag as that of the Assad regime in Syria today.
Other groups and figures that stand out for praise include late President Hugo Chávez of Venezuela (as a supposed symbol of anti-imperialism), Hezbollah (in keeping with the image of resistance to the West etc.), Saddam Hussein (for similar reasons) and of course, Bashar al-Assad.
Figure 2: Graphic in Arab Nationalist Guard circles commemorating Gamal Abdel Nasser, featuring an eagle symbolizing the flag of the UAR/Syria.
Figure 3: Another Arab Nationalist Guard graphic commemorating Gamal Abdel Nasser and the UAR: “The Northern Region: Damascus- The United Arab Republic- Cairo: The Southern Region.”
Figure 4: One of many photos circulated in Arab Nationalist Guard social media featuring demonstrations for Palestine.
The Arab Nationalist Guard maintains links with the activist networks- by the name “Arab Nationalist Youth”- from which it draws recruits in a number of locations. Some of the more prominent places where Arab Nationalist Youth activity can be found include Sidon in Lebanon, Gaza and Egypt.
Figure 5: “Arab Nationalist Youth” event for Eid al-Fitr in Sidon in August. Note the identical logo to the Arab Nationalist Guard indicating that the Arab Nationalist Youth is simply the activist wing.
Figure 6: A young female activist for the Arab Nationalist Youth at the Eid event in Sidon.
Figure 7: Group photo for the Arab Nationalist Youth in Sidon.
Figure 8: Arab Nationalist Youth activists featured in some of the anti-Morsi demonstrations in Egypt at the end of June.
Figure 9: Arab Nationalist Youth activists in Gaza, December 2012.
Operations of the Arab Nationalist Guard in Syria
According to an Arab Nationalist Youth activist and subsequent fighter for the Arab Nationalist Guard, alternating his time between Sidon and Damascus, the Arab Nationalist Guard’s membership includes Arab nationalists from a variety of countries, including Egypt and Iraq.
At the same time, he claimed to me that the group has “fighters from all Syrian sects and welcomes all ethnicities of the Ummah from Arabs, Kurds and Amazigh (the Arab Maghreb) because we nationalists believe that the land is for all in it and we distance ourselves from chauvinism.” This apparent openness contrasts a great deal with Arab nationalist regimes’ actual historical record with regards to Kurdish and Berber minorities, whether Saddam Hussein’s Iraq or Muammar al-Qaddafi’s Libya (both figures revered in these circles anyway).
My contact added that the Arab Nationalist Guard, which cooperates closely with the Syrian army and the National Defense Force militia, operates in a number of areas of Syria, including Damascus, Deraa, Homs and Aleppo governorates. From the open-source evidence that has emerged, it would appear that Damascus province is the primary region of focus for the Arab Nationalist Guard, playing a role in the recent regime offensive on the Qalamoun area. Other areas of operation in Damascus province I have been able to identify- barring those mentioned in the photos below- encompass Mazara’ al-Qasimiya and Hatita al-Turkoman.
Figure 10: Arab Nationalist Guard fighters of the Mohamed Brahmi battalion in Qalamoun, Damascus province.
Figure 11: Arab Nationalist Guard members engage in outreach to locals in the regime stronghold of Jaramana, Damascus, during a funeral for one of its fighters.
Figure 12: Arab Nationalist Guard fighters in Damascus.
Figure 13: Screenshot from a video
claiming Arab Nationalist Guard participation in the regime’s
capture of as-Sabina al-Kubra in Damascus countryside in early
November. Note that this video was set to the song “Fire
your Guns, Show No Mercy” by pro-Hezbollah Lebanese Christian
singer Julia Boutros.
Figure 14: Screenshot of Arab
Nationalist Guard fighters from the same video.
Figure 15: Arab Nationalist Guard
militiamen in an unknown location in Syria, but most likely Damascus
province again.
Figure 16: Arab Nationalist Guard
fighter in Damascus province.
Figure 17: Scenes of fighting in the
areas of Damascus from an Arab Nationalist Guard video. Noteworthy is
mention of participation in fighting in the district
of Barza near the main city.
Martyrs
The Arab Nationalist Guard has its own claimed martyrs but sources connected to the group are unwilling to name many for “security reasons.” The same reason lies behind vagueness on areas of operation outside of Damascus province. Below are the most notable cases.
Figure 18: Aamer Eid Abdullah- “Abu
Nasir”- “martyred in defense of the unity and nobility of the
Syrian Arab Republic.” An Egyptian killed fighting in Qalamoun in
November.
Figure 19: Scene from Jaramana for
the November funeral of Arab Nationalist Guard commander Ahmad Othman
(Abu Bakr al-Masri), originally from Cairo. Note the placard
featuring Assad alongside Gamal Abdel Nasser.
Conclusion
Arab
nationalism has lost much favor among governments in the Middle East
and North Africa: indeed, even with the Assad regime itself and close
associates, it is notable how there is an increasing emphasis in the
discourse on claiming true Syrian identity, stressing use of Syrian
dialect of Arabic and claiming a proud pre-Arab history (e.g. see
this latest song by the Muqawama
Suriya of Latakia- “Resist”-
which mentions how “the history of the land witnessed the
Byzantines, previously the Romans,” and avoids references to
pan-Arab ideals).
However, for some on the ground in a number
of Arab countries, whether Egypt
(note especially as regards the anti-Muslim Brotherhood Tamarrod
movement with reverence for Nasser) or Yemen,
the ideology lives on, translating to support for Assad in spite of
the ever growing Sunni-Shi’i sectarianism in regional discourse.
Perhaps we should not be so surprised that old-fashioned Nasserites
have ended up fighting in Syria.
Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi is
a Shillman-Ginsburg Fellow at the Middle East Forum and a student at
Brasenose College, Oxford University. Website:
http://www.aymennjawad.org.
Twitter: @ajaltamimi
6 - Abu Sakkar
Probably the most notorious video of the conflict so far, the video posted online in May showed a member of the Syrian opposition, Abu Sakkar, stating that "we will eat your hearts and your livers, you soldiers of Bashar the dog!", then cutting out an organ from the corpse on the ground, and biting down on it. There's many edited versions of the video online, here's an example of one of them
One thing that's interesting to note is the video that appeared online was actually edited before it was even posted. Supposedly, the edited video was sent to pro-government groups as a threat, but earlier versions seen by various organisations also included direct threats to Alawites that were apparently removed before the video was sent out.
The media storm that followed this video was quite unique for any video coming from Syria, and Abu Sakkar rapidly became the poster boy for anti-opposition sentiments, with one individual's act being used to paint the opposition as "cannibal rebels", even by Russian President Vladimir Putin, who stated "one does not really need to support the people who not only kill their enemies, but open up their bodies, eat their intestines in front of the public and cameras". In the media storm that followed, Abu Sakkar even felt the need to justify his actions, claiming images on the dead man's phone of rape and child killing had been his motivation, and telling the BBC "I didn't want to do this. I had to. We have to terrify the enemy, humiliate them, just as they do to us. Now, they won't dare be wherever Abu Sakkar is.".
Whatever motivation or justification Abu Sakkar claimed, in the public imagination he came to represent the darkest elements of the Syrian opposition, and the increasingly extreme nature of the conflict.
5 - Chasing White Grenades In Saraqeb
While many people who know my blog are no doubt very familiar with my work on the August 21st Sarin attack in Damascus, what many people are unaware of is my equally obsessive investigation into another alleged chemical attack in the town of Saraqeb, Idlib, on April 29th. One particularly unusual element of the attack was the delivery method, which was reportedly white grenades, as shown below
France had received samples from the scene of the attack which they claimed contained evidence of Sarin. Despite that, so many different details of the attack didn't make sense to me. From piecing together various pieces of evidence (which I detailed here) I discovered the method of attack was claimed to be two white grenades, placed inside a breeze/cinder-block (the remains of which can be see here), which was then dropped from a helicopter, with the grenades apparently producing smoke as they fell. This didn't seem to make sense if it was a Sarin attack; the grenades would have produced heat while producing smoke, and as Sarin is heat-sensitive it would have degrading the Sarin; the scale of the attack was tiny on areas with no obvious military value; and all-in-all it seemed like the most inefficient, awkward, and potentially self-endangering way of using Sarin.
In fact, I would have almost have dismissed the attack if it wasn't for another alleged Sarin attack two weeks earlier in Sheikh Maqsoud, Aleppo. Again, there were reports of grenades dropped from helicopters, a small number of causalities, and photographs showing the same type of white grenade surrounded by the remains of what appears to be a disintegrated breeze/cinder-block.
After that the trail went cold, with no more attacks using this unusual method reported, and I was inclined to think that the attacks were possibly not Sarin at all, but something else. It wasn't until the final UN report on the use of chemical weapons was published that the agent used in the attack was possibly identified. One victim of the Saraqeb was taken to Turkey, and her corpse was made available for testing to the investigation team. They discovered her organs had traces of Sarin in them, and this seemed to strongly point towards Sarin being used in Saraqeb. While the report had little to say on Sheikh Maqsoud attack, it seems not unreasonable to assume the same chemical agent was used.
The question is then, why? As I said before, the attacks were executed in a very unusual fashion, seemed capable of resulting in small numbers of causalities, and were on targets with no obvious military value. So the question remains, why did the Syrian military go to the risk of delivering Sarin in such a self-endangering and seemingly pointless manner?
4 - Qatar, Sudan, China, And Missiles
Croatian weapons weren't the only arms smuggled to the Syrian opposition in 2013. In February, a couple of months after the first sighting of Croatian weapons, Chinese FN-6 MANPADS (MAN Portable Air Defence Systems) started to appear in the east of the country
At the time it was unclear exactly where they had come from. It was considered highly unlikely that the Western powers involved in the conflict would sign off on MANPADS being supplied to a fractured opposition, so one theory was they came from an as yet unknown stock of weapons supplied to the Syrian government by China. However, several months later, the New York Times revealed Sudan had been selling the FN-6 MANPADS to Qatar, who had been supplying them to the opposition. In fact, it also appears other Chinese weapons havd been provided by Sudan to Qatar, including Chinese HJ-8E ATGMs (Anti-Tank Guided Missiles), M99 anti-materiel rifles, QLZ-87 automatic grenade launchers, and other weapons.
Much like the Croatian weapons smuggling, this goes to show that YouTube can be the starting point of investigations that can uncover all sorts of newsworthy information.
This analysis addresses the southeastern Otaibah and northeastern Adra offensives, which together constitute Phase I of the rebels’ “Battle of God is the Greatest and Most Honorable” in East Ghouta:
How far south and west did the rebels reach in the Otaibah offensive?
Which of the captured towns do they still hold?
What divides the Adra offensive from the Otaibah offensive?
On November 22nd, mainstream news outlets, including the Israeli newspaper Haaretz, reported fierce fighting in East Ghouta resulting in heavy casualties. On November 22nd, Haaretz reported “fierce fighting to the east of Damascus has killed more than 160 people in the past two days” (22nd-24th of November). In hindsight, this clearly signified the beginning of the Otaibah offensive - what we now know as Phase I. The Otaibah offensive was fought in the southeastern quadrant of East Ghouta and struck eastward from Al-Bilaliyah toward Otaibah.
On December 11th, the rebels launched another offensive in East Ghouta from the northeastern quadrant: the Adra offensive. The Adra offensive struck northeast from Duma toward Adra.
It should be noted that the situation in East Ghouta is clearly in flux. The battle lines change daily and the maps produced for this report should in no means be considered to be entirely accurate, though they do constitute a good representation of the general progress of the battle.
What is presented here is the evidence I have as of December 21st; it will of course be necessary to add corrections and update this analysis as the situation evolves and more data emerges.
The Otaibah Offensive and Government Counter-Offensive
The Otaibah offensive struck eastward from al Bilaliyah to Otaibah in southeastern East Ghouta. The official announcement of the completion of Phase I initially posted by @IslamArmy01 stated that Jund al Malah (Ahrah Ash-Sham, Jabhat al Nusra, Habib Mostapha, Shabab AlHoda, Katibat Issa ibn Mariam,) Jaysh al Islam and the Islamic Union of Sham Soldiers (Shabab al Hoda, Habibi Mostapha, Amjad al Islam, Al Sahaba, Dirii al Asima) collectively participated in the offensive.
Figure 2: Rebel
Announcement of Completion of 1st Phase of Offensive
As Joshua Landis writes, “No mention is made of the newly announced Islamic Front. In this major battle driving regime forces from a large part of the Ghouta Ahrar al-Sham, let by Hassan Aboud is identified with Jabhat al-Nusra, the al-Qaida affiliate. Jaysh al-Islam, which is led by Zahran Alloush is identified independently of Ahrar. This suggests that the Islamic Front alliance announced in November has not taken root, at least not yet.”
In the footage dump on December 16th, the rebels claim to have captured 40 square kilometers of East Ghouta (pretty accurate), killed 800 government soldiers (certainly inflated; the footage doesn’t show anywhere near that number, but heavy losses were definitely inflicted on government troops), destroyed 23 vehicles and captured 44 (once again, almost certainly inflated, but some government vehicles were destroyed and others were captured).
On November 24th, a National Defense Force video showed NDF forces attempting to push north from Harran al Awamid against the rebel positions in Qaysa.
Figure 4: NDF video from the town of Harran al Awamid
Harran al Awamid is located a few kilometers south of Qaysa. The report stated: “We are currently going in the direction of Bahariah. To support the SAA against the armed militants: takfiris. Military operations still continue. The military command assures the civilians are evacuated while they are sterilizing the area of terror. This group is on its way to Bahariah. We do of course have forces inside. We will reinforce them so we can repel the attack.”
On December 10th, SANA claimed to have regained control of Qaysa and to have ‘restored security and stability to it’, though there has been no visual evidence to support these claims. Considering the only primary evidence provided by the rebels was from the outskirts of the town, and that government claims to have retaken the town come from SANA, it can be concluded that the government has probably recaptured Qaysa.
Deir Salman, al-Qasimiyah, Abbadeh and Al-Bahariyah
On November 24th, Etilaf.org released a statement, entitled “FSA and Islamic Front Advance on Regime Forces in Eastern Ghouta,” which stated: “The Free Syrian Army and the Islamic Front captured the towns of Al-Bahariyah, Qasimiyah, Abbadeh and Deir Salman in Eastern Ghouta after fierce clashes with Assad Forces with reports of regime losses.” The statement further stated: “clashes are still going on in the town of Otaibah.”
Figure 5: Rebel Gains, December 5th
Deir Salman, دير سلمان
The rebels reportedly captured Deir Salman on November 22nd. Footage released in the December 16th footage dump showed the rebels celebrating at the center of Deir Salman as well as another clip showing a rebel tank and infantry destroying a government building. A further video shows rebels storming a government building as it burns.
Figure 6: Rebels Storm Government Building as it Burns
However on December 19th rebel pages reported a heavy government bombardment rocket and artillery bombardment. On December 20th government pages and Arab news outlets claimed that the town had been recaptured. Starting with Al Hadath News, then Slab News and Al Nour. An Al Manar reporter, Sonar Hatem, also made the same claim on Twitter. Visual evidence has not yet been provided of these claims, but they were consistently carried in news outlets and on pro-government social media pages.
Until more evidence emerges, the situation in Deir Salman should be considered to be in flux, but it is very possible that the government has regained the town.
Jarba, قرية الجربا
Jarba, located northeast of Al-Qasimiyah, was another town reported captured on November 24th.
On December 3rd, in an exception to the media blackout, the rebels released a short video showing their presence in Jarba outside a damaged mosque. On December 16th, this was confirmed with the release of footage of the rebels celebrating in Jarba. The local Facebook page is inactive, but there have been no government counter-claims of retaking the town. It is therefore likely, once again, that the rebels still hold the town as of December 21st.
Al-Bahariyah, البحارية
Located slightly north of Jarba is Al-Bahariyah. The rebels initially reported on November 22nd to have captured the town, which can now be tentatively confirmed with footage available. Other footage released mid-December shows the rebels fighting in the town with tanks and another clips shows captured government positions. There are no government counter-claims to have recaptured the city. So it is likely that the rebels still control the town as of December 21st.
On December 7th, the government claimed to have ‘confront(ed) terrorists’ in Abbadeh, but there have been no claims of the town being fully recaptured from the government. Yet again it can be concluded that the rebels are still in control of the town of Abbadeh.
Otaibah, قرية العتيبة
The furthest eastern extent of the Otaibah offensive seems to have been when the rebels briefly entered the western outskirts of the town of Otaibah. Otaibah is located here.
Figure 7: Rebels at the Junction northeast of Otaibah
Soon after, SANA news agency reported that the army had “restored security and stability to al-Eteibeh area and its surrounding in eastern Ghouta in Damascus countryside after eliminating an armed terrorist group that infiltrated the area few days ago.” In conjunction with this claim, the NDF released a video showing them inside Otaibah. Evidently the government has regained control of Otaibah.
The Curious Case of Mayda’a, ميدعا
Sitting north of Al-Bahariya and south of a government base, Brigade 39, is the town of Mayda’a. On October 19th, Fars News reported, “The source underlined that only Meyda’a region has remained to be cleaned up of militants, adding that the only supply route to the rebels in Eastern Ghouta now passes through this region.” The claim that the rebels had a supply route through Mayda’a is unverifiable elsewhere, but it can be evidenced that the rebels held Mayda’a before the Otaibah. On September 15th the Sham News Network reported the government shelled the town. On September 28th the local LCC reported that the government launched an air strike on the town. On October 15th Sham News Network reported government shelling of the town. It is unlikely that the government was shelling its own positions, so it appears that the rebels had been in control of Mayda’a since early September, subsequently confirmed by a Damascus source. Taken in conjunction with the October 19th report, it would seem that the rebels held Mayda’a when they launched the Otaibah offensive. As there have been no reports of the government recapturing Mayda’a as of December 19th, it would appear that the rebels still hold Mayda’a.
Figure 8: Map of East Ghouta as of December 21st
Summary
During Phase I, as of early December, the rebels had captured Al Bilaliya, Deir Salman, Qasimiyah, Abbadeh and Al-Bahariyah in full and parts of Otaibah and Qaysa. Since then, it is likely that the government has recaptured the Otaibah outskirts it lost, as well as Deir Salman and the parts of Qaysa that the rebels briefly took.
It can be tentatively concluded that currently the southern line of this Otaibah front runs along the southern tips of Al Bhilaliyah to Qasimiyah and then Abbadeh. The western front sits at the west of Abbadeh and runs vertically upwards along the western portions of Jarba, Al Bahariyah and Mayda’a. Sitting above Mayda’a, the government base, Brigade 39, severs the Otaibah front from the Adra Front.
The Adra Offensive
What is the situation in Adra?
On December 11th, the rebels launched an offensive on Adra. A week after the December 5th rebel claim from Otaibah, rebel activists claimed the Adra offensive represents the latter part of the Phase I offensive in East Ghouta. The Adra offensive appears to have been launched from the direction of Duma, the northeastern-most city in the rebel Ghouta pocket. On December 13th, pro-government activist Syrian Perspective created a map showing the rebels having made gains up to Baghdad Bridge to the northwest, Aard al Jullah to the north and As Safariyah town to the southeast of Adra.
On December 12th Lorientle Journal reported that the Syrian government had launched a counter-offensive. The key for the government was reestablishing control of the main road leading out of Damascus. There was, and continues to be, heavy fighting in the area. The Adra offensive seems to be a much bigger concern to the government than the Otaibah offensive.
While the situation is clearly in flux, the government does seem to be making inroads to rebel gains; however, so far, the rebels continue to hold the center of Adra.
Summary
The Otaibah front struck southeast from Al-Bilaliyah to the outskirts of Otaibah with the initial offensive taking seven towns. The offensive has opened up a broader front in southeastern Ghouta for the rebels to potentially access from the outside with supplies (precariously). The government has counter-attacked taking the outskirts of Otaibah and possibly the towns of both Deir Salman and Qaysa.
Was Phase I a decisive victory for the rebels?
It is a hard question to answer as it remains unclear exactly what is going on; opinions differ depending on whom you ask. Clearly the rebels captured a considerable area including at least seven towns, inflicting losses some degree of government losses and securing a substantial amount of government armor.
But did the rebels break a clear corridor through the siege?
No.
Certainly their southeastern front is now broader and more accessible than it was before Phase I, but the government’s recapture of the towns of Qaysa, Deir Salman and parts of Otaibah, combined with their string of air defense and army bases to the east of East Ghouta mean that rebels still have very little free movement. Evidently the rebels’ failure to secure Otaibah in full and the government success in retaking the parts lost dampens the rebels’ elation after Phase I. However it is clear that overall the rebels gained more than they lost in this offensive and certainly improved their situation if compared to the situation prior to Phase I. The rebels have clearly improved their situation in East Ghouta significantly ahead of the Geneva II Peace Conference, not that any of the groups participating in these offensives have committed to attend.
As for the Adra offensive, it is too early to predict the results. The government’s swift counter-offensive has enjoyed some significant success. If the RT reports are true and the rebel supply lines from Duma have been severed, this would not bode well for the rebels left in a small pocket in Adra. It should be noted that the Adra counter-offensive seems to have received a much more concentrated counter-effort from the government than Otaibah. That said, the rebels still hold most of Adra and show no signs of retreating. Both sides claim heavy losses.
On December 21st very unconfirmed reports began to circulate from jihadist accounts that the rebels had begun Phase II in Damascus, titled “Enter the Door.”
