New Key Evidence In Understanding The August 21st Sarin Attack

Yesterday, a video was published online by the website Al-hadath News showing the type of munition used in the August 21st Sarin attack being launched from Qadam Railway Station

There's two minor points to note about this video, and one major point.  At the start of the video, the cameraman describes the weapon as a "Volcano rocket".  As I noted earlier this week, the "Volcano rocket" is a named used for both this weapon, and smaller IRAM-type weapons used by government forces.  It seems now, we finally have a name for this weapon.

The other minor point is about the flag on the truck.  It's not a great shot of the flag, but some people have noted the white circle on a black background looks a lot like the flag used by various Jihadist groups in Syria.  As this photograph of the National Defence Force shows, it's not just Jihadists who use that particular colour scheme

Those are both minor points, but what's extremely unique and important about this video is it shows the impact of the rocket followed by the sound of the explosion.  The detonation is at around 17.5s, and the noise of the explosion can be heard around 23.5s, so that's a delay of around 6 seconds.  The speed of sound at around the altitude is around 337 m/s, so that would mean the range of the munition is around 2022 meters.

I showed this video to Richard Lloyd, who has been studying the munitions used in the August 21st Sarin attack closely, and based on the available evidence, he concluded that the munition was launched at around a 21 degree angle, with a range of around 2.1km.  That reminded me of another video showing the launch and impact of a Volcano, this time fired from Mezzeh airbase

While the impact isn't visible, it appears the flight time is around 20-22 seconds, several seconds longer than the other video.  Richard Lloyd believes that the longer flight time would point to a higher angle of launch, and a longer range.  Based off the two videos Richard Lloyd believes a range of 2-2.5km is reasonable for the Volcano rocket.  That's not to say the maximum range is definitely 2.5km, just that based of available evidence that's a reasonable estimation.

Thank to the UN report we have an idea of the direction the rockets came from, and a recent Al Jazeera Arabic documentary about the August 21st attack might even provide more information

In the film they present what they claim is more evidence from the attack, including two previously unseen Volcano rockets (bringing the total recorded to 8), and what they claim is the azimuths for those two rockets

With the UN report, that's three azimuths, 285, 290, and 307 degrees.  We also know the exact impact location of two of the Volcanoes used in the attack (details here and here).  Given that information, I've put together a map that shows the possible area of origin for the attack based of the possible ranges (click to expand)

What's interesting about this range and the azimuth, is it puts the possibly launch locations inside an area that was part of the Syrian Army's "Operation Qaboun", which was heavily covered by ANNA News.  Their first video was posted on June 24th, with the last video posted on August 20th.  It covered the attempts by the Syrian army to fight their way through a district between Qaboun and Jobar, which would act as a staging point for attacks later on in the year.  Videos posted by ANNA News establish that the Syrian military were operating, and based, inside that area, for example this video from August 5th showing at the bus station to the east of the area

At 1:54 in the below video, filmed on August 10th, you can see the mosque just west of the tank base in the area

Open Source IMINT took a very detailed look at videos posted by ANNA News showing fighting in the area from September onwards, and it shows that region now being used to launch attacks both to the north and the south

After the August 21st attack Storyful collected data on various claims about the impact locations of rockets used in the attack, including the claims by the local LCCs about the impact locations of each rocket.  All the positions were plotted onto a map, with the impact locations reported by the LCC marked in light blue.  According to that map, all the impact locations are within 2.5km of the area controlled by the Syrian army.

So from all this information we can conclude that the Syrian military would have been capable of launching the August 21st Sarin attack, despite the short range of the Volcano rockets.

You can contact the author on Twitter @brown_moses or by email at brownmoses@gmail.com

A Detailed Examination Of The Range Of Munitions Used In The August 21st Sarin Attack

Thanks to John Minthorne, who has put together this detailed analysis of the range of one munition type used in the August 21st Sarin attack.  John Minthorne is a professional mechanical engineer with around seven years relevant experience.  His relevant experience includes process system design, project management, feasibility and conceptual studies, and computational fluid flow modelling.  The original report and associated files can be found here.

UMLACA Maximum Range Analysis

Abstract

This report attempts to establish, with a minimal level of rigor, the maximum range that can be assigned to the 330mm-class chemical rocket (the "unidentified munition linked to alleged chemical attacks [UMLACA]) used in the August 21, 2013 attacks on Ghouta, Syria. The report is based on public information including United Nations reports, NGO publications, amateur video & photography of the remains of the weapons, public weather data. In particular, this goal of this report is to determine whether this model of rocket could have been launched from the Syrian Army Republican Guard "base 104", approximately 9.5 km west of the impact sites.

Background

In the early morning of August 21, 2013, the Ghouta residential suburb of Damascus, Syria was struck by a rocket attack that killed hundreds. Representatives of the Syrian Army and rebel forces were quick to blame one another for the attack, and international observer countries including France, the United Kingdom, Russia, and the United States made official but predictable statements  blaming the "opposite side".

In mid-September, Human Rights Watch (HRW) and the United Nations (Sellström) released reports that confirmed the August 21st attack did make use of Sarin. Consistent with the UN Mission's charter, the Sellström report did not assign blame for the attacks. The report did, however, note the azimuth of the ballistic trajectories of two of the munitions used, including a UMLACA that impacted Ein Tarma. The Human Rights Watch, along with several news organizations, noted the the trajectory azimuths intersect deep in Syrian government-held territory, specifically the Republican Guard 104th Brigade military base.

However, this information is only meaningfully damning to the Syrian government if the UMLACA is capable of being fired approximately 9.5 km from the Republican Guard base to the impact site. Much of the flight path less than 8 km from the impact site is identified by Human Rights Watch as "contested" at the time of the launch (Lyons).

Whoghouta.blogspot analysis

One organization to estimate the maximum range of the UMLACA is whoghouta.blogspot.com (sasa wawa). This analysis reported in a maximum plausible range of 3.5 km and concluded that the rockets could not have been launched from the Republican Guard base. This analysis was qualitatively reviewed, and in the opinion of this author the analysis contains a number important flaws. Some of the more significant errors include:

• Assuming very short burn times (and wrongly stating that such an assumption is conservative). Drag increases as a function of more than the square of the velocity, and as a result the thrust of the rocket motor over time is a crucial consideration.
• Using hobby rocketry engines as the basis of design. By extension, underestimating the propellant mass and specific impulse.
• Miscalculating the center of drag, severely underestimating the rocket's stability.
• Failure to consider wind direction, elevation above sea level, or air temperature.

Summary of available information

Information for this report was gleaned from publicly available information:

• Published photographs and diagrams based on those photographs, by Human Rights Watch.
• Field measurements and photographs taken by the United Nations Mission.

Assumptions

• Secondary sources of ballistic error such as Coriolis forces are ignored.
• Additional assumptions are listed in the relevant sections of this study.

UMLACA Physical Properties

Propellant Mass

The total impulse of the UMLACA rocket motor is limited by the propellant selected and the volume of propellant used. Since the purpose of this study is to evaluate whether a 9.5 km travel distance can be ruled out, each physical assumption is listed as a range between which the actual values for the UMLACA likely fall.

The total length of the UMLACA is about 2200 mm. Some portion of the nose section is filled with a bursting charge and detonator, so the maximum length of the solid fuel volume is assumed to be 2000 mm. The UN report implies that the motor section may be as short as 1340 mm, so a more pessimistic assumption incorporating a void space inside the weapon's warhead would be a fueled length of 1300 mm.

The external diameter of the UMLACA is 120 mm. Assuming a robust, wall thickness consistent with standard weight pipe, an internal diameter of 110 mm is used. This results in a volume range of between 0.0124 and 0.0190 m3.

The density of high-performance solid propellants varies between 1.6 and 1.86 kg/L (Zandbergen). Applying this value range to the fuel volume range, the rocket's propellant mass is found to be between 19.8 and 35.34 kg.

Specific and Total Impulse

The specific impulse of a rocket motor will have a profound effect on its performance. As a motor becomes more efficient, it can increase the final velocity of a rocket exponentially higher. This effect is more muted in a subsonic or transonic rocket than in an orbital or sounding launch vehicle, however. Military propellants have specific impulses in the range of 210 to 260 s (2060 – 2550 N*s/kg) (Zandbergen). Multiplying this range by the propellant mass gives us a total impulse for the UMLACA of 40800 to 90100 N*s.

Maximum Thrust

Gases escape a rocket nozzle in a predicable fashion. The fluid flow velocity through the nozzle throat is Mach 1, such that the total thrust generated by a rocket motor varies roughly proportionally to both the chamber pressure and throat area (Platzek). Unfortunately, no information appears to be publicly available documenting the precise the throat area of the rocket motor. The Human Rights Watch report contains one photograph of the rear of the motor and a tape measure, allowing estimation of the nozzle throat to be very roughly 50 mm. Assuming a chamber pressure of 7 MPa, this would equate with a maximum thrust of around 22 kN. Given the very large amount of uncertainty on this number, no conclusions can be drawn from this. It is simply noted that the estimated maximum possible thrust is within an order of magnitude of the thrust a designer would desire for this weapon.

Thrust Characteristics

A solid-fuel rocket has a practical maximum burn time – the regression rate of propellant is lowest in a solid grain geometry, but is still non-zero. Regression rates for typical high-performance propellants vary from 5 to 25 mm/s (Zandbergen), corresponding to a theoretical maximum burn time of 80 s to 400 s for a 2 meter, solid grain rocket motor. The longest total burn time considered in this study was 45 s, well within the realm of feasible achievability.

The amount of thrust a solid-fuel rocket provides over the course of its burn broadly customizable by changing the chemistry and structure of the rocket grain. For a rocket with no lift and poor drag characteristics such as the UMLACA, maximum range will be achieved with a short, high thrust initial impulse followed by a long, low thrust burn to sustain velocity at low transonic speed (~0.7M or 240 m/s). A thrust/time profile of this shape is both achievable and commonly found in military rockets (Platzek).

Environmental Considerations

Wind

A rocket spends a significant amount of time in flight. In evaluating the maximum distance a rocket may travel, the velocity of the wind encountered must be considered. At 2:00 AM on the morning of the attack, the wind at Damascus International Airport was blowing from the WSW (about 248°) at a sustained speed of 6.9 miles per hour (3.1 m/s) and increasing (Weather Underground). Wind speed is typically higher a significant distance above the ground; for the purposes of this analysis the wind velocity is assumed to be an average of 4 m/s from 248° (37° from a pure tailwind from the rocket trajectory of 285°. Correspondingly, a rocket azimuth of 143° relative to a 4 m/s wind was used in the OpenRocket software trajectory models. For ~60 s long flights, this adds a few hundred meters to the range. If meteorological information shows that higher-altitude tailwinds were present, this could increase the maximum range by a high single-digit percentage.

Atmospheric density

Aerodynamic drag is proportional to the density of the fluid through which the projectile travels. The temperature in Damascus at 2:00 AM on the morning of the attack was about 73°F (22.7°C) – if a standard atmospheric temperature of 15° is assumed, drag will be overstated by about 2.8%. The elevation of the targeted area in Ghouta is about 760 meters above sea level – if sea level elevation is assumed, drag will be overstated by about 9.5%. Since the temperature profile of the atmosphere above Damascus is not known, trajectory models assumed a standard atmospheric temperature and a launch elevation of 760 m above sea level.

Relative elevations

A projectile on a nominally parabolic trajectory will travel a greater distance if its impact location is of lower elevation than if it flies over a flat plain. The topography of northern Damascus is dominated by Mount Qasioun, a 1151 meter high peak. The areas of Ghouta targeted are lower, around 760 meters above sea level. Since the rocket attack was obviously not launched from the peak of Qasioun, the actual difference in elevation was less than 400 meters. This difference in elevation is not considered in these range calculations, since the actual launch elevation is not precisely alleged. This means that the maximum ranges shown are conservative by a small degree (probably 0.1-0.2 km) due to the relative elevations of the launch and impact sites.

Maximum Range Calculation

Physical Rocket Model

A model of the UMLACA and derivative UMLACA with a more aerodynamic nose cone were created in the Open Rocket program. Both models were modified from a model downloaded from the whoghouta.blogspot web site. The models are described in the two tables below; dimensions are in mm, roughnesses are in um, and masses are in kg (unless noted otherwise).

Drag Modifications

Any designer tasked with extending the range of the UMLACA would immediately consider improvements to the rocket's drag. With a Cd of about 1.0, the rocket's drag is several times the value to which it could be reduced with relatively superficial modifications. The nearly blunt front of the rocket generates about 80% of the subsonic total drag.

The UN and HRW reports both sketch the UMLACA with a completely blunt end, but the least is known about the front portion of the rocket because it is damaged upon use by the bursting charge and subsequent impact with the ground. The front plate includes six threaded holes which could be used to attach a light-weight aerodynamic nose cone. As such, the possibility that rockets fitted with nose cones were used on August 21 cannot be ruled out. Since addition of an aerodynamic nose dramatically changes the maximum range of the UMLACA, maximum ranges were established both with and without the aerodynamic nose cone.

Rocket Motor Design

Six hypothetical rocket motors were evaluated, three per drag condition of the UMLACA. All utilized an initial boost phase to accelerate the rocket to about 0.7M (240 m/s), followed by a lower sustainer thrust to maintain flight speed. Two used total impulses of 40800 N*s, the lower end of the estimated motor impulse. The remaining motors used the higher end of the estimated impulse, about 90100 N*s. The full .eng data for each motor can be found here.

Software Limitations

For convenience, this study matched the "whoghouta" blog's selection of Open Rocket as the software to simulate the UMLACA trajectory. The UMLACA is several times larger than a typical large single-stage hobby rocket, and its characteristic geometry likely challenges the software in ways that were not the focus of its development.

Simplification of Fin Layout

The Open Rocket software does not support modelling of a circumferential band around the perimeter of the tail fins. This band is parallel to the air stream, generating significant drag as well as contributing to the stability of the rocket. To model the ring's contribution to drag and efficiency, the fin height was increased from the actual dimension of 95 mm to 135.6 mm, replicating the total fin material area of 0.179 m2.

In addition, the enclosed nature of the air stream through the fin assembly may create directional flow effects more pronounced than a more simple fin arrangement. Study of the airflow through this fin assembly is an excellent candidate for further study of the UMLACA's aerodynamics.

Transonic and Supersonic Drag Performance

The UMLACA is likely but not certainly an exclusively subsonic weapon. The coefficient of drag of an object in a fluid flow stream is not constant; it changes with velocity. At about M0.8 the Cd beins to increase, peaking locally at M1.0 and dropping to an intermediate value for low supersonic values (Heinrich). The Open Rocket software attempts to model these changes in Cd, but for a rocket with such an unusual shape as the UMLACA it is likely that the modelled transonic behaviour is not fully accurate.

Results

For the UMLACA without drag-reducing features, the maximum distance travelled was about 6.5 km, for the UMLACA4 motor curve at a launch angle of 43° from vertical. Maximum distance travelled using a 41 kN*s motor was about 3.3 km.

If the UMLACA weapons used in the August 21st attacked had aerodynamic nose cones, their maximum range could be in excess of 15 km. With a range of 15 km, the UMLACA5 motor curve did not produce the greatest travel distance but its lower average thrust kept the more streamlined rocket at transonic speed (increasing confidence that the simulation is accurate).

Conclusions

• The rocket with a blunt nose has mediocre drag characteristics. A designer seeking to maximize the weapon's range could add a nose cone to the weapon, which would greatly reduce the drag coefficient and increase the range. The presence of threaded holes on the front plate of the rocket could be an indication that this was, in fact, done.
• The rocket is aerodynamically stable and unlikely to tumble or excessively oscillate in flight.
• The publicly available information on the UMLACA (particularly the chemical variant) leaves a large margin of doubt as to the rocket's range and flight characteristics.
• On the basis of the publicly available information referenced in this report, an attack from the Republican Guard 104th Brigade base cannot be ruled out as implausible.
• The maximum range of the UMLACA is probably between 3.3 km and 6.5 km, increasing to 15 km if a nose cone were installed.

Things That Are Not True - Only Rebels Use Weapons Mounted On Trucks With Non-Military Colours

One claim that's been constantly repeated by people attempting to prove the Syrian military was not responsible for the August 21st Sarin attack is that the Syrian military would never use trucks with non-military colours.  This claim is a response to the following videos and pictures, that appears to show the same type of munition linked to the August 21st Sarin attack being launched.  As always, it should be noted that the type of munition used has at least two variants, and possible a third, larger, high explosive variant

These photographs and videos from Damascus and Aleppo claim to show the Syrian army using these truck mounted weapons, but the argument has been that these are clearly non-military vehicles, something only the Syrian opposition uses.  While it's true the Syrian opposition mounts plenty of different weapons on trucks of various shapes and sizes, it's certainly not true that only the Syrian opposition uses non-military trucks in this way.  The following video is from a missile test in the Summer of 2012, where a variety of missiles and rockets were launched from the 155th brigade base

As we can see in the video, there's clearly trucks with non-military colour schemes being used to launch large rockets or missiles

The same missile test was also broadcast on State TV, with images of the same vehicles

So it's pretty clear the claim that only the Syrian opposition uses trucks with non-military colours is an inaccurate statement.  In fact, it's not that unusual, as these photos from an Iranian military parade shows (source)

More posted on the subject of the August 21st attacks can be found here, and other posts on chemical weapons and Syria, including extremely informative interviews with chemical weapon specialists, can be found here.

You can contact the author on Twitter @brown_moses or by email at brownmoses@gmail.com.

A Chemical Weapons Expert Responds To The Article "Questions Plague UN Report on Syria"

Earlier this week an article was published by Al Akhbar, Questions Plague UN Report on Syria, making a number of claims about the UN report, including "There is not a single environmental sample in Moadamiyah that tested positive for Sarin." and "It is scientifically improbable that survivors would test that highly for exposure to Sarin without a single trace of environmental evidence testing positive for the chemical agent.".  This is then used to claim that the 140mm artillery rockets fired at Moadamiyah were not carrying Sarin, as widely reported, and that the trajectory of these rockets, as per the UN report, which crosses over with the trajectory of other rockets fired at Eastern Ghouta over the Syrian army’s Republican Guard 104th Brigade base, is indicative of nothing, as the munitions did not contain Sarin.

One of the chemical weapon experts quoted in the article is Dan Kaszeta, who has responded to the article with a FAQ he's published online.

Q: The article claims "not a single environmental sample in Moadamiyah that tested positive for Sarin." - What is your reaction to this?

I consider this statement to be a misleading half-truth that “cherry picks” from the UN report. It is true in respect to the fact that no actual Sarin was found in the 13 environmental samples taken from Moadamiyah. But the samples show DIMP, IMPA, and MPA, all of which are strong indicators of Sarin. The environmental samples are clear indicators that Sarin was used because of the clear presence of chemicals that are clearly decomposition products (IMPA, MPA) and impurities (DIMP), all of which persist longer in the environment than Sarin itself.

There are several plausible reasons why the UN team did not collect a sample of actual Sarin at the Moadamiyah. Any or all of the following explanatory or contributory factors may have applied to this circumstance:

• The 140mm rocket alleged to have been used in Moadamiyah is patently smaller than the devices used elsewhere. Therefore, there it would carry far less chemical agent than larger devices. There may have been less Sarin to find at each individual site where the 140mm rocket was used.
• The UN report states that they did not find the actual warhead. Their photos are of the rocket section, not the agent-carrying portion of the rocket.
• The lack of a payload-carrying section indicates to me that the explosive bursting charge of the rocket functioned as intended. The US Army used approximately a 3.3:1 ratio by weight of Sarin to conventional explosive in the US’s closest analogue to the 140mm rocket, the M55 115mm rocket. As a Soviet-designed 140mm rocket carried approx. 2.2 kg of Sarin, a comparable ratio would indicate an explosive charge of 650-700 grams of explosive. From my own direct experience with explosives in my military and law enforcement training, such a quantity would shred the rocket’s warhead section into small fragments. As metal fragments are a likely place to collect a Sarin sample, the fragments at Moadamiyah may have been too small to locate or indeed too small to contain an effective sample of the agent.
• A fully effective and efficient explosive dissemination of a 140mm rocket carrying Sarin would create an aerosol of finely divided droplets, with little or no pooling or puddles of Sarin, making it harder to find a trace of actual Sarin. This factor presumes that the munition efficiency (the percentage of Sarin dispensed as an aerosol to create rapid effects) of the 140mm rocket is higher than that of the larger system used elsewhere. Based on my knowledge of chemical weapons design, I believe this to be the case.
• If the location in Moadamiyah under investigation had been exposure to more ventilation, more moisture, or both, the evaporation and degradation of Sarin would have been increased relative to other locations. With the information available to me, I cannot know whether this was the case or not.

Q: The same article claims "It is scientifically improbable that survivors would test that highly for exposure to Sarin without a single trace of environmental evidence testing positive for the chemical agent." How do you answer this question?

This is an untrue statement unsupported by the facts. The statement appears to betray an ignorance of the relationship of Sarin to its degradation products. As I state above Sarin degrades into IMPA and/or MPFA. IMPA is a direct daughter compound of Sarin.

Q: The article also states that sarin can last "for months, sometimes years in the environment." Could you clarify the situation where that would be the case?

The persistence (or not) of Sarin in the environment depends on numerous variables.  The fate of Sarin in the environment is effected by evaporation, hydrolysis, and thermal decomposition. I will address each in turn:

• Evaporation. Sarin has a non-trivial vapor pressure and a relatively low “latent heat of vaporization” (the energy required to go from liquid state to vapor state) at normal temperatures. Therefore, Sarin is a volatile liquid, and it will evaporate into the air if given the chance to do so. In open contact with the air, Sarin liquid cannot be expected to last for more than a few hours. 30 minutes at 15º C is stated by one German authority. In situation where the liquid Sarin is trapped and not exposed to air, it may persist for some time. 
• Hydrolyis. Sarin will decompose into IMPA or MPFA in contact with moisture.  Sarin not in contact with moisture, such as humidity in the air or soil, will last longer.
• Thermal decomposition. Sarin thermally decomposes rapidly above 150º C.

Sarin without direct contact with air or water or extreme heat simply has less means to evaporate or degrade. Sarin trapped in a way where it has no access to air or water will significantly increase its persistence in the environment. In addition, liquid Sarin absorbs into some surfaces. I find samples 27 and 28 particularly revealing, as they are from window seals/gaskets. This is exactly where I would look for Sarin.

Q: Would you agree with the UN's claim on page 5 of the report that "The environmental, chemical and medical samples we have collected provide clear and compelling evidence that surface-to-surface rockets containing the nerve agent Sarin were used in Ein Tarma, Moadamiyah and Zamalka in the Ghouta area of Damascus."?

Yes. I believe that the environmental samples are conclusive. The medical evidence is somewhat less conclusive in my mind, but only because the methodology by which the samples were analyzed is not clearly stated.

Q: Considering the evidence in the UN report, do you agree with the articles conclusion that the 140mm artillery rockets fired at Moadamiyah did not contain Sarin?

I do not agree with this conclusion. I can think of no other reason to account for the presence of DIMP and IMPA at the scene.

Q: The article quotes you as saying "environmental and medical evidence cannot conceivably be considered a scientifically or statistically accurate sample of the population of affected victims. It would be considered scientifically unsound to draw widespread conclusions based simply on this sample." Could you expand on what you mean here?

The only point I am making with that statement is that the sample population of 36 individuals is too small to be considered statistically adequate to represent the entire population of thousands of people affected by the attacks. It is just too small a slice of the theoretical data set to allow one to draw widespread conclusions about the whole incident. A statistician could shed more light on the science behind this, as it has been over 20 years since my last statistics class.

My statement should not be taken to mean that we cannot learn from the data collected on the 36 people. Nor should my original statement be taken as a statement that I do not believe Sarin was used. As I state in my earlier report, I firmly believe Sarin was used, based on the evidence of the UN Report. My statement just means we can’t apply those particular findings based on 36 people to the broader population of many thousands with any expectation of accuracy.

Q: The same article also highlights you're concerns over the mixture of symptoms not matching that of past sarin attacks; "Is it possible that we are looking at exposure to multiple causes of injury? Were some of the examined victims exposed to other things in addition to Sarin? I am not stating that Sarin was not used. It clearly was. My point is that it is either not behaving as we have understood it in the past or that other factors were at work in addition to Sarin" Could you expand on that point?

The point I was trying to make is as follows: One logical explanation behind the diverse and variegated signs and symptoms noted in the report may be the fact that we are looking at exposure to more than one thing. In simpler terms, did other chemicals cause injury in addition to Sarin.

There are numerous ways in which this could be the case. One possibility is widespread presence of smoke and other respiratory irritants. One theory I would like to explore is binary chemical weapons.

A binary chemical weapon is one that combines several components to create the chemical agent desired, generally by mixing the two chemicals in flight on the way to the target. Both the US and Soviet Union developed this technique during the Cold War.  For example, a binary weapon could create Sarin. One excellent example of this was  the M687 artillery shell developed by the US Army.  The M687 was designed to  combine two canisters mid flight after being fired from a 155mm howitzer. One canister  contained DF (Methylphosphonic difluoride – see above) while the other canister contained a mix of isopropyl alcohol and isopropyl amine. The two canisters would mix  to create Sarin. The actual success of inflight mixing was very difficult to achieve and was the result of much research, development, and test firing both with simulant chemicals and live agents.

My theory is that the larger 330-360mm rocket may have been designed as a binary agent to combine chemicals to create Sarin. However, the ‘dark art’ of perfecting the inflight mixing may not have been learned by its designers. In such a case, the device would disseminate a mix of chemicals upon impact or detonation. Some Sarin would be created, but an awful lot of precursors would be present. None of these precursors are pleasant substances and their general proclivity to cause respiratory and eye irritation could explain the relatively ubiquitous but generic respiratory and eye symptoms. In addition, the presence of MPFA at the locations tied to the larger rocket, but not the smaller rocket, could support this theory. This is because MPFA is a direct decomposition product of DF, the Sarin binary component.

Q: Wouldn’t the attackers just mix up the chemicals, THEN pour them into the rocket?

There’s no theoretical reason why that couldn’t happen. It’s just that it seems a dim idea to do it that way. Taking dangerous chemicals and mixing them in open air to create an even more dangerous chemical, which would evaporate and cause a downwind hazard seems like a difficult thing to get soldiers to do, and that’s speaking in my capacity as a former Chemical Corps Officer. Anyone forced to do do would probably rush and make mistakes or do a poor job of it. Mixing binary components before putting them both in the weapon would negate all of the advantages of having a binary weapon in the first place. Using pure, unitary agent would achieve much higher efficiency at the same or lower (non-trivial) level of danger to the troops handling the agent. I see little point in a binary system that isn’t an in-flight mixing technique.

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All these questions and more can be found on Dan Kaszeta's FAQ.

More posted on the subject of the August 21st attacks can be found here, and other posts on chemical weapons and Syria, including extremely informative interviews with chemical weapon specialists, can be found here.

You can contact the author on Twitter @brown_moses or by email at brownmoses@gmail.com.

Evidence Of The Syrian Army Using Munitions Linked To The August 21st Sarin Attack

Since the UN report into the August 21st sarin attack confirmed the use of a previously unknown munition in the attack, which I had previously named the UMLACA (more details here), there's been a lot of debate about whether or not the Syrian army has such a munition.  There's been multiple videos of the munitions posted online by the Syrian opposition, and they've been consistently described as being fired by Syrian government forces.  From those videos, I've been able to identify at least two types of these munitions, one type linked to the August 21st sarin attack and past alleged chemical attacks, and a second, high explosive, type.

The following video from Daraya, Damascus, published on Decemeber 29th 2012, was highlighted by @hesbol on a blog post attempting to discern the range of the UMLACA.  It shows what seems to be a high explosive version of the UMLACA being launched and detonating

As the camera tracks the flight of the UMLACA it's very distinct outline can be clearly seen

In the video it's claimed that the munitions are fired from Mezzeh airbase, and it's actually possible to confirm they are coming from the direction of Mezzeh airbase.  At the start of the video we see the launch, and the outline of the hills behind it.

Using Google Earth we can position the virtual camera facing north from Daraya, looking towards Mezzeh airbase, and it's clear the topography matches what we see in the video

The structure at the top of the hill is the HQ of Maher al-Assad's 4th division, which can be seen here on Wikimapia.  A report from the Institute for the Study of War examining the situation in Damascus in December 2012, shows that the area north of Daraya, including Mezzeh airbase, and the 4th division terrain to the north, were under the control of the Syrian army, and it seems, from what we can see in the above video, that the UMLACA was fired by Syrian government forces.  This not only shows the Syrian army have been using the munitions, but they've been using them since December 2012.

More posted on the subject of the August 21st attacks can be found here, and other posts on chemical weapons and Syria, including extremely informative interviews with chemical weapon specialists, can be found here.

You can contact the author on Twitter @brown_moses or by email at brownmoses@gmail.com.

Statement By Dale Gavlak On The Mint Press Article "Syrians In Ghouta Claim Saudi-Supplied Rebels Behind Chemical Attack"

One article that has become a regular feature in the debate on who was responsible for the August 21st sarin attack in Damascus is "Syrians In Ghouta Claim Saudi-Supplied Rebels Behind Chemical Attack", published on the Mint Press website, with Dale Gavlak and Yahya Ababneh on the byline.

Dale Gavlak has now sent me the following statement about the article.

Mint Press News incorrectly used my byline for an article it published on August 29, 2013 alleging chemical weapons usage by Syrian rebels. Despite my repeated requests, made directly and through legal counsel, they have not been willing to issue a retraction stating that I was not the author. Yahya Ababneh is the sole reporter and author of the Mint Press News piece.   To date, Mint Press News has refused to act professionally or honestly in regards to disclosing the actual authorship and sources for this story.

I did not travel to Syria, have any discussions with Syrian rebels, or do any other reporting on which the article is based.  The article is not based on my personal observations and should not be given credence based on my journalistic reputation. Also, it is false and misleading to attribute comments made in the story as if they were my own statements.

Dale Gavlak contacted me using an email address used in previous correspondence, relating to this article.

More posted on the subject of the August 21st attacks can be found here, and other posts on chemical weapons and Syria, including extremely informative interviews with chemical weapon specialists, can be found here.

You can contact the author on Twitter @brown_moses or by email at brownmoses@gmail.com.

Syria's Sarin Attacks - Grasping At 140mm Straws (And Why Size Matters)

Since the UN report into the sarin attacks on August 21st linked two munitions to the attack, there's been various claims made about who could have been responsible.  The New York Times summarises a number of key pieces of information that points towards the Syrian military being responsible here, and for my own part, I've stated I've never seen either of the munitions used, the M14 140mm artillery rocket, and the munition I named the UMLACA, in the hands of the Syrian opposition.

In response to that statement a number of people and organisations have claimed that the opposition actually does have 140mm rockets.  One example is from this piece from Press TV, 5 lies invented to spin UN report on Syria

Chemical weapons were delivered with munitions not used by rebels: This claim includes referencing "Syria watcher" Eliot Higgins also known as "Brown Moses," a UK-based armchair observer of the Syrian crisis who has been documenting weapons used throughout the conflict on his blog.
While Higgins explains these particularly larger diameter rockets (140mm and 330mm) have not been seen (by him) in the hands of terrorists operating within and along Syria's borders, older posts of his show rockets similar in construction and operation, but smaller, most certainly in the hands of the militants. 

Despite what the author may have been told in the past, size does matter, especially when it comes to IDing munitions.  He no doubts refers to the sort of videos now being used to prove the opposition have 140mm artillery rockets, and here's a couple of the examples I've been sent

These, and similar videos, have been cited by a number of people as evidence that the opposition could have launched 140mm rockets.  The problem with this theory is, neither of these are the types of launchers that could fire 140mm rockets.  The top video shows the Type-63 multiple rocket launcher, which launches 107mm rockets, and the bottom video shows the Croatian RAK-12 multiple rocket launcher, which fires 128mm rockets.  There's also been a number of DIY rocket launchers shown in opposition videos, but I've never seen evidence of 140mm rockets fired from those either.  One thing that would stand out right way about 140mm rockets is the number of nozzles on the rear of the rocket.  Unlike many other types of rockets, they have 10 nozzles, so they are pretty easy to spot.  Evidence may exist, and if it does I'd love to see it, but I've yet to see any.

So, to say the presence of 107mm and 128mm rockets in the opposition's arsenal means they also have 140mm rockets is deeply flawed logic.  It's also important to note that the BM-14 launcher looks quite different from the above launchers.  The main difference is four more barrels

Something that's pretty easy to spot.

I'd also highly recommend watching the following video, published before the report, discussing the munitions used, in particular the M14 140mm artillery rocket.

In particular I recommend watching the section on the "179" marking found on the remains in Damascus, from 6:18 onwards, which details it's origin in the former Soviet Union.  More details of the origin of the munitions in Siberia can be found here.

More posted on the subject of the August 21st attacks can be found here, and other posts on chemical weapons and Syria, including extremely informative interviews with chemical weapon specialists, can be found here.

You can contact the author on Twitter @brown_moses or by email at brownmoses@gmail.com.

An Examination Of Videos Claiming Liwa Al-Islam Were Responsible For the August 21st Sarin Attack

This is an updated version of an earlier post.

This morning I was sent an email directing me to links to 3 videos posted on LiveLeak.  The same videos were also posted on YouTube, with the following description

September 15. Kurdish Peshmerga killed three Syrian terrorists on border. They found cell phone in pocket. Night bombing video there. Terrorists on video wear gas masks. Video was shot August 21. One terrorist name it Storm operation.

The videos are shown below

LiveLeak

Transcript:

0:01 …….Assad’s dogs in Jobar by  two “Ababeel” rockets, Wednesday 21th August 2013. 

0:04 (someone else) Go back Abu Muhammad (a nickname) 

LiveLeak

Transcript:

0:01 …….Assad’s Shabeeha in Qaboun neighborhood August 21th 2013 by Ababeel rocket 

LiveLeak

Transcript:

Wednesday August 21th 2013. Operation “Reeh Sarsar” …. Targeting Assad troops in Quaboon 

(The operation name in English is Cold Wind Operation)

The men in the video claim to be Liwa al-Islam, and the many flags in the video are also marked Liwa al-Islam.  In the videos they are shown to launch the same unusual munitions (I've dubbed UMLACAs) used in the August 21st sarin attack.  

Obviously, this is meant to be proof that Liwa al-Islam were responsible for the August 21st attack, but there's a lot about it that seems dubious.

First of all the video quality is awful, so it's very difficult to make out a lot of details.  It's also rather odd it's so dark when August 21st was a full moon, and there's no lights in the city visible.   Apart from that, there's three things the videos seem designed to really push, that the UMLACAs are being used, it's August 21st (repeated on each of the videos), and it's Liwa al-Islam.  They don't just say they are Liwa al-Islam, but everything is draped in Islamic black standards with Liwa al-Islam written on it

A look though YouTube channels used by Liwa al-Islam, here and here, doesn't seem to show videos where they've draped black flags over the weapons they are using, as seen in these new videos, and the new videos also don't appear to have the Liwa al-Islam logo anywhere, which they do seem to like plastering all over their equipment.  It's also a bit odd they'd cover everything with the logo, yet film it using such a poor quality camera. 

It's interesting that they are also using a D-30 howitzer, a weapon that's not been identified as being used in the attack, yet they still feel the need to wear gas masks around it (apart from the cameraman, who can be heard clearly, unhindered by a mask in all videos), and there's no sign of the BM-14 multiple rocket launcher that has been linked to the attack

The videos were also uploaded to brand new YouTube and LiveLeak accounts, something they have in common with previous dubious videos, including this video claiming to show a rebel group using chemical weapons to kill a rabbit (reposted here to another channel)

It's not the only thing the rabbit video has in common with the new videos.  In the rabbit video it's stated at 6:44 that the name of the group is the "Reeh Sarsar" (Cold Wind) Chemical Battalion, with the flag on the wall showing the same name.  As I noted in the above transcript, the third video calls the Operation "Reeh Sarsar" (Cold Wind), exactly the same name as the group in the rabbit video.

Update Liwa al-Islam has issued a statement in response to these videos

In the Name of God; the Most Compassionate; the Merciful
“Thus was the Truth vindicated and that which they were doing was made vain. Thus were they there defeated and brought low.” – the holy Quran
Further on statement no. 75/34-13, on the massacre by chemical weapons in Gouta on August 21, 2013, we state the following:
The terrorist Assad regime has fabricated videos showing people wearing masks and firing D-30 artillery and rockets. Voices in the video state that the incident took place on August 21st. The Assad regime has put a banner on which was written, in a strange way, the name “Liwa al-Islam”. These fabricated videos were circulated online and handed over to western media in order to incriminate Liwa al-Islam. The position of Liwa al-Islam is summed up in the following points:

1. Those videos were not published on our official channels. They are thus forged and completely fake.
2. Liwa al-Islam does not have the kind of artillery shown in the videos. Only the Assad regime has this capability. Furthermore, this kind of artillery cannot in any way carry warhead that might be filled with chemical weapons.
3. Only the Assad regime has chemical weapons in Syria. Assad admitted to that by agreeing to turn over his stockpile of chemical weapons to the international community. The UN team report, moreover, confirmed the rockets used in the attacks on August 21st were launched from regime-controlled areas.
4. In the targeted areas in Gouta, there was a battalion affiliated with Liwa al-Islam. Ten soldiers of this battalion were killed and around 50 were injured.
5. The regime has also fabricated a video showing members of Liwa al-Islam beheading soldiers. We stress that this is a mere cheap lie. Liwa al-Islam denounces this kind of behavior, and it is not part of its policy to execute detainees.
6. Liwa al-Islam pledges to continue the fight to rid the country of the filthy terrorist regime. We will not be weakened by videos faked by those who have the blood of innocent people on their hands and those who used chemical weapons against innocent civilians. We will continue the fight until we bring the criminals to justice. Liwa al-Islam emphasizes that any political solution that does not involve accountability for crimes against the Syrian people is completely unacceptable. The world has forgotten all crimes by the Assad regime and focused only on the use of chemical weapons. When the international community makes a deal with Assad to eliminate his stockpile of chemical weapons and then hands him a certificate of good conduct, which puts him in a position to freely continue killing with other means, it becomes a partner in Assad’s murderous crimes.

“Might belongeth to Allah and to His messenger and the believers.” - the holy Quran

Update Enhanced versions of the videos can be found here.

More posted on the subject of the August 21st attacks can be found here, and other posts on chemical weapons and Syria, including extremely informative interviews with chemical weapon specialists, can be found here.

You can contact the author on Twitter @brown_moses or by email at brownmoses@gmail.com.

Who Was Responsible For The August 21st Attack?

In light of today's report from the UN confirming the use of sarin in the August 21st attacks in Damascus, I thought I'd take a look at the open source evidence of who is responsible.  I'll be looking at evidence that's freely available for anyone to examine, rather than what German spy boats may or may not of heard, or intelligence reports that tell us they have evidence, but don't actually show the evidence.  As always, evidence does not automatically equal proof, so it's up to you to decide if this information proves one side or the other was responsible.

Two munitions have been linked to the attack, the M14 140mm artillery rocket, and a munition I've previously referred to as the UMLACA (Unidentified Munition Linked to Alleged Chemical Attacks).

M14 140mm artillery rocket

UMLACA

The UN inspectors have now linked both munitions to the chemical attacks, so the question is, who used them?  In the 18 months I've been studying the arms and munitions in the conflict I have never seen either type of munition used by the opposition. The opposition has rocket artillery, for example the 107mm Type-63 multiple rocket launcher and the Croatian 128mm RAK-12, but I've never seen any sign of the 140mm systems (such as the BM-14) that would be used to launch the M14 artillery rocket.  More details on the M14, and it's origins, are in this video from RUSI

As with the M14, there's no evidence the Syrian opposition has access to, or have used, the UMLACA.
Since January 2013, a number of photographs and videos of these munitions have been published by opposition activists, who have consistently claimed these were fired by government forces.  The first video, posted from Daraya, Damascus on January 4th 2013, doesn't even link the munition to a chemical attack, and through the last 3 weeks of investigations on the munition, I've established there are at least two types of this munition; the type linked to the August 21st attack and other alleged chemical attacks, and a high explosive type, which I examine in this post.

It's important to note that the UMLACA has also been recorded at the scene of at least one other chemical attack, including one in Adra, Damascus, on August 5th, which I detail here.  Another video, from June 11th, also filmed in Adra, shows the remains of an UMLACA that's described as a "chemical rocket", although it's not specified which alleged chemical attack it was linked to.  Considering the new information presented in today's UN report, it seems worth re-examining some of the earlier allegations of chemical attacks in Syria.

One thing that must be stressed, is that the UMLACA is a munition that's never been seen in any other conflict, and it's origins are somewhat of a mystery.  This has led some people to claim the munition could have been constructed by the opposition, and one popular video shows what's claimed to be a chemical munition being used by the opposition, with some even claimed it's the UMLACA, even though it's clearly a totally different design

The above video is what's known as a "Hell Cannon", a popular mortar type weapon used by the Syrian opposition.  I've gone into more details about the Hell Cannon, and why it's not a chemical weapon, as some people have claimed, here, but there is one other aspect of it I want to explore in relation to the UMLACAs.
As I've said before, some people have claimed the UMLACA could be a DIY munition manufactured by the opposition, but by examining the construction of both the Hell Cannon and the UMLACA I think it's clear there's a very significant difference in the quality and complexity of construction.

When the Hell Cannon first appeared in May 2013, it was accompanied by a release of a promotional video showing the construction of the weapon, shown below

In this video we can see the most complex part of the system is the launching platform, with the munition itself being not much more than a gas cylinder welded onto a metal pole, with fins added.  The gas cylinder warhead is then filled with fertilizer based explosive, and fitted with a simple impact fuze.  The launching platform is pretty simple, just a mortar tube with the rest of the construction desgined to give it stability.  The following video, published on August 5th, shows ammunition for the Hell Cannon being produced

The design has had a slight improvement, with extendable tail fins added, and large numbers of the munitions being produced.  If these were all chemical weapons then it's pretty clear someone would have noticed by now, and this really demonstrates how basic the design of these munitions are, something that's reflected in pretty much all the munitions produced by the opposition.

Over the past three weeks I've been collecting detailed photographs of the UMLACA, trying to make sense of how it's put together, and how it works.  What's become clear is the UMLACA is far much more than just a barrel on a rocket.  Human Rights Watch's report on August 21st included a diagram of the UMLACA I helped produce, shown below

There's a lot of details that point to this being more sophisticated that the gas cylinders on a stick, for example, way in which the warhead appears to be designed to come apart.  There's clues to this in the various videos and photographs of the remains of the munition.  The following images are taken from 4 different UMLACAs, showing the remains of the outer shell of the warhead

You'll note that they've consistently split in exactly the same way, right down the length of the warhead, apparently pre-weakened to break open that way.  Another example is the rocket itself, as the below video of the high explosive variant of the UMLACA demonstrates, the housing for the rocket, which the tail fins are attached to, has been manufactured separately, and tightly fitted over the rocket, with fixtures added to the end so it can firmly attach to the base of the warhead (40 seconds onwards)

These are just a couple of examples of the design quality of the munition, demonstrating this is something that's beyond anything the opposition has manufactured themselves, strongly indicating this is something that's been manufactured by the Syrian military, or one of it's allies.  More examination of the construction of the munition can be found here.

There's also a number of videos and images showing what appears to be there munitions, or variants, being used by government forces.  This first video shows what appears to be a larger version of the same munition being loaded into a launcher, and launched

This video claims to show one of the munitions launched from the government controlled Qadam railway station in Damascus

The below screenshots of the video clearly shows the profile of the rocket matching the unusual profile of the UMLACA

This image appears to show an UMLACA loaded into what arms expert Nic Jenzen-Jones has described as an Iranian Falaq-2 type launcher, with the same launching vehicle photographed in November 2012

It was also possible to find the precise location of one of the munitions fired, and deduce it was fired from the north, the same direction as the 155th brigade missile base, and related sites (detailed here).

This is the evidence that the Syrian government was capable of the attack, and had a history of using the munitions linked to the attack.  As for evidence of Syrian opposition responsibility, that appears rather thin on the ground.  You have claims the attacks were faked, the victims being Alawite hostages from Latakia, that were somehow driven through hundreds of miles of contested and government controlled territory to Damascus.  There's claims that this was some sort of accident involving Saudi supplied chemical weapons, which fails to explain how one incident could effect two separate areas.  Other claims centre around the opposition having sarin, based off reports in Turkey in May, where it was reported Jabhat al-Nusra members were arrested with sarin.  The "sarin" was later reported to be anti-freeze, and only this week some of the members are being prosecuted for trying to make sarin, having only a shopping list of ingredients, rather than actual sarin.  It seems to me, that compared to the evidence of government responsibility for the attacks, the evidence of opposition responsibility seems very poor.

More posted on the subject of the August 21st attacks can be found here, and other posts on chemical weapons and Syria, including extremely informative interviews with chemical weapon specialists, can be found here.

You can contact the author on Twitter @brown_moses or by email at brownmoses@gmail.com.