The Syrian National Defence Force Provides More Evidence Linking The Government To The August 21st Sarin Attacks

Last week, I wrote about a video the Syrian National Defence Force had posted on their YouTube channel, showing them using the family of munitions that the munitions linked to the August 21st Sarin attack comes from.  These munitions, which I dubbed the UMLACA (Unidentified Munitions Linked to Alleged Chemical Attacks), were heavily documented by myself and others in the wake of the August 21st attack, and we were able to draw a number of conclusions about the munition.  These include there being at least two types of munition, explosive and chemical, there being two sizes of these munitions (the smaller linked to the August 21st attack, and two different types of launching platforms (a twin-barrel type, and single-barrel type).

Now, two more videos have been posted online showing Syrian military forces using the same kind of munitions.  The first video was posted on the YouTube channel of Tarek Ali, a reporter for Al Mayadeen TV, a Lebanese news channel that's been supportive of the Syrian government.  Tarek Ali has been spending time with the Syrian military, and this report is from the SAA and NDF advance on the villages of Maheen and Hawaree, after taking the town of Sadad, Homs.

At the start of the video we see a vehicle drive by, with a twin-barrel launching on the rear

This is clearly the same type of truck mounted launcher that has been filmed and photographed in Damascus and Aleppo, and shown to launch the UMLACA

Aleppo

Mezzeh air base, Damascus

It's worth noting for anyone investigating these launchers that the type of truck used appears to be different in each example.

The next example, helpfully posted on the Facebook page of the National Defence Force in Damascus, gives us our best view yet of the larger type of munition and single-barrel launcher

For those of us who have been trying to figure out every detail possible about these munitions, it provides some more clues about how these munitions and their launchers work.

The above image shows the single hole on the rear of the warhead, and a cover that has been manufactured for the nozzle of the rocket.  Not something that points towards a hastily put together DIY weapon.

Here we have the UMLACA in the launch tube, and you can just make out the black numbering that's common to the explosive type of these munitions, along with the single hole on the rear of the warhead.  Here we can see a black rod shaped device that has been attached to the hole.  It was noted that in the footage posted online shortly after the August 21st attack, showing the same kind of launcher and munition, that one of the men in the video appeared to screw something into the rear of the warhead, and this appears to be what that was.  What it actually is though, is another question.

During the launch we also get our first clear video of the fuze at the end of the warhead, which seems to point it being some sort of impact fuze.  It also appears that the black rod attached to the rear of the warhead is still in place, although it's hard to be 100% sure because of the motion of the rocket during launch.

This image was taken just after the cap on the nozzle was removed, and it appears a white cable was being held in by the cap.

A cable is also seen running of the side of the truck, but it's unclear if this could be a command cable.

The man who removes the nozzle cap then appears to possibly pull the cable onto the truck, maybe to connect to the possible command cable?

It also appears that just before each launch, no cable can be seen hanging from the rear of the rocket, suggesting that perhaps the cable has been looped back onto the truck to connect to the potential command cable.

If nothing else, this gives you an idea of the extra little details this video provides, and for those of us still trying to gather every single tiny piece of information on these munitions this sort of footage is invaluable.

More posts on the subject of the August 21st attacks can be found here, and other posts on chemical weapons and Syria, including extremely informative interviews with chemical weapon specialists, can be found here.

You can contact the author on Twitter @brown_moses or by email at brownmoses@gmail.com. 

Industrial And Economic Aspects Of Sarin : Why Poor Quality Is Not An Indicator Of Non-state Manufacture

A guest post by Dan Kaszeta.

Introduction: 

To use Sarin in any reasonable quantity, an industrial operation is needed.  The Syrian incident in August of this year is of a size and scale that a large production effort was needed to accomplish it.  But even a large-scale effort can produce an inferior quality product.  The alleged poor quality of the Sarin used in Ghouta should not be taken as evidence that the Syrian government did not make it. 

A number of blogs and articles have been advancing, either explicitly or implicitly, a thesis that I would term the “Sarin Quality argument.”  Roughly stated, the argument goes as follows: “The Sarin used in Damascus was obviously low quality.  Therefore it must not have been made by a national level production program.”  The implication, therefore, is that the Sarin in use on 21 August 2013 must not have been made by the Assad regime.   The purpose of this paper is to refute that argument. First, I will make a few general observations.   Second, I will address in detail several points made by various bloggers and activists that are advanced in support of the “Quality” argument.  Third, I will advance my own argument, which I would describe as a “Sarin Quantity and Economics Argument”.

General Observations on Sarin Production and Quality Control

Production of Sarin is actually very difficult, particularly if you want to get more than a few spoonfuls.   Various commentators have commented on the chemistry of Sarin production, but merely listing the chemical reactions required does not fully address the chemical engineering requirements.   None of the observers other than myself seems to seriously address the Sarin production issue from an industrial perspective.  A reasonable publicly available document produced by the now defunct US Office of Technology Assessment describes many of the engineering hurdles required for production of Sarin.  Sarin is not a substance that easily lends itself to home-brew or clandestine “drug-lab” type manufacture, principally due to the requirements to handle highly dangerous corrosive gases at high temperature.  I address some of these issues in summary form in my Bloomberg View op-ed column, but there is a deep well of information available if you are willing to research the history of the German nerve agent production facilities and the history and US production efforts at Rocky Mountain Arsenal, the facility in Colorado where the USA’s “unitary” Sarin was produced between 1953 an 1957.

One principle problem faced by anyone producing Sarin is that the last step of the Sarin process actually leaves you with a cocktail of Sarin and acids.  You get one mol of HF (hydrogen fluoride) or HCl (hydrogen chloride) for each mol of Sarin you produce.  Most of the production pathways will end with HF in the Sarin.  The US worked out a so-called di-di process (very hard to pull off, I may add) that ends up with HCl. Worked out in weight equivalents, if you make 1 kg of Sarin, it is going to be mixed with 140 g of HF.  This residual HF is nasty stuff, to say the least.   The residual acid, regardless of whether it is HF or HCl, is going to cause a number of problems.  First, the product will be corrosive to whatever container or munition that it is in, degrading the shelf life of the container or munition and eventually posing safety and handling problems from leakage.   Second, acidity causes degradation of the Sarin.   Third, HF vapor can defeat many types of protective clothing and equipment.  The acidic nature of the mix reduces the effective shelf life of the Sarin from decades to months.

The US, the Soviet Union, and to the best of my knowledge, the UK and Tito-era Yugoslavia had developed the ability to refine the residual acid out of Sarin as a final refining step.  I am not sure if anyone else was.  My initial research has not been able to indicate whether the original German Nazi-era production facility surmounted this problem.  Even the very large US production facility at Rocky Mountain Arsenal devoted many PhDs and millions of dollars to this effort and did not perfect the distillation process until well after production started.  Earlier batches were re-distilled once the distillation method was perfected.  The distillation of the residual acid was, and continues to be, a deeply protected dark art.  Some of the general information about the process, but not the details, is described in the engineering history of Rocky Mountain Arsenal.   It is my belief that the UK mastered this process at their facility in Nancekuke, Cornwall and that the USSR did so similarly in its production facilities.  The existence of long shelf-life Sarin in the Soviet-era stockpile is de facto evidence of this. I have spoken to several people involved in Tito-era Yugoslavian chemical weapons and they have indicated to me that Yugoslavia was able to remove the acid.  Saddam Hussein’s Iraq did not perfect the acid removal step of the process.  Chinese, Swedish, North Korean, and French Sarin efforts remain an enigma to me.

If you are planning to store your Sarin for a long time, you need to remove the residual acid.  However, this is not a terrible barrier if one is planning to use the Sarin quickly.  The Iraqi military used a “just in time” approach to Sarin production and made every effort during the Iran-Iraq war to use the Sarin that they produced quickly.  The Iraq Sarin production efforts are indicative that a nation state can produce the industrial infrastructure for Sarin but not have the acid removal step, either because they couldn’t do it or because it was too expensive to do.

The best way I can summarize the production issues in brief form is as follows:

• A bench-top or home-style setup is very dangerous.  Some lab scale production facilities using modern technology and techniques can create teaspoon-type quantities.  
• To get any reasonable quantity of Sarin you need a factory-type setup. Even a very expensive factory gets you only a moderate grade of Sarin.  The US OTA study estimated that you needed at least $10 million in 1993 USD to get a basic setup going, not accounting for effectively dealing with waste or safety issues or the refining process. 
• To get a high quality, acid-free, long-shelf life product, you need a lot more money and effort than just a base-level production facility.  Iraq wasn’t able to pull it off.  But if you don’t need shelf life, you needn’t bother with acid removal.  
• The Iraq experience shows that a large, multimillion dollar chemical weapons production effort can still produce a mediocre product.  

Salient points of the “Quality Argument”

In the various blogs and documents I have seen, the crux of the “Quality Argument” can be distilled down to four points. 

Point 1:  The UN report found multiple chemical impurities, indicating a deficient Sarin production.  This obviously means that it wasn’t produced by a state-level manufacturing program.

The Iraqi example shows us that a large and sophisticated chemical weapons production infrastructure can produce Sarin with significant impurities in it.  The presence of impurities is testament to how hard it is to remove them, not any kind of evidence of non-state manufacture.  

Point 2: Numerous odors were reported.  High quality Sarin is odorless

Indeed.  But this argument serves no great point one way or the other to tell who made it.  Pure Sarin is odorless.  But lower quality Sarin, which can be produced by a large state-run operation, will have impurities and decomposition products.  The residual acids will react to whatever the impure Sarin has been stored in.  If a binary device was used (see below), much of what may be smelled is precursors or byproducts rather than the Sarin itself.  Yes, there are many reasons why lower quality Sarin can smell funny.  But none of those reasons can be any kind of evidence to state that the Assad regime didn’t manufacture it. 

Point 3: No “stabilizers” were found in the Sarin residue.  Serious military grade Sarin has stabilizers

The purpose of so-called “stabilizers” in Sarin is to prevent corrosion during long-term storage.   In the US Sarin program in the 1950s, the additives were tributylamine and a chemical called N,N’-Diisopropylcarbodimide.  These chemicals were added to prevent corrosion of steel and aluminum.   If you don’t care about long term storage, you don’t need to add speciality additives.  If your Sarin is produced from binary components (see below), there is not any absolute requirement to add additives, particularly as shelf life is patently not a concern after mixing the two components. 

Point 4: Syria has admitted to a serious CW production program.  Such a program can’t make deficient Sarin.

This is simply not true.  The US and USSR made Sarin in poor to mediocre condition for years before perfecting the process.  Iraq devoted a large effort to manufacturing nerve agents and did so in large quantities during the Iran-Iraq war.  The size, expense, and scope of the Iraqi industrial program is well documented by UNSCOM and UNMOVIC, and appears to be larger than the Syrian program.  Yet it made an inferior grade of Sarin, largely due to the lack of an acid distillation step in the process.  I think that taking Syria’s admission of a nerve agent production facility as some sort of evidence that someone else made the Sarin in question is a truly epic feat of Orwellian doublethink. 

A quick tutorial on Binary Sarin

Many of the issues surrounding the continuing mysteries of the Ghouta attacks can possibly resolved if the Sarin used in the attacks was binary in nature.  I am increasingly of the belief that 8/21 involved a binary chemical warfare agent.  Chemical agents can be made in binary form – by combining two or more non-warfare agent precursor chemicals to create the warfare agent.  This is done for many reasons, to include safety and security.  To date, it appears that at least four different nerve agents (GB, GD, GF, and VX) can be made in a binary fashion.i  Iraq experimented with binary Mustard but could not make it into a tactically and economically viable weapon due to the low concentration of Mustard in the mix that was produced.

In the case of Sarin, a chemical known as DF (methylphosphonic difluoride) is mixed with isopropyl alcohol.  This chemical reaction results in Sarin and hydrogen fluoride (HF).  It is my understanding that this reaction is a bit violent, and the resulting HF in vapor form is in itself a highly toxic and corrosive substance.  For this reason, US binary Sarin weapons included a quantity of isopropylamine to react with the surplus acid.  

It would appear, both from the OPCW and various media activity that the Syrian CW program’s nerve agents are actually binary in nature, wherein Syria stores the binary components of Sarin and VX.  The OPCW states that Syria declared approximately 1230 unfilled munitions.  This fact implies that the mode of employment is to fill munitions prior to use, rather than manufacture and store filled munitions.  

In my experience, there are three theoretical ways to effectively field binary Sarin:

1. In-flight mixing.  One could put the separate components into the weapon system and have the mixing occur in flight on the way to the enemy.  This is much harder to do in practice than in theory.  The US spent a lot of time and money into getting the mixing in flight correct.  Even so, the project was plagued with errors and I am not convinced that the US ever fully resolved the in-flight mixing issues before the programs were cancelled. Iraq used binary Sarin.  
2. Mixing at the launch point.  Theoretically, the products can be mixed immediately prior to pouring into the munition.   This is an abysmally bad idea with Sarin.  This is very dangerous for the handler who has to do it and the reaction produced by combining the components is a very dangerous one. While it can be safely handled in a reactor vessel or inside a steel artillery shell,  doing this in a bucket on the side of the road may kill the handler and damage vital equipment due to the corrosive nature of the HF.  This may be a more viable approach with VX, though, as that reaction creates fewer acute problems.  
3. Mixing in the factory prior to shipping.  One viable concept of operations is to do the mixing in a factory setting with proper engineering controls to contain the reaction and the concomitant HF.  The munitions could be filled in the factory and sent straight to the field for use.  The OPCW’s reference to mixing and filling equipment could be taken as evidence that this is the approach in use in Syria. 

The proper employment of binary Sarin requires effective mixing and cannot be done without creating excess HF vapor.  A poorly executed binary mix will result in a cocktail of chemicals: some Sarin, some unmixed precursors, some byproducts – including HF. This could go a long way towards explaining the mix of casualties and odors during the 8/21 attack.  The precursors and byproducts are more in the category of general irritants than specific neurological poisons (as Sarin is) and are more likely to have strong odors. 

The Sarin Quantity Argument

The amount of Sarin that appears to have been used is a strong indicator of a national-level production program.

People often make assumptions about the efficiency of Sarin as a battlefield weapon.  There is a wide gulf between theoretical toxicity of Sarin in the laboratory environment and actual practical toxicity on the battlefield.   To make a very long story short, a lot more Sarin is needed to create death and injury than the layman usually thinks.   Even though Sarin is very toxic, a large number of casualties over a wide area will require a lot of chemical agent.  

In my recent article in CBRNe World magazinei, I use old military chemical target analysis methods to attempt to figure out how much Sarin may have been used.   These methods are too lengthy and obtuse to recite here.  Indeed, I had to summarize for the CBRNe World article due to a 2000 word article limit.   Basically, as a thought exercise, I pretended that I was Assad’s chemical officer and using old US charts and tables.  I had to make many assumptions and guesses, as some raw data was simply unavailable to me.   I came up with an order of magnitude estimate that the amount of Sarin for an attack of this nature would have been somewhere in the range of 370 kg to 4400 kg.  As is often the case, I believe that there are strong reasons why neither the bottom end or the top end of the range of estimates is likely to be the case.  My own instinct tells me we are looking at something roughly around a metric ton of Sarin.

A metric ton (-ish) of Sarin is not something that anyone is going to cook up without a factory.  Who is more likely to have done this?  An unnamed non-state actor or the state who has admitted to having the factory?  As previously stated, a significant amount of engineering is required to produce Sarin, even in small quantities.   It should be noted that the Aum Shinrikyo production facility, the only significant example of non-state Sarin manufacture, is an interesting comparison point. It cost a lot of money, was a large and custom-built three story building, was staffed by engineers and chemists, and used a front company to buy chemicals legally.   Despite this level of effort, the Aum Shinrikyo facility was only able to manage a modest production level of single batches of 2 gallons of Sarin. 

To make ton-level quantities of Sarin an industrial-scale factory is needed.  The level of difficult and the scale of the operation simply don’t permit it to be done in less than a factory setting.  Based on the German experience at their factory in Dyhernfurth, a ton of Sarin required about 8 tons of precursor raw materials.  Due to principles of conservation of mass, about 7 tons of waste material, much of it very dangerous, would be produced.  

The scale of the operation required to produce tons of Sarin, or indeed tons of DF (the critical precursor binary component) raises an interesting issue of economics.   Given the industrial difficulties, Sarin is extremely expensive in comparison to conventional alternatives, unless you run your Sarin plant for years and amortize the cost over the course of thousands of tons of product.  The expense, in terms of equipment and skilled labor, of such an effort means that one has to seriously question whether this is time, labor, and money well spent in pursuance of tactical military objectives.  One has to seriously question whether a cash-strapped insurgency is going to squander their resources on such an endeavor when that amount of money, tens of millions of dollars at a minimum, could be used for a lot of other purposes to greater effect.  Thirty million dollars buys a lot of conventional equipment that is much more immediately useful than a few tons of Sarin.  So, from an industrial and economic standpoint, the culprit looks to be the regime more than anyone else. 

Notes and Disclaimers:

1. This paper represents my personal opinion and does not represent any position or opinion of any previous employer.
2. I’ve used US spelling conventions and a US paper size instead of UK conventions.  I had to pick one or the other.  Criticisms on this point will be ignored. 
3. Information current as of 6 November 2013 was used for this paper. I have done rather a lot of research on chemical warfare agents over the years.   Some of the documents I have consulted are not generally available online.  They are in these quaint things called libraries.  Others are government documents that you might have to go to a special reading room to find or to request by Freedom of Information means.   If you can’t find a document I cite online, please don’t blame me.  The internet has a lot, but it doesn’t have everything. 
4. I firmly believe that Sarin, as a product trade name, should be capitalized.  I often lose this argument, but I continue to insist on this point. 

About the author: Dan Kaszeta is the author of “CBRN and Hazmat Incidents at Major Public Events: Planning and Response” (Wiley, 2012) as well as a number of magazine articles and conference papers.  He has 22 years of experience in CBRN, having served as an officer in the US Army Chemical Corps, as CBRN advisor for the White House Military Office, and as a specialist in the US Secret Service. He now runs Strongpoint Security, a London-based CBRN and antiterrorism consultancy and is also a Senior Research Fellow with the International Institute of Nonproliferation Studies.

The Fall of Yaroubiya to the YPG In Context

A guest post by Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi and Fadel al-Kifa’ee.

Introduction: Solidifying Stalemate

The small town of Yaroubiya in north-east Syria (Hasakah governorate) on the border with Iraq recently came to media attention in light of the takeover of the locality by the YPG- a Kurdish militia affiliated with the Democratic Union Party (PYD). This resulted in the expulsion of the al-Qa’ida affiliate Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS), among other fighters

To be sure, in the grand scheme of things in the conflict between the YPG and rival rebel factions, the takeover of Yaroubiya does not represent a decisive turning point but a further step towards the most likely overall outcome: namely, consolidation of existing positions.

Generally, since the outbreak of wider conflict following the YPG’s expulsion of ISIS from Ras al-Ayn in July, the YPG has retained its strongholds in Hasakah governorate- where Kurds form a continuum of populated territory in much of the area- and expanded its control to an increasing degree.

In the case of Ras al-Ayn, Jabhat al-Nusra (JN), ISIS and Ahrar ash-Sham have repeatedly failed to advance beyond the outskirts since July, and have at best only launched mortar strikes on the town center.

In contrast, in Aleppo and Raqqa governorates, where Kurds form pockets of population, the YPG has suffered serious losses, such as expulsion in August from the town of Tel Abyaḍ in northern Raqqa on the border with Turkey.

The Situation in Yaroubiya

The case of Yaroubiya stands out for its wider analytical implications. Just before the YPG takeover, the town was under the control of ISIS/JN and two other groups: Ansar al-Khilafa and Liwa al-Tawhid wa al-Jihad.

Some comment is needed here on the JN-ISIS relationship in these eastern borderlands: it would appear that the boundaries between the two remain unclear.

Thus, consider the photographic evidence below. The town of Yaroubiya features JN graffiti that has not been erased, but from the same period of the YPG offensive on the town photos of captured vehicles with the ISIS banner were released. Certainly for the YPG the two names and banners are interchangeable. This is similarly the case with reports from jihadi sources on the Yaroubiya area.

Perhaps the lack of clear boundaries between ISIS and JN in these border areas is not so surprising, where mujahideen both Syrian and foreign will naturally tie the struggles of eastern Syria and the Sunni protestors and insurgents in Anbar and Ninawa governorates in Iraq to one unified cause.

Figure 1: Entry to the market in Yaroubiya, featuring JN graffiti on the wall to the right (cf. this video at around 1:30 minutes in).

Figure 2: Vehicle captured by the YPG featuring the ISIS banner. Photo released on 24 October.

Figure 3: A graphic put out by a YPG fighter equating JN and ISIS- seen as one entity- with the gates of Hell.

According to a pro-ISIS source in Hasakah interviewed for this piece, Ansar al-Khilafa and Liwa al-Tawhid wa al-Jihad are aligned with ISIS/JN, but Liwa al-Tawhid wa al-Jihad was a very small battalion in Yaroubiya. The town was also home to a rebel group drawn from local Arab Shammar tribesmen: Liwa Ahrar al-Jazira (LAJ). The battalion was expelled from Yaroubiya in mid-October on ISIS/JN allegations of corruption. The price of flour for distribution to local inhabitants was then lowered to consolidate control over the town.

Figure 4: Photo of an Ansar al-Khilafa fighter at the Yaroubiya border gate on October 26. The town fell into YPG hands towards the end of the day. It should be pointed out that multiple groups in Syria use the name Ansar al-Khilafa. This group in Yaroubiya- extending into the Qamishli area- is distinct from Ansar al-Khilafa in Aleppo governorate affiliated with Hizb-ut-Tahrir.

Figure 5: Liwa al-Tawhid wa al-Jihad fighters in Yaroubiya on October 26, showing that they had not been driven out just yet.

Key to the narrative put out by jihadi supporters over the fall of Yaroubiya is the notion of ‘betrayal’ in the sense of collaboration between the local tribesmen, the Iraqi army under the Maliki government, and the Assad regime.

Though LAJ stayed out of the fighting and put up an announcement on Facebook immediately after the fall of Yaroubiya denouncing an alleged Iraqi army presence in the town, a report from the Iraqi Kurdish outlet Rudaw-corroborated by our local Hasakah source- has shown that LAJ has tried to reach out to the YPG for a power-sharing deal.

Figure 6: Photo distributed by LAJ, among others, allegedly showing Iraqi army vehicles in Yaroubiya. However, they do not actually belong to the Iraqi army, but the YPG.

In contrast, ISIS/JN, Ansar al-Khilafa and Liwa al-Tawhid wa al-Jihad are on the outskirts trying to regain control, aided by the Salafist battalion Ahrar ash-Sham’s firing mortar rounds at the YPG, accused by Ahrar ash-Sham of being “agents” of Iran, Assad and Israel.

This reflects the general tendency whereby organized rebel battalions- whether under the FSA-banner or Islamist coalitions-will not side with the YPG against ISIS. The rule of thumb here is partly rooted in the widespread perception of the PYD as a regime agent, though a more accurate characterization is that the PYD is determined to hold on to Kurdish areas at least and to this end is willing to cooperate or fight with regime forces and rebels depending on the circumstances at a local level.

In any case, tribal locals and other civilians- even of Arab ethnicity- differ from the organized rebel battalions in that they may prefer the YPG as the lesser of two evils, such that the YPG has now organized an “Arab Citizens’ Battalions” military unit.

Perhaps more important is the question of the Iraqi government role. It is certainly true that the Iraqi army reinforced their own side of the border, but there is no evidence of active Iraqi military aid to the YPG. Nor is there evidence for Assad forces’ assistance to the YPG in this case, despite the clear pleasure shown by pro-Assad channel Sama TV at the YPG takeover.

Figure 7: Screenshot from a video currently being circulated in jihadi social media purporting to show an Iraqi army Humvee on the Iraqi side of the border across from Yaroubiya.

Rather, the Iraqi aim was to stop the ISIS fighters in particular from slipping into Ninawa province, where, as a report from Baghdad’s newspaper al-Aalem has shown, ISIS fighters have frequently retreated in the face of rout at the hands of the YPG and/or regime forces as a launching pad to head back into Syria. Mosul in particular- where ISIS has an extensive financial network- serves as an apt base for recuperation. Of course, the YPG will also have an interest in preventing ISIS fighters from having border crossings whereby they can retreat into Iraq to launch new incursions into their territory in Syria.

Yaroubiya and Kurdish Rivalries

Unsurprisingly, this coinciding of interests on the part of the YPG and Iraqi government has won praise for Baghdad from some Syrian Kurdish figures. For example, Shelal Kedo- a member of the Syrian Kurdish Council- told Iraqi outlet al-Sumaria News that the takeover of Yaroubiya marked a turning point for the better in relations between Syrian Kurds and Iraq.

At the same time, a member of the West Kurdistan Council (NB West Kurdistan- Syrian Kurdistan) denied active Iraqi assistance in the takeover of Yaroubiya. In any event, the positive outlook on the alignment of interests between Baghdad and the YPG contrasts notably with the tensions between the PYD and the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government under Massoud Barzani, whose ties with Turkey are viewed with strong dislike by the PYD. The PYD sees Ankara as supporting jihadis against Syrian Kurds. Some YPG commanders have also voiced disaffection at a perceived lack of support from Arbil for the fight against the jihadis.

Far from bringing about Kurdish political unity in the face of a perceived common threat, therefore, the Yaroubiya affair may actually help solidify divisions among Kurds and hinder the long-term prospects of an oft-touted merger of Syrian and Iraqi Kurdistan.

Indeed, it is apparent that in its conflict with other rebel groups, the YPG has been able to bolster the PYD’s image as protector of Syrian Kurds, to the detriment of rival Kurdish factions.

Recently the YPG released a statement accusing several factions of committing aggression on YPG territory. Besides usual suspects such as ISIS, Ahrar ash-Sham and Liwa al-Tawhid (all of whom were part of a joint statement in August calling for the purging of the ‘PKK’- interchangeable with YPG here- from the Manbij-Hasakah highway), the YPG also singled out the Kurdish Islamic Front and the Salah ad-Din Kurdish brigade.

The Kurdish Islamic Front is a Salafist group that supports ISIS in its fight with the PYD and runs a number of schools according to Shari’a for Kurdish children in Aleppo, among other areas. It should also be noted in this context that the Kurdistan Islamic Union Party in Iraq has confirmed that some 30 Iraqi Kurds from Sulaymaniya have gone to join the ranks of JN/ISIS. The Salah ad-Din brigade was accused by the PYD last year of coordinating an attack with Jabhat al-Nusra on a Kurdish area of Aleppo.

Figure 8: Logo of the Kurdish Islamic Front.

On the political level, affiliates of the Kurdish National Council (KNC), which rivals the PYD, are hurt by association with the opposition-in-exile coalition, which after the takeover of Yaroubiya released a statement condemning the YPG for expelling the ‘FSA’ from the town (even as there were no FSA groups in the town by the time of the YPG takeover) with supposed Iraqi military assistance. Such detachment from reality can do the KNC no good to win Syrian Kurdish support.

In short, the Yaroubiya affair reflects a hardening of divisions, not only in territory between the YPG and other rebels, but also among the Kurdish political factions of Syria and Iraq. The events should further illustrate that the role of political ideology in the Syrian conflict cannot be down-played as analysis cannot be reduced to single paradigms of ethnicity or who simply has more money and arms.

Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi is a student at Brasenose College, Oxford University, and a Shillman-Ginsburg Fellow at the Middle East Forum. Fadel al-Kifa’ee is an Iraqi political analyst. Follow on Twitter @ajaltamimi and @fadelalkifaee

Syrian National Defence Force Video Shows Them Using The Munition Type Linked To The August 21st Sarin Attack

Thanks to reader simla1, and the Syrian National Defence Force, for the following video

Posted on the Syrian National Defence Force YouTube channel and Facebook pages, this video, titled "The Road to Victory", is a fairly straightforward promotional video, much like the videos posted by various opposition groups.  The video shows of various military equipment, and at 1:33 it shows off something that's very significant

This clearly matches the type of munition used in the Sarin attack on August 21st, which I dubbed the UMLACA (unidentified munition linked to alleged chemical attacks).  Previously it's been established there's at least two types of these munitions, explosive and chemical, and possibly two different sizes.  I suspect this version might be the larger type I believe is launched from a single barrel launcher shown in a video published on August 28th. The smaller type is launched from twin-barrelled launchers, as seen at the government controlled Mezzeh airbase at the end of 2012.

It seems that with this video, and other evidence gathered over the past couple of months, it now seems undeniable that the Syrian military has been using this family of munitions for at least the past 10 months.

It's also worth noting the nose of the warhead appears to be rounded

During the discussion of the range of the munition, the aerodynamics of the warhead appears to be a significant factor in the range of the munition, and it appears some examples of the munition have been shown with a rounded nose, which is significant when calculating the possible range of the munition.

While not quite as significant, this video also contains another example of the Syrian military using IRAMs.

More posts on the subject of the August 21st attacks can be found here, and other posts on chemical weapons and Syria, including extremely informative interviews with chemical weapon specialists, can be found here.

You can contact the author on Twitter @brown_moses or by email at brownmoses@gmail.com.

A Detailed Examination Of The Range Of Munitions Used In The August 21st Sarin Attack

Thanks to John Minthorne, who has put together this detailed analysis of the range of one munition type used in the August 21st Sarin attack.  John Minthorne is a professional mechanical engineer with around seven years relevant experience.  His relevant experience includes process system design, project management, feasibility and conceptual studies, and computational fluid flow modelling.  The original report and associated files can be found here.

UMLACA Maximum Range Analysis

Abstract

This report attempts to establish, with a minimal level of rigor, the maximum range that can be assigned to the 330mm-class chemical rocket (the "unidentified munition linked to alleged chemical attacks [UMLACA]) used in the August 21, 2013 attacks on Ghouta, Syria. The report is based on public information including United Nations reports, NGO publications, amateur video & photography of the remains of the weapons, public weather data. In particular, this goal of this report is to determine whether this model of rocket could have been launched from the Syrian Army Republican Guard "base 104", approximately 9.5 km west of the impact sites.

Background

In the early morning of August 21, 2013, the Ghouta residential suburb of Damascus, Syria was struck by a rocket attack that killed hundreds. Representatives of the Syrian Army and rebel forces were quick to blame one another for the attack, and international observer countries including France, the United Kingdom, Russia, and the United States made official but predictable statements  blaming the "opposite side".

In mid-September, Human Rights Watch (HRW) and the United Nations (Sellström) released reports that confirmed the August 21st attack did make use of Sarin. Consistent with the UN Mission's charter, the Sellström report did not assign blame for the attacks. The report did, however, note the azimuth of the ballistic trajectories of two of the munitions used, including a UMLACA that impacted Ein Tarma. The Human Rights Watch, along with several news organizations, noted the the trajectory azimuths intersect deep in Syrian government-held territory, specifically the Republican Guard 104th Brigade military base.

However, this information is only meaningfully damning to the Syrian government if the UMLACA is capable of being fired approximately 9.5 km from the Republican Guard base to the impact site. Much of the flight path less than 8 km from the impact site is identified by Human Rights Watch as "contested" at the time of the launch (Lyons).

Whoghouta.blogspot analysis

One organization to estimate the maximum range of the UMLACA is whoghouta.blogspot.com (sasa wawa). This analysis reported in a maximum plausible range of 3.5 km and concluded that the rockets could not have been launched from the Republican Guard base. This analysis was qualitatively reviewed, and in the opinion of this author the analysis contains a number important flaws. Some of the more significant errors include:

• Assuming very short burn times (and wrongly stating that such an assumption is conservative). Drag increases as a function of more than the square of the velocity, and as a result the thrust of the rocket motor over time is a crucial consideration.
• Using hobby rocketry engines as the basis of design. By extension, underestimating the propellant mass and specific impulse.
• Miscalculating the center of drag, severely underestimating the rocket's stability.
• Failure to consider wind direction, elevation above sea level, or air temperature.

Summary of available information

Information for this report was gleaned from publicly available information:

• Published photographs and diagrams based on those photographs, by Human Rights Watch.
• Field measurements and photographs taken by the United Nations Mission.

Assumptions

• Secondary sources of ballistic error such as Coriolis forces are ignored.
• Additional assumptions are listed in the relevant sections of this study.

UMLACA Physical Properties

Propellant Mass

The total impulse of the UMLACA rocket motor is limited by the propellant selected and the volume of propellant used. Since the purpose of this study is to evaluate whether a 9.5 km travel distance can be ruled out, each physical assumption is listed as a range between which the actual values for the UMLACA likely fall.

The total length of the UMLACA is about 2200 mm. Some portion of the nose section is filled with a bursting charge and detonator, so the maximum length of the solid fuel volume is assumed to be 2000 mm. The UN report implies that the motor section may be as short as 1340 mm, so a more pessimistic assumption incorporating a void space inside the weapon's warhead would be a fueled length of 1300 mm.

The external diameter of the UMLACA is 120 mm. Assuming a robust, wall thickness consistent with standard weight pipe, an internal diameter of 110 mm is used. This results in a volume range of between 0.0124 and 0.0190 m3.

The density of high-performance solid propellants varies between 1.6 and 1.86 kg/L (Zandbergen). Applying this value range to the fuel volume range, the rocket's propellant mass is found to be between 19.8 and 35.34 kg.

Specific and Total Impulse

The specific impulse of a rocket motor will have a profound effect on its performance. As a motor becomes more efficient, it can increase the final velocity of a rocket exponentially higher. This effect is more muted in a subsonic or transonic rocket than in an orbital or sounding launch vehicle, however. Military propellants have specific impulses in the range of 210 to 260 s (2060 – 2550 N*s/kg) (Zandbergen). Multiplying this range by the propellant mass gives us a total impulse for the UMLACA of 40800 to 90100 N*s.

Maximum Thrust

Gases escape a rocket nozzle in a predicable fashion. The fluid flow velocity through the nozzle throat is Mach 1, such that the total thrust generated by a rocket motor varies roughly proportionally to both the chamber pressure and throat area (Platzek). Unfortunately, no information appears to be publicly available documenting the precise the throat area of the rocket motor. The Human Rights Watch report contains one photograph of the rear of the motor and a tape measure, allowing estimation of the nozzle throat to be very roughly 50 mm. Assuming a chamber pressure of 7 MPa, this would equate with a maximum thrust of around 22 kN. Given the very large amount of uncertainty on this number, no conclusions can be drawn from this. It is simply noted that the estimated maximum possible thrust is within an order of magnitude of the thrust a designer would desire for this weapon.

Thrust Characteristics

A solid-fuel rocket has a practical maximum burn time – the regression rate of propellant is lowest in a solid grain geometry, but is still non-zero. Regression rates for typical high-performance propellants vary from 5 to 25 mm/s (Zandbergen), corresponding to a theoretical maximum burn time of 80 s to 400 s for a 2 meter, solid grain rocket motor. The longest total burn time considered in this study was 45 s, well within the realm of feasible achievability.

The amount of thrust a solid-fuel rocket provides over the course of its burn broadly customizable by changing the chemistry and structure of the rocket grain. For a rocket with no lift and poor drag characteristics such as the UMLACA, maximum range will be achieved with a short, high thrust initial impulse followed by a long, low thrust burn to sustain velocity at low transonic speed (~0.7M or 240 m/s). A thrust/time profile of this shape is both achievable and commonly found in military rockets (Platzek).

Environmental Considerations

Wind

A rocket spends a significant amount of time in flight. In evaluating the maximum distance a rocket may travel, the velocity of the wind encountered must be considered. At 2:00 AM on the morning of the attack, the wind at Damascus International Airport was blowing from the WSW (about 248°) at a sustained speed of 6.9 miles per hour (3.1 m/s) and increasing (Weather Underground). Wind speed is typically higher a significant distance above the ground; for the purposes of this analysis the wind velocity is assumed to be an average of 4 m/s from 248° (37° from a pure tailwind from the rocket trajectory of 285°. Correspondingly, a rocket azimuth of 143° relative to a 4 m/s wind was used in the OpenRocket software trajectory models. For ~60 s long flights, this adds a few hundred meters to the range. If meteorological information shows that higher-altitude tailwinds were present, this could increase the maximum range by a high single-digit percentage.

Atmospheric density

Aerodynamic drag is proportional to the density of the fluid through which the projectile travels. The temperature in Damascus at 2:00 AM on the morning of the attack was about 73°F (22.7°C) – if a standard atmospheric temperature of 15° is assumed, drag will be overstated by about 2.8%. The elevation of the targeted area in Ghouta is about 760 meters above sea level – if sea level elevation is assumed, drag will be overstated by about 9.5%. Since the temperature profile of the atmosphere above Damascus is not known, trajectory models assumed a standard atmospheric temperature and a launch elevation of 760 m above sea level.

Relative elevations

A projectile on a nominally parabolic trajectory will travel a greater distance if its impact location is of lower elevation than if it flies over a flat plain. The topography of northern Damascus is dominated by Mount Qasioun, a 1151 meter high peak. The areas of Ghouta targeted are lower, around 760 meters above sea level. Since the rocket attack was obviously not launched from the peak of Qasioun, the actual difference in elevation was less than 400 meters. This difference in elevation is not considered in these range calculations, since the actual launch elevation is not precisely alleged. This means that the maximum ranges shown are conservative by a small degree (probably 0.1-0.2 km) due to the relative elevations of the launch and impact sites.

Maximum Range Calculation

Physical Rocket Model

A model of the UMLACA and derivative UMLACA with a more aerodynamic nose cone were created in the Open Rocket program. Both models were modified from a model downloaded from the whoghouta.blogspot web site. The models are described in the two tables below; dimensions are in mm, roughnesses are in um, and masses are in kg (unless noted otherwise).

Drag Modifications

Any designer tasked with extending the range of the UMLACA would immediately consider improvements to the rocket's drag. With a Cd of about 1.0, the rocket's drag is several times the value to which it could be reduced with relatively superficial modifications. The nearly blunt front of the rocket generates about 80% of the subsonic total drag.

The UN and HRW reports both sketch the UMLACA with a completely blunt end, but the least is known about the front portion of the rocket because it is damaged upon use by the bursting charge and subsequent impact with the ground. The front plate includes six threaded holes which could be used to attach a light-weight aerodynamic nose cone. As such, the possibility that rockets fitted with nose cones were used on August 21 cannot be ruled out. Since addition of an aerodynamic nose dramatically changes the maximum range of the UMLACA, maximum ranges were established both with and without the aerodynamic nose cone.

Rocket Motor Design

Six hypothetical rocket motors were evaluated, three per drag condition of the UMLACA. All utilized an initial boost phase to accelerate the rocket to about 0.7M (240 m/s), followed by a lower sustainer thrust to maintain flight speed. Two used total impulses of 40800 N*s, the lower end of the estimated motor impulse. The remaining motors used the higher end of the estimated impulse, about 90100 N*s. The full .eng data for each motor can be found here.

Software Limitations

For convenience, this study matched the "whoghouta" blog's selection of Open Rocket as the software to simulate the UMLACA trajectory. The UMLACA is several times larger than a typical large single-stage hobby rocket, and its characteristic geometry likely challenges the software in ways that were not the focus of its development.

Simplification of Fin Layout

The Open Rocket software does not support modelling of a circumferential band around the perimeter of the tail fins. This band is parallel to the air stream, generating significant drag as well as contributing to the stability of the rocket. To model the ring's contribution to drag and efficiency, the fin height was increased from the actual dimension of 95 mm to 135.6 mm, replicating the total fin material area of 0.179 m2.

In addition, the enclosed nature of the air stream through the fin assembly may create directional flow effects more pronounced than a more simple fin arrangement. Study of the airflow through this fin assembly is an excellent candidate for further study of the UMLACA's aerodynamics.

Transonic and Supersonic Drag Performance

The UMLACA is likely but not certainly an exclusively subsonic weapon. The coefficient of drag of an object in a fluid flow stream is not constant; it changes with velocity. At about M0.8 the Cd beins to increase, peaking locally at M1.0 and dropping to an intermediate value for low supersonic values (Heinrich). The Open Rocket software attempts to model these changes in Cd, but for a rocket with such an unusual shape as the UMLACA it is likely that the modelled transonic behaviour is not fully accurate.

Results

For the UMLACA without drag-reducing features, the maximum distance travelled was about 6.5 km, for the UMLACA4 motor curve at a launch angle of 43° from vertical. Maximum distance travelled using a 41 kN*s motor was about 3.3 km.

If the UMLACA weapons used in the August 21st attacked had aerodynamic nose cones, their maximum range could be in excess of 15 km. With a range of 15 km, the UMLACA5 motor curve did not produce the greatest travel distance but its lower average thrust kept the more streamlined rocket at transonic speed (increasing confidence that the simulation is accurate).

Conclusions

• The rocket with a blunt nose has mediocre drag characteristics. A designer seeking to maximize the weapon's range could add a nose cone to the weapon, which would greatly reduce the drag coefficient and increase the range. The presence of threaded holes on the front plate of the rocket could be an indication that this was, in fact, done.
• The rocket is aerodynamically stable and unlikely to tumble or excessively oscillate in flight.
• The publicly available information on the UMLACA (particularly the chemical variant) leaves a large margin of doubt as to the rocket's range and flight characteristics.
• On the basis of the publicly available information referenced in this report, an attack from the Republican Guard 104th Brigade base cannot be ruled out as implausible.
• The maximum range of the UMLACA is probably between 3.3 km and 6.5 km, increasing to 15 km if a nose cone were installed.

The “Hizballah Execution Video”: Confirmation of Shia Militia Involvement

A guest post by Phillip Smyth of Jihadology.net.  Videos and images should be considered graphic.

Figure : Photo of those executed by Hizballah and posted to social media.

On October 8, 2013, the news website, NewLebanon.info released a video claiming to show members of Lebanon’s Iranian-backed Shia Islamist Hizballah, executing what appeared to be wounded men they pulled from the back of a van. The slain men were reported to be Syrians, possibly captured rebels.

The video caused controversy with the public and activists alike in Lebanon, Syria, the broader Middle East, and the West. Hizballah has been silent on the issue, but one spokesman said the organization would address the issue. Despite accusations Hizballah had pulled-off the killings, along with audio recordings demonstrating the executioners with Lebanese accents talking about Iranian Revolutionary religious concepts (an important underpinning for Hizballah’s ideology), there was still enough plausible deniability available for Hizballah and other Shia militia groups to argue they had no part in the killings.

Nevertheless, after analyzing Shia militia social media pages, I did come across the proverbial, “Picture worth a thousand words” in relation to the execution video: A photo featuring the same men who had been killed in the grainy execution video, were in fact the dead men in another photograph. This picture was uploaded to a prominent pro-Shia militia Facebook page which promotes the “Al-Muqawama al-Islamiyah” (“The Islamic Resistance”). This term regularly describes Iranian-backed Shia Islamist groups with militia apparatuses established in Iraq and Lebanon. It was also of a higher definition than the video recording. Adding to the photograph’s credibility was the fact that it was posted on October 1, 2013; Seven days before the video was released.

One of the dead men, the first to be dragged from the van in the video and wearing visible red boxer shorts is in the photograph. Another man, in a white T-shirt covered in blood, was summarily executed in the video. For the photo, he was placed in the pile of the other dead. The man in the striped sweater was taken out of the van at 0.48 and was then shot in the head twice. His destroyed cranium is easily spotted in the photograph and the video.

Figure : The man in the red boxer shorts. (video capture)

Figure : The black shirted man lying dead over the legs of the man in the red boxer shorts. (video capture)

Figure : The killed man in the white blood-stained T-shirt. (video capture)

Figure : The dead and executed men lying in the same position as the hi-res photo above. (video capture) 

When one follower of the page asked why such a graphic image needed to be posted, the admin responded, saying this would be the fate for anyone who wishes “to abuse Sayyida Zaynab”. Another outspoken member of other pro-Shia militia Facebook sites responded that the dead bodies were the result of, “self-defense”.

The admin for the page claims to be located in Tehran, Iran and the page he administers says it is based in Iraq. The administrator is also a prominent poster of graphics which promote the cause of Iraq’s Kata’ib Hizballah, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada, and Lebanese Hizballah—all Iranian-backed suppliers of foreign Shia fighters to Syria. These graphics have been widely circulated in these circles, suggesting a more formal link between the administrator and these organizations. 

After processing around eighty Facebook pages (posts from August 15th-October 23rd ) which promote pro-Shia militia in Syria material, only this Facebook page posted the photograph. When measured against more directly controlled Assad groups on social media, the same photo could not be found. Most interesting was the lack of any type of watermark which would demonstrate the photograph was taken from another website or source. 

However, photographs of the executed had circulated elsewhere prior to the release of the video and to this particular photograph posted on Shia militia social media. On September 23, 2013, the same dead men were part of a post placed online by Bousla.net. At that time, it was claimed they were part of the Salafi rebel organization, Liwa’a al-Islam, and were ambushed in the rural East Ghouta region outside of Damascus. Furthermore, it was reported in the article that elements of Liwa’a Zulfiqar, a Syrian based Shia militia whose fighters primarily come from the aforementioned groups in Iraq, and work in conjunction with Lebanese Hizballah, led the attack. Elsewhere, on LiveLeak, the pictures were republished and it was added that the executed individuals were, “near jordanan border the place where the cia saudi arabia and jordanian intelligence finance and train rebels [sic]”.  

Figure : Three of the photos published by Bousla.net which clearly showing the executed men in the video.

Most intriguing about the video and photo posts in news media (as opposed to social media), were the two sources to which this material was leaked. Both market themselves as “independent” Lebanese (as opposed to Iraqi, Iranian, Syrian, or other Arab outlets) news providers, have little original content, and do not have much of a share of an already packed Lebanese media market. Ironically, Bousla.net, the original poster of the images of those executed in the video, published a piece claiming the video was a fabrication and that Lebanese Hizballah had no role in the killings. Bousla.net also drew no connection between the original photos and the video.

Figure : The banner photograph for the Facebook page featuring the execution photo in question. The title reads, “Al Muqawama” (“The Resistance”). The logos for (left to right) Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, Lebanese Hizballah, Kata'ib Hizballah, and Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada are shown on the poster with the golden dome for the Sayyida Zaynab shrine in Damascus. Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei is shown prominently in the left.  

The dates these photographs were posted, their higher resolution (when compared to the video), the source(s) which published the information, and the utilization of the same bodies, conclusively establish that a Shia Islamist militia—most likely involving Hizballah, was behind the killings. The publishing of the photographs and the leak of the video of the killings further symbolize a new and carefully coordinated social and traditional online media campaign to show Syria’s rebels that Iranian-backed groups will resort to brutal means to win in Syria. 

Hizballah Executing Syrian Prisoners? - Analyzing the Video

A guest post by Phillip Smyth of Jihadology.net.  Videos and images should be considered graphic.

Uploaded onto YouTube on October 8, 2013 was a 1 minute and 40 seconds long video claiming to show members of Lebanese Hizballah brutally executing, “wounded Syrians”.

The film was shocking for more than its sadistic contents. Accusations of Lebanese Hizballah carrying out massacres and executions have been part and parcel of the pro-Syrian rebel narrative for some time. Yet, despite claims of that variety and daily doses of ultra-violence pouring endlessly onto the web for the past two years from pro-rebel and anti-Assad sides of the spectrum; little, in terms of videotaped human rights violations by Hizballah or by their allied Syria-based Iraqi Shia militias, could be found online.

Owing in large part to these groups’ Iranian-proxy status and clear religiously-based order, the aforementioned Shia Islamist organizations function in a far more militarily professional manner. Additionally, Lebanese Hizballah and their Iranian-backed Iraqi cohorts, operate advanced messaging and propaganda initiatives. In turn, this has allowed for them to successfully present their narratives and images to a wide audience.

Furthermore, there has been some criticism regarding the veracity and authenticity of the video clip. In part this is due to claims that the audio for the clip could not be verified and may be taken from other sources.
Nevertheless, after close analysis, this clip may be the first substantial video evidence demonstrating Lebanese Hizballah and/or other Shia militia (primarily staffed by Iraqis) groups in Syria of conducting blatant human rights abuses.

This piece will attempt to go through the evidence presented in the video by assessing the main data-points and other factors which have been at play in Shia militia circles and details found in the video:

• Uniforms, headbands, and ribbons worn by the fighters.
• The Lebanese accent of the shooters and those speaking
• The discussion of Iranian revolutionary concepts adopted by Hizballah.
• Trends in Hizballah and among fellow Iranian-backed Shia Islamist groups for filming and photographing dead rebels.
• Assessing where the video originated.
• An increase in the posting of brutal images featuring dead rebels by Shia Islamist groups in Syria.

A Rough Transcript of the Film

With the traffic from short wave radios and the lack of visible speech by particular fighters, the task of writing a highly accurate transcription was made somewhat difficult. Additionally, I did not write what was being said during the radio transmissions. Regardless, this is what could be picked-up:

Fighter to other militants: “Move it! Move it! Move it!” *The fighters run around a van to the vehicle’s trunk.* (0.01-0.05)

*Radio traffic* (0.05-0.14)

A chant from off camera: “fi sabil Allah” (0.11)

*The fighters pull what appear to be wounded men, most likely Syrians, from the back of a van or minibus. There’s heavy radio traffic obscuring what the fighters are saying.* (0.12-0.30)

A fighter says: “Fi sabil Allah” (0.20-0.21)

*Three men are pulled from the back of the van.* (0.20.-0.35)

*One of the men is immediately shot.* (0.35-0.37)

*Another man is pulled from the van.* (0.37-0.54) 

A supposed militant says: “Bring him down.” (Meaning a man from the back of the van). (0.44)

A more hushed voice chimes in and says: “Hold on! Wait! Wait!” (0.53-0.54)

*This man is shot multiple times in the head.* (0.57-1.01) 

Screaming voice off camera: “O guys!” (1.01)

Another fighter’s voice: “Enough” (1.02)

Said by another person (possibly the cameraman or a fighter to another fighter. Even added to the video’s context it can be viewed as a compliment or as sarcasm): “You’re a tough one.” (1.05-1.06) (some have speculated that the accent used is Syrian, still this section of speech is not definitive enough to be deemed Syrian).

One of the fighters: “That one is mine…The killer of the martyr Yahiya is mine!” (Meaning the fighter had selected a person on the ground to shoot) (1.06-1.10)

Another fighter says: “I am *inaudible* on my own (1.10-1.12)

In the background another fighter says: “Hizballah” (1.10-12)

Another voice (possibly a fighter): “Why are you using this rhetoric?” (1.12-1.13)   

*What appears to be wounded a man is pulled from the back of the van.* (1.11-1.16) 

Another Militant: “O! For the martyr Yahiya!” (1.16-1.19)

*Inaudible speech in background* (1.16-19)

A clearer voice says: “Come, come.” (1.16-1.19)

*The fighter who pulled down the man kicks him and is stopped by another militant.* (1.16-1.20)

Fighter referred to as ‘Hajj’ (speaking Lebanese dialect): “Wait. Wait. We are performing our taklif and we are not seeking personal vengeance.” *This fighter goes off camera and another comes to the fore and shoots the man on the ground.* (1:23-1:36)

Another fighter off-screen says: "fine, fine, Hajj. fi sabil Allah.” (1.28)

Another militant: "No! The martyr Yahiya! No!” (1.29-1.35)

*A rifle is fired by a militant who comes into frame at the man writhing on the ground* (1.35-1.38)

Off-screen militant: “Move it [“yallah”, in Lebanese slang], let’s go." (1.38-1.40)

Criticism of the Clip

Found on some pro-Assad and pro-Hizballah websites was a piece criticizing the movie by Mr. Ahmed M. Yassin. In an interesting twist, the author blames the Syrian army and/or the National Defense Forces (a Syrian state-supported militia-style group trained by Iran and Hizballah). He also correctly states that the actions of those in the video would constitute a war crime.

Yassin starts out by saying the radio transmissions are taken from a clip involving Hizballah fighters in Qusayr and their headquarters in May, 2013. These clips were provided in the article. When compared, it is extremely hard to tell whether there is any credibility to this criticism. Additionally, if the radio traffic was faked, that would necessitate the other audio sections were also added later. Still, the author does not come to this conclusion. Plus, the audio tends to match with the actions seen in the film.

Yassin added to this by claiming the uniforms seen in the video do not match the type worn by Hizballah. According to the author, this was due to the green and brown colors not being as “dark” as some previously utilized by Hizballah. An example from the 2006 Hizballah-Israel War is offered as supporting evidence for this claim. Additionally, the author also claims that the pants are not the same as those Hizballah. However, rationally speaking, it’s not hard, nor is it unheard of fighters (in professional or paramilitary organizations) altering their uniforms. (See explanation covering uniforms used by Hizballah and other Shia militias below).

The piece also stated that “fi sabil Allah” would not be used by an ideologically educated Hizballah fighter in the context of “killing” (a term used during the film) for Allah. Only “fighting” in a justified and sanctioned war for Allah (see explanation below regarding this phrase). Though, this minor linguistic distinction appears to be more about splitting hairs, rather than establishing the statements made in the video as spurious.

Where Did the Video Come From?

The clip was first uploaded to a YouTube account belonging to a website called NewLebanon.info. This site appears to present itself as a more independent (as opposed to being tied to the main Shia parties, Hizballah or Harakat Amal) Shia-oriented news provider in Lebanon.

After the video was posted, NewLebanon.info published a piece defending its authenticity. In it, they argued that even if the audio was added later, defenders of Hizballah had no explanation for the material shown in the video. This form of defense also leaves holes for further criticism, particularly regarding the images presented in the video. Essentially, NewLebanon.info’s case rests on the assumption the fighters shown were Hizballah members. However, with the little information available, sans audio, it would be impossible to confirm whether the fighters were from Hizballah or not.  

The Ayatollah’s New Clothes

Some viewers of the video have come to the conclusion that the fighters shown in the clip must be Hizballah members due to the presence of yellow ribbons tied to their battle fatigues. While this sounds like an argument based on an odd piece of minutia, Syrian rebel groups, their supporters, and onlookers have repeatedly stated that yellow ribbons are a clear identity marker for Hizballah members in Syria. 

Additionally, one of the fighters in the video is wearing a green headband as he drags wounded and possibly dead bodies from the back of a van. This may be another sign he may belong to a Shia organization.

It is true that the variety of Shia militia groups backing the Assad regime have been photographed and recorded wearing plain headbands or those featuring religious slogans (most often, they are colored black, green, red, or yellow).

Additionally, there is quite a lot of history of yellow ribbon decorations symbolizing Khomeinist causes. In the early 90s, Iranian protesters would go to Mecca and protest the U.S. and Israel wearing their yellow ribbons and bands.

More recently, Hizballah fighters have also been recorded in Syria with yellow-ribbons tied to their uniforms. In Lebanon, the group used yellow-ribbon wearing street-toughs when intimating and attacking their Shia opposition. Members of the Iranian-backed Iraqi Shia groups, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq and Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada, often feature their fighters in Syria wearing these types of adornments. Liwa’a ‘Ammar Ibn Yasir (see videos marked: “LAIY Fighters With A Captured Rebel & Engaged In Combat” and “LAIY Fighters Record Syrian Rebels They Killed”), another Shia militia group formed primarily from Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq and Kata’ib Hizballah members, has also been filmed with their members wearing green headbands featuring Shia religious slogans and yellow ribbons.

The emphasis on these color combinations has roots which trace back to Hizballah’s official party colors, yellow and green, which are featured on the group’s flag (though, in most occasions, yellow is more normally associated with Hizballah). Green also finds its place into the color spectrum of Shia Islamists since it is the color of Islam and the Ahl al-Bayt (the descendants of the Prophet Muhammed to whom Shia pay special devotion).

While markers such as these serve as interesting circumstantial evidence pointing to Lebanese Hizballah involvement, they are hardly enough to establish that fighters from Hizballah or Iraqi Shia militia members were in the video. Shia militia groups operating in Syria and militias directly controlled by the regime of Bashar al-Assad have donned many different styles of colored ribbons as identity markers. Members of Liwa’a al-Imam al-Hasan, a primarily Iraqi Shia militia which operates in conjunction with Hizballah in Rif Dimashq, has been recorded wearing red and yellow ribbons. Assad’s own Ba’ath Party militia, Kata’ib al-Ba’ath and the National Defense Forces have also been shown wearing red (in an ironic twist, the video link actually has a Lebanese Hizballah song playing in the background) and yellow ribbons.

Ribbons and headbands aside, there is also the issue of the taped fighters’ uniforms. The pattern, appears to be modeled off of or an actual U.S. M81 Woodland Pattern Battle Dress Uniform (BDU). This uniform type is seen quite regularly on Lebanese Hizballah members and with other Shia militiamen operating in Syria. Additionally, Woodland Pattern types are widely available across the Middle East. Hizballah’s main backer, Iran, has even manufactured its own varieties. This style of uniform is also commonly worn by Hizballah and other Shia militias fighting in Syria.  

Figure : A Kata'ib Sayyid Shuhada member in a Woodland Pattern-style BDU (covered in dust) and with a headband featuring a Shia slogan ("Husayn ya aba al-shuhada"or “Husayn O father of the martyrs”)

Figure : Lebanese Hizballah’s Mahdi Yaghi. His death in Syria was announced on October 1, 2013. Note his woodland pattern-style uniform and the headband. 

Figure : A Hizballah figher who was kiilled in September during a fight in Ba'albek, Lebanon. He too wears the woodland pattern-type camouflage.

Khomeinism Rears Its Head

Throughout the clip, “In the path of Allah” (“fi sabil Allah”, also transliterated as, “fi sabillah”) is said a number of times, underlining a religious message from executioners. In the context of the video, the phrase is used as another religious justification for the killings. While this phrase is important for Sunni and Shia Muslims alike, particularly those waging jihad, it has a special place in Hizballah propaganda and in the party’s background. One of Hizballah’s earliest songs, “Ya Aba Abdillah”, repeats the phrase as part of the lyrics. When Hizballah’s “martyrs” have been announced, the slogan finds its way into online commemorations. As a long-arm for Iran’s Islamic Revolution, the group itself is also cast as following “in the path of Allah”. Thus, the “Party of Allah”, is presented as executing his will on earth.

One of the filmed Hizballah members pauses to state the goals of the executions and possible chide another fighter who kicked a prisoner. In a very clear Lebanese accent he states, “We are performing our taklif and we are not seeking personal vengeance”. The mention of performance of a taklif is one of the most important sections of the video demonstrating these fighters likely originated from Hizballah.

In a June USA Today article which covered Hizballah’s involvement in Syria, a Hizballah fighter noted, "Everyone who is sent to fight in Syria has received a 'Taklif Sharii'". USA Today added the taklif sharii is “a religious command that means he will go to heaven if killed.” Nevertheless, the taklif sharii is more than just a religious edict which guarantees a martyred fighter’s spot in heavenly paradise. It is a religious obligation put forth by a cleric and must be followed. In fact, it is a form of religious ruling which underpins the Khomeinist ideology guiding Iran, Hizballah, and all of the main Iraqi Shia organizations sending militiamen to Syria.

Augustus Richard Norton noted that Hizballah’s adherence to taklif sharii is a theological legal ruling, “as though commanded by Allah”. According to Mohammed Sherri, an Al-Manar (Hizballah’s official TV channel) commentator, “once a taklif is issued, violating it is similar to any sin, like murder or adultery, or not praying or fasting.” In traditional Shi’ism, the taklif sharii was rarely issued and normally did not deal with political issues. The concept was actually revived as an important Shia idea by the father of Iran’s Revolution, Grand Ayatollah Khomeini and as an important support for his form of clerical rule, Wilayat al-Faqih (in Persian it’s known as Velayat e-Faqih). In effect, the issuing of a taklif sharii by a high ranking Shia cleric, in this case Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei—The “Spiritual leader” of Hizballah and the other Iraqi Shia groups, is a direct order coming from Allah.

Prior to and during the Iraq War (2003), Iran facilitated the creation of so-called, “special groups” and political organizations loyal to Wilayat al-Faqih. Hizballah is also a firm supporter of the Wilayat al-Faqih ideology. Iraq’s “special groups” of yesteryear are now fully formed political and militant organizations. Included among these organizations are Iraq’s Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, Kata’ib Hizballah, the Badr Organization, and Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada—All suppliers of Shia fighters to Syria.

Journalist Nicholas Blanford notes that new Hizballah members, “absorb the principles of the Islamic revolution in Iran, obedience to the wali al-faqih [the head of an Islamic state, according to the system of wilayat al-faqih, which holds that the preeminent religious authority should be the supreme ruler]”. The same is true for these Iraqi Shia fighters who cooperate with Hizballah in Syria.

All of these organizations received a takif sharii from Iranian and higher-level local clerics to fight in Syria. Thus, this concept’s appearance in the clip’s dialogue underlines that the fighters are not simply “Shia volunteers”, but ideologically trained fighters.

The Propaganda of Brutality

Ideology is not the only factor pointing to Hizballah’s involvement in the video. Staged photographs featuring dead rebel fighters is also hardly a new form of propaganda for Hizballah and allied Shia Islamist organizations. In fact, a prominent face for Hizballah “martyrdom” in Syria, Hajj Ali Jamal al-Jashi (A.K.A. Haidar) was filmed prior to his death (announced in April, 2013) posing next dead rebel fighters (it’s important to note that the footage seen after Jashi is shown supposedly comes from a Hizballah “night time ambush” in Syria in September).

The message presented is clear, the rebels are being “punished” (a common term on Shia militia social media on captions for dead rebels) for daring to oppose the “Resistance” of Hizballah and its allied regional organizations. Still, Hizballah and their social media sites do not often post the more graphic varieties photographs of dead rebels and has rarely posted photographs of its fighters with the dead. Nevertheless, this is not the case for other Iraqi Shia organizations fighting in Syria and the posting of these types of photos onto Shia Islamist social media has been an increasing trend.

The executions also bear a striking resemblance to photographs released by other allied Shia militia organizations. In some respects, it can be argued that Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada has almost fetishized the posting of gruesome photographs of dead rebels, at times featuring piles of dead, and of their own fighters posing with the bodies (see the section marked, “Gruesome Uploads: KSS Promotes Their Kills”). Nearly 20 percent (37) of the 207 photographs posted by Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada’s official Facebook page are of dead rebels. Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq also occasionally posts photographs of dead rebels. In April and May, Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas also posted graphic photographs of their dead enemies. These same pictures have circulated around social media circles which promote Shia Islamist militias in Syria.

Since piles of dead bodies are often photographed together in open fields and other areas, it can be assumed they have been piled there and then photographed. This allows for Hizballah and their allied organizations to issue a more effective message. With these photos, they can bluntly demonstrate they are having success in the field and that they have contempt for their enemies.  

Figure : This photograph purportedly shows a member of Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas stepping on the head of a captured Syrian rebel. The picture has circulated on pro-Shia militia social media pages since April. 

Figure : Another photograph posted in April supposedly showing Liwa'a Abu Fadl al-Abbas members standing over a dead rebel. This is a newer version of the photo with a new logo posted in the upper-right corner.

Figure : Two Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada militiamen pose with the bodies of dead rebels. One of the Shia militiamen has his boot on the face of a dead rebel.

Figure : Another photo supposedly showing a Shia militiaman with his foot on the body of a "Nusra Front terrorist" in Damascus.

Extremely graphic - Figure : A Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada photograph of a rebel with his ribcage blown open. The caption for this picture included a, "Hahahahahaha".

Figure : Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq's Liwa'a Kafil Zaynab (AAH-LKZ) posted this and a number of photos featuring killed rebels and using them as examples of AAH-LKZ’s combat effectiveness.

Figure : A photo of dead rebel bodies from a pro-Shia militia Facebook page. The picture is credited to Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada. However, it has been posted by other Shia miitia groups.

Conclusion

Attempting to conclude which organization the militants in the video came from, based simply on their uniforms and ribbons, is a futile exercise. This is particularly the case in Syria where weapons systems, uniforms, and a wide variety of equipment can and has easily traded hands.

However, when placed in a wider context with the fighters speaking in Lebanese accents and discussing important Khomeinist ideological concepts (which are of key importance to Hizballah) helps establish the possibility that fighters from Hizballah were involved. Since Hizballah and its allied organizations have taken to posting brutal imagery, featuring piles of dead rebel fighters, the clip may have shown what could have been a prelude to posts of that nature or another example (this time, involving Shia fighters) of a heightened level of brutality present in Syria.

Unfortunately, as with many YouTube clips emanating from Syria, more evidence is needed to make a definitive calls about the clip in question. Though, based on the large amount of circumstantial data, it is highly likely these were Hizballah fighters executing a number of men.